EBERENZ (ROBERT F.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY SUPREME COURT:
JANUARY 14, 2009
(FILE NO. 2008-SC-0494-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000349-MR
ROBERT F. EBERENZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00128
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Robert F. Eberenz presents two claims for relief from his
conviction of First Degree Fleeing or Evading as well as First Degree Wanton
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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Endangerment. His first claim is that his conviction of having committed both
offenses constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. The second claim is that the trial court committed a due process
violation by failing to grant his motion for directed verdict, by which he claimed
the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him. We see no
merit in either of Eberenz’s arguments and, therefore, affirm the convictions.
Double Jeopardy Claim
With regard to the first claim, that of double jeopardy, the court agrees
with Eberenz that failure to object to double jeopardy at trial does not waive the
right to raise the issue on appeal. Sherley v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 615, 618
(Ky. 1977). Furthermore, Eberenz and the Commonwealth agree that the pertinent
law regarding double jeopardy is found in Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d
805 (Ky. 1996), which uses the “additional fact” analysis from Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Burge at 809-11. The determination to
be made is “whether the act or transaction complained of constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutes and, if it does, if each statute requires proof of a fact the other
does not.” Id. at 811. The parties disagree, however, as to how this rule of law
applies to the offenses of First Degree Fleeing or Evading and First Degree
Wanton Endangerment.
Eberenz was convicted of Fleeing or Evading under KRS
520.095(1)(a)(4). The pertinent section reads as follows:
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(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the
first degree:
(a) When, while operating a motor vehicle with intent to
elude or flee, the person knowingly or wantonly disobeys
a direction to stop his or her motor vehicle, given by a
person recognized to be a police officer, and at least one
(1) of the following conditions exists . . . .
4. By fleeing or eluding, the person is the cause, or
creates substantial risk, of serious physical injury or
death to any person or property . . . .
KRS 520.095(1)(a)(4).
Eberenz was also convicted of Wanton Endangerment in the First
Degree under KRS 508.060.
(1) A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first
degree when, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, he wantonly engages
in conduct which creates a substantial danger of death or
serious physical injury to another person.
KRS 508.060.
The statutes are similar in some ways. It is clear, however, that the
offense of Fleeing or Evading contains elements that Wanton Endangerment does
not – at a minimum, in this context, it requires operation of a motor vehicle and
disobeying a direction to stop given by one recognized to be a police officer.
The major point of contention, then, is whether the offense of Wanton
Endangerment contains an element not present in the offense of Fleeing or
Evading. The Commonwealth maintains that the phrase “under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” in KRS 508.060
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constitutes an independent element not present in KRS 520.095(1)(a)(4). We
agree.
In Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003), our Supreme
Court discussed the origin and parses the language of the Fleeing or Evading
statutes in some detail. Bell at 495-96. The most significant aspect of Bell for our
purposes is that it explicitly points out that Kentucky recognizes a state of
“aggravated wantonness” when someone acts “under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life,” and that this is different from
being merely “wanton.” Id. at 496.
How to practically differentiate between mere wantonness and
“aggravated” wantonness is a thornier problem. A “wanton act” is itself defined as
“[o]ne done in reckless disregard of the rights of others, evincing a reckless
indifference to consequences to the life, or limb, or health, or reputation or
property rights of another[.]” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1419 (5th ed.
1979)(emphasis added). How well or accurately one can measure degrees of
indifference to human life is a difficult question, but fortunately it is not necessary
to determine that here. The question before this court is whether the language of
“under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”
constitutes a separate element of First Degree Wanton Endangerment for double
jeopardy purposes.
The assault statutes, KRS 508.010 and 508.020, offer a similar
“wantonness” language distinction. First Degree Assault, KRS 508.010(1)(b), may
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be charged when, “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life [the accused] wantonly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes serious physical injury to another
person.” (Emphasis added). By comparison, one provision of second degree
assault, KRS 508.020(1)(c), provides that the accused is guilty when “[h]e
wantonly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument.” (Emphasis added). The degree of wantonness
is not the only difference between the cited provisions, but it seems clear that the
legislature does intend a difference by the enhancement in the wantonness
language. The courts are bound to give meaning to every part of a statute, in
particular where legislative intent seems clear. And so, we must do so here.
To our knowledge, there are no published cases dealing explicitly
with this question. The Court of Appeals, however, has rendered several
unpublished decisions addressing the issue. Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.28, we are now permitted to cite such cases for consideration if
there are no published opinions that address the same issue.
In Pinkston v. Commonwealth, 2004 WL 595647 (Ky.App. Mar. 26,
2004)(No. 2001-CA-002552-MR), review denied (Ky. Sep. 16, 2004), this Court
initially held that simultaneous convictions for First Degree Fleeing or Evading,
Second Offense DUI, and First Degree Wanton Endangerment did constitute
double jeopardy. Pinkston v. Commonwealth, 2003 WL 2003813 (Ky.App. May
02, 2003)(No. 2001-CA-002552-MR), review granted (Feb. 11, 2004). However,
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the Supreme Court vacated that decision, remanding it for reconsideration in light
of Bell. On remand, we stated that, “[f]rom our reading of Bell, we see that the
first-degree wanton endangerment conviction should not have been reversed and
thus order that said conviction be reinstated.”
In Gray v. Commonwealth, 2004 WL 2315193 (Ky.App. Oct. 15,
2004) (No. 2003-CA-000648-MR), review denied (Sep. 14, 2005), we reached the
same conclusion reached in Pinkston.
To prove wanton endangerment, the Commonwealth
must prove that the accused manifested an extreme
indifference to the value of human life. Fleeing or
evading does not contain this element. As can be seen,
fleeing or evading requires proof of three additional
elements that wanton endangerment does not. Wanton
endangerment requires proof of one additional element
that fleeing or evading does not. Therefore, double
jeopardy did not prohibit the Commonwealth from
prosecuting Gray for both charges.
Finally, we recently decided Butcher v. Commonwealth, 2007 WL
2894213 (Ky.App. Oct. 5, 2007)(No. 2006-CA-000989-MR), in which we held
that First Degree Wanton Endangerment contained a separate element, namely that
it “requires proof that the defendant manifested an extreme indifference to the
value of human life by wantonly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk
of death or injury to another person.”
The frequency with which this issue repeatedly arises in our courts
should have called for the publication of authority on this issue prior to now.
Previous publication may have eliminated doubt in the minds of appellants who
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subsequently challenged their convictions based on this issue. But because these
unpublished opinions are only the fringe and not part of the warp and woof of our
jurisprudence, Eberenz was perfectly justified in bringing us this very same issue
for at least the fourth time.
We therefore hold again that convictions on both First Degree Fleeing
or Evading and First Degree Wanton Endangerment will not trigger double
jeopardy, as each offense contains at least one element not present in the other.
Insufficient Evidence Claim
Eberenz appeals on a second ground, stating that it was reversible
error to deny his motion for directed verdict. We cannot agree. Our standard of
review on appeal of the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is
whether, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for the jury to find the defendant guilty of the indicated offense.
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983). Eberenz posits that there
is no substantial evidence in this case to support his conviction, provided of course
that we completely ignore the testimony of the police officer involved, Officer
Cox. But we cannot ignore such testimony where the officer’s credibility was
assessed by the jury and appropriately found to be worthy of consideration.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 880 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Ky. 1994), citing Commonwealth
v. Bivins, 740 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1987). In this case, the jury believed Officer
Cox, and that evidence is substantial enough to convict Eberenz.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy A. Durham, II
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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