REDMON (STEVEN) VS. LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 12, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: OCTOBER 17, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000411-MR
STEVEN REDMON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-006808
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION
APPELLEE
AND
JESSE GARON
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND MOORE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is a case involving a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition.
The Appellant appeals an Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
denying the issuance of a writ prohibiting the Louisville and Jefferson County
Human Relations Commission (HRC) from conducting further proceedings against
the Appellant in an administrative action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August of 2001, Jesse Garon filed a Complaint of Discrimination
against Appellant Steve Redmon with the HRC. The Complaint alleged that Mr.
Garon was the victim of hate crimes perpetrated by Mr. Redmon. On November
20, 2002, the HRC found probable cause regarding the commission of the crimes
and tendered a Conciliation Agreement (CA) to Mr. Redmon. HRC informed Mr.
Redmon that he could either pay the compensatory and punitive damages
demanded by Mr. Garon ($537,283.29) or he could elect to either proceed with an
administrative hearing through the HRC or take the matter to circuit court. Mr.
Redmon rejected the CA and notified HRC that he was electing to pursue the
action in Jefferson Circuit Court. HRC then notified Mr. Redmon that it had erred
in its information regarding his ability to bring a circuit court action, his only
avenue being an administrative hearing.
Mr. Redmon thereafter filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition in
Jefferson Circuit Court asserting that he had a right under the Kentucky
Constitution to have a jury trial. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied his Petition on
the grounds that, due to the appeal process, an adequate remedy existed. Mr.
Redmon then brought this appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a writ of prohibition may only be granted if the Appellant
establishes that:
1.)
the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its
jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or
2.)
the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury would
result.
An appellate court should not disturb a lower court’s decision to either
grant or deny a petition absent an abuse of discretion as such a decision falls within
the discretion of the court in which the petition was filed. Id. at 5. A court has
abused its discretion if its decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or
unsupported by sound legal principles. Jaroszewski v. Flege, 204 S.W. 3d 148,
150 (Ky.App. 2006).
ANALYSIS
Under Louisville Metro Code 281, Series 1991 § 98.49(a),
[n]o person shall discriminate against another person by
intentionally interfering with another person or the
property of another person with the motive to intimidate
or interfere with or oppress the other person because the
other person is a member of one or more classes of
persons referenced in paragraph (b)(1) of the federal Hate
Crime Statistics Act (Public Law 101-275) and/or, in
addition, classes of persons identifiable by gender and/or
disability or health related condition.
-3-
“The statute which creates a right can prescribe a proceeding for
adjudication of that right in an administrative forum without a jury trial.”
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky.
1981), citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed. 2d 260
(1974).
Mr. Redmon asserts that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused its
discretion in concluding that the constitutional question should be set aside in favor
of allowing the orderly, even if erroneous, proceedings of the HRC to go forward.
He also argues that it erred in determining that his right to a jury trial was remedied
by his ability to appeal the decision of the administrative body.
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that “[t]he ancient
mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate,
subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution.”
In Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety, Etc., 430 U.S. 442,
97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that
the right to a trial by jury means the rights which existed in suits under the
common law. In Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d
852 (Ky. 1981), the Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed with that holding and
applied it to the Kentucky Constitution. It held that Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution did not create a right to a jury trial; it merely preserved that right
which existed under the common law. Id. at 854.
The Fraser Court went on to opine that,
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Because the right to be free from discrimination based on
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, and age is a
creature of statute and not a common-law tort, it does not
fall within the scope of the right to trial by jury preserved
by the seventh amendment and by Section 7 of the
Kentucky Constitution. (Citation omitted). The statute
which creates a right can prescribe a proceeding for
adjudication of that right in an administrative forum
without a jury trial. (Citation omitted).
Id.
In the present action, Louisville Metro Code § 98.48, et seq. involves
bias-related or “hate” crimes. While Mr. Redmon argues that these crimes are
simply common law torts, this Court disagrees. In Fraser, the Court found that the
right to be free from discrimination based upon one’s race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or age was created by statute and was not a common law tort. Id. at
854.
While Louisville Metro Code § 98.48, et seq. involves actions which
have some of the same elements as common law torts, the actions are different in
an essential element. The actions must have hate or bias in order to be brought
under these sections. Consequently, these rights are created legislatively and a jury
trial is not required. Id. Common law tort actions for assault and trespass do not
require hate or bias to be present.
The Jefferson Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Redmon’s Petition for a Writ of Prohibition prohibiting the HRC from adjudicating
his case in an administrative forum without a jury. Thus, its decision of January 31,
2005, is affirmed.
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KELLER AND MOORE, JUDGES, CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Jeffery B. Skora
Michael R. Mazzoli
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON
COUNTY HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION:
Mark Dobbins
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FILED FOR RPII
Michael R. Mazzoli
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON
COUNTY HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION:
William J. Walsh
Louisville, Kentucky
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