AUBREY (JEFFREY LYLE) VS. AUBREY (KAREN BRADLEY)
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RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001837-MR
JEFFREY LYLE AUBREY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY M. WALSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00116
KAREN BRADLEY AUBREY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Jeffrey Lyle Aubrey (“Jeff”) appeals from an order of the
Madison Circuit Court denying his motion to set aside a separation agreement
between Jeff and his former wife, Karen Bradley Aubrey (“Karen”). After
carefully reviewing the record, we affirm.
Jeff and Karen were married in 1971. Karen, through counsel,
initiated divorce proceedings in January 2004. Jeff, pro se, signed a settlement
agreement resolving issues relating to marital property, assets, and debts. The
agreement was filed with the court on February 27, 2004. On March 5, 2004, the
circuit court rendered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of legal
separation incorporating the settlement agreement.1
More than two years later, on May 15, 2006, Jeff, through counsel,
filed a motion to set aside or modify the settlement agreement on grounds of
unconscionability.2 The court denied Jeff’s motion on August 9, 2006. This
appeal followed.
Jeff argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to set aside or modify the separation agreement. He contends the settlement
agreement should be reopened pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 60.02(d) and set aside as unconscionable.3 The rule states:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: * * * (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other
than perjury or falsified evidence; * * * The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time . . . .
1
It is unclear why the court rendered a decree of legal separation rather than dissolution.
2
Jeff also moved the court to convert the decree of legal separation into a decree of dissolution.
Karen opines that Jeff’s pleadings below failed to designate that he was seeking CR 60.02
relief. We conclude that it was not a fatal flaw, as “the name given to a pleading is not
controlling, as its character is always to be determined by the averments in the pleading.”
Powell v. C. Hazen's Store, Inc., 322 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1959).
3
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Karen argues that Jeff failed to assert grounds that warrant reopening
pursuant to CR 60.02(d). Jeff primarily relies on Burke v. Sexton, 814 S.W.2d 290
(Ky. App. 1991), where Ms. Sexton, pro se, signed an agreement that divided
property in her husband’s favor and waived further notice of all court proceedings.
Id. at 291. Thereafter, Mr. Burke reconciled with his wife and told her that he had
stopped the pending divorce. Id. In actuality, Mr. Burke went forward with the
divorce, and the decree was granted without notice to Ms. Sexton. Id. at 291-92.
On review, a panel of this Court concluded Mr. Burke’s behavior amounted to
“fraud affecting the proceedings” pursuant to CR 60.02(d) which justified
reopening the judgment. Id. at 292.
Likewise, in Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816 (Ky. 2002), the
Court concluded reopening pursuant to CR 60.02(d) was proper where Mr.
Terwilliger knowingly undervalued marital assets for the purpose of decreasing his
wife’s share in the settlement agreement. Id. at 818.
In contrast to the facts of Burke and Terwilliger, Jeff does not allege
his wife made material misrepresentations or that he was unaware of the terms to
which he agreed. The record shows he signed an agreed order to submit the case
for final adjudication after the settlement agreement was tendered. Now, Jeff,
without elaboration, asserts he was at a disadvantage without counsel, and he was
under duress when he signed the agreement.
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In its order denying relief, the trial court noted Jeff had complied with
the agreement for two years, and he did not allege malfeasance on the part of
Karen in his failure to litigate the case.
In sum, we are not persuaded that Jeff’s allegations amount to “fraud
affecting the proceedings” warranting reopening of the judgment pursuant to CR
60.02(d).
Nevertheless, we also conclude Jeff has failed to show the separation
agreement is unconscionable. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.180(4)
requires the trial court to consider whether a settlement agreement is
unconscionable prior to incorporating it into a decree of dissolution. See Peterson
v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Ky. App. 1979). “A separation agreement
which was originally determined not to be unconscionable may later be modified if
due to a change in circumstances the agreement has become unconscionable.”
Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Peterson, supra.).
Here, in the decree of legal separation, the trial court concluded the
separation agreement was conscionable; consequently, “modification is []
impermissible absent a showing of a change in circumstances.” Id. at 797.
Jeff contends the settlement agreement was unfair and lopsided at its
inception. He does not allege a change in circumstances warranting modification
of the agreement. The record shows that Jeff willingly entered into the settlement
agreement, which addressed disposition of significant marital debts that the parties
agreed to pay jointly. While Jeff is clearly disappointed with the result of his
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agreement, it cannot be found “unconscionable solely on the basis that it is a bad
bargain.” Peterson, 583 S.W.2d at 712.
Finally, Jeff alternatively argues that the court should have modified
his maintenance obligation. However, the circuit court’s order only addressed
Jeff’s request to set aside the entire agreement. The court did not specifically
address the alternative theory of maintenance modification, and Jeff did not request
specific findings. Consequently, we are precluded from reviewing this alternative
claim for relief. Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
For the reasons stated herein, the order of Madison Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James A. Shuffett
Lexington, Kentucky
David Wickersham
Coy, Gilbert & Gilbert
Richmond, Kentucky
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