COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. THOMAS LEE CRUM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
MARCH 28, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-001419-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00369
v.
THOMAS LEE CRUM
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ACREE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from a
judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court ordering the Commonwealth
to compensate Thomas Crum for work performed as an inmate while
he was incarcerated in a Florida penitentiary under the
Interstate Corrections Compact.
KRS 196.610.
The Commonwealth
argues the circuit court incorrectly interpreted KRS 196.610 and
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
ignored the terms of the contract, entered into pursuant to the
statute, between the State of Florida and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
We agree and reverse the judgment of the circuit
court.
Crum was convicted of numerous felonies in Nelson and
Oldham counties and was sentenced to serve over 405 years in the
penitentiary.
He was transferred to a Florida facility in April
1992, pursuant to the interstate compact agreement between
Florida and Kentucky.
This agreement is authorized by KRS
196.610 and the terms are specifically set forth in the
“CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND THE STATE [SIC] OF
KENTUCKY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS
COMPACT”.
In March 2003, Crum filed a petition for a
declaration of rights in the Franklin Circuit Court.
He
challenged the validity of the interstate compact and his
transfer to Florida, as well as the fact that Kentucky did not
compensate him for work he was required to do as a Florida
inmate.
The circuit court denied the challenge to the transfer
under the compact, but the court’s order granted Crum’s request
to be reimbursed by Kentucky for his inmate labor in Florida.
This appeal followed.
The Commonwealth raises two arguments on appeal.
First, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit court
erroneously interpreted KRS 196.610 to require the Commonwealth
to reimburse Crum for inmate labor performed while he was in a
Florida penitentiary.
Next, the Commonwealth asserts, even if
-2-
the circuit court correctly interpreted the statute, the
judgment contains an insufficient basis upon which to inform the
Commonwealth of the extent of its liability.
Crum failed to
submit any records of the type or amount of work performed, as
well as any compensation received while incarcerated in Florida.
Consequently, the circuit court’s judgment is mute as to the
amount of damages owed by the Commonwealth.
When Crum submitted his pro se Appellee brief, he
included in the appendix extra-judicial records regarding his
inmate work in Florida.
The entire second half of his brief is
supported by these records and, based upon them, he claims the
Commonwealth owes him $6,392.00.
The Commonwealth responded
with a motion to strike the brief for failure to comply with
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12.
That motion was
passed by the motions panel of this Court for consideration with
the merits by this panel.
We will dispose of this issue before
addressing the circuit court’s erroneous statutory
interpretation.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(vii) governs the contents of a brief’s
appendix and contains this prohibition:
“Except for matters of
which the appellate court may take judicial notice, materials
and documents not included in the record shall not be introduced
or used as exhibits in support of briefs.”
CR 76.12(8)(a)
permits, but does not require, a brief to be stricken for
failure to comply substantially with the rule.
We have
previously ruled that an appellate court may elect not to
-3-
consider a portion of a brief as a penalty for failure to comply
with CR 76.12.
1985).
Pierson v. Coffey, 706 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky.App.
In light of Crum’s status as a pro se litigant, we have
elected not to strike his brief in its entirety, but to
disregard only that portion of his brief that relies on the
extra-judicial materials contained in the appendix.
Further,
since we have determined that the Commonwealth is not required
by KRS 196.610 to reimburse Crum for his inmate work in Florida,
the issue of the circuit court’s failure to specify the amount
of damages is moot.
The circuit court found that the interstate corrections
compact, KRS 196.610, required the Commonwealth to compensate
Crum for inmate labor he performed in Florida.
Article IV(h) of
that compact provides:
Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of
this compact shall have any and all rights
to participate in and derive any benefits or
incur or be relieved of any obligations or
have such obligations modified or his status
changed on account of any action or
proceeding in which he could have
participated if confined in any appropriate
institution of the sending state located
within such state.
KRS 197.070(1) requires the Department of Corrections to provide
employment for all prisoners confined to penitentiaries.
KRS
197.110(4) directs the Department to promulgate administrative
regulations regarding the amount and manner of payment to
prisoners for their labor.
The circuit court reasoned that,
since Crum would have been employed and paid by the Commonwealth
-4-
had he been confined to a penitentiary within Kentucky, to allow
the Commonwealth to avoid paying him for his work in Florida
would be in conflict with the clear language of Article IV(h) of
the interstate compact.
The circuit court’s reasoning focused solely on
Article IV (a) and (h).
We have previously discussed the latter
section; the former reads as follows:
(a)
Whenever the duly constituted
authorities in a state party to this
compact, and which has entered into a
contract pursuant to article III, shall
decide that confinement in, or transfer
of an inmate to, an institution within
the territory of another party state is
necessary or desirable in order to
provide adequate quarters and care or
an appropriate program of
rehabilitation or treatment, said
officials may direct that the
confinement be within an institution
within the territory of said other
party state, the receiving state to act
in that regard solely as agent for the
sending state.
Based on the phrase “the receiving state to act in that regard
solely as agent for the sending state,” and the language of
section (h), the circuit court concluded that the Commonwealth
was responsible for compensating Crum for his inmate employment
in Florida.
We disagree.
Article III(a)(3) of the interstate compact requires
any contract between Kentucky and another state, pursuant to the
compact, to specify the terms under which inmates will
participate in inmate employment programs.
The compact between
Kentucky and Florida contains an entire section devoted to
-5-
inmate training or employment.
The relevant portions of Section
14 of the contract read as follows:
Training or Employment
(a)
Offenders from the sending State
shall be afforded the opportunity
and shall be required to
participate in
programs of occupational
training and
industrial or other work on
the same basis as offenders of the
receiving
State. Compensation in
connection with
any participation
(whether as payment,
incentive, or for
any therapeutic or rehabilitative reason)
shall be paid to
offenders of the sending
State on the
same basis as to offenders of
the receiving State. Any such offenders of
the sending State shall be subject to
the regular work discipline imposed
upon other offender participants in the
particular program. However, nothing
contained herein shall be construed to
permit or require any offender of a
sending State to participate
in any training, industrial or work
program contrary to the laws of the
sending State.
(b)
The receiving State shall have the
right to dispose of all products
produced by an offender, shall retain
all proceeds therefrom, and shall bear
all costs of said program. [emphasis
added]
Consequently, according to the terms of the contract, Florida
was responsible for any compensation owed to Crum.
Further,
Crum was not entitled to be paid according to the Kentucky
Department of Corrections’ regulations governing inmate
employment since Section 14(a) of the contract specifies that he
would be compensated on the same basis as offenders from the
receiving State, in this case, Florida.
-6-
The circuit court’s order completely ignored Article
III of the compact, as well as the language in Section 14 of the
contract between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the State of
Florida.
Inasmuch as there may be said to be a conflict between
KRS 196.610 Article IV(h) and Section 14 of the contract, we
turn to the rules governing statutory construction.
We first note that Section 14 derives its authority
from KRS 196.610 Article III(a)(3) which requires contracts
pursuant to the interstate compact to specify the terms of
inmate employment.
Thus, we must determine whether Article
III(a)(3) trumps Article IV(h) with regard to this issue.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has provided the following
guideline to statutory construction:
When there appears to be a conflict between
two statutes, as here, a general rule of
statutory construction mandates that the
specific provision take precedence over the
general. Moreover, it is the Court's duty
to harmonize the law so as to give effect to
both statutes. Finally, statutes should be
construed in such a way that they do not
become meaningless or ineffectual.
Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106, 107-08 (Ky. 2000).
Article
III(a)(3) specifically requires contracts pursuant to the
interstate compact to establish the terms for “the disposition or
crediting of any payments received by inmates on account” of
their participation in inmate employment programs.
Thus, its
language is specific to the issue of inmate employment.
Article
IV(h) does not specifically govern inmate employment.
Consequently, Article III(a)(3) takes precedence on that issue.
-7-
Further, the circuit court’s construction of Article IV(h),
requiring the Commonwealth to treat Crum’s inmate employment as
if it had occurred in Kentucky rather than Florida, robs Article
III(a)(3) of its authority to allow contracts between states to
govern inmate employment.
This is contrary to the principle that
“statutes should be construed in such a way that they do not
become meaningless[.]”
Phon, 17 S.W.3d at 108.
Finally, we note that even if Crum receives no
compensation for his inmate employment, there is no
constitutional violation.
“An inmate has no constitutional
right to a specific educational or vocational program in prison.
. . . It is well settled that an inmate has no constitutional
right to be rehabilitated.”
Archer v. Reno, 877 F.Supp. 372,
377 (E.D.Ky. 1995)(citations omitted).
about “diminished liberties.”
730 (D.C.Ky. 1974).
Incarceration brings
Preston v. Ford, 378 F.Supp. 729,
Among the liberties diminished are the
rights to “participation in a particular prison job, . . . or
payment for work while incarcerated.”
Id.
(Internal citation
omitted; emphasis supplied).
We conclude that the circuit court’s failure to
consider KRS 196.610 Article III(a)(3) and Section 14 of the
contract between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the State of
Florida, led to an erroneous interpretation of KRS 196.610.
Since the statute does not require the Commonwealth to
compensate Crum for inmate labor he performed while incarcerated
in Florida, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is
-8-
reversed and this case is remanded for entry of an order
dismissing Crum’s petition for declaration of rights.
Further, the Commonwealth's motion to strike Crum's
brief is denied as moot.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
March 28, 2008
/s/ Glenn Acree
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brenn O. Combs
Frankfort, Kentucky
Thomas Lee Crum, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
