CRUMP (LARRY) VS. MOTLEY (JOHN)
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001085-MR
LARRY CRUMP
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00003
JOHN MOTLEY, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Larry Crump, an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex (EKCC), appeals the Morgan Circuit Court’s dismissal of
his declaratory judgment action in which he requested a review of his disciplinary
proceeding. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
On or about September 13, 2005, prison authorities intercepted a letter
written by Crump to Lisa Parks. In the letter, attached to Part I of the disciplinary
report dated September 14, 2005, Crump wrote, in pertinent part, the following:
Baby we got to get me out of here. It’s getting to where I can’t
deal with it anymore. Weve got to get a plan together and get
me out, than we’ll be together and noone will keep us apart, or
no rules.
Baby its too simple to get me out. you seen how the guard at
court took me. Im in a little car and they park around back
where its nice and secluded. All it takes is to build up some
nerve, and pull the gun when they get me out of the car.
There needs to be two people, I’m gona write Nick in this letter
and you can get it to him. He knows he’s wrong, and he
snitched so he’ll be anxious to do anything to help me out of
here. He of all people know me and what Ill do to him for
doing me the way he has. So when and if he helps, once I’m
out, I wont have no use for him anymore. He can also get guns.
All he’ll need is some Krystal Meth in his system to give him
the balls to do it with you, and I’ll be free.
Following the inspection of this letter, Crump was immediately placed in
administrative segregation pending further investigation.
Subsequently, prison authorities charged Crump with conspiring to
commit physical action resulting in the death or injury of an employee or noninmate, a category VII, item 4, inchoate violation of Corrections Policies and
Procedures (CPP) 15.2. On September 22, 2005, an EKCC adjustment committee
held a disciplinary hearing to consider the charge against Crump.
Following the hearing, the adjustment committee found Crump guilty
of the charged offense and punished him by placing him in disciplinary segregation
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for one year and stripping him of 1,290 days of non-restorable good-time credit.
After his declaration of rights action was dismissed by the trial court, this appeal
followed.
Crump first contends that his constitutional due process rights were
violated when he was charged with conspiring to commit physical action resulting
in the death or injury to another. He contends that the charge is patently
unsupported by the facts and constitutes vindictive prosecution.
As a foundation for our analysis, we observe that prison inmates
facing disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to the full panoply of rights as other
non-institutionalized individuals who are summoned to answer for impermissible
conduct. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-562, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d
935 (1974). Rather, prison inmates simply need to be provided with a minimum
standard of due process. Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky.App. 1997).
The United States Supreme Court has enumerated three basic
procedural requirements that must be provided to prison inmates who are subjected
to disciplinary proceedings. Prisons must provide the accused with advance
written notice of the charges against him; the accused must have an opportunity to
call witnesses and present evidence when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and the accused must be provided with a written statement from
the fact finder regarding the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
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Further, the appellate standard of review of a prison disciplinary
committee’s findings of fact is the “some evidence” standard. Smith, 939 S.W.2d
at 358. The “some evidence” standard of review does not require that an
adjustment committee’s factual findings be supported beyond all reasonable doubt
or even compelling evidence but rather evidence that will support a reasonable
inference of guilt. Id. at 357.
Although Crump contends that he was impermissibly charged with
one of the most serious crimes in terms of severity of punishment, his actions
squarely placed his conduct within the scope of the charged offense.
Fundamentally, by arguing that the prison’s conclusion regarding the outcome of
his escape plan was “purely speculative,” Crump misunderstands the essence of an
inchoate offense which sanctions a defendant’s conduct prior to the achieving of
his ultimate objective.
CPP 15.2 (II)(E)(1), regarding inchoate violations, provides the
following:
A person may be found to have committed the violation
listed in this policy if he: a. Attempts to commit the
violation; b. Solicits another or others to commit the
violation; c. Conspires with another or others to commit
the violation; d. Aids the action of another or others in
committing the violation.
As previously noted, “Physical action resulting in the death or injury
on an employee or non-inmate” is a category 7 offense constituting a major
violation as listed in the CPP. The definition section of CPP 15.2 defines physical
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action as “any act of fighting, hitting, kicking, shoving, pushing, biting, using force
or other similar types of physical contact, throwing, squirting or spitting any item,
substance or fluid.”
Consequently, when Crump directed that guns be drawn against the
officers transporting him to a court hearing, he committed an inchoate offense;
thus, he was properly found guilty of the principal offense by virtue of CPP 15.2
(II)(E)(1). While Crump correctly contends that no prison official was injured or
killed, he misses the point that the planning of such an inherently dangerous act,
for purposes of prison regulations, constituted the principal offense. There is
“some evidence” evidence supporting the adjustment committee’s finding that
Crump’s plan would have resulted in injury or even death to prison guards.
Furthermore, notwithstanding his contention that he could not be
found guilty of a conspiracy because his letter never reached a “co-conspirator,”
we note that prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky. 1996). Crump’s due process rights,
as required in Hill, were observed by prison officials.
Additionally, there was “some evidence” to permit a reasonable
inference that Crump’s action would cause injury or death to another. Drawing
guns on prison guards, in a secluded location, by an individual under the influence
of methamphetamine to effectuate a daring prisoner escape constitutes “some
evidence” supporting the adjustment committee’s findings.
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Crump next contends that his due process rights were violated because
he was denied a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing. Specifically, he contends
that the investigator’s report regarding his improper conduct and the hearing
officer’s findings were identical and serve as “some evidence” of collusion
between the two. He contends that the hearing officer was impermissibly
influenced by the investigator and entered the hearing with a preconceived notion
of his guilt. We disagree.
The “Disciplinary Report Form Part I-Write Up and Investigation,”
written by the investigating officer, and the “Disciplinary Report Form Part IIHearing/Appeal,” written by the hearing officer contain identical summaries when
describing Crump’s improper conduct. While Crump contends this is “some
evidence” of collision between the two, we find his contention unpersuasive. The
investigative report was part of the record for the hearing officer to consider, and
copying the investigator’s description of Crump’s improper conduct was not
indicative of collusion or partiality. Finally, there is no presumed bias when a
prison’s security office provides both the investigator and hearing officer.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Morgan Circuit Court
dismissing Crump’s petition for a declaration of rights is affirmed.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Crump, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Angela E. Cordery
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Office of Legal Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
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