MOSES (FELIX) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001930-MR
FELIX MOSES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00156
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Felix Moses appeals his conviction in the McCreary Circuit
Court for rape in the third degree. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
On October 30, 2004, a judgment of paternity was entered adjudging
Moses, an adult, the father of a child born to D.F., a minor. On November 22, 2004, a
McCreary County grand jury indicted Moses for third-degree rape for having engaged in
sexual intercourse with a person who was less than sixteen years old.
After two mistrials, Moses’ trial began on June 22, 2006. The
Commonwealth primarily relied on the testimony of D.F., the victim. She testified that
she met Moses when she was twelve years old, and the two developed an intimate
relationship which culminated in sexual intercourse when she was fourteen.
She further testified that she informed Moses of her age prior to engaging
in sexual intercourse with him and that she never misled Moses about her age.
Specifically, she denied ever telling Moses that she was seventeen. Further, the
Commonwealth introduced several photographs of D.F. which depicted her physical
appearance at various times between meeting Moses and the birth of their child.
Moses testified that he believed D.F. was over the age of fourteen when
they had sexual intercourse. Moses’ father, Felix Moses Sr., testified that the victim
informed him she was seventeen and aggressively pursued his son. Moses’ mother,
Margie Moses, gave similar testimony.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Moses guilty of third-degree
rape. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Moses to
one year’s imprisonment. This appeal follows.
Moses contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal. He argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to
find that he believed D.F. was less than sixteen years old when they had sexual
intercourse. Thus, pursuant to KRS 510.030, he contends that the trial court should
have granted his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
On appellate review of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, our
analysis is to determine “whether, under the evidence viewed as a whole, it was clearly
unreasonable for the jury to have found the defendant guilty.” Bray v. Commonwealth,
177 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Ky. 2005). We further recognize that the Commonwealth bears
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the burden of proof in establishing each element of a charged crime otherwise a
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict should be granted. Williams v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986).
KRS 510.060(1)(b) provides that “[a] person is guilty of rape in the third
degree when being twenty-one (21) years old or more, he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with another person less than sixteen (16) years old.” However, as a
defense, KRS 510.030 provides the following:
In any prosecution under this chapter in which the victim's lack
of consent is based solely on his incapacity to consent
because he was less than sixteen (16) years old, mentally
retarded, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, the
defendant may prove in exculpation that at the time he
engaged in the conduct constituting the offense he did not
know of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity
to consent.
Thus, the mistaken belief as to the age of the victim (inability to consent) can exculpate
a defendant from criminal liability. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 223, 160 S.W.2d
649 (1942).
Moses contends there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had
knowledge that D.F. was under sixteen when they engaged in sexual intercourse.
Specifically, he contends that D.F. and her mother led him to believe that D.F. was
sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their sexual intercourse. Additionally,
although D.F. testified that she informed Moses of her age before intercourse, Moses
points out that D.F. did not specifically testify as to what age she told him prior to the
illegal conduct.
He further contends that his introduction of evidence regarding his
memory loss, major depression, nervous disorder, and low I.Q. of 80 should have been
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accepted as bolstering his testimony that he was unaware that D.F. was under sixteen.
He argues that his parents’ testimony, that D.F. had told them that she was seventeen,
was improperly disregarded by the jury.
Despite Moses’ recitation of the trial testimony, his contention is
unconvincing because there was sufficient evidence, viewed as a whole, to permit the
jury to reasonably find Moses guilty of third-degree rape. The Commonwealth
introduced D.F.’s testimony that she never mislead Moses regarding her age and never
informed him that she was seventeen.
The Commonwealth also introduced several photographs of D.F. depicting
her at the age of 12, when she first met Moses, to the age of 14, when they engaged in
sexual intercourse. While Moses now contends that the photograph depicting D.F. at
age twelve was inaccurate, the photograph was apparently admitted without objection
and constituted competent evidence for the jury to consider.
Accordingly, based on the evidence before the jury, there was sufficient
evidence to find Moses guilty of rape in the third degree. D.F. testified that she never
misled him regarding her age. Additionally, a photograph of D.F. taken when she was
twelve, at the time when Moses first met her, was introduced as evidence. Thus, in
addition to testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that Moses knew D.F. had not
reached sixteen years of age at the time of intercourse.
While Moses cites the comments to KRS 510.030 for the proposition that
his mistaken belief did not have to be reasonable, the jury is entrusted with the sacred
duty of observing and weighing the credibility of witnesses and evidence. In fulfilling its
obligation, the jury did not believe Moses’ testimony that he believed D.F. was sixteen
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years old or more. Therefore, when considering all of the evidence, we cannot
conclude that the jury’s finding was unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCreary Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Angela Johnson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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