AMERICAN NURSING CARE, INC. v. DENEILYA UPTON; HONORABLE JAMES L. KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001082-WC
AMERICAN NURSING CARE, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-06-00209
DENEILYA UPTON;
HONORABLE JAMES L. KERR,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: American Nursing Care, Inc. (“ANC”), seeks review of an April 27,
2007, decision of the Workers' Compensation Board remanding an Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ) award on the issue of Deneilya Upton's average weekly wage (“AWW”).
We affirm.
Upton, age 36, is a high school graduate, and she attended one and one-half
years of college. She also received vocational training as a certified nurse's aide. Upton
was hired by ANC in December 2003, as a home health aide. Shortly thereafter, Upton
was injured on January 12, 2004, when she slipped on ice and fell outside of a patient's
home. She was treated the following day for low back pain and returned to work at ANC
on light duty. Upton's last date of employment with ANC was in November 2004.
Following a hearing on Upton's claim for benefits, the ALJ issued an
opinion and award assessing a 10% impairment. The ALJ made the following finding
regarding Upton's AWW:
10. The parties were unable to stipulate to an average
weekly wage. KRS 342.140(1) which provides that an
employee working less than 13 calendar weeks immediately
preceding an injury shall have his/her wages by taking the
wages had the employee been so employed by the employer
the full 13 week[s] immediately preceding the injury when
work was available to other employees in a similar
occupation. While [Upton] testified that she earned $8.00 per
hour for a 45 hour week, the wage records filed by [Upton]
indicate that [Upton] worked eight hours the week ending
December 26, 16.25 hours the week ending January 2, 17.3
hours the week ending January 9, and 43.5 hours the week
ending January 16. Adding those hours, it appears [Upton]
worked 85.05 hours over the prior four week period and
dividing those hours by 4 yields an average of 21.26 hours
per week. As [Upton] testified to earning $8.00 per hour, that
number shall be multiplied by the wage figure and the [ALJ]
finds that [Upton's] average weekly wage was $170.08 per
week.
The ALJ denied Upton's subsequent petition for reconsideration; thereafter,
Upton appealed to the Board, contending the calculation of her AWW was erroneous.
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In a well-reasoned opinion, the Board stated:
After having carefully considered the ALJ's calculation of
Upton's average weekly wage and applicable statutory and
case law, we are convinced the ALJ's decision does not
follow the mandates of KRS 342.140(1)(e)[,] at least not
without further explanation. The ALJ merely added the total
wages earned by Upton over the four week period she was
employed by [ANC] and divided by four without providing
any explanation why this would be a representative wage.
This is not a calculation pursuant to KRS 342.140(1)(e).
The Board remanded the claim to the ALJ for further factual findings on the
issue of AWW. ANC filed this petition for review.
ANC argues that the ALJ's calculation of Upton's AWW was supported by
substantial evidence and that the Board erred by remanding the issue for further findings.
Normally, this Court gives deference to the Board’s decision and only intervenes when
the Board's action constitutes a flagrant error resulting in gross injustice. Western Baptist
Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). However, this case involves a
question of statutory interpretation. Consequently, because statutory interpretation is a
matter of law, we owe no deference to the findings of the Board, and our review is de
novo. Newberg v. Thomas Industries, 852 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Ky.App. 1993).
KRS 342.140 states in pertinent part:
The average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time
of the injury or last injurious exposure shall be determined as
follows:
(1) If at the time of the injury which resulted in death or
disability or the last date of injurious exposure preceding
death or disability from an occupational disease:
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...
(d) The wages were fixed by the day, hour, or by the output of
the employee, the average weekly wage shall be the wage
most favorable to the employee computed by dividing by
thirteen (13) the wages (not including overtime or premium
pay) of said employee earned in the employ of the employer
in the first, second, third, or fourth period of thirteen (13)
consecutive calendar weeks in the fifty-two (52) weeks
immediately preceding the injury.
(e) The employee had been in the employ of the employer
less than thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding
the injury, his average weekly wage shall be computed under
paragraph (d), taking the wages (not including overtime or
premium pay) for that purpose to be the amount he would
have earned had he been so employed by the employer the
full thirteen (13) calendar weeks immediately preceding the
injury and had worked, when work was available to other
employees in a similar occupation.
At the hearing, conflicting evidence was presented regarding the
availability of work at ANC. Additionally, Upton testified that her scheduled hours were
out of the ordinary during the four weeks preceding her injury. The evidence showed that
ANC paid Upton weekly, and the pay period was Friday through Thursday. On Upton's
first day of employment with ANC, she attended an eight-hour training session on the
final day of the pay period. Then, during the two weeks encompassing the Christmas and
New Year's holidays, Upton's elderly patient did not need full-time care because family
members were visiting. Finally, Upton worked 43.5 hours during her fourth week of
employment.
Our Supreme Court has stated:
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KRS 342.140(1)(e) applies to injuries sustained after fewer
than 13 weeks' employment. It utilizes the averaging method
set forth in KRS 342.140(1)(d) and attempts to estimate what
the worker's average weekly wage would have been over a
typical 13-week period in the employment by referring to the
actual wages of workers performing similar work when work
was available. As was recognized in [C & D Bulldozing Co.
v.] Brock, [820 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1991),] the goal of KRS
342.140(d) and (e) is to obtain a realistic estimation of what
the injured worker would be expected to earn in a normal
period of employment.
Huff v. Smith Trucking, 6 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Ky. 1999).
In the case at bar, the ALJ calculated Upton's AWW by averaging the hours
she worked in the four weeks preceding her injury. Although the ALJ cited the proper
statute in his findings, we are unable to reconcile the statutory formula with the ALJ's
calculation. Likewise, in reaching his conclusion, the ALJ did not address Upton's
contention that her first three weeks of work prior to her injury were not representative of
a “normal” period of employment. Based upon our review, it appears the ALJ failed to
“take into consideration the unique facts and circumstances” presented by this case. Id. at
822. Consequently, we agree with the Board that this matter must be remanded to the
ALJ for further findings on the issue of Upton's AWW pursuant to KRS 342.140(1)(e)
and relevant case law.
For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Workers' Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
David D. Black
DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
Cincinnati, Ohio
John W. Hardin
STUART & HARDIN, PLC
Versailles, Kentucky
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