KELLY LAWLER AND EMILY LAWLER v. JOSEPH PATRICK RIGGS; ZACHARY NICHOLAS DOE; AND THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 21, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000886-ME
KELLY LAWLER AND
EMILY LAWLER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00447
JOSEPH PATRICK RIGGS;
ASHLEY WIMSATT;
ZACHARY NICHOLAS DOE; AND
THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: WINE, NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Kelly Lawler and Emily Lawler (collectively referred to as the
Lawlers) bring this appeal from an April 10, 2007, order of the Nelson Circuit Court
dismissing their petition for custody of Zachary Nicholas Doe. We affirm.
Zachary was born on November 28, 2004. Shortly thereafter, Zachary was
abandoned by his biological mother, Ashley Wimsatt,1 at Flaget Memorial Hospital. See
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 405.075; KRS 620.350. The Cabinet for Families and
Children (Cabinet) obtained custody of Zachery and subsequently placed him with foster
parents, the Lawlers. On December 28, 2004, Zachary's biological father, Joseph Patrick
Riggs, signed a disclaimer of paternity.
In June 2005, the Cabinet filed a petition to terminate Wimsatt's parental
rights in the Nelson Circuit Court (Action No. 05-AD-0009). Following a hearing on the
Cabinet's petition, the court noted on its docket sheet that Wimsatt wished to terminate
her parental rights but there were “new issues regarding paternity.” Wimsatt testified that
Riggs was Zachary's father. Based upon Wimsatt's testimony, the Cabinet contacted
Riggs to determine if he desired to pursue custody. After DNA test results confirmed that
Riggs was Zachary's father, Riggs began exercising supervised visitation with Zachary in
April 2006, pursuant to a case plan established by the Cabinet.
On July 14, 2006, Riggs filed a petition for custody of Zachary in the
Nelson Circuit Court (Action No. 06-CI-00447). On February 1, 2007, the Lawlers filed
a petition for custody of Zachary in the Nelson Circuit Court (Action No. 07-CI-00068).
The Lawlers also filed a motion to intervene in the action initiated by Riggs (Action No.
1
In the notice of appeal, Ashley Wimsatt's last name was mistakenly spelled “Wimpsatt.” We
have used the correct spelling of Ashley's last name “Wimsatt” in our opinion.
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06-CI-00447) and filed a motion to consolidate Action Nos. 06-CI-00447 and 07-CI00068.
On April 10, 2007, an order was entered granting the Lawlers' motion to
consolidate Action Nos. 06-CI-00447 and 07-CI-00068 and simultaneously dismissing
the Lawlers' petition for custody. Therein, the court determined that the Lawlers lacked
standing to intervene and did not meet the statutory requirements of a de facto custodian.
This appeal follows.
We begin our analysis by determining the applicable standard of review to
be applied in this appeal. On review of matters pertaining to child custody, this Court
must determine whether the circuit court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Ky. R.
Civ. P. 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986). Issues that are strictly
legal in nature and questions of law will be reviewed de novo. Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74
S.W.3d 777 (Ky.App. 2002).
The Lawlers contend that the circuit court erred by denying them standing
as de facto custodians under KRS 403.270. To qualify as a de facto custodian, it must be
established by clear and convincing evidence that a person has “been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a
period of six (6) months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age . . . .” KRS
403.270; Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517 (Ky.App. 2005).
In this case, the Lawlers were foster parents to Zachary for approximately
two years. As foster parents, the Lawlers received compensation from the Cabinet. The
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circuit court thoroughly analyzed the family expenses and financial support received and
expended for Zachary. The circuit court concluded that the Cabinet was Zachary's
primary financial supporter and the Lawlers have failed to demonstrate how this finding
was clearly erroneous. Hence, we do not believe that the Lawlers have established that
they provided the primary support for Zachary to be de facto custodians as required by
KRS 403.270. See Swiss v. Cabinet for Families and Children, 43 S.W.3d 796 (Ky.App.
2001)(holding that foster parents did not qualify as de facto custodians as the Cabinet
provided the primary support for the child). Accordingly, the circuit court properly
concluded that the Lawlers did not qualify as de facto custodians under KRS 403.270.
Next, the Lawlers assert that Riggs waived his superior right to custody and
that they have standing to seek custody of Zachary under Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d
336 (Ky. 2003). The Lawlers point out that Riggs signed a disclaimer of paternity.
Therein, Riggs stated he was not the father of the child, possessed no legal claim to the
child, did not object to adoption of the child and waived further notice of court
proceedings concerning any possible rights in connection with the child. Relying upon
the authority of Moore, the Lawlers argue that Riggs waived his superior right to custody,
and that they have standing to file a petition for custody. See Moore, 110 S.W.3d 336.
The Lawlers make a compelling argument. However, in Moore, the
Supreme Court concluded that the prospective adoptive parents had standing to seek
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custody of the child under KRS 403.420(4)(b).2 See Moore, 110 S.W.3d 336.
Specifically, the Moore Court held that a third party must initially demonstrate standing to
commence the custody action under KRS 403.420(4)(b) and then must demonstrate
unfitness of the biological parent or waiver of the parent's superior right to custody. Id.
Unfortunately for the Lawlers, KRS 403.420(4)(b) was repealed by the
Kentucky General Assembly effective July 13, 2004, and was not re-enacted. Under that
statute, a third party who was not a de facto custodian but who had physical custody of a
child was given standing to commence a custody action.3 With the repeal of KRS
403.420, a third party who is not a de facto custodian but who has physical custody of a
child no longer has standing to commence a custody action. It seems to this Court that
the legislature may have unintentionally overlooked such third parties when it repealed
KRS 403.420(4)(b). In any event, the effect of the repeal of KRS 403.420(4)(b) remains
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.420(4)(b) read:
(4) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the Circuit Court:
....
(b)
By a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the
county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the
physical custody of one (1) of his parents[.]
3
In Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003), the Court interpreted the phrase “physical
custody” in KRS 403.420(4)(b) to mean more than actual possession of the child. Rather, the
Court held that physical custody “for the purposes of establishing standing requires . . . a
showing 'that the parent has somehow voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the
child.'” Id. at 358.
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the same – third parties who do not qualify as de facto custodians but who have physical
custody of a child are without standing to commence a custody action.
The Lawlers argue that KRS 403.420 was replaced by KRS 403.800 which
is part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“Uniform Act”)
that was passed by the Kentucky General Assembly in 2004 and became effective on July
14, 2004. However, those statutes set forth in the Uniform Act pertain specifically to
child custody issues arising in interstate relationships involving the child, the parents, or
persons acting as a parent. There is absolutely no legislative intent set forth in these
statutes that would apply the same to situations arising from purely intrastate custodial
relationships with a child. The Lawlers have also failed to cite any legal authority that
would apply the Uniform Act to the issues raised in this appeal. We therefore must
conclude that the Uniform Act is simply not applicable to this case.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the
Lawlers lacked standing to seek custody of Zachary under KRS 403.270.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Nelson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, JOSEPH PATRICK RIGGS:
LeeAnna Dowan
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Paula K. Pace
Bardstown, Kentucky
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