WILLIAMS (RONALD EARL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000276-MR
RONALD EARL WILLIAMS, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-001844
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: On April 21, 2003, Ronald Earl Williams, Jr. entered
a non-conditional plea of guilty to one count each of murder and kidnapping and to
two counts of first-degree robbery, resulting from the kidnapping, robbery and
murder of Keith Alexander and the robbery of Terrance Huguley. On July 10,
2003, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 25
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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years. He appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s denial of his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence. The grounds Williams has stated for the motion are that his defense
counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain a hearing to determine whether
Williams was competent to enter his plea; that counsel failed to reasonably
investigate his case; that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors must be
considered and that the circuit court erred by failing to appoint counsel for
Williams and to hold a hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion. We find no error and
affirm.
As an initial matter, our review of the videotaped and written record
confirms the finding of the circuit court that on its face, Williams’ plea was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent as required by all applicable law. Williams
however alleges that his counsel was so ineffective that his plea was thereby
rendered involuntary. We have explained the standard for evaluating whether
Williams has carried his burden in such a review as follows:
A showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective in
enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal
alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two
components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome
of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would
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not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going
to trial.
Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky.App. 1986) (internal
citation omitted).
In this case as in Sparks a jury trial was in progress when the
defendant decided to accept the Commonwealth’s offer and change his plea to
guilty. Williams’ first allegation is that his counsel was ineffective by failing to
obtain a hearing to determine whether or not Williams was competent to stand
trial. By Williams’ own admission his competency and IQ were evaluated three
times and each time Williams was found to be competent. During the first two
examinations Williams was found to have an IQ below 70, but as his counsel
admitted during the guilty plea colloquy, the examiner was of the opinion that each
of those times Williams was malingering. On the third evaluation with an
acceptable level of effort Williams was found to have an IQ of 75. The circuit
court held a competency hearing on March 11, 2002, and entered an order finding
Williams to be competent to stand trial based upon the court’s review of records
and the testimony of Dr. Simon at the hearing.
Williams’ argument here seems to be that Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) Chapter 504 requires that he be given another competency hearing prior to
his guilty plea. Williams does not refer us to the specific section of the statute
upon which he relies for this proposition, and we can find none. In short this
argument is devoid of merit and factually misleading. Once a defendant’s mental
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competency has been determined “there is no right to a continual succession of
competency hearings in the absence of some new factor” reasonably indicating a
need for a new hearing. Harston v. Commonwealth, 638 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky.
1982); accord, Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1990). Williams
has not shown the existence of any such factor here.
Williams’ next argument is that his counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance because he failed to adequately prepare and investigate the
case, and failed to prepare Williams himself for trial. In order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must satisfy a two-part test by
showing: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency
resulted in actual prejudice affecting the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985). Establishing prejudice requires showing
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
The short answer to this argument is that Williams pleaded guilty and
thereby waived his ineffective assistance claims, so long as the plea was
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456
S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1970). Nevertheless we examined the record for any evidence to
support Williams’ allegations that his counsel failed to investigate and prepare, and
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found none. The evidence of Williams’ guilt was overwhelming, including
Williams’ statement to police admitting the shooting, the statement of Terrance
Huguley, and the statement of Williams’ girlfriend Kesha Pendleton, to whom he
admitted that he had killed a man and taken his money. The Commonwealth
intended to show that Williams robbed Huguley and Alexander because he needed
money to procure an abortion for Pendleton; indeed, Pendleton said in her
statement that Williams told her he had the money for the abortion after the
robbery. Williams contends that his counsel failed to sufficiently investigate his
claims that he shot the victim in self-defense, but no evidence supported his claim.
Alexander’s body was found behind the steering wheel of his car with one gunshot
wound to the back of his head. The Commonwealth’s witnesses had given
recorded statements prior to trial, and their testimony would have been damaging
and difficult to rebut. The Commonwealth was poised to portray a scenario of
Williams, needing money for an abortion, kidnapping Alexander, forcing him to
drive to a secluded location, robbing him and then executing him in cold blood
with a pistol shot to the back of the head. With no evidence except the possibility
of Williams’ self-serving testimony upon which to build a self-defense case, it
would be an ineffective lawyer indeed who would not advise his client of a very
high likelihood of receiving the death penalty.
Given all the circumstances the record does not bear out Williams’
claims that his counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. Williams’ counsel
filed discovery requests and filed several motions to have Williams’ competency
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determined. He filed a motion to suppress Williams’ statement to the police. He
filed Williams’ Jefferson County Public School records and other documents, and
filed a motion to exclude the death penalty due to Williams’ supposed low IQ and
lack of competency. He and his co-counsel were ready for trial and in fact
commenced the trial before Williams decided to change his plea. After the plea
was entered and even after Williams had filed a bar complaint against him, at
Williams’ request his counsel filed and argued a motion to set aside the guilty plea,
and then represented Williams at sentencing. We found nothing in this record to
suggest that counsel’s performance was substandard. As Williams has failed to
direct us to any such proof in the record we presume that counsel’s performance
fell within the wide range of what is considered effective assistance. See Baze v.
Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Ky. 2000). There was no error.
Williams argues that if the separate errors he has alleged his counsel
committed are not found to be reversible we should consider their effect in the
aggregate, citing Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 2001) and other
Federal cases. Having found no errors by counsel we need not consider this
argument.
In his reply brief Williams “retracted” his claim that the trial court
failed to appoint counsel to represent him on this 11.42 proceeding, saying that the
claim was “inadvertent” and that what he meant to say was that the court erred by
not granting an evidentiary hearing. In fact he attempted to make both claims in
his brief. It appears that confusion has been caused by Williams’ practice of
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repeatedly filing pro se pleadings with the assistance of inmate legal aides while
simultaneously requesting the assistance of appointed counsel. In any event the
claim that the court failed to appoint counsel is false. To the contrary, the record
indicates that the circuit court has, to date, never denied any of Williams’ forma
pauperis motions or his motions for appointment of counsel, and has appointed
counsel for Williams on four different occasions.
Finally Williams argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant an
evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion. We have reviewed the entire record
and we find no grounds to disturb the trial court’s finding that both the issues
raised by Williams and the voluntariness of his plea can be fully determined by
reference to the record, and therefore no evidentiary hearing was required. We
have discussed the issues above. Williams’ demeanor on the videotape of his
guilty plea gives no indication of anything amiss. When accepting the plea, the
court placed Williams under oath and very carefully and patiently explained his
rights and the consequences of his plea. Williams testified that his plea was
voluntary, that he understood the terms of the plea and its consequences, and that
he was pleading guilty because he is guilty. Neither Williams nor his counsel
stated any reason why his plea should not be accepted. The terms of his plea were
stated and explained to him verbally and in writing. He signed the plea papers.
His demeanor at the time of his plea appeared normal. According to statements
made on the videotape of the sentencing hearing Williams discussed the plea with
his counsel and with family members at length before pleading guilty. Given the
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charges, the evidence and the possible penalty it certainly cannot be said that
pleading guilty was not a reasonable and sensible choice for Williams. If
Williams’ own sworn testimony and the statements of his counsel are trustworthy,
then the plea was voluntary and intelligent. We find no error. See Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993); see also Sparks, 721 S.W.2d
at 727.
The Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ronald E. Williams, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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