KIRKLAND (CHARLES MICHAEL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 1, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000100-MR
CHARLES MICHAEL KIRKLAND
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 98-CR-00190 AND 98-CR-00190-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Charles Michael Kirkland appeals from an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 and Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 60.02. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The pertinent facts of this case were stated by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Kirkland v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 71 (Ky. 2001), wherein
Kirkland’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Having reviewed the record,
we adopt the facts as stated in Kirkland, 53 S.W.3d at 73-74, as follows:
Kirkland [who was then a juvenile] and McKee entered a
Lexington liquor store intending to rob the owner. Both
defendants knew the owner kept a pistol behind the
counter. McKee, unarmed, entered first, while Kirkland,
armed with a 9 millimeter handgun, followed. The store
surveillance camera showed that as McKee ran around
the counter presumably to obtain money from the cash
register, Kirkland fired a shot which passed through the
cash register and struck the owner. Both Kirkland and
McKee fled the store without taking any money. The
owner died from his wounds. After being questioned by
police, McKee confessed and Kirkland made various
inconsistent statements to the police.
At trial, Kirkland testified in his own defense and
admitted he was the shooter, but claimed that the
shooting was accidental. He admitted that he had
previously told others that the victim was shot when he
went for his gun. He also testified that McKee had
hollered “gun” right before the fatal shot was fired.
McKee did not testify. A jury determined that both
Kirkland and McKee were guilty of murder and robbery
in the first degree and sentenced Kirkland to life without
parole for 25 years on the murder charge, and a
concurrent sentence of 25 years on the robbery charge
and sentenced McKee to 25 years on the murder charge
and 20 years on the robbery charge to run consecutively.
On February 17, 2006, Kirkland filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02
and RCr 11.42 requesting a new sentencing hearing based on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In Roper, the Court concluded that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under
the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125
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S.Ct. at 1200. Because he was a juvenile at the time of his crimes, Kirkland
contended that Roper required that he be granted a new sentencing hearing. On
December 22, 2006, the trial court denied Kirkland’s motion for post-conviction
relief. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Kirkland contends the following: (1) the trial court failed
to understand that his sentence was predicated on the false premise, now
eviscerated by Roper, that he was culpable as an adult; (2) the trial court erred by
not granting relief because equity demands the modification of his sentence; and
(3) he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the facts and law upon which
his RCr 11.42 motion was based were unknown before the Supreme Court decided
Roper.
With respect to Kirkland’s contention that the trial court failed to
understand the import of Roper to the continued validity of his sentence, this Court
has previously held that defendants who were juveniles at the time they committed
their crimes, and were subsequently sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole for twenty-five years, are not entitled to new sentencing hearings pursuant
to Roper. Sims v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 731, 732-33 (Ky.App. 2007).
Additionally, addressing his second contention, we fail to find a legitimate
equitable basis to grant Kirkland a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly,
Kirkland’s first two contentions are meritless.
Finally, Kirkland contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing because the law upon which his RCr 11.42 motion was based was
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unknown before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roper. Despite this contention,
this Court previously addressed this exact contention in our Sims decision by
holding that such a claim was barred due to timeliness pursuant to RCr 11.42(10).1
Sims, 233 S.W.3d at 733. As stated in Sims, Roper does not have an indefinite
retro-application to life sentences as it does for juvenile death penalty sentences.
Id. Therefore, Kirkland’s RCr 11.42 motion was untimely and does not merit
relief.
For the foregoing reasons, the Fayette Circuit Court’s order is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Office of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
RCr 11.42(10), in pertinent part, provides that “[a]ny motion under this rule shall be
filed within three years after the judgment becomes final.”
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