GREEN (VANCE CARTER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000053-MR
VANCE CARTER GREEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00248
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SPECIAL JUDGE: This appeal arises from a Hardin Circuit
Court order denying Vance Green’s RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, alter, or amend
his conviction. Green claims that his attorney’s misadvice led to his decision to
Retired Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
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plead guilty and requests that this Court reverse the Hardin Circuit Court order.
We disagree and affirm the order of the Hardin Circuit Court.
On June 3, 2005, Vance Green was indicted by a Hardin County
grand jury for receiving stolen property (RSP) over $300, possession of marijuana
(POM), and possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP). At the time of his arrest,
Green was on parole for a prior conviction. On the day he was indicted, Green
entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth which provided that Green
would be sentenced to three years on RSP and twelve months on POM, both
running concurrently for a total of three years. In addition, the Commonwealth
agreed to dismiss the PDP charge and recommend that Green receive probation.
On June 14, 2005, Green appeared before the Hardin Circuit Court to
enter his plea. During the plea colloquy, Green’s counsel advised him and the
court that the plea agreement was unlawful. Defense counsel advised that under
the law, Green was ineligible for probation because he was on parole. Despite
receiving this information, Green persisted in entering a guilty plea in exchange for
the Commonwealth’s recommendation of three years imprisonment to run
consecutively with Green’s current time. Final judgment was entered June 21,
2005.
Green’s counsel incorrectly advised that probation was prohibited.
Under KRS 533.030 (2), Green was eligible for probation because he pled to a
Class D felony. Parole only effects probation eligibility when the defendant pleads
guilty to a felony that is a Class C or greater felony. Upon learning of his
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counsel’s error, Green filed an RCr 11.42 motion in the Hardin Circuit Court to
vacate, alter or amend his conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court denied his motion. This appeal follows.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
movant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency
prejudiced the case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Further,
courts must examine counsel’s conduct in light of professional norms based on a
standard of reasonableness. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky.
2001). With respect to a guilty plea, however, a movant must also show that
counsel’s performance so seriously affected the case, that but for the deficiency,
the movant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Green argues that his counsel’s misadvice constituted an unreasonable
deficiency outside the professional norm, which prejudiced his case. Furthermore,
we note that the RCr 11.42 motion filed with the Hardin Circuit Court argues the
error caused him to accept an offer that he otherwise would not have taken. We
agree that counsel’s misadvice constitutes deficient performance. However, Green
fails to show that he would not have accepted the guilty plea and would have
insisted on going to trial but for the erroneous advice.
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sparks v.
Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Circuit, 1988), held that “. . . . gross misadvice
concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” In
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this 6th Circuit opinion, Sparks made the following allegations concerning his
guilty plea:
[o]n March 15, 1984, the third day of petitioner's
trial, after defense counsel had already advised
petitioner that if he didn't plead guilty he would get
life without parole, petitioner was informed that
his mother was in the hospital in critical condition.
Petitioner's counsel then advised him that if he
didn't plead guilty he may never see his mother
again. At this point petitioner was confused and
under duress and finally agreed to plead guilty for
a recommendation of thirty-five (35) years.
Sparks, at 882.
Following the denial of his petition for writ of habeus corpus, Sparks
alleged on appeal to the 6th Circuit that, but for the misadvice, he would not have
pled guilty and would have continued with the trial. The attorney’s advice was
incorrect because Sparks would have been eligible for parole. Therefore, an
evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was granted.
Although this Court is not bound by the 6th Circuit’s decision is
Sparks, we find the reasoning persuasive. However, here Green cannot argue that
he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. If defense
counsel had not incorrectly advised Green and the court that Green was ineligible
for probation, Green would have proceeded with the plea agreement in which the
Commonwealth recommended probation.
Green also alleges that defense counsel’s mistake was so egregious
that it rendered his plea involuntary under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
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(1969), which requires pleas to be “freely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
made”. Although Green entered the plea under the assumption that he was
ineligible for probation, the record indicates that Green entered his plea advised of
all Boykin rights.
Kentucky courts have consistently held that there is no constitutional
right to probation. Land v. Commonwealth, 986 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1999);
Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. App. 1986). Instead, “it is clear
in this Commonwealth that probation is a privilege rather than a right.” Brown v.
Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. App. 1977). Simply because the first
agreement included a recommendation of probation did not guarantee that the
Court would grant Green probation.
Although he was misinformed as to the potential sentence
consequences, he pled guilty of his own free will. The failure of counsel or the
court to inform him of all possible consequences of his plea will not render the plea
involuntary. This Court, in Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1983)
stated:
. . . . a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver
does not necessarily include a requirement that
the defendant be informed of every possible
consequence and aspect of the guilty plea. A
guilty plea that is brought about by a person’s
own free will is not less valid because he did not
know possible consequences of the plea and all
possible alternative courses of action. To require
such would lead to the absurd result that a person
pleading guilty would need a course in criminal
law and penology.
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Green entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, albeit with the
incorrect information about all potential consequences.
Because Green cannot show that he would not have pled guilty and
that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial if he had not been misinformed,
the trial court properly denied his RCr 11.42 motion. Accordingly, we affirm the
order of the Hardin Circuit Court.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erwin W. Lewis
Public Advocate
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Amy Robinson Staples
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Henry Flores
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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