FULTZ (DOUGLAS R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000203-MR
DOUGLAS R. FULTZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCLEAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted Douglas Ray Fultz
(Fultz) of manslaughter in the second degree and recommended a sentence of ten
years’ imprisonment. The trial court entered a consistent judgment and it is from
this jury verdict and judgment that Fultz appeals. In his appeal, Fultz argues that
the trial court erred when it: (1) did not permit a witness to testify that Fultz had
said he thought the victim was involved in terrorist activities; (2) it permitted the
Commonwealth to argue that Fultz was not acting in self-defense, but was simply
paranoid; (3) it did not admonish the jury to refrain from interpreting a witness’s
reluctance to testify as evidence that the witness was afraid of Fultz; (4) it failed to
hold a hearing to determine whether that witness had the “capacity for recollection
and expression;” (5) it failed to give a “missing evidence” instruction to the jury;
and (6) it failed to hold a hearing to determine if the jury had been tainted by
observing a juror eating lunch with a deputy sheriff. Finally, Fultz argues that
these errors, cumulatively, resulted in “manifest injustice” adversely affecting his
right to a fair trial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
On December 11, 2005, Fultz shot Spyridon Armenis (Armenis).
Armenis died five weeks later as a result of his gunshot wound. The shooting was
the culmination of several months of discord among Armenis, Fultz, and several
others. We will outline the history of that discord below, and will set forth
additional facts as we address the issues raised by Fultz.
Armenis leased property in McClean County that contained an oil
field (the Taylor farm). Because the oil wells were not operational, Armenis and
Alen Guyan (Guyan) entered into an agreement for Guyan to repair the motors,
pumps, and other infrastructure related to the oil field. Guyan brought Fultz to the
Taylor farm to supervise and perform the rehabilitation work. During the summer
of 2005, Armenis became dissatisfied with the progress of the rehabilitation work
so he asked his nephew, Theodore Simeonidis (Simeonidis), to come to western
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Kentucky to help Fultz. Simeonidis agreed and brought a friend, Ashley, with him.
Initially, Fultz, Simeonidis, and Ashley lived in trailers on the Taylor farm within
close proximity to each other, and had a friendly relationship.
During the summer of 2005, Guyan and Armenis traveled to Europe
together. After they returned, their relationship became strained, and Guyan told
Armenis that he no longer wanted to be associated with Armenis. Guyan also
stated that he intended to purchase the Taylor farm, which he ultimately did, thus
making Armenis his lessee. At the same time, the relationship between Fultz and
Simeonidis also became strained, with Fultz siding with Guyan and Simeonidis
siding with his uncle.
We note that, on two occasions, police officers were called to
investigate and/or handle disputes among Fultz, Guyan, Armenis, and Simeonidis.
In October of 2005, Kentucky State Police Trooper Trevor Scott (Trooper Scott)
investigated a complaint by Armenis that Fultz had threatened him and was
destroying property in the oil field. After speaking with Armenis, Fultz, and
others, Trooper Scott advised Fultz and Armenis that their disputes were not
criminal in nature and should be dealt with civilly.
In November of 2005, McClean County Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Palmer
(Deputy Palmer) responded to a complaint that “there was going to be a shooting”
on the Taylor farm. Deputy Palmer testified that Armenis wanted him and other
officers to evict Fultz from the Taylor farm, stating that if something was not done,
there would be a shooting. Officer Palmer advised the parties, as had Trooper
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Scott, that their issues were civil in nature not criminal. We note that during
Palmer’s investigation, Fultz stated that Armenis had threatened to kill him.
In addition to complaining to Deputy Palmer that Armenis had
threatened to kill him, Fultz also complained to Harold Ashcraft, Guyan, FBI
Agent Jerry Garner (Agent Garner), attorney Harold Mathison, and Robbie
Edmonds that Armenis had threatened him and that he was afraid of Armenis.
On December 11, 2005, Fultz discovered that a water line to his trailer
had frozen and burst. After he repaired the water line, Fultz drove from his trailer
to some storage tanks that were seven-tenths of a mile away so that he could turn
on the water. While Fultz was by the storage tanks, two neighbors, Phillip
Willoughby (Willoughby) and his daughter, drove up on a four wheeler. Fultz and
Willoughby were having a friendly discussion when Armenis and his wife drove
up to the storage tanks. Armenis got out of the car and walked toward Fultz,
demanding to know what Fultz was doing by the storage tanks. Fultz advised
Armenis that it was none of his business and moved away from Armenis. Armenis
continued to approach Fultz, who testified that he felt trapped and feared for his
life. Fultz further testified that Armenis reached under his coat, as if trying to get a
gun, and Fultz shot Armenis in the chest. During their investigation, the police did
not find any gun in Armenis’s possession. We will set forth additional facts, as
necessary, below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Because it differs for each of the issues raised by Fultz, we will
address the standard of review as we analyze those issues.
ANALYSIS
A. Terrorist Activity Testimony
Prior to trial, the court ruled that Fultz would not be permitted to
submit testimony from Agent Garner that Fultz and Guyan had complained to him
that they believed that Armenis was engaged in terrorist activities. In doing so, the
court found that such testimony was not relevant.
At trial, Fultz asserted that he shot Armenis in self-defense because he
feared for his life. In support of that defense, Fultz offered testimony from Agent
Garner, who testified that he met with Guyan and Fultz on October 24, 2005.
Guyan and Fultz complained to Agent Garner that they feared for their safety and
made allegations that Armenis was involved in fraudulent activities. When Agent
Garner testified that Guyan and Fultz questioned whether Armenis was engaged in
terrorist activities, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection and
admonished the jurors to ignore any testimony regarding fraudulent activities and
terrorism.
Fultz argues that his belief that Armenis was involved in terrorist
activities was relevant to establish the magnitude of his fear, and that the trial
court’s refusal to permit testimony regarding that belief was prejudicial to his
defense. In reviewing this issue, we note that “[a] trial judge’s decision with
respect to relevancy of evidence under KRE 401 and 403 is reviewed under an
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abuse of discretion standard.” Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ky.
2001).
Having reviewed the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
trial court. In doing so, we note that Fultz was entitled to put forth evidence to
show that he feared Armenis and that he was acting in self-defense. Saylor v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Ky. 2004). Fultz put forth such evidence
with his testimony and the testimony of Guyan, Ashcraft, Edmonds, and Mathison.
Furthermore, although the court prohibited Agent Garner from mentioning
terrorism, both Fultz and Guyan testified that Armenis stated that he could have
them killed by “the Chinese,” “the Russians,” or “the militia,” clearly raising the
specter of terrorist activities without specifically mentioning that word.
Finally, we note that Fultz’s entitlement to introduce evidence to
support his self-defense claim is not limitless. KRE 403 provides that relevant
evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” In his
brief, Fultz argues that “[m]ost people remember the bombing of the Murrah
Building in Oklahoma City . . . . [w]hat happened on September 11, 2001” and
that “[o]ne of the common refrains in the Global War on Terrorism is that the
United States must fight the war ‘over there’ or else terrorists will be ‘over here’
. . . .” This argument reflects the exact confusion of the issues and undue prejudice
that the trial court was attempting to avoid by barring any direct mention of
terrorism. There was no proof that Armenis was involved in any illegal activities,
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let alone terrorist activities. In light of that, the introduction of “terrorism” into the
trial would have epitomized the very wrongs KRE 403 attempts to avoid.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly excluded any mention of terrorism.
B. Closing Argument
When recalling the day of the shooting, Fultz testified that, after he
shot Armenis, he kept an eye on Willoughby, because he did not know “whose
side” Willoughby would take. During closing argument, the Commonwealth’s
attorney stated “thank goodness a man can’t come up with things in his own mind
– paranoia – and be relieved of responsibility because he thought, and that thought
process was wrong.” He then stated:
[w]e were one instant away from having two victims in
this case – the same paranoia. Mr. Willoughby, who he
had had conversations with the defendant before – after
he shoots Mr. Armenis in the chest, what is his thought
process? – I knew [Mr. Willoughby] was a Vietnam vet.
I didn’t know whether he was in this thing. He then said
after the shooting, Fultz went to the truck and got another
.45 and put it on. Can you imagine if Theo driving down
the road or coming on there, if he had gotten there?
Bam! Thought he was going to get me, too. The law
does not authorize and exonerate a person with these type
of everybody’s gonna get me concept.
Fultz complains that these statements by the Commonwealth’s
attorney during closing “nullified” the court’s self-defense instruction.
In order to preserve the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument, the defendant must object. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91
S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002). Fultz did not object to the statements made by the
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Commonwealth’s attorney during closing argument; therefore, that issue is not
preserved for our review. However, had Fultz properly preserved the issue for our
review, any error was not so flagrant as to have warranted a new trial.
C. Admonition to Jury Regarding
Testimony of Larry Doss
During the Commonwealth’s case, Larry Doss (Doss) testified that he
had worked with Fultz. Doss was initially contacted by Officer Palmer during
October of 2005, in connection with a complaint from Armenis that Fultz had
threatened to kill him. At that time, Doss told Officer Palmer that he had never
heard Fultz make any threats against Armenis. Shortly before trial, the
Commonwealth was contacted by one of Doss’s acquaintances, who indicated that
Doss had told him that Fultz had threatened to kill Armenis. Officer Palmer reinterviewed Doss and Doss admitted that he had overheard Fultz threaten to kill
Armenis.
In a pre-trial conference, the Commonwealth moved for permission to
have Doss testify that he had heard Fultz threaten to shoot Armenis. The
Commowealth argued that the testimony of this “prior bad act” was being offered
to show Fultz’s motive or state of mind and to refute Fultz’s argument that he acted
in self-defense. Fultz objected to admission of that testimony on the grounds that
the most recent statement of Doss was contradicted by Doss’s first statement.
Additionally, Fultz objected because the statement was a “surprise” and highly
prejudicial. The court found that Fultz had the statement for two weeks prior to
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trial and there was no surprise. Furthermore, the court noted that, while the
statement might be prejudicial, its probative value would outweigh that prejudice.
Finally, the court noted that the prior inconsistent statement gave Fultz “great
ammunition” to impeach Doss.
At trial, Doss admitted that he had made the two contradictory
statements. As to the first, Doss explained that he lied to Officer Palmer because
he did not want “to get involved.” When the Commonwealth’s attorney attempted
to get Doss to repeat the specific threats, Doss did not answer. When prompted by
the judge, Doss continued to sit silently. Eventually, after significant prompting,
Doss admitted that Fultz had stated that he wanted to shoot Armenis. Fultz feared
that the jury would interpret that Doss was reluctant to testify because he was
afraid of Fultz and, during a bench conference, Fultz raised that fear with the trial
court. However, Fultz did not specifically request an admonition.
Fultz argues before us that the trial court should have admonished the
jury that “they were not allowed to consider Doss’ [sic] statement as bearing upon
Doug Fultz’s character or his propensity to commit crimes in general.” There are
two deficits with Fultz’s argument on appeal. As noted by the Commonwealth and
above, Fultz did not request an admonition; therefore, that issue is not preserved
for appeal. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1971).
Additionally, the argument Fultz is making before us is not the
argument Fultz made to the trial court. Fultz cannot argue before the trial court
that Doss’s testimony should be barred because of surprise and undue prejudice
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and argue before us that Doss’s testimony was improper character evidence. See
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976).
Finally, we note that under KRS 404(b) “[e]vidence of other . . . acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” However, KRS 404(b)(1) provides that such evidence is
admissible “[i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident[.]” The Commonwealth offered Doss’s testimony for acceptable
purposes, to show motive, plan, and absence of an accident. Therefore, the trial
court committed no error in permitting Doss to testify.
D. Competency of Larry Doss
Near the end of his testimony, Doss stated that he was bipolar and was
taking medication for that condition. Doss testified that, without his medication,
he suffers from problems with his memory; however, when he takes his
medication, his memory improves. Following this testimony, Fultz moved to have
all of Doss’s testimony stricken from the record as incompetent or, in the
alternative, for a hearing to determine Doss’s competence. The court denied
Fultz’s motion, noting that there was no evidence of Doss’s incompetence.
Furthermore, the court noted that Doss stated that he was taking his medication
daily and therefore should have no significant memory deficits.
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On appeal, Fultz argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a
hearing to establish Doss’s competency to testify. The Commonwealth argues that
Fultz did not preserve this issue for review, and Fultz admits as much in his brief.
Having reviewed the trial video, we disagree with the parties. After
Doss’s testimony regarding his bi-polar disorder and memory deficits, Fultz
objected to Doss’s testimony and moved to strike it. When the court overruled that
objection, Fultz asked the court for time to ask additional questions regarding
Doss’s mental illness, the medication he was taking, and whether Doss was aware
of what he was doing in court. Fultz suggested that, to spare Doss from
embarrassment, those questions could be asked during a separate, in-chambers
hearing. The court denied Fultz’s request for a separate hearing, but did permit
Fultz to question Doss regarding his mental status. Under these circumstances, we
hold that Fultz did request a competency hearing, albeit a limited one. However,
we also hold that, based on our review of the trial video, Fultz had adequate
opportunity to explore Doss’s competency and did so.
Furthermore, we note that a person is competent unless a court
determines that he:
(1) [l]acked the capacity to perceive accurately the
matters about which he proposes to testify;
(2) [l]acks the capacity to recollect facts;
(3) [l]acks the capacity to express himself so as to be
understood, either directly or through an interpreter; or
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(4) [l]acks the capacity to understand the obligation of a
witness to tell the truth.
KRS 601(b). Taking the preceding factors into consideration, the trial court has
the sound discretion to determine whether a witness is competent to testify.
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Ky. 1985). In reviewing the
trial court's exercise of its discretion, we bear in mind that it is in the unique
position to observe witnesses and to determine their competency. See Kotas v.
Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978).
Having reviewed the trial video, we discern no abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court. In doing so, we note that, although Doss appeared
reluctant to testify, he did not appear incapable of doing so. Furthermore, after
prompting, Doss was capable of recollecting facts and of expressing himself to the
jury. Finally, there was nothing in Doss’s testimony or demeanor to suggest that
he did not understand his obligation to tell the truth. Therefore, we hold that the
trial court did not err when it denied Fultz’s request for an in chambers hearing on
Doss’s competency.
E. Missing Evidence Instruction
Officer Payne, who investigated the crime scene, testified that he
failed to collect the clothing Armenis was wearing the day of the shooting. When
he did attempt to retrieve Armenis’s clothing from the hospital, he was advised that
the hospital no longer had it. Officer Payne admitted that he had made a mistake
when he failed to get Armenis’s clothing from the hospital, because any gunshot
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residue on the clothing could have been used to determine the distance between
Fultz and Armenis.
At trial, Fultz moved the court to give a “missing evidence”
instruction to the jury. The court, noting that the Commonwealth had never had
possession of the clothing, denied Fultz’s motion.
Alleged errors regarding jury instructions are questions of law and
must be examined using a de novo standard of review. Hamilton v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky. App. 2006). With that standard in
mind, we note that:
the purpose of a “missing evidence” instruction is to cure
any Due Process violation attributable to the loss or
destruction of exculpatory evidence by a less onerous
remedy than dismissal or the suppression of relevant
evidence. . . . [T]he Due Process Clause is implicated
only when the failure to preserve or collect the missing
evidence was intentional and the potentially exculpatory
nature of the evidence was apparent at the time it was lost
or destroyed. . . . [A]bsent some degree of “bad faith,”
the defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the jury
may draw an adverse inference from that failure.
Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002). (Emphasis in original).
Fultz argues that the Commonwealth should have secured Armenis’s
clothes so that they could be tested for gun powder residue. According to Fultz,
the presence of such residue would have bolstered his case that he felt trapped and
feared for his life when he shot Armenis. That may be the case; however, a
“missing evidence” instruction is not mandated unless there is some evidence of
intent or bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth. There is no evidence of
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either intent or bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth, only evidence of a
mistake. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Fultz’s request for a “missing
evidence” instruction.
F. Juror Misconduct
During lunch on the second day of trial, Officer Payne sat with a juror
at a table in a local restaurant. When advised of this, the court held an in-chambers
hearing to determine what, if any, misconduct had occurred. Officer Payne
testified that the diner where he ate lunch was crowded, and there were not many
available seats. There was a seat at the table where Officer Payne usually sat, and
he chose to sit there despite the fact that a juror was already sitting at that table.
Officer Payne testified that there was no conversation about the trial during lunch
and that he did not remember having any direct conversation with the juror.
Fultz moved for a mistrial arguing that other jurors could have seen
Officer Payne eating with that juror. Fultz further argued that any jurors who saw
Officer Payne eating with that juror could have been prejudiced, although Fultz did
not articulate with any specificity how the other jurors might have been prejudiced.
The Commonwealth noted that there were thirteen jurors and that one juror would
be dismissed prior to deliberations. Therefore, the Commonwealth suggested
dismissing that juror, thereby mitigating any possible prejudice. The court found
that there had been no prejudice or misconduct and overruled Fultz’s motion for a
mistrial. However, to remove any appearance of misconduct, and at the request of
Fultz, the court dismissed that juror, designating him as the alternate.
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Fultz argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it did
not conduct a hearing to determine whether any of the other jurors had seen Officer
Payne eating with that juror. The Commonwealth argues that Fultz did not
preserve this issue. However, contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, Fultz
did ask the court to conduct a hearing with that juror to determine if any other
jurors were present at the restaurant. Therefore, we hold that Fultz did preserve
this issue for our review.
In support of his argument, Fultz cites to Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363,
87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966); and Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85
S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). However, those cases are distinguishable. In
Remmer, a person remarked to a juror “that he could profit by bringing in a verdict
favorable to the petitioner.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228, 74 S.Ct. 451. The juror in
question informed the judge of the contact and the judge advised the prosecutor,
but not the defendant, of the contact. The FBI conducted an investigation and
determined that the statement had been made in jest. Unlike the juror in this case,
the juror in Remmer not only sat on the jury, but became the jury foreman. The
defendant did not learn of these events until he read about them in a post-trial
newspaper story. He moved for a mistrial, a motion the U.S. District Court denied.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the District Court, held that “any
private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror
during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons,
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deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . .” However, “[t]he presumption is not
conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after
notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451.
The case before us obviously differs from Remmer. Officer Payne did
not discuss the case with the juror and the juror was dismissed from the jury before
deliberations. Fultz could not show that any other jurors were present in the
restaurant or, if they were, how they might have been prejudiced by seeing Officer
Payne eating lunch with that juror. Additionally, unlike in Remmer, the trial court
herein brought the matter to the attention of the parties and conducted an inchambers hearing. Therefore, Remmer, has no application to the case before us.
In Parker, the bailiff charged with escorting the jurors, commented to
one of the jurors that he believed that the defendant was guilty and that any errors
in a guilty verdict could be corrected by the Supreme Court. In finding error, the
Supreme Court held that “the unauthorized conduct of the bailiff ‘involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process.’” Parker, 385 U.S. at 365, 87 S.Ct. at 471, citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 542-43, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1633, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965).
As with Remmer, Parker is distinguishable on its facts. Officer
Payne, unlike the bailiff in Parker, did not discuss the case with the juror at his
table, let alone express any thoughts regarding Fultz’s guilt or innocence.
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Therefore, there was not the type of unauthorized conduct likely to cause the
prejudice that the Supreme Court found in Remmer.
Finally, in Turner, the jury was sequestered during the trial and
deliberations. Two of the deputies who ran errands for the jurors, ate with them,
and conversed with them, were key prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court
held that such an association between the deputies and the jurors was highly
prejudicial because the deputies were the jurors’ “official guardians.” Turner 379
U.S. at 474, 85 S.Ct. at 550.
Again, as noted above, the contact between Officer Payne and the
juror was casual, not official. Furthermore, Officer Payne and the juror did not
have any conversation about the trial. Therefore, as with Remmer and Parker,
Turner is not relevant to the case before us, and we discern no error in the trial
court’s denial of Fultz’s request for an additional hearing.
G. Cumulative Error
Finally, Fultz argues that the cumulative effect of the above errors
acted to deprive him of a fair trial. We hold that no error occurred at the trial;
therefore, there can be no cumulative error.
CONCLUSION
After careful review of the record and the arguments of counsel, we
are unable to detect any error on the part of the trial court; therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the McLean Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
John Palombi
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Perry T. Ryan
Frankfort, Kentucky
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