KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS. COYLE (WILLIAM LESLIE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 16, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001335-MR
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00039
WILLIAM LESLIE COYLE;
MARTHA TWEED; MICHAEL
DAVID ELLIOTT
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company appeals
from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict holding that a homeowner’s policy issued in
the name of Martha Tweed applied so as to provide liability coverage in connection with
an incident during which William Leslie Coyle, Tweed’s husband, shot and injured
Michael David Elliott. As an issue of fact, the jury determined that the shooting was not
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
intentional, but was, rather, a product of negligence. For the reasons stated below, we
reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Farm Bureau.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Coyle and Tweed were married in 1999 and in January 2001 were living at
a residence owned by Tweed in Boston, Kentucky, on Dones Lane. The residence was
insured under a policy issued by Farm Bureau.
Tweed and Elliott were both employed at Ambrake and became
acquainted as a result of being coworkers. According to Coyle, Elliott became attracted
to Tweed and attempted to date her. Upon being rebuffed, Elliott began harassing her
and Coyle. Acts of harassment included stalking her, vandalizing Coyle’s and Tweed’s
property, and writing obscene messages concerning Tweed on traffic signs in the
Dones Lane area. The harassment had been ongoing for about a year.
On January 19, 2001, Tweed and Coyle were at home when Coyle
noticed Elliott driving by their residence. Coyle thereupon decided to confront Elliott,
grabbed a Colt .22 pistol belonging to Tweed, and pursued Elliott. Coyle caught up with
Elliott as he was entering the Bluegrass Parkway from Highway 62.
Coyle passed Elliott and pulled his vehicle in front of Elliott’s vehicle,
blocking it. Coyle exited his vehicle and walked toward Elliott’s vehicle intending to
confront him concerning the situation. Elliott, however, sped off around Coyle’s vehicle
and proceeded west toward Elizabethtown. As Elliott sped away, Coyle pulled the pistol
from his jacket pocket and fired two shots at Elliott’s vehicle. At least one of the shots
struck Elliott’s vehicle on this occasion. Coyle then reentered his vehicle and resumed
his pursuit.
The chase continued until Elliott pulled into the parking lot of Lincoln Trail
Elementary School in Elizabethtown with Coyle close behind. While attempting to turn
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around in the snow-covered school parking lot, Elliott slid into a chain link fence and
came to a stop. Coyle pulled in behind Elliott, exited his vehicle, and approached
Elliot’s vehicle.
Elliott lowered a window on the drivers’ side and Coyle walked around to
the side of his vehicle under the assumption that Elliott was going to talk to him. As
Coyle approached the side of the vehicle, however, Elliott again attempted to flee.
Coyle thereupon fired two shots from the pistol through the open window of the vehicle,
striking Elliott in the scapular area of his left shoulder. The bullet punctured and
collapsed his lung. As further discussed below, the principal issue in this case is
whether the shots Coyle fired at the elementary school were intended to strike Elliott, or
were not intended to strike him but instead struck him “by accident.”2
On January 9, 2002, Elliott filed a Complaint against Coyle in Hardin
Circuit Court alleging the intentional torts of assault and battery. The Complaint also
sought punitive damages. Coyle answered, denying liability, and filed a counterclaim
alleging counts based upon harassment, stalking, and outrageous conduct.
Eventually Tweed’s Farm Bureau policy and its potential coverage came
to light, and on September 17, 2003, Farm Bureau filed an intervening petition for
declaration of rights seeking a declaratory judgment that the Tweed policy did not cover
the events of January 19, 2001, and that it had no liability under the policy. Tweed was
also added to the litigation as an intervening respondent.
Coyle was an “insured” under Tweed’s insurance policy because he was a
relative (her husband) living in her household. However, as relevant here, the policy’s
As a result of his conduct Coyle was indicted on one count of first-degree assault and five
counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. Coyle eventually pled guilty to first-degree assault
under extreme emotional disturbance and five counts of first-degree wanton endangerment.
Coyle was sentenced to a total of seven years’ imprisonment, probated for five years. For his
conduct in harassing Tweed, Elliott pled guilty to first-degree stalking. He was sentenced to
three years’ imprisonment and received probation.
2
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liability coverage extended only to an “occurrence,” and an occurrence is defined in the
policy as an “accident.” Further, the policy had an exclusion to liability coverage which
provides that the coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage “[w]hich is
expected or intended by one or more ‘insureds’.”
On December 5, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Elliott’s
motion to file an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint abandoned Elliott’s
intentional assault and battery claims and, instead, grounded his claims against Coyle
upon a negligence theory. The Amended Complaint stated that “[Coyle] negligently
discharged a weapon at Plaintiff’s vehicle, striking Plaintiff,” and that “[Coyle] breached
his duty to use his handgun in a way that avoided injuries to Plaintiff.” The Amended
Complaint thus brought Elliott’s claims within the scope of Tweed’s Farm Bureau
policy.3
On January 28, 2004, Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court denied the motion by order entered July 19, 2004. On September 20,
2005, Farm Bureau filed a second motion for summary judgment. The second motion
was denied by order entered November 28, 2005.
The case was tried before a jury on March 1 and March 2, 2006. At the
conclusion of the trial the jury was presented with the following two interrogatories:
A. Do you believe from the evidence that WILLIAM LESLIE
COYLE intentionally fired a pistol at or in the general
direction of MICHAEL DAVID ELLIOTT with the expected
result of wounding/harming MICHAEL DAVID ELLIIOTT and
was not an “accident” in the sense of being merely negligent
and unintended?
As noted above, n.2, one of the crimes to which Coyle pleaded guilty was first-degree assault
under extreme emotional disturbance, an offense in which “intentionally causing injury or
serious physical injury is an element of the offense;” see KRS 508.010 and 508.040. No
specific estoppel argument was advanced in this case, but the doctrine has found application in
other cases. See, e.g., Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d 220 (Ky.App. 1997); see also Parsley v.
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 103 (Ky.App. 2000).
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B. Do you believe from the evidence that WILLIAM LESLIE
COYLE understood the physical nature of the consequences
of his actions and intended to shoot or expect to injure
MICHAEL DAVID ELLIOTT upon discharge of the firearm on
the date and at the time of the subject incident, and was not
an “accident” in the sense of being merely negligent and
unintended?
The jury answered “no” to both of the foregoing interrogatories, thus determining
Coyle’s shooting of Elliott to be an “accident” which was “merely negligent and
unintended.”
On March 8, 2006, the trial court entered final judgment adjudging that,
because the shooting was an accident, Tweed’s Farm Bureau policy did not preclude
coverage of Coyle, and denying Farm Bureau’s petition for a declaration of noncoverage.
On March 17, 2006, Farm Bureau filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and/or a new trial. On June 5, 2006, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion. This appeal followed.
ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Farm Bureau contends that it was entitled to summary judgment prior to
the commencement of the trial. We agree.
Following the conclusion of discovery, citing Stone v. Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 34 S.W.3d 809 (Ky.App. 2000), Walker v. Economy
Preferred Insurance Company, 909 S.W.2d 343 (Ky.App. 1995), and Thompson v.
West American Insurance Company, 839 S.W.2d 579 (Ky.App. 1992), Farm Bureau
moved for summary judgment. In its motion, Farm Bureau argued that Coyle’s conduct
was so certain to have caused the type of harm which occurred that the shooting should
be deemed intentional as a matter of law pursuant to the inferred intent doctrine as
described in the foregoing cases. The trial court subsequently denied the motion.
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The denial of a motion for summary judgment “is not reviewable on appeal
from a final judgment where the question is whether there exists a genuine issue of
material fact.” Transp. Cabinet, Bureau of Highways, Commonwealth of Kentucky v.
Leneave, 751 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Ky.App. 1988). Further, “once the trial begins, the
underlying purpose of the summary judgment expires and all matters of fact and law
procedurally merge into the trial phase, subject to in-trial motions for directed verdict or
dismissal and post-judgment motions for new trial . . . .” Id. at 38. However, there is an
exception to this rule where: (1) the facts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis of the
ruling is a matter of law, (3) there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there is an entry of a
final judgment with an appeal therefrom. Then, and only then, is the motion for
summary judgment properly reviewable on appeal. Id. at 37.
As further discussed below, we believe that the exception described in
Leneave is applicable in this case, and that the trial court’s denial of summary judgment
is reviewable upon appeal.
Coyle was deposed two times prior to trial.4 Our review of those two
depositions discloses that, as argued by Farm Bureau, Coyle made admissions
sufficient to bring this case within the inferred intent doctrine and, pursuant to that
doctrine, Farm Bureau was entitled to summary judgment.5
In Elliott’s December 17, 2003, deposition, the following exchange
occurred:
Q. So you shot through the driver’s window as he pulled
away?
4
On October 25, 2002, and on December 17, 2002.
While we have concluded that summary judgment should have been granted, we must
acknowledge that the trial record contains substantial evidence in support of the verdict denying
the exclusion. Despite his seemingly inconsistent deposition testimony, Coyle testified at trial
that he “never intended to shoot Mr. Elliott,” that when he fired the shots he was “not thinking of
hitting him with that bullet” and that at the time the shots were fired he did not even consider the
possibility that the bullet would hit Elliott.
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you know you did that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then – which is what you intended to do?
A. Yes, sir.
....
Q. Okay. And again, you intended to discharge that bullet
at Mr. Elliott?
A. Yes, sir.
Thus in the above exchange Coyle admitted that he intentionally and
deliberately discharged a bullet at Elliott during the Lincoln Trail incident.
Similarly, Coyle testified as follows in his December 17, 2006, deposition:
Q. But you were conscious that you had pointed a gun at his
car [at the Bluegrass Parkway exit] and pulled the trigger
weren’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I mean, you knew what you were doing?
A. Oh, yes, sir, yes, sir.
Q. And you intended to do what you did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the same thing at Lincoln Trail. I mean, you
intended to shoot at his car as it drove off, didn’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Thus in this exchange, Coyle admitted that he intended to shoot at the car
occupied by Elliott in the course of the Lincoln Trial incident.
We acknowledge the rule “that if injury was not actually and subjectively
intended or expected by the insured, coverage is provided even though the action giving
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rise to the injury itself was intentional and the injury foreseeable.” James Graham
Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky.
1991), reaffirmed, Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d 633,
639 (Ky. 2007). However, there is an exception to this rule. We believe that exception
is applicable here. That exception is the doctrine of inferred intent.
Although it could be said that Justice Palmore presaged the doctrine of
inferred intent in Graves v. Dairyland Ins. Group, 538 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1976), it was not
examined per se in Kentucky law until five years later in Willis v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co.,
614 S.W.2d 251 (Ky.App. 1981). Willis, like Graves, arose from an assault case. In
Willis, after entry of a jury verdict and judgment finding the defendants guilty of assault,
the plaintiffs amended their complaint to join Hamilton Mutual, which had a
homeowner’s policy covering one of the defendants. We held that the circuit court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Hamilton Mutual due to an exclusion in
the policy for injury or damage which was “expected or intended” by the insured. The
insurance company was not bound by the testimony of its insured, but could assert the
result of the earlier trial regarding the insured’s participation and intent. Id. at 252.
Ten years later in James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., an environmental damage case, the Supreme Court touched on the
inferred intent rule, noting that one could infer from an actor's conduct that he intended
the injury. The court reversed a summary judgment giving effect to an exclusion in the
insurance policy and remanded for factual findings on the issue of whether the business
owner intended or expected the resulting contamination. However, the court stated that
“[c]ertainly the circuit judge is not absolutely prohibited from inferring on summary
judgment that an insured intended or expected damage regardless of whether the
objective or subjective test is used. In some cases, it is almost irrelevant whether an
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objective or subjective test is applied because of the circumstances.” Id. at 277;
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pelgen, 241 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Ky.App. 2007).
The majority of state jurisdictions typically applied the doctrine in the first
instance to preclude insurance coverage where the insured sexually molested a child.
Goldsmith v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio, 890 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky.App. 1994), citing
B.B. v. Continental Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1288, 1293 n.8 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting unanimous
consensus in 1993 among thirty-four states which held that in cases of sexual
molestation or abuse of a minor, the harm resulting to the child was intended as a
matter of law and a subjective test of intention is irrelevant). The reasoning is that “the
act is considered a criminal offense for which public policy precludes a claim of
unintended consequences, that is, a claim that no harm was intended to result from the
act.” Goldsmith at 646 (internal citation and additional bracketed language omitted).
Kentucky courts have applied the doctrine of inferred intent in the specific
context of child molestation. See Thompson v. West American Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d
579, 580-81 (Ky.App. 1992). However, they have not hesitated to apply the doctrine in
other circumstances in which human experience tells us that the nature of the
intentional act presumes an intention to do harm.
We have applied the doctrine even where the insured established a
mental incapacity that did not enable him to form an intent to cause harm.
[W]here the insured’s conduct is both intentional and of such
a nature and character that harm inheres in it, that conduct
affords a sufficiently clear demonstration of intent to harm
subsuming any need for a separate inquiry into capacity.
Once it is determined, strictly by examining the nature and
character of the act in question, that it is appropriate to apply
the inferred intent rule, then the actor’s actual subjective
intent to harm or capacity to form that intent becomes
irrelevant.
Goldsmith at 646 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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In Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau, a case with factual similarities to this
case, we applied the doctrine of inferred intent where the insured pointed a rifle at
another and pulled the trigger.
Michael pointed the rifle directly at Jeremy and shot him at
close range. The resulting bodily harm, or in this case
death, cannot be conceived in any other way other than that
which was the result of a plan, design, or intent. There is no
doubt that pointing and firing a loaded rifle at Jeremy was an
act certain to cause a particular kind of harm[.]
Id. at 812, 813 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We have applied the doctrine where the insured simply punched another
in the face. Walker v. Economy Preferred Ins. Co. at 345. In Walker, the insured
admitted intending to punch his victim. However, he argued on appeal that there should
be coverage under the policy because testimony was “uncontradicted that he [the
insured] did not intend to injure him [the insured’s assaulted victim], and that under the
principles espoused in . . . Brown Foundation, [supra,] it was premature for the trial
court to extinguish [the insurer’s] obligation to provide coverage.” Walker at 344. This
Court disagreed, declaring that
this case presents one of those exceptions alluded to in
Brown Foundation, and that the “inherently injurious” act of
punching someone in the face supports the trial judge’s
inference as a matter of law that [the insured] intended to
injure Walker.
Walker at 345; accord Sigler v. Ralph, 417 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1967)(Even absent
intent to harm, “use of a firearm under these circumstances was enough to justify a jury
in inferring intent.”). “If a trial judge may infer intent to harm from the act of punching
someone in the face, then a fortiori, a trial judge may infer intent to harm from the act of
pointing and shooting a [firearm] at an [individual] at close range.” Stone at 813.
Finally, recently in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pelgen, this Court
applied the inferred intent doctrine to hold that coverage was not provided to a mentally
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ill insured who shot his wife and then killed himself. In Pelgen we stated “[t]he inferred
intent rule is supported by sound public policy principles, in part because it removes
from the trial court the burden of determining an actor's thought process when engaging
in conduct resulting in harm. That is to say, in certain circumstances one may
reasonably infer from the facts that the actor intended the harm, without needing to
resort to proof of that intent.” Pelgen at 817. By way of analogy Pelgen further noted
that “to give merit to a claim that no harm was intended to result from the act of shooting
a loaded weapon into a crowd of people or that such an act was accidental would be
unsound[.]” Id.
We believe that this case presents a factual scenario best resolved by
application of the doctrine of inferred intent. Pursuant to the inferred intent doctrine,
Coyle’s subjective intent to harm Elliott is irrelevant. Once Coyle admitted that he
intentionally pointed his weapon at Elliott and that he “intended to discharge that bullet
at Elliott[,]” we cannot avoid, except through a contorted logic, the determination: (1)
that “the insured's conduct is both intentional and of such a nature and character that
harm inheres in it,” (2) “that it is appropriate to apply the inferred intent rule,” and (3) that
Coyle’s “actual subjective intent to harm . . . becomes irrelevant.” Goldsmith at 646.
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
Coyle’s pretrial admission to intentionally pointing a firearm at Elliott and
intending further to discharge the bullet “at Elliott” establish that the Lincoln Trail
incident was not an “occurrence” contemplated by even a liberal reading and broad
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application of the terms of the insurance policy. Based upon Coyle’s admissions, and
upon application of the inferred intent doctrine, there were no factual issues for
resolution by a jury. Application of the inferred intent doctrine compels the result that
Farm Bureau was entitled to summary judgment following the completion of discovery,
and the case should not have proceeded to trial. Thus, the trial court erred by denying
Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment.
OTHER ISSUES
Farm Bureau also contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict at the
close of the appellees’ evidence on the basis that Coyle’s trial testimony was subject to
only one interpretation and conclusion – that the shot that hit Elliott was an intentional
act, and was not accidental or a product of negligence. Alternatively, Farm Bureau
argues that it was entitled to a new trial because Elliott and Coyle collaborated on their
jury strikes at the conclusion of voir dire.
Because of our disposition of this appeal, these issues are moot, and we
need not discuss them upon the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Farm Bureau.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
R. Keith Bond
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MICHAEL
DAVID ELLIOTT:
Douglas E. Miller
Radcliff, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM
LESLIE COYLE:
Teresa E. Logsdon
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
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