HOWARD (BYRON) VS. NOT BE PUBLISHED HOWARD (RUTH GOLDEN)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001362-MR
BYRON HOWARD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00182
RUTH GOLDEN HOWARD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Byron Howard appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and decree of dissolution of marriage from the Whitley Circuit Court
dissolving the marriage between Byron and Appellee, Ruth Golden Howard.
Byron and Ruth were first married in 1975 and divorced in early
1983. After divorcing, the parties reconciled, but did not remarry until May 10,
1995. Byron, an attorney, and Ruth, an accountant, had two children during their
second marriage.
The parties separated in June 2005, and Ruth filed a petition for
dissolution in Bell Circuit Court on July 25, 2005. Byron was served with the
petition and summons on September 23, 2005. Thereafter, on October 28, 2005,
Byron, pro se, filed an untimely motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Bell
Circuit Court denied Byron’s motion to dismiss on November 21, 2005.
Inexplicably, Byron failed to participate in any further proceedings, including
Ruth’s deposition. In February 2006, Byron retained an attorney, Mr. Cline, for
the limited purpose of challenging venue. Thereafter, Byron, through counsel,
filed a second motion to dismiss for improper venue. On February 20, 2006, rather
than dismiss the case, Bell Circuit Court entered an order transferring the case to
Whitley Circuit Court.
On March 15, 2006, Byron underwent open-heart surgery and
remained hospitalized for two weeks. On March 28, 2006, Mr. Cline, after
consulting with Byron, moved to withdraw as counsel.1 Also on March 28, Ruth
moved for a final hearing on the decree of dissolution. The hearing was held on
April 10, 2006, and the court rendered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
decree of dissolution. Byron did not attend the hearing, as he had re-entered the
hospital on April 3, due to surgical complications. Likewise, Mr. Cline did not
attend the hearing on Byron’s behalf. Shortly thereafter, Byron retained new
1
The Whitley Circuit Court granted the motion to withdraw on May 5, 2006.
-2-
counsel and filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the decree. Following a
hearing on May 8, 2006, the court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
Byron contends the decree constituted a default judgment against him.
He relies on Childress v. Childress, 335 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1960) for the proposition
that, “[b]ecause of public concern, the court should be liberal in divorce
proceedings in permitting the raising of issues so that there may be full opportunity
to present all the evidence.” Id. at 353-54. In Childress, the husband, who was
illiterate, asked the court for leave to file a belated answer and affidavit
challenging his wife’s allegations. Id. at 352. The husband’s request came one
month after the filing deadline and prior to the entry of the divorce decree. Id. The
trial court denied the husband’s motion and entered a default judgment of divorce.
Id. On review, Kentucky’s highest court reversed, noting that the movant had
made a prima facie challenge to the divorce action. Id. at 354. As Byron points
out, the Childress court observed that default judgments in divorce cases are
disfavored. Id. However, the court went on to say, “delay in pleading without
reasonable excuse cannot always be overlooked.” Id.
Byron also relies on Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v. Chemical Design Co.,
Inc., 899 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. App. 1995). In Sunrise, a panel of this Court elucidated
that, to set aside a default judgment, “the moving party must show: (1) a valid
excuse for the default; (2) a meritorious defense to the claim; and (3) absence of
prejudice to the non-defaulting party.” Id. at 859.
-3-
Byron argues that he was entitled to present evidence in his defense
challenging the division of an investment account and his ability to pay child
support. He claims his absence from the final hearing was excusable because he
was hospitalized, and alternatively, because he believed Ruth would postpone the
hearing after she informally signed a note on April 3, 2006, giving him additional
time to respond to the petition.
While we acknowledge Byron’s hospitalization during the end of
March 2006, it is unrefuted that Byron was an attorney in good standing with the
Kentucky Bar Association. In his arguments to this Court, Byron ignores the fact
that his initial motion to dismiss in Bell Circuit Court was untimely, and he does
not address his failure to participate in the litigation after his first motion to dismiss
was denied in November 2005. Furthermore, he does not explain his failure to
seek permission to file a belated response to Ruth’s petition once the case was
transferred. See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02 (movant may seek
enlargement of time to file belated response based on “excusable neglect”).
Instead, Byron asserts that once venue was established in Whitley Circuit Court, he
was prepared to “actively pursue” the case, but his mid-March hospitalization
prevented it.
We, like the trial court, find Byron’s excuses unpersuasive. We note
that, “[a]lthough default judgments are not favored, a trial court is vested with
broad discretion when considering motions to set them aside, and an appellate
court will not overturn the trial court's decision absent a showing that the trial court
-4-
abused its discretion.” PNC Bank, N.A. v. Citizens Bank of Northern Kentucky,
Inc., 139 S.W.3d 527, 530-31 (Ky. App. 2003) (citation omitted). After thorough
consideration of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Byron’s motion to set aside the decree.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Whitley Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. Wayne Shepherd
Corbin, Kentucky
Darrell L. Saunders
Corbin, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.