MOORE (HARRY V.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000289-MR
HARRY V. MOORE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00380
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Harry V. Moore appeals the Henderson Circuit Court’s order
denying his RCr2 11.42 motion to alter, amend, or vacate his sentence. After a
careful review of the record, we affirm.
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Moore was indicted on charges of first-degree robbery and theft by
unlawful taking, over $300. Specifically, the indictment charged as follows:
Count 1
That on or about October 22, 2003, in Henderson
County, Kentucky, the Defendant, Harry Vinson Moore,
committed the offense of First Degree Robbery by
pushing and kicking Brenda Sutton, spraying her with
pepper spray, gagging her thereby causing her physical
injury and threatening to kill her while in the course of
committing a theft at the National Check Advance;
Count 2
That on or about October 22, 2003, in Henderson
County, Kentucky, the Defendant committed the offense
of Theft By Unlawful Taking Over $300 by taking a
Chevrolet Lumina van owned by Brenda Sutton with a
value of over $300.
Moore moved for a competency evaluation, and his motion was
granted. An evaluation for competency and criminal responsibility was conducted
by Dr. Robert Sivley, Jr., of the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC).
Dr. Sivley reported that Moore had a significant mental health history, due to two
suicide attempts. Dr. Sivley conducted tests on Moore. He ultimately concluded
that Moore was mildly mentally retarded; suffered from “depression, anxiety,
and/or psychosis.” Dr. Sivley reported that the severity of these conditions was
difficult to determine because Moore had not been “truthful in reporting his
symptoms.” According to Dr. Sivley, there was insufficient “evidence”3 to
Because “evidence” was the term that Dr. Sivley used in his report, we will use that term in
this opinion.
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conclude that at the time Moore committed the alleged crimes, he was unable to
comprehend the illegality of his actions or to conform “his behavior to the
requirements of the law.” As for Moore’s competency to stand trial, Dr. Sivley
reported that: Moore “demonstrated a good understanding of litigation principles
in general and the roles of the various principals involved in the litigation process”;
he understood what a plea bargain was; he knew and understood the charges
against him; and he had the “basic knowledge to comprehend legal decisions and
to participate rationally in his own defense.” Dr. Sivley stated that Moore
appeared to have some absence of motivation, but it was difficult to determine
whether this “lack of motivation could reduce, if any, his ability to assist his
attorney in his own defense.” However, Dr. Sivley opined that Moore had “the
capability to participate rationally in his own defense.”
An abbreviated competency hearing was held, wherein Dr. Sivley’s
competency evaluation report was reviewed. Moore’s attorney did not present any
witnesses at the hearing, but he advised the circuit court that it may want to review
the report more thoroughly. The circuit court found that Moore was competent,
and Moore entered a guilty plea during that same proceeding. He was sentenced to
serve fifteen years on count one of the indictment and, on count two, he was
sentenced to serve five years, to run concurrently to his sentence for count one.
Moore filed his RCr 11.42 motion, alleging that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel for various reasons, and requesting an evidentiary
hearing. The circuit court denied Moore’s request for an evidentiary hearing
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because it determined it could resolve his RCr 11.42 claims on the record. As for
Moore’s RCr 11.42 motion, the circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that
Moore’s claims lacked merit.
Moore now appeals, claiming as follows: (1) he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to request a full
competency hearing and question Dr. Sivley about his evaluation report; (2) he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to investigate
Moore’s mental health history further; (3) he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel due to counsel’s failure to “protect” him from double jeopardy when
Moore was convicted of both robbery and theft; and (4) the circuit court should
have held an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion brought under RCr 11.42 “is limited to issues that were not
and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191
S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006). “An issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may
not be relitigated in this type of proceeding by simply claiming that it amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. “The movant has the burden of establishing
convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right which would
justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction proceeding. . . . A
reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts and witness
credibility made by the circuit judge.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
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A. CLAIM THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE DUE TO FAILURE TO
REQUEST FULL COMPETENCY HEARING AND QUESTION DR.
SIVLEY
Moore first alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel due to counsel’s failure to request a full competency hearing and to
question Dr. Sivley about his evaluation report. To prove that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel, thus warranting a reversal of his conviction,
Moore must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
outside “the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”; and (2) this
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Because an abbreviated competency hearing was conducted, in which
the court thoroughly reviewed Dr. Sivley’s competency evaluation report, and Dr.
Sivley’s report concluded that Moore was competent to stand trial, Moore cannot
show that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a full
competency hearing and by failing to question Dr. Sivley. See id. Therefore, this
claim lacks merit.
B. CLAIM THAT COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
DUE TO FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY
Moore next asserts that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to investigate Moore’s mental health history. Moore contends
that he did not have the mental capacity to commit the crime, so he was not
culpable.
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Although Dr. Sivley’s report concluded that Moore suffered from
“depression, anxiety, and/or psychosis,” the severity of these conditions was
difficult to determine because Moore had been dishonest in reporting his
symptoms. Additionally, Dr. Sivley reported that there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that at the time Moore committed the alleged crimes, he was unable to
comprehend the illegality of his actions or to conform “his behavior to the
requirements of the law.”
Because Dr. Sivley’s report provided that there was not enough
evidence to show that Moore was unable to comprehend the illegality of his actions
or to conform his behavior to the law, Moore cannot show that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to further investigate his mental health history.
This is because Moore has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient by failing to conduct this investigation or that his defense was prejudiced
to the extent that the result of the trial court’s proceedings would have been
different if counsel had conducted this investigation. See id. Therefore, this claim
lacks merit.
C. CLAIM THAT COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
BY FAILING TO PROTECT MOORE FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Moore next contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
due to counsel’s failure to “protect” him from double jeopardy when Moore was
convicted of both robbery and theft.4 The offense of robbery is a combination of
We note that this claim was not preserved for appeal. Nevertheless, we find that this claim
lacks merit.
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the offenses of theft and assault. See Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 38
(Ky. 2002). When a person is convicted of both robbery and theft, and the facts
supporting the separate theft conviction are the same facts used to support the theft
aspect of the robbery conviction, the person has been subjected to a double
jeopardy violation. See McKee v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Ky. App.
1986).
Moore asserts that, because he was convicted of robbery and theft, his
right against double jeopardy has been violated. However, his argument is
misplaced. The facts supporting Moore’s robbery conviction, as charged in the
indictment and alleged in the criminal complaint, were that Moore went into the
National Check Advance’s place of business, pushed and kicked an employee of
the business, sprayed her with pepper spray, gagged her, and threatened to kill her,
then he stole money from the business. Thus, the theft aspect of the robbery
conviction was that Moore took money from the business.
Moore then left the business and stole the employee’s van. According
to the indictment, this was the act forming the basis for the separate theft charge
against Moore. Therefore, the events supporting the theft aspect of the robbery
conviction were not the same events as those used to support the separate theft
conviction. The theft of the money from the National Check Advance and the theft
of the van were two separate thefts, and there was no double jeopardy violation
when Moore was convicted of both robbery and theft.
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Alternatively, although the business’s employee happened to be at the
place of business, acting as the business’s agent at the time of the robbery, the cash
stolen at the business was not her personal money. However, the theft of her car
was a crime against her personally, and it was a separate act of theft. Thus, the
theft of the money supporting the robbery conviction and the theft of the van were
separate crimes and double jeopardy does not attach.
Moreover, under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the question is “whether the act or
transaction complained of constitutes a violation of two distinct statutes and, if it
does, if each statute requires proof of a fact the other does not.” Commonwealth v.
Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996). Moore’s robbery conviction required
proof that threats or force were used to obtain the money from the business. In
turn, his conviction for theft by unlawful taking of property worth more than $300
required proof that the vehicle stolen was valued at greater than $300. Therefore,
both the robbery and the theft convictions required proof of a fact that the other did
not, and Moore’s convictions for robbery and theft did not violate double jeopardy.
Consequently, this claim lacks merit, because Moore cannot prove
that his counsel acted deficiently in failing to raise a meritless double jeopardy
challenge.
D. CLAIM CONCERNING DENIAL OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Finally, Moore alleges that the circuit court should have granted his
request for an evidentiary hearing concerning his RCr 11.42 claims. Pursuant to
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RCr 11.42(5), if there is “a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the
face of the record [,] the court shall grant a prompt hearing. . . .” In the present
case, because the circuit court determined that Moore’s claims could be resolved
by examining the record, the court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, after “the trial court denies a motion for an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of allegations raised in a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, our
review is limited to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the
conviction.” Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, all of Moore’s claims were conclusively refuted
by the record. Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying his request for an
evidentiary hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the order of the Henderson Circuit Court is affirmed.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING. I concur with
the majority opinion, but I respectfully disagree with its analysis of the double
jeopardy issue.
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Moore claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his attorney allowed him to plead guilty to both robbery and theft in
violation of double jeopardy principles. He concedes that the issue was not raised
before the trial court, but he contends that double jeopardy claims are not waived
even though they weren’t raised at the trial level. See Baker v. Commonwealth,
922 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Ky. 1996).
Moore’s argument, however, is not that the trial court erred in
violating double jeopardy principles. Rather, his claim is that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel. I conclude that the Baker case is not applicable
and that the argument raised here was waived due to Moore’s failure to raise it
before the trial court. Thus, I agree with the majority that the issue was not
properly before us. I would affirm for that reason.
However, I disagree with the majority on the issue of whether
Moore’s robbery and theft convictions in this case violate double jeopardy
principles. I believe that Jordan v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Ky.
1985), is on point. In my view, the facts in Jordan are practically identical to those
herein. Had Moore properly raised the issue to the trial court, I believe he would
have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether there was
ineffective assistance of counsel because Moore pleaded guilty to both robbery and
theft, which, in my view, violates double jeopardy principles.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harry Vinson Moore
Pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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