PALMER-BALL, M.D. (ROBERT BUSCHER) VS. PALMER-BALL (SHEILA CLEMONS)
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RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002647-MR
AND
NO. 2007-CA-000124-MR
ROBERT BUSCHER PALMER-BALL, M.D.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE JERRY J. BOWLES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-502080
SHEILA CLEMONS PALMER-BALL
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, NICKELL, AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: The marriage of Robert (“Bob”) and Sheila (“Sheila”)
Palmer-Ball was dissolved by order of the Jefferson Circuit Court on March 28,
2006. On December 4, 2006, the trial court entered an order correcting errors in
the prior opinion and denying other issues raised in motions to alter, amend or
vacate1 filed by both parties. Bob appeals and Sheila cross-appeals from both
orders. Bob’s appeal focuses on whether a Florida condominium purchased during
the marriage, but after Bob received an inheritance from his father’s estate, should
have been awarded to him entirely as nonmarital property; whether the trial court
properly calculated the value of Bob’s medical practice; whether the trial court
properly awarded maintenance and attorney fees to Sheila; and whether the trial
court properly divided the marital debts between the parties. Sheila’s cross-appeal
focuses solely upon whether a diamond pendant, purchased as an investment by
Bob during the marriage with marital funds, is marital property to be divided
between the parties or a gift from Bob to Sheila for their silver wedding
anniversary and therefore Sheila’s nonmarital property. We affirm the trial court’s
orders in all respects.
FACTS
Sheila and Bob were married in Louisville on February 15, 1974.
Two children, both adults now, were born to their union. A daughter, Elizabeth
(“Beth”), was born in 1979. Bob and Sheila paid her tuition to Bellarmine
University and borrowed heavily against their whole life insurance policies to
purchase an unencumbered home for her. A teacher, Beth intends to repay the
purchase price of her home to her parents, but is uncertain when her finances will
permit her to do so. A son, Matthew (“Matt”), was born in 1983. He was
attending Notre Dame University when the divorce proceedings began. Bob
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.
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testified he and Sheila had promised to fund Matt’s college tuition. Sheila testified
Matt was never told he would not have to contribute to his education. Bob
intended to retire early, but chose to work at least four additional years to pay for
Matt’s tuition. Once the divorce proceeding began and there was a downturn in
Bob’s medical practice, Bob borrowed money from his brother ($20,500.00) to pay
for Matt’s senior year of college. Matt graduated in May 2005.
When Bob and Sheila married in 1974, Bob was a high school biology
teacher. He subsequently graduated from medical school in 1980 and has practiced
internal medicine since that time. Bob is currently a solo practitioner and rents
office space from Norton Healthcare. Salaries of some, but not all, of his office
staff are included in his rent package. In recent years, Bob’s business earnings
have ranged from a high of $220,534.00 in 2000 to a low of $40,376.00 in 2004.
Bob testified the drop in earnings resulted partially from many of his patients
switching to Humana, a health insurance plan for which he was not an approved
provider. Bob joined the Humana network of providers in 2003 and is rebuilding
his patient base. Sheila believes Bob could earn more money by advertising. Bob
opposes physician advertising. He testified he would not be the first Louisville
internist to advertise for patients. Bob was fifty-six years old at the time of
dissolution.
Sheila earned her teaching degree in 1973 and began teaching in 1974.
In 1979, she earned a Master’s degree in education. Between Matt’s birth in 1983
and the time he turned seven in 1990, Sheila did not work outside the home.
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During that time she cared for the couple’s two children. In 1990 Sheila took a
position at Assumption High School where she remains today as director of a
program she developed for children with learning disabilities. Sheila has taught in
the Jefferson County Public Schools, but most of her professional career has been
spent in the service of parochial schools. Bob maintains Sheila could increase her
salary and retirement benefits by returning to the county school system. Sheila
was fifty-three years old and earning $53,706.00 annually at the time of
dissolution.
According to Sheila, her marriage of nearly thirty years to Bob was
rocky. The couple separated in 1996 but reconciled later that year. They
celebrated their silver wedding anniversary in 1999. In November 2002, the
couple separated for the final time and Sheila petitioned to dissolve the marriage in
June 2003.
During the separation in 1996, Sheila remained in the marital home
and Bob moved to an apartment. In August 1996, while living in the apartment,
Bob used marital funds to buy a diamond pendant for $25,000.00 as an investment.
He never mentioned the pendant to Sheila, which was appraised at $71,000.00 in
1996. That was not unusual since Bob handled the family’s finances. Bob showed
the diamond to their daughter Beth, her boyfriend, and several coworkers. When
Beth asked her father why he bought such a large diamond he said it was an
investment. When Beth asked if she could have it, he said she could wear it, but
she could not have it. Three years later, on the occasion of their silver wedding
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anniversary in February 1999, Bob asked Sheila whether she would like to wear
the diamond pendant to a family dinner being held in their honor. The diamond
was a surprise to Sheila and prompted her to ask where else she could wear it. Bob
said she could wear it anywhere, even grocery shopping the following day. The
parties differed as to whether Sheila was keen on attending the anniversary party
but she did attend and she did wear the diamond. When the couple returned home
that evening Bob did not ask Sheila to return the 5.85 carat diamond to him, nor
did he ever ask that she return it to him or safeguard it in any special way. Sheila
now claims the pendant was Bob’s anniversary gift to her and therefore her
nonmarital property. Bob disagrees saying he never told Sheila the diamond was a
gift; Sheila says he never said it was not a gift. Ultimately, neither Sheila nor Bob
chose to keep the diamond which at dissolution had an appraised value of
$77,000.00. The court ordered Bob to sell the diamond and evenly split the
proceeds with Sheila.
The couple maintained two checking accounts at separate banks
during their marriage. There was a household account for ordinary living expenses
and a separate business account for the medical practice. The only money
deposited into the business account came from insurance reimbursements and
patient fees. Bob testified he would never commingle the funds in the two
accounts. When the balance in the household account dwindled, Bob withdrew
money from the business account as a salary and deposited it into the household
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account. Sheila’s salary was also deposited into the household account and used to
pay incidentals and living expenses.
Bob wanted to retire to a warm climate. When his father died, Bob
inherited about $300,000.00. At Sheila’s suggestion, she and Bob traveled to
Florida to begin the search for a vacation condo. They quickly found one they
liked in Naples and Bob paid the $16,000.00 down payment from his inheritance.
Both parties agreed the $16,000.00 down payment on the condo was Bob’s
nonmarital property.
Of the $300,000.00 inheritance, about $130,000.00 was a separate
stock account which both parties also agreed was Bob’s nonmarital property. The
remainder of Bob’s inheritance, minus the $16,000.00 down payment on the
condo, was deposited into the couple’s household account and used to pay living
expenses. While the family spent the inheritance for daily living, Bob did not draw
a salary from the business account. Instead, his usual salary was allowed to grow
in the business account where it earned a higher rate of interest. Once the business
account had grown sufficiently, Bob wrote a check for the balance of the condo
($146,000.00) from the business account. At the time of dissolution, the condo had
increased in value from the purchase price of around $162,000.00 to an appraised
value of $300,000.00. Sheila accepted the appraised value; Bob did not. Bob
asked that the appraisal be reduced by $25,000.00 due to water damage. The
appraiser took a second look at the unit but saw no need to adjust his original
opinion. Although unable to trace the condo purchase directly to his inheritance,
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Bob maintained the condo was his nonmarital property because his inheritance
enabled the family to buy the unit. The trial court found Bob did not satisfy
Kentucky’s tracing requirement and therefore ninety percent of the condo was
found to be marital property. Ultimately, Bob retained the condo and bought out
Sheila’s marital interest.
After multiple hearings and a three-day trial, the Jefferson Circuit
Court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 28, 2006.
The court divided the couple’s property and marital debts and awarded
maintenance and attorney fees to Sheila. In particular, the court found ninety
percent of the Florida condo was marital property because it was purchased with
marital funds from Bob’s medical practice bank account and not from his
inheritance as Bob had maintained. The court found the diamond pendant was
marital property because Sheila did not prove Bob transferred it to her as a gift.
Thereafter, both parties filed timely motions to alter, amend or vacate
the March 28, 2006, findings and conclusions. As a result, the court corrected a
few errors, rejected other arguments made by the parties, and issued a new order
dated December 4, 2006. Bob has appealed both the March 28, 2006, and the
December 4, 2006, orders. Sheila has filed a cross-appeal from both orders. We
now affirm.
ANALYSIS
In a dissolution action, “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
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to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR 52.01. When supported by
substantial evidence, findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Sherfey v. Sherfey,
74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.App. 2002). We give due deference to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge witness credibility and when the evidence is conflicting, the
trial court, not this Court, decides who and what to believe. Adkins v. Meade, 246
S.W.2d 980 (Ky. 1952). While factual issues are reviewed for clear error, legal
issues are reviewed de novo. Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Ky.App.
2003); Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky.App. 2001).
With few exceptions, all property acquired during a marriage is
presumed to be marital property. KRS2 403.190(2) and (3). However, a party may
overcome this presumption by proving an item was “acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent during the marriage and the income derived therefrom unless
there are significant activities of either spouse which contributed to the increase in
value of said property and the income earned therefrom. . . .” KRS 403.190(2)(a).
A party claiming an asset is nonmarital property bears the burden of proving its
nonmarital character by clear and convincing evidence. Sexton v. Sexton, 125
S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ky. 2004); Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. 1998).
To determine whether property is marital or nonmarital, Kentucky uses a “source
of funds” rule. Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Ky. 2001). Simply stated,
property purchased with nonmarital funds during a marriage is nonmarital property
and property purchased during a marriage with marital funds is marital property.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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THE DIAMOND PENDANT
Sheila advances only one claim. She contends the trial court erred in
finding the diamond pendant she wore to her twenty-fifth wedding anniversary
dinner was marital property rather than a gift to her from Bob and therefore hers
alone. Bob testified he purchased the pendant with $25,000.00 in marital money as
an investment in 1996 while the parties were separated. He further testified he
never intended to give the necklace to anyone. Sheila does not dispute the
diamond was purchased as an investment but claims its character changed when
Bob asked her if she’d like to wear it to their anniversary dinner in 1999, she wore
it, and Bob never asked for its return. Bob argues the trial court properly found the
necklace to be marital property and ordered it sold3 with the proceeds being
divided equally between the parties.
Whether the pendant was a gift is an issue of fact we review for clear
error. Hunter, supra, 127 S.W.3d at 660 (citing Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31
(Ky.App. 1980)); CR 52.01. So long as the trial court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence we will not disturb them. Sherfey, supra. Since Sheila claims
the diamond was a gift, she bears the burden of clearly and convincingly proving it
to be nonmarital property. Travis, supra.
Four factors determine whether the pendant was marital property:
The court originally awarded the diamond pendant to Bob and credited Sheila with half of the
appraised value ($37,500.00). Ultimately, the parties agreed Bob would sell the diamond and the
parties would evenly split the proceeds.
3
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the source of the money with which the “gift” was
purchased, the intent of the donor at that time as to
intended use of the property, status of the marriage
relationship at the time of the transfer, and whether there
was any valid agreement that the transferred property
was to be excluded from the marital property.
O’Neill v. O’Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky.App. 1980). Of the four factors, the
donor’s intent carries the most weight. Sexton, supra, 125 S.W.3d at 268-69. In
applying these factors to the case sub judice, Bob testified he bought the pendant
with marital funds as an investment. The sales ticket for the pendant identified it
as an “investment diamond” and Beth, the couple’s daughter, testified Bob told her
he bought the diamond as an investment. Sheila was unaware of the purchase for
three years. This was not particularly unusual since Bob handled the finances for
the family. The parties disagreed about the status of the marriage at the time the
diamond was purchased in August 1996. Bob testified the parties were separated;
Sheila testified they had reconciled, but Bob did not fully return to the marital
home until November 1996. Shortly before the couple’s twenty-fifth wedding
anniversary dinner on February 15, 1999, Bob showed the pendant to Sheila and
asked whether she would like to wear it to dinner. Sheila was surprised and asked
where else she could wear the necklace. Bob responded she could wear it
anywhere she wanted, even grocery shopping. There was no testimony Bob and
Sheila ever agreed to exclude the pendant from their marital property or that Bob
intended the diamond to be a gift to Sheila and therefore her nonmarital property.
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Sheila testified she believed the diamond was a gift. However, under
O’Neill, it is not Sheila’s belief, but rather Bob’s intent, that is the controlling
factor. Furthermore, it is doubtful Sheila really believed the necklace was a gift
because she asked Bob where she could wear it besides the anniversary dinner. If
she truly believed it was a gift to do with as she pleased she would not have asked
where else she could wear it. As stated in O’Neill, Bob’s purchase of the diamond
in 1996 changed the form of the marital funds from cash to jewelry, but asking
Sheila whether she wanted to wear the diamond to a party in 1999 and then
allowing her to store it in her jewelry box within the marital home did not
transform the pendant into nonmarital property. Sheila’s complaint that the trial
court took Bob’s testimony at face value rather than questioning his veracity is
unpersuasive. Both Beth and the pendant’s invoice corroborated Bob’s testimony
that the diamond was purchased as an investment. There was no testimony from
anyone that Bob ever told Sheila the diamond was a gift to her or that he
considered the pendant anything other than an investment. Sheila assumed the
pendant was a gift because she expected a memento of their silver anniversary.
The trial court was free to pick and choose among the conflicting evidence and we
cannot say it clearly erred in believing Bob and finding the diamond pendant was
marital property. Thus, we reject Sheila’s claim on cross-appeal and affirm the
trial court’s orders as they pertain to the diamond pendant.
THE FLORIDA CONDO
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Bob alleges the trial court erroneously found ninety percent of the
family condo was marital property. In what he labels a “but for” argument, Bob
contends the condo purchase was made possible solely by an inheritance he
received upon his father’s death so the condo should have been awarded to him in
its entirety as nonmarital property. In contrast, Sheila urges us to affirm the trial
court’s ruling because Bob did not trace the balance of the condo’s purchase price
to a nonmarital asset as required by Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575 (Ky.
1990). Having considered the current state of the law in Kentucky and the facts
presented to us, we reject Bob’s “but for” argument and affirm the trial court’s
finding that ninety percent of the condo’s value was marital property.
The facts are undisputed. Bob inherited $300,000.00. Approximately
$130,000.00 of his inheritance was held in a separate stock account later deemed
Bob’s nonmarital property by the trial court. From the remaining $170,000.00 Bob
paid the $16,000.00 down payment for the condo, the purchase price of which was
about $160,000.00. Because this $16,000.00 down payment was traced directly to
Bob’s inheritance the trial court likewise found it to be Bob’s nonmarital property.
However, Bob deposited his remaining inheritance, about $154,000.00, into the
couple’s household account, thereby commingling it with their marital property.
The couple continued to pay daily living expenses from their household account,
while not drawing any salary for Bob from the business account, thereby allowing
his earnings to draw a higher rate of interest. This business account was also
marital property. Later, after sufficient funds were accumulated in the business
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account, Bob paid off the balance owed for the condo purchase, about
$146,000.00, with a check drawn on that account. Because Bob could not
subsequently trace the $146,000.00 condo payoff directly to his inheritance, which
had been deposited into the couple’s household account, the trial court found
ninety percent of the condo’s purchase price came from marital funds. We hold
the trial court was correct in characterizing all but the $16,000.00 down payment,
and its proportionate increase in value4, as marital property.
Citing Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky.App. 1979), Bob argues
Kentucky no longer requires precise tracing of nonmarital funds into an asset
acquired during marriage, and the couple’s two bank accounts should be
considered as one, thereby allowing him to trace the condo payoff drawn on the
business account to his inheritance proceeds which he had deposited into the
household account. While it may be true that precise tracing is no longer required,
the concept of tracing remains alive and well in the Commonwealth as explained in
Chenault, supra, 799 S.W.2d at 578-9.
In Allen v. Allen, supra, the Court of Appeals retreated
somewhat from its earlier decisions and held that the
requirement of tracing should be fulfilled, at least as far
as money is concerned, when it is shown that nonmarital
funds were deposited and commingled with marital funds
and that the balance of the account was never reduced
below the amount of the nonmarital funds deposited.”
Id. at 600. The view expressed in Allen is consistent with
the concurring opinion of Vance, J., in Turley v. Turley,
The trial court awarded $30,000.00, ten percent of the condo’s $300,000.00 appraised value at
dissolution, to Bob as his nonmarital property. This figure was based on the court’s finding that
the $16,000.00 condo down payment, which all agreed was Bob’s nonmarital property, was ten
percent of the approximately $160,000.00 purchase price of the condo.
4
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supra. In that concurring opinion, it was persuasively
argued that all nonmarital property should be restored
upon dissolution of the marriage providing the parties
have, throughout the marriage, maintained at least as
much in assets as the combined value of their nonmarital
property. By logical inference, if this view were adopted,
any decrease during the marriage in the parties' total
nonmarital asset value would be charged pro rata against
their percentage share of total nonmarital property to be
assigned.
As appealing as the foregoing view may be, particularly
when the simplicity of its application and its inherent
equity is considered, we believe the concept of tracing is
too firmly established in the law to be abandoned at this
time.
Accordingly, we shall adhere to the general requirement
that nonmarital assets be traced into assets owned at the
time of dissolution, but relax some of the draconian
requirements heretofore laid down. We take this position,
in part, in reliance upon the trial courts of Kentucky to
detect deception and exaggeration or to require additional
proof when such is suspected.
Thus, while tracing has not been eliminated, its requirements have been relaxed for
the unsophisticated. However, that word hardly describes Bob who demonstrated
great knowledge and skill in testifying about complex financial topics such as
medical billing, health insurance, and the tax consequences of life insurance
policies and investments.
Here, Bob traced the condo funds to two sources. The $16,000.00
down payment came from Bob’s inheritance, a nonmarital asset, and the
$146,000.00 payoff came from the couple’s business account, a marital asset. Yet,
Bob provides no legal authority which would allow us to accept his argument that
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we should combine the couple’s separate household and business accounts, located
at two separate banks and under two separate names, and treat them as one account
from which he ultimately paid off the condo. Allen may provide slight support for
this premise, but it is easily distinguishable because there the commingling of
marital and nonmarital funds occurred within a single bank account. Here we have
two separate accounts and Bob, himself, testified he would never mix money from
the two. If Bob would not combine or commingle the money held in these separate
accounts it is unreasonable to ask or expect this court to do so.
Essentially, Bob argues the court can distinguish and separate his
inheritance from the couple’s marital property regardless of which of their
accounts it was deposited into and which of their accounts was used to pay off the
condo’s purchase price. To illustrate his point Bob offered the analogy of mixing
one’s mashed potatoes with one’s green peas, noting that though they be
commingled they are no less identifiable and separable. However, once one’s eggs
have been scrambled it is impossible to separate them from the omelet. Thus, we
reject Bob’s interesting epicurean analogy and hold his legal theory as contrary to
longstanding Kentucky law. Indeed, merely showing one “brought nonmarital
property into the marriage without also showing he or she has spent his or her
nonmarital assets in a traceable manner during the marriage” will not satisfy
Kentucky’s tracing requirement. Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 299 (Ky.App.
2004). The undisputed proof established only the $16,000.00 down payment for
the condo was traceable to Bob’s inheritance. Because Bob did not trace the
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remainder of the condo purchase price to a nonmarital asset he brought to or
acquired during the marriage, there was no basis upon which the trial court could
have found it to be nonmarital property. Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 163,
176 (Ky. 1978). On the strength of Chenault, we affirm the trial court’s finding
that ninety percent of the condo was marital property.
In a related argument, Bob claims the trial court prevented him from
proffering evidence in support of his “but for” argument. Our review of the
videotaped trial shows just the opposite. This claim is complicated by the fact that
avowal testimony was not recorded when elicited in October 2004. At some point
during the avowal, Sheila’s attorney objected to the relevance of proving the
portion of Bob’s inheritance he deposited into the household account would have
been sufficient to buy the condo had it been used for that purpose. The trial court,
according to Sheila’s brief, sustained that objection. Then, while preparing for trial
to resume in June 2005, Bob’s attorney discovered about ninety minutes of
recorded testimony, including the avowal, was missing from the videotape. When
trial resumed, the parties and the trial court attempted to reconstruct the avowal.
After a long discussion, the court told Bob he could put on any avowal testimony
he wanted and suggested three options for doing so: the parties could stipulate to
the facts; they could submit affidavits summarizing the testimony; or they could
continue taking evidence on the record. After about a five minute discussion on
the record, Bob’s attorney stated he had adequately preserved the record for
consideration by this Court and there was no need to put anything else on the
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record. Thus, the trial court did not prevent Bob from offering testimony by
avowal.
However, the trial court did question the necessity of an avowal since
the issue was strictly one of law and the anticipated testimony, much of which had
already been stipulated, was not going to satisfy Kentucky’s tracing requirement.
Bob’s attorney stated he was not trying to prove any facts, he was simply
attempting to create a record for this Court to review if we found the “but for”
argument convincing. Since we have rejected the “but for” argument there could
be no error on the part of the trial court.
In another argument related to the condo, Bob claims that even if it is
properly characterized as marital property, he is still entitled to more than half of it.
He argues he is entitled to one hundred percent of the condo because his
inheritance made its purchase possible. Despite a valiant search of the record, it
does not appear this theory was ever presented to the trial court and Sheila argues it
is unpreserved. We will not address an argument that has not first been brought
before the trial court for consideration. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d
219, 222 (Ky. 1976). Moreover, CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires “at the beginning of
the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue
was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” No such statement
appears in Bob’s brief. Therefore he has also failed to comply with this rule.
We will make one final comment about the condo. Bob stated in the
written “closing argument” he submitted to the trial court after the conclusion of all
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the proof, “[i]n the least, the [trial] Court should credit Bob’s $16,000.00 nonmarital (sic) down payment plus the growth attributable to the market increase in
the property’s value as Bob’s non-marital (sic) asset.” That is precisely what the
trial court did. The court figured the $16,000.00 down payment, which all agreed
came from the inheritance, was about ten percent of the $162,000.00 purchase
price of the condo. The trial court then awarded to Bob, as nonmarital property,
$30,000.00 or ten percent of the $300,000.00 appraised value of the condo. The
trial court correctly applied the law and there is no basis for reversal.
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VALUATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE
Bob alleges the trial court improperly calculated the value of his
medical practice resulting in a figure that was inflated by $13,506.29. He claims
the error occurred when the trial court updated the accountant’s appraisal of the
practice instead of ordering an accountant to update the numbers. Bob contends
the trial court should have written-off as uncollectible forty percent of the accounts
receivable for the first nine months of 2004 as was his accountant’s habit. In
contrast, Sheila argues the court applied the desired reduction. This issue is
unpreserved for our review as it was not included in Bob’s motion to alter, amend
or vacate. As stated previously, we will not review a claim that has not first been
presented to the trial court. Kennedy, supra. Furthermore, it appears the court did
in fact deduct forty percent of the accounts receivable as being uncollectible.
Therefore we affirm the trial court on this point.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Bob argues the trial court erroneously awarded $19,500.00 in
attorney’s fees to Sheila. Without citing any authority for this theory, he claims
the trial court failed to find Sheila could not pay her own attorney’s fees. Sheila
responds that a trial court is not required to make specific findings in awarding
attorney’s fees. We agree with Sheila.
Awarding attorney’s fees is wholly within the discretion of the trial
court and will be disturbed only if the trial court abused its discretion. Giacolone
v. Giacolone, 876 S.W.2d 616, 620-21 (Ky.App. 1994) (citing Gentry v. Gentry,
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798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); and Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975)).
Contrary to Bob’s claim, a trial court need not make specific findings on this issue,
it need only “‘consider’ the financial resources of the parties” and any award it
makes must be reasonable. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 798 S.W.2d 145
(Ky.App. 1990). KRS 403.220 authorizes a court, “after considering the financial
resources of both parties,” to:
order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to
the other party of maintaining or defending any
proceeding under this chapter and for attorney’s fees,
including sums for legal services rendered and costs
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or
after entry of judgment. The court may order that the
amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce
the order in his name.
Our review of the record confirms the trial court considered the financial resources
of both parties, past, current and future, in great detail. Following that review, the
court awarded Sheila $19,500.00 toward her attorney’s fees and costs of
$36,431.70. In light of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney’s fees to Sheila and there is no basis for reversal.
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DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBTS
Bob’s next complaint is that the trial court incorrectly divided the
marital debts between the parties. When dividing marital property, including
debts, the trial court is to divide it into “just proportions.” KRS 403.190(1).
However, that does not mean there must be an equal division. Lawson v. Lawson,
228 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky.App. 2007); Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 25
(Ky.App. 1994). In reaching its conclusion, the trial court shall consider:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to
live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
KRS 403.190(1).
Bob’s first allegation about the division of marital debt is that the trial
court failed to give him credit for having paid the interest on loans taken against
his and Sheila’s life insurance policies to purchase a home for their daughter.
While required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), we find no citation in Bob’s brief telling us
where he asked the trial court to give him credit for these interest payments.
Additionally, our review of the trial court record, including Bob’s motion to alter,
amend or vacate, does not reveal such a request. Since the claim was not presented
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to the trial court first, it is not preserved for our review and we will not comment
further. Kennedy, supra.
Bob’s second complaint is that the trial court should have required
Sheila to pay part of the $20,500.00 Bob borrowed from his brother to pay tuition
for Matt’s senior year of college. While Bob testified both children had been
promised a college education, Sheila testified Matt was never told he would not
have to contribute to his college degree. When there is conflicting testimony, the
trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. CR 52.01. Matt was
emancipated at the time Bob received the loan from his brother. There was no
testimony Sheila agreed to the loan for the purpose of paying Matt’s tuition. In
light of the proof, we cannot say the trial court’s findings of fact are “clearly
contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 58
(Ky.App. 1990). Thus, there is no basis for reversal.
Bob’s final complaint about the division of marital debt is that Sheila
should have been responsible for half of the $77,000.00 he borrowed from his
brother because that money benefited the marriage. In his motion to alter, amend
or vacate, Bob says the loan was used to pay “automobile insurance payments,
mortgage payments, payments on life insurance loans and other debt which did
benefit the marital community.” The trial court denied the requested relief because
Bob:
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failed to specify the portion of the loan from his brother
used to benefit the marital estate. Evidence of how the
amount of the loans from Bob’s brother (except that
$20,500 was for college expenses for the party’s son)
used for marital purposes were not presented during the
trial and this Court cannot make decisions on evidence
not of record. No evidence was presented that Shelia
(sic) participated in or had knowledge of the extent of
these payments or there (sic) ultimate use.
Bob’s appellate brief did not identify the evidence the trial court found to be
lacking. Without such proof we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in
dividing the marital debt between Bob and Sheila. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52
S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). Thus, there is no basis for reversal.
MAINTENANCE
Bob contends the trial court awarded $1,000.00 in monthly
maintenance to Sheila for nine years in contravention of KRS 403.200. He argues
the court based its decision solely on the standard of living of the parties while they
were married. Sheila contends the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
Whether to grant maintenance lies solely within a trial court's sound
discretion. Maintenance may be awarded if the requesting spouse cannot
otherwise provide for his/her reasonable needs and cannot support himself/herself
“through appropriate employment.” KRS 403.200(1). In analyzing a request for
maintenance, a trial court must consider:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to
him, and his ability to meet his needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a
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child living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the
marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the
spouse seeking maintenance.
KRS 403.200(2). After reciting the statutory factors mentioned above, the trial
court evaluated Sheila’s current salary, her potential earning capacity (calculated to
be about one-half of Bob’s average income over the last five years), interest on
liquid assets apportioned to her, her age, and the unlikelihood she could
significantly increase her earning power before reaching retirement age. The court
also considered the standard of living established during the twenty-nine year
marriage as required by KRS 403.200(2)(c). Contrary to Bob’s claim, the award of
maintenance was not based solely upon the standard of living to which Sheila had
grown accustomed during almost three decades of marriage. We perceive no abuse
of discretion in the trial court commenting upon the difference in the
unencumbered value of the marital residence Bob chose to keep ($450,000.00) and
the fully financed home Sheila bought for herself ($101,500.00). These factors
bear upon Sheila’s ability to meet her needs and upon Bob’s ability to provide for
himself and pay his maintenance obligation. Bob has no house mortgage; Sheila
does. The amount of maintenance awarded to Sheila is reasonable. We will not
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substitute our judgment for that of the trial court where its decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1990).
Accordingly, there is no basis for reversal.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Vicki L. Buba
Oldfather Law Firm
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Mary Janice Lintner
Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Mahan, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Douglas S. Haynes
Fernandez Friedman Haynes & Kohn,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
Vicki L. Buba
Oldfather Law Firm
Louisville, Kentucky
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