DANA CORPORATION v. MELINDA ADAMS; HON. JOHN W. THACKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000579-WC
DANA CORPORATION
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-92749
MELINDA ADAMS; HON. JOHN W. THACKER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE: Dana Corporation petitions for review of an opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board which reversed in part and remanded an opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge. We affirm.
In 2003, Melinda Adams was employed in the assembly area of Dana
Corporation, where she was required to lift parts weighing five to fifty pounds on a
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Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
shoulder yoke about six hundred times per day. She began to notice pain in her
shoulders, elbows, and thumbs in January, 2003. Adams testified that she notified her
supervisor of her symptoms at that time, although he did not fill out an incident report.
Adams made further reports of shoulder pain to the company nurses in May, and
consulted with two physicians. Ultimately, she had surgery on her right shoulder in
March, 2004.
Adams filed a claim against Dana on August 31, 2005, alleging that she had
sustained work-related injuries to both her shoulders on June 24, 2003.
KRS 342.185 provides that an employee must file a claim within two years
of giving notice of an injury to the employer. KRS 342.185 also contains a tolling
provision, however, which allows the two year limitations period to begin running after
the suspension of the payment of income benefits. The right shoulder surgery was
performed on March 19, 2004. Dana paid total temporary disability (TTD) benefits to
Adams from the date of the surgery until April 5, 2004. Dana does not dispute that the
payment of TTD benefits tolled the limitations period for the right shoulder. The issue is
whether the payment of the TTD benefits following the surgery on Adams’s right
shoulder also tolled the limitations period for the injury to her left shoulder.
The preliminary question that must be addressed is whether Adams gave
notice of an injury to both shoulders on June 24, 2003. Dana does not dispute that she
gave notice of a work-related injury to her right shoulder on June 24, 2003. The ALJ
found as follows:
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The plaintiff has alleged an injury date to the left shoulder of
June 24, 2003. The testimony of the plaintiff was that she
began experiencing pain in the left shoulder in January of
2003 and reported this to the defendant/employer. Her
testimony also was that on June 24, 2003 she experienced
pain in the left shoulder, saw a doctor, and reported the
condition of the left shoulder to the defendant/employer. The
plaintiff has been paid no benefits for the condition to the left
shoulder. The instant claim was filed on August 31, 2005.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the claim on the left
shoulder was filed more than two years after the date of the
injury, irregardless of which injury date is used and the
plaintiff was paid no benefits for the condition to the left
shoulder. The Administrative Law Judge finds that the
plaintiff’s claim for benefits related to the injury to the left
shoulder must be dismissed, pursuant to KRS 342.185.
In other words, the ALJ concluded that Adams had reported the left
shoulder injury in January or June, 2003, but that the precise date was not significant
because the limitations period for her left shoulder injury was not tolled by the payment
of TTD benefits following the right shoulder surgery.
It is Dana’s position that it had no notice of any left shoulder injury until
the filing of Adams’s claim in August 31, 2005, and that consequently the payment of
TTD benefits following the surgery could not possibly have tolled the two-year
limitations period for the left shoulder.
In its review of the ALJ’s opinion, the Board stated that
[t]he ALJ implicitly concluded that the left and right
shoulder conditions became manifest at the same time in
January, 2003 or June, 2003. The ALJ’s finding regarding
the date of manifestation is not at issue on appeal. Adams
testified that Dr. Percinel told her she had work related
problems with both shoulders when she first saw him in 2003.
Adams’ testimony is sufficient to support a finding of a
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manifestation for purposes of notice and the beginning of the
statute of limitations period.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the Board that the ALJ made an implicit finding that Adams
had given notice of an injury to both shoulders in either January or June, 2003. Had the
ALJ not made such a finding, it would not have been necessary for him even to consider
whether the TTD benefits paid following the right shoulder surgery had tolled the
limitations period for the left shoulder. Dana nonetheless maintains that it had notice
only of a right shoulder injury on June 24, 2003, and that an official First Report of Injury
to that effect was completed on July 1, 2003. This document is not in the record before
us. “It has long been held that, when the complete record is not before the appellate
court, that court must assume that the omitted record supports the decision of the trial
court.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985).
We next consider whether the payment of TTD benefits following the rightshoulder surgery tolled the limitations period for both shoulders. The Board held that it
did.
It is apparent the ALJ found the TTD payment was
based on surgery being performed on the right shoulder. The
period of voluntary TTD payments commenced with the date
of surgery and continued until Adams’ return to work. Thus,
the ALJ took a narrow view that the payment of TTD benefits
was confined to the right shoulder and only tolled the statute
of limitations as to the right shoulder only. We believe KRS
342.0011(11)(a) and 342.185 can not be read so narrowly.
Where the same cumulative trauma produces disability to
multiple body parts manifesting at the same time, we
believe payment of TTD benefits for any of the affected
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body parts tolls the statute of limitations for the entirety
of the affected body parts. Thus, the ALJ erred in finding
the claim as it related to the left shoulder was barred by the
statute of limitations. To hold otherwise would require the
claimant to split his cause of action. Nothing in the statute
indicates a legislative intent to require the claimant to split his
cause of action. To the contrary, it is evident the legislative
intent under the Act is to encourage less litigation rather than
more. . . . The position adopted by the ALJ promotes
additional litigation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We “correct the Board only where the Court perceives the Board has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hospital
v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). We find that the Board has neither
overlooked nor misconstrued controlling statutes. Indeed, its approach is consonant with
the purpose of the tolling provision, which is to protect injured workers.
It has long been recognized that KRS 342.185 operates
together with KRS 342.040(1) and tolls the period of
limitations until after the payment of voluntary income
benefits ceases in order to protect injured workers from being
lulled into a false sense of security by receiving such
payments and, therefore, failing to actively pursue a claim.
J & V Coal Co. v. Hall, 62 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Ky. 2001).
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven D. Goodrum
James B. Compton
Lexington, Kentucky
Ched Jennings
Louisville, Kentucky
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