HAZARD MILLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000591-MR
HAZARD MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM ENGLE, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00286
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Hazard Miller appeals from an order of the Pike Circuit Court denying
his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. We affirm.
Miller was indicted by a Pike County Grand Jury on two counts of firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance (Oxycontin). Gail Cavins, a confidential
informant working with the Kentucky State Police, participated in two videotaped drug
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Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
buys at Miller's residence on July 22 and July 24, 2002. The video showed an individual
leaning out a window of the residence to conduct the transactions.
A jury trial was held on June 11, 2003. The jury viewed the video, and
Cavins testified that Miller sold her the drugs. Miller and his wife both testified and
offered an alibi for the dates in question. The Millers contended they were camping at a
mountain cabin with their grandchildren from July 19 through July 26.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Miller guilty on both counts
and recommended a ten-year sentence on each count, to be served consecutively. On
July 3, 2003, the trial court sentenced Miller to twenty years' imprisonment pursuant to
the jury's recommendation. Miller's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in an unpublished decision. Miller v. Commonwealth, 2003-SC-0518-MR
(May 20, 2004).
On November 9, 2004, Miller filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial
court granted Miller's motion for appointment of counsel, and a supplemental brief was
filed on Miller's behalf. An evidentiary hearing was held two years later, on December 5,
2006, following the recusal of the trial judge and appointment of new post-conviction
counsel for Miller. At the hearing, Miller and his wife both testified that trial counsel
failed to advise Miller of a plea bargain and that counsel failed to investigate alibi
witnesses for trial. Trial counsel also testified at the hearing and refuted Miller's
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allegations. The trial court denied Miller's RCr 11.42 motion on February 16, 2007. This
appeal followed.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel Miller must show that, (1)
“counsel's performance was deficient[;]” and (2) “that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense[,]” by depriving Miller of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). Ultimately, Miller “must
demonstrate that, absent counsel's errors, there exists a 'reasonable probability' the jury
would have reached a different verdict.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545,
551 (Ky. 1998) quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Since the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on Miller's motion, we “must defer to the determination
of the facts and witness credibility made by the trial judge.” Haight v. Commonwealth,
41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we will not disturb the
findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure 52.01; Adams v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. 1968).
We first address Miller's allegation that counsel failed to communicate with
him regarding a five-year plea bargain. Miller contends that had he been aware of the
plea offer, he would have accepted it rather than proceed to trial. At the hearing, the
court heard conflicting testimony. On one side, both Miller and his wife claimed they
were unaware of the offer until after the trial concluded. On the other hand, trial counsel
denied the Millers' allegations that he failed to advise them of the plea offer. Counsel
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testified he told the couple about the offer during a meeting and they went “back and
forth” on it. Miller now opines that trial counsel's testimony was not credible because he
was unable to provide any written evidence that he made Miller aware of the offer. We
disagree.
We acknowledge Miller's disappointment with the unfavorable verdict;
however, considering the totality of the testimony on this issue, we agree with the trial
court's finding that counsel communicated the offer to Miller, and Miller decided to stand
trial on the charges. It was undisputed that trial counsel was an experienced criminal
defense attorney who had practiced law for thirty-four years. A review of the hearing
shows that the testimony of trial counsel was both reliable and credible, while Miller's
testimony was less than convincing. It was within the province of the trial court to assess
the credibility of the witnesses at the hearing. Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442. We conclude
the findings of the trial court were not clearly erroneous.
Miller next argues counsel was deficient by failing to investigate alibi
witnesses. At the hearing, both Miller and his wife testified that counsel never informed
them that witnesses would be necessary at trial. In contrast, counsel testified that he
explained to the Millers the importance of having alibi witnesses to bolster the defense;
however, the Millers only advised counsel of one possible witness. It was unrefuted that
counsel spoke with the individual identified by the Millers, but during the interview
counsel determined the witness would likely further incriminate Miller. In light of the
testimony presented at the hearing, we agree with the trial court that counsel fully
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investigated Miller's alibi defense. “A reasonable investigation is not an investigation
that the best criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time
and resources, but also with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct.” Haight, 41 S.W.3d
at 446 (citation omitted). Miller did not call any of his alleged alibi witnesses to testify at
the RCr 11.42 hearing, and he failed to show that the jury's verdict would have been
different had his witnesses testified at trial. Under the totality of the circumstances
presented here, we agree with the trial court that counsel prepared a vigorous defense and
competently investigated the case.
We have closely considered each of the allegations raised by Miller, and we
have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal. We conclude, as did the trial court, that
Miller failed to meet his burden pursuant to Strickland, supra.; accordingly, he is not
entitled to RCr 11.42 relief.
For the reasons stated herein, the order of the Pike Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Y. Josephine Layne
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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