RICHARD PITCOCK, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000207-MR
RICHARD PITCOCK, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00913
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Richard Isaac Pitcock, Jr. appeals from a jury verdict and
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court finding him guilty of a number of offenses,
including first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and sentencing him to a total
of seven-and-one-half years' imprisonment. After our review, we affirm.
On July 5, 2006, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Pitcock on one
count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance (crack cocaine), a Class D
felony pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415; one count of first-
degree fleeing/evading police, a Class D felony pursuant to KRS 520.095; one count of
reckless driving in violation of KRS 189.290; one count of disregarding a stop sign in
violation of KRS 189.330; and one count of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender, a Class C felony pursuant to KRS 532.080. On July 13, 2006, Pitcock appeared
with counsel and entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment.
Following a jury trial held on November 30, 2006, Pitcock was found guilty
on all counts with the exception of the first-degree charge of fleeing/evading police. The
jury instead found him guilty of the second-degree version of the offense of
fleeing/evading. The jury subsequently recommended a total sentence of seven-and-onehalf years' imprisonment. On December 8, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment that
reflected the jury's findings of guilt. On December 28, 2006, the court sentenced Pitcock
in accordance with the jury's recommendations. This appeal followed.
Pitcock first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient
to support a conviction. Our standard of review as to the denial of a motion for directed
verdict was set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991):
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given.
For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
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reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight
to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Id. at 187. Accordingly, we must examine the evidence as a whole to determine if the
jury's finding of guilt was clearly unreasonable.
At trial, Officer Stacy Shannon of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government Division of Police testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. She indicated
that on May 18, 2006, at approximately 4:00 a.m., she was patrolling her beat when she
saw a man approach a silver SUV parked on a street. That street was known to be a
frequent site for illegal drug transactions. The SUV's tail lights were on, and its motor
was running. The driver of the SUV extended his arm from the vehicle and took
something from the man. Shannon testified that she had a clear, unobstructed view of the
driver and that he was wearing a red jacket over a blue shirt.
Believing that a drug transaction was taking place, Shannon pulled behind
the SUV, illuminated it with her spotlight, and exited her cruiser. At that point, the
individual who had been standing next to the SUV walked away, and the vehicle sped
away from the scene. Shannon returned to her cruiser, activated its emergency lights and
siren, and pursued the SUV. A high-speed chase ensued during which the driver of the
SUV proceeded the wrong way down Chestnut Street and ran stop signs at the
intersections of Third and Chestnut Streets and Fourth and Chestnut Streets. Shannon's
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supervisor ordered her to terminate the chase, and she did. However, she was given
permission to patrol the immediate area and to continue to search for the SUV. Some
time later, she saw the SUV turn into a private driveway and crash into a house.
The driver immediately exited the vehicle and attempted to flee on foot.
Shannon gave chase, and the two ran through some bushes near the side of a house.
Shannon testified that the area in question was well lit with street lights. As the driver
was running, he removed and discarded his red jacket. Shannon testified that he was
wearing a long-sleeved blue shirt and blue jeans. After realizing that she could not catch
up with him, Shannon radioed for assistance and returned to her cruiser. Along the way,
she stopped and picked up the red jacket and searched the SUV, where she found a
suspected rock of crack cocaine wrapped in a $5.00 bill. (Testing at the Kentucky State
Police Forensics Laboratory confirmed that the substance was, in fact, crack cocaine.)
Shannon then ran the tags on the SUV and called the registered owner – Pitcock's father,
Richard Pitcock, Sr. – to inform him that his vehicle had been involved in a wreck.
Pitcock's father arrived on the scene and told Shannon that he had last seen
his son on May 14, 2006, when he had given him permission to borrow the SUV.
According to Shannon, he also told her that Pitcock had been wearing a red jacket, bluejean shirt, and blue jeans when he last saw him. Shortly later, Shannon saw Pitcock
standing in a nearby driveway. She testified that he was wearing a long-sleeved blue
shirt and blue jeans and that he had the same body build and hair color as the person who
had been driving the SUV. Shannon also indicated that her trousers were wet from the
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knees down as a result of running through bushes during the chase and that Pitcock's
pants were similarly damp. According to Shannon, she then interviewed Pitcock, and he
admitted to her that the red jacket was his and that he had used crack cocaine earlier in
the evening. However, he denied that he had been driving the SUV and told Shannon
that “some boys” had stolen the car from him and that he had been looking for it. Despite
Pitcock's version of events, Shannon testified that she was 100% certain that he was the
person whom she had chased in her cruiser and on foot.
In response to this evidence, Pitcock offered his own highly contradictory
testimony at trial. First, he claimed that he was not the driver of the SUV and that he did
not own or wear a red jacket. Instead, he testified that he had loaned the vehicle to
another individual on May 17, 2006. At trial, Pitcock gave the name of the individual,
who would not testify for fear of retribution according to Pitcock. He stated that the SUV
was in good shape when he loaned it and that the compact discs in the vehicle were not
his. He further indicated that he only came upon the scene of the SUV crash after a
friend told him that he had seen the vehicle and that it was about to be towed. Pitcock
highlights Shannon's testimony that, during the chase on foot, she was more focused on
avoiding obstructions in her path and keeping up with the driver than she was on
identifying him or looking for the discarded red jacket; she also did not see the driver
actually drop the jacket.
He commented on Shannon's admission that it was not unusual for
individuals in a high-crime area to take or loan cars. He also cited to his father's
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testimony at trial that Pitcock was not wearing a red jacket when he left home with the
SUV and that he did not believe that Pitcock owned the jacket because he had not seen it
before. Pitcock's father testified that the manner in which he had to adjust the seat of the
SUV before driving it home that night was not consistent with how he had to adjust it
when Pitcock had been driving the car. He noted that he did not believe that the rap
music compact discs strewn throughout the SUV were Pitcock's because he was a country
music fan.
Pitcock contends that the totality of the testimony presented at trial supports
his defense that he was not the driver of the SUV and that the Commonwealth
consequently failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver.
However, after considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
as we must, we believe that sufficient evidence was presented to survive a motion for
directed verdict. Officer Shannon identified Pitcock as the driver of the SUV without
equivocation. Pitcock's arguments pertain to the weight of the evidence presented and to
issues of witness credibility, which are matters left exclusively to the purview of the jury.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
Pitcock's motion for directed verdict and that the jury's decision was not clearly
unreasonable.
Pitcock last argues that the jury was improperly instructed as to the
definition of possession in the context of the possession of a controlled substance charge.
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However, he acknowledges that this argument is not preserved for appellate review.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.54(2) provides as follows:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give
an instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and
adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes objection
before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the
matter to which the party objects and the ground or grounds
of the objection.
The rule is mandatory in nature and has been strictly enforced. “Failure to comply with
subsection (2) of RCr 9.54 has been consistently held to prohibit review of alleged error
in instructions because of the failure to properly preserve the claimed error.” Gibbs v.
Commonwealth, 208 S.W.3d 848, 853 (Ky. 2006). Nevertheless, Pitcock asks us to
consider his argument pursuant to the “palpable error” standard set forth in RCr 10.26,
which provides:
A palpable error which effects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or
by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently
raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.
For an error to be palpable, it must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
noticeable.” Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997). It must also involve
“prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible error[.]” Ernst v.
Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005). In reviewing a case for palpable error,
our analysis must focus upon whether a substantial possibility exists that the result in the
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case would have been different but for the claimed error. Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206
S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).
In support of his position that the definition of possession presented to the
jury was erroneous, Pitcock cites Pate v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593 (Ky. 2004). In
Pate, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Kentucky Penal Code's definition of
possession as utilized in KRS 500.080(14) does not apply to offenses covered by KRS
Chapter 218A. Id. at 598. Instead, the Court set forth that to possess, as employed by
KRS Chapter 218A, means “[t]o have as property; own.” Id. The definition of
possession given to the jury was: “to have actual physical possession or otherwise to
exercise actual dominion or control over a tangible object....” Pitcock contends that that
definition is at odds with the requirements of Pate. We agree. The definition is taken
verbatim from KRS 500.080(14), and Pitcock was charged under KRS 218A.1415. The
definition was indeed erroneous under Pate.
Nonetheless, we do not conclude that the instruction constituted “a
substantial error resulting in manifest prejudice.” RCr 10.26. The Pate Court
additionally noted that possession for purposes of KRS Chapter 218A includes both
“actual” and “constructive” possession. Pate, 134 S.W.3d at 598. “To prove
constructive possession, the Commonwealth must present evidence which establishes that
the contraband was subject to the defendant's dominion and control.” Id. at 598-99,
quoting Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2000). We have previously
held that “the person who owns or exercises dominion or control over a motor vehicle is
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deemed to be the possessor of any contraband discovered inside it.” Paul v.
Commonwealth, 765 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.App. 1988); see also Deboy v. Commonwealth,
214 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ky.App. 2007).
Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this interpretation, holding that
“proof that a defendant has possession and control of a vehicle is evidence to support a
conviction for constructive possession of contraband found within the vehicle.” Burnett,
31 S.W.3d at 880. The jury's decision reflected that it believed that Pitcock was the
driver of the SUV and that, therefore, he had possession and control of the vehicle. Thus,
the fact that crack cocaine was found within the SUV supports a conviction for
possession of contraband. We conclude that manifest injustice did not occur as a result of
the trial court's error because there is not a substantial possibility that the jury's decision
would have been different but for the harmless error.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Denise Redwine
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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