ELLIS (DEON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000553-MR
DEON ELLIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-000094
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Deon Ellis appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
convicting him of complicity to commit first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
while in possession of a handgun and possession of marijuana. He takes issue,
primarily, with two rulings by the trial court which denied his motions to exclude
evidence seized in a warrantless search of his apartment. Having reviewed the
arguments and the record, we affirm.
Ellis and a co-defendant were in his apartment in the Beecher Terrace
housing complex when Louisville Metro Police received a call reporting a shooting in the
area. Officer Peter Glauber questioned a witness at the scene who described the
suspects and indicated the door of the apartment they had entered. Officer Glauber
knocked on the door with two back-up officers and Ellis answered. He gave the officers
permission to enter the apartment. Inside, they smelled a strong odor of marijuana.
When the officers questioned the two men, Ellis’ co-defendant opened his hand to show
several buds of marijuana.
Officer Joshua Judah was conducting a protective sweep of the apartment
when he opened a kitchen closet and saw a bag of cocaine sitting on a box. He picked
up the bag and saw a second bag underneath. Officer Judah showed the cocaine to
Officer Glauber. They questioned Ellis about the presence of additional drugs in the
apartment, and he admitted that there was a joint on his bedside table. Ellis and his codefendant were then arrested.
When they arrived at the police station, Ellis repeatedly asked to make a
phone call. Eventually, Officer Glauber loaned him a cell phone to call his uncle. The
officer inadvertently heard part of the conversation and gleaned from it that Ellis had
guns in his apartment. A search warrant was obtained and executed. Officers found a
.38 caliber pistol in the pocket of a leather jacket hanging in the kitchen closet and a
Glock 19 semi-automatic handgun hidden inside the kitchen trashcan, under the plastic
garbage bag.
Ellis and his co-defendant were indicted on charges of complicity to
commit first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance while in possession of a
handgun, possession of marijuana, and theft because the Glock had been reported as
stolen. The theft charge was severed from the remaining counts of the indictment. Ellis
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filed a pretrial motion asking for suppression of the items seized during the warrantless
search of his apartment. At the suppression hearing Officer Glauber testified about the
circumstances surrounding Officer Judah’s discovery of the cocaine in the kitchen
closet. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
At trial, some of Officer Judah’s testimony seemed to contradict Officer
Glauber’s account. Ellis moved, again, for the evidence to be suppressed and the
motion was denied a second time. The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on
facilitation as requested by Ellis. Ellis was convicted and sentenced to twelve years’
imprisonment. His co-defendant was only convicted of possession of marijuana. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Ellis first argues the trial court erred when it refused to
suppress the drugs seized from Ellis’ apartment during a warrantless search. Although
the constitutions of both the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky require
a warrant before conducting a search of someone’s property, there are certain
recognized exceptions, such as when officers encounter contraband in plain view. The
plain view exception has three requirements: (1) the officer’s presence on the scene
must be justified, (2) the discovery must be inadvertent, and (3) the contraband nature
of the items seized must be readily apparent. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d
876, 879 (Ky. 1989). Ellis concedes the first two elements of the plain view
requirement, but disputes that the contraband nature of the bags of cocaine was readily
apparent.
The standard of review for a suppression ruling is twofold. The trial court’s
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; however, we review
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de novo the legal correctness of the trial court’s ruling. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44
S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App. 2000). Officer Glauber was the only witness at Ellis’ pretrial
suppression hearing. He testified that Officer Judah conducted a protective sweep of
the apartment while he and another officer were in the room with Ellis and his codefendant. Officer Judah called Officer Glauber to the kitchen where he had opened a
closet door and “pointed to a box and on that box was a pretty sizeable bag of what
appeared to be powder cocaine and crack cocaine.” Based on Officer Glauber’s
testimony, the trial court correctly found that the plastic bags containing the cocaine
were in plain view and, thus, denied the motion to suppress.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Officer Judah who actually found the
cocaine. He described opening the kitchen closet and finding two bags of cocaine, one
with smaller baggies of cocaine inside it.
I happened to notice a large bag of crack cocaine on top of a
Christmas tree box inside a closet. I removed that and found
another bag of powdered cocaine underneath it.
On cross-examination, Officer Judah stated that he could see the end of the bag
sticking out from the box and also that the entire top of the bag was visible. At that
point, Ellis’ trial counsel approached the bench and asked for the cocaine to be
suppressed. The trial court initially stated that the issue had already been determined
during the pretrial suppression hearing. Counsel argued that suppression could be
sought at any time and, further, pointed out that Officer Judah had not testified at the
pretrial hearing. The trial court again denied the motion based on the officer’s
statement that he had seen the cocaine. The trial court also made a finding that Officer
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Judah decided to search a little bit further after seeing part of the bag sticking out of the
box.
If the evidence in fact supported a finding that Officer Judah decided to
search a little bit further after seeing part of a plastic bag, then the legally correct ruling
required suppression of the evidence. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct.
1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), see also Commonwealth v. Hatcher, 199 S.W.3d 124,
128 (Ky. 2006). As in the case at hand, Hicks involved police officers responding to a
reported shooting. While inside the apartment from where the gun was fired, officers
noticed an expensive stereo set-up, even though the rest of the apartment was illfurnished. One of the officers decided to record the serial numbers of the pieces, even
moving some of them in order to be able to locate the numbers. Further investigation
revealed that some of the components had been stolen in an armed robbery. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions rejecting the state’s
assertion that the serial numbers were subject to the plain view exception.
[T]he “distinction between ‘looking’ at a suspicious object
in plain view and ‘moving’ it even a few inches” is much
more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It
matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great
personal value to respondent-serial numbers rather than
(what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under
the equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a search,
even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 at 325.
The Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly relied on the Hicks decision in
Hatcher, supra. That case involved police responding to a call about an abandoned
minor. The defendant’s child answered the door, and the officer saw a ceramic pipe
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sitting on a coffee table of a type which could be used to smoke illegal substances. The
child gave him permission to enter the apartment where he seized the pipe and
examined it, detecting an odor of marijuana. This Court held that the pipe should have
been suppressed since its contraband nature was not readily apparent. The Kentucky
Supreme Court agreed finding “no distinction between the manipulation of a pipe to
discern the odor of marijuana and the manipulation of stereo components to retrieve
serial numbers.” Hatcher, 119 S.W.3d at 128.
We must next examine the evidence to determine whether or not it
supports the trial court’s finding that Officer Judah, spotting a plastic bag in a box of
Christmas tree parts, decided to search a little further and, thus, found cocaine. As
previously noted, Officer Judah testified on direct examination that he noticed a large
bag of cocaine on top of the box when he opened the closet door. Picking up the first
bag, he spotted the second bag of cocaine underneath it. Ellis characterizes the
officer’s testimony during cross-examination as contradicting his earlier description. We
cannot agree.
At different points during cross-examination, Officer Judah did say that he
saw the end of the bag sticking out of the box and the entire top of the bag. However,
this is not inconsistent with his earlier statement that he could see the cocaine in the
bag. Furthermore, the officer was never asked whether he could see the bag’s contents
and, therefore, his initial statement on this point was never directly challenged.
Ellis seizes upon the trial court’s comment that Officer Judah “searched a
little bit further” after seeing the bags. Like Officer Judah’s testimony, however, that
statement does not indicate that the bag’s contents – the cocaine itself – was not in
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plain view. In fact, the trial court, both before and after that comment, ruled that it was.
If the officer had actually searched a little bit farther, he would likely have found
contraband we know was not in plain view – the gun in the pocket of the jacket hanging
in the closet just above the cocaine.
As previously stated, Ellis conceded the first two elements of the plain
view exception found in Johnson, the officer’s presence in the kitchen was justified, and
his discovery of the cocaine was inadvertent. The third element, whether or not the
contraband nature of the cocaine was readily apparent, is the basis of Ellis’ contention
that the evidence should have been suppressed. Since Officer Judah never
contradicted his testimony that he saw the cocaine upon first opening the closet door,
the Commonwealth met the third element of establishing the plain view exception.
Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the evidence to be admitted, albeit for the
wrong reason.
Ellis next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on facilitation to commit first-degree trafficking, while in possession of a handgun, and
facilitation to commit first-degree trafficking. Criminal facilitation is defined by statute as
“acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime,
[a defendant] engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to
commit the crime.” Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 506.080(1). Facilitation is a lesser
included offense of complicity and would have lowered the penalty range on Ellis’
charge to a Class D felony for first-degree trafficking while in possession of a handgun,
or to a Class A misdemeanor for first-degree trafficking. The trial court did instruct the
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jury on the lesser included offense of first-degree trafficking, but refused to instruct on
facilitation.
Ellis contends he was entitled to a facilitation instruction because the jury
could have “[entertained] reasonable doubt of [his] guilt on the greater charge, but
[believed] beyond a reasonable doubt that the [he] is guilty of the lesser offense.”
Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Ky. 1993). He argues that the jury
was presented with a question of fact as to whether the Commonwealth proved his
participation in trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether the evidence showed
that Ellis merely allowed another to store drugs in his apartment, knowing that person
was engaged in trafficking. Ellis claims that his own testimony supported the theory that
he facilitated trafficking.
During his trial, Ellis admitted to owning the .38 caliber revolver, but
denied any knowledge of the Glock or the cocaine. His trial counsel argued in closing
argument that Ellis’ co-defendant had the opportunity to hide the Glock and the cocaine
before Ellis answered the door. KRS 406.080(1) requires a defendant to act “with
knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime[.]”
(Emphasis added.) Since Ellis denied having any knowledge that there was cocaine in
his kitchen closet, his testimony does not support an instruction on facilitation. The trial
court’s “duty to prepare and give instructions on the whole law of the case . . . does not
require an instruction on a theory with no evidentiary foundation.” Neal v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Ky. 2003).
Finally, Ellis argues that the trial court improperly allowed hearsay
evidence to be presented relating to his parole eligibility. During the penalty phase of
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his trial, the Commonwealth sought to introduce a document titled “Certification on the
Calculation of Parole Eligibility.” Ellis objected to the introduction of the four-page
document absent a live witness from the Department of Corrections. The trial court
ruled that the document was a certified, attested copy of a government record and, thus,
admissible. Kentucky Rule of Evidence 201. Ultimately, only the first page of the
document was admitted as an exhibit. Ellis claims his right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses was violated by introduction of a document, which could not
be cross-examined. This issue has previously been decided by the Kentucky Supreme
Court, and we are bound by that ruling to uphold the trial court’s decision. Abbott v.
Commonwealth, 822 S.W.2d 417, 491 (Ky. 1992).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Appellate Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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