CONWAY (PATRICIA L.), ET AL. VS. SALT RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE COOPERATION
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RENDERED: JULY 11, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001919-MR
PATRICIA L. CONWAY; HAROLD MCLAUGHLIN;
PAUL PRICE; AND DAVID CROSS
CROSS-APPELLANTS
v.
CROSS-APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, SENIOR JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01319
SALT RIVER ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE COOPERATION
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Patricia L. Conway, Harold McLaughlin, Paul Price,
and David Cross appeal from a Bullitt Circuit Court opinion and order granting
summary judgment in their favor and finding that Salt River Electric Cooperative
Corporation (SRECC) had participated in unlawful corporate activity. We affirm.
In 2005, SRECC bought 7.25 acres of land in Bullitt County,
Kentucky. SRECC then began the necessary steps to have the property annexed
and rezoned in anticipation of selling it to Sabert Manufacturing Company.
Appellants filed a complaint in Bullitt Circuit Court and sought an order requiring
SRECC to cease development, re-zoning, or any other action that would cause the
property to become industrial property and ordering SRECC to dispose of the
property. Appellants filed two amended complaints, which essentially sought the
same relief in addition to an order requiring SRECC to cease all buying and selling
of land. Ultimately, SRECC and the appellants moved for summary judgment. In
an order entered on May 24, 2006, the trial court granted the appellants’ motion for
summary judgment after opining that SRECC’s actions were not appropriate under
the law governing rural electric cooperative corporations, KRS2 Chapter 279.3
Specifically, the trial court found that SRECC did not have the authority to
purchase and sell real property to potential electric customers.
SRECC next filed a motion seeking to have the May, 24, 2006,
opinion and order made final and appealable or, in the alternative, to alter, amend
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
This Chapter has since been revised.
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or vacate said judgment. On August 9, 2006, the trial court entered an opinion and
order denying SRECC’s motion and ordering them to sell the 75-acre tract of real
estate “as soon as reasonably feasible.” The trial court also noted that the property
had already been rezoned and the parties were involved in a separate proceeding
relating to the zone change ordinance. SRECC appealed4 and appellants crossappealed the portion of the trial court’s orders that failed to direct SRECC to cease
to develop, rezone, or cause the property to become industrial property. SRECC’s
direct appeal was later dismissed on their motion, in an order entered by the Court
on October 25, 2007. Appellants’ cross-appeal remains.
The standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App.1996). Summary judgment is
proper when it appears that it would be impossible for the adverse party to produce
evidence at trial supporting a judgment in his favor. James Graham Brown
Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Ky.1991).
An appellate court must review the record in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion and must resolve all doubts in his favor. Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.1991).
Appellants argue that the trial court committed clear error by
permitting SRECC to illegally purchase, hold, develop and rezone land for resale.
Salt River Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Patricia L. Conway, 2006-CA-001865 (Order
Dismissing Appeal entered October 12, 2007).
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They also argue that the remedy, requiring the property to be sold, constituted an
abuse of discretion because it permitted SRECC to complete its illegal scheme.
Specifically, appellants argue that the trial court erred by failing to void the
purchase of the 75 acres by SRECC, the annexation, and the rezoning. They ask
the Court to remand the matter with direction that the trial court void the purchase
of the property by SRECC.
By appellants’ own admission, the annexation and the rezoning issues
are being pursued in other actions.5 Appellants have a remedy available to them in
those proceedings and therefore it would not be appropriate for the trial court to
make a ruling on those issues in a separate proceeding. Accordingly, we will not
address those issues.
The only remaining issue, therefore, is the original purchase of the
property by SRECC. However, we do not believe this issue to be properly
preserved. CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). In their final amended complaint, appellants
demanded the following:
1. That an order issue [sic] to [d]efendant that it cease
all activities to develop, re-zone or take any action to
cause the property . . . to become industrial property.
2. That [d]efendant be [o]rdered to conform all of it’s
[sic] activities so that it conforms to the provisions of
KRS Chapter 279.
3. That [d]efendant be [o]rdered to dispose of the
property . . . and any other property it has purchased .
..
At the time the briefs were submitted to the Court action 07-CI-01303 was pending in Bullitt
Circuit Court. The other two actions, 05-CI-1364 and 06-CI-00790, were pending on appeal,
Harris G. White, Jr. v. City of Hillview, Kentucky, 2006-CA-002482-MR.
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4. That [p]laintiffs be awarded all other relief to which
they may appear to be entitled including their cost
herein expected.
Nowhere in their final or prior complaints, or by motion, did appellants ask that the
sales contract between SRECC and the original owner be declared void. When
asked about this absence during oral argument, appellant’s counsel cited to the
language which requests that SRECC “cease all activities” and “conform to the
provision of KRS 279.” We do not believe this language to be indicative of the
appellants’ desire to have the sales contract declared null and void. To ask that
activities be ceased and that a sales contract/property transfer be declared void are
two very different requests. If appellants had wished the sales contract to be
declared void, they were provided with ample opportunity to ask as much in the
three complaints that were filed in the action.
Appellants also claim that this issue was preserved by a motion filed
on March 3, 2006. This motion, however, seeks to have the contract between
SRECC and Sabert declared null and void, not the contract between SRECC and
the original owner of the property. These two sales contracts occurred at different
times with only SRECC as a common party in both actions. Asking for one to be
declared void does not result in an all-inclusive request for the other to be declared
void.
Lastly, we note that the appellants failed to join the appropriate parties
to secure the relief they seek. See CR6 19.01. In order to acquire an order voiding
6
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the original sale to SRECC, appellants should have included all of those parties
who were implemental in those acts and which such an order would affect, namely
the original owner of the land from which SRECC purchased it. Appellants argue
that SRECC failed to raise the defense of failure to join an indispensable party and
thus any such argument is waived. We do not agree. The failure of a party to raise
the defense of failure to join an indispensable party does not change the fact that
the court does not have jurisdiction over those parties. Accordingly, the trial court
cannot enter an order to the prejudice of one who is not a party to the action and
who has sold the land to SRECC in good faith. Furthermore, appellants’ argument
is disingenuous, in that they were the party that failed to request the relief that
would require the joinder of other parties. Therefore, we do not believe the trial
court committed error by failing to enter an order voiding the zoning change,
annexation, or sale of the property to SRECC.
For the foregoing reasons, the May 25, 2006, opinion and order and
the August 9, 2006, opinion and order of the Bullitt Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR CROSS-APPELLANTS:
John E. Spainhour
Givhan & Spainhour, PSC
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR CROSS-APPELLEE:
John Douglas Hubbard
Regina Rapier Beckman
Fulton, Hubbard & Hubbard
Bardstown, Kentucky
Bixler W. Howland
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR CROSSAPPELLEE:
John Douglas Hubbard
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