LARRY MCINTOSH AND LYNN MCINTOSH v. OLDHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 7, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000118-MR
LARRY MCINTOSH AND
LYNN MCINTOSH
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00406
OLDHAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD,1 NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Larry McIntosh and Lynn McIntosh (collectively referred to as the
McIntoshes) bring this appeal from a January 10, 2007, summary judgment of the
Oldham Circuit Court in favor of Oldham County Board of Education (Board) and
1
Judge Howard concurred in this opinion prior to Judge Michael Caperton being sworn in on
December 7, 2007 as Judge of the Third Appellate District, Division 1. Release of this opinion
was delayed by administrative handling.
awarding the McIntoshes $1,931.00, plus interest, for the taking by eminent domain of a
permanent easement upon their property. We affirm.
In 1998, the Board selected a site for constructing a new elementary school,
middle school, and high school in Oldham county. This site was bordered along the
north side by Kentucky Highway 22. In order to obtain approval for its site plan from the
Kentucky Highway Department (Department), the Department required the Board to
construct turn lanes near the entrance to Highway 22. The construction of the turn lanes
required the Board to condemn permanent easements from ten abutting property owners,
including the McIntoshes. The easement sought upon the McIntoshes' property was
comprised of a 20 foot by 105 foot strip of land.
Based upon a previously obtained appraisal, the Board offered the
McIntoshes $1,700.00 for the condemned permanent easement. Kentucky Revised
Statues (KRS) 416.550. The McIntoshes rejected the offer, and the Board subsequently
filed a condemnation action against the McIntoshes. Pursuant to KRS 416.580, the
circuit court appointed three commissioners to value the subject property. The
commissioners' report determined that the difference in the fair market value of the
McIntoshes' property before the taking and the fair market value of the property after the
taking was $1,931.00. By interlocutory judgment, the circuit court found that the Board
had the right to condemn the permanent easement upon the McIntoshes' property and
awarded $1,931.00 in compensation for the taking. KRS 416.610.
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The McIntoshes filed exceptions to the interlocutory judgment and
challenged the amount of compensation awarded as inadequate. KRS 416.620(1).
Therein, the McIntoshes also requested a jury trial upon the issue of compensation.
The McIntoshes intended to testify at trial and give opinions concerning the
difference between the fair market value of their property before the taking and the fair
market value of their property after the taking.2 The Board subsequently obtained written
discovery and depositions from the McIntoshes regarding their qualification to testify as
to the fair market value of their property before and after the taking. Thereafter, the
Board filed a motion in limine to exclude the McIntoshes' testimony as to the fair market
value of the property and also filed a motion for summary judgment.
On January 10, 2007, an order was entered granting the Board's motion in
limine to exclude the McIntoshes' testimony and granting the motion for summary
judgment. The court determined that the McIntoshes were not qualified to give their
opinions concerning the before and after fair market value of the property. The court also
noted that the McIntoshes had no other evidence concerning the before and after fair
market value of their property. As such, the court entered summary judgment in favor
the Board and awarded the McIntoshes $1,931.00 plus interest (representing the
commissioners' award.) This appeal follows.
The McIntoshes contend the circuit court erroneously entered summary
judgment and that they were improperly denied the “statutory right to a jury trial”
2
Based upon review of the record on appeal, Larry McIntosh and Lynn McIntosh did not retain
any licensed real estate appraiser or other expert witness to testify on their behalf.
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available to landowners in a condemnation action under KRS 416.620. Moreover, the
McIntoshes believe they were qualified to express opinions upon the before and after fair
market value of their property and that the circuit court committed reversible error by
deciding otherwise.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no material issues of fact
and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ky. R. Civ. P. 56; Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). For the reasons hereafter
stated, we think the circuit court properly entered summary judgment.
KRS 416.620(1) plainly provides that “[a]ll questions of fact pertaining to
the amount of compensation to the owner, or owners, shall be determined by a jury . . . .”
Under this statute, a landowner of condemned property is clearly entitled to a jury trial
upon “questions of fact” as to the proper amount of compensation. Thus, to be entitled to
a jury trial, there must exist a justiciable question of fact as to the proper amount of
compensation for the jury to decide. In order for the McIntoshes to be entitled to a jury
trial, it was incumbent upon them to have presented sufficient probative evidence to
create an issue of fact upon the proper amount of compensation.
In granting summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that the
McIntoshes failed to offer any evidence upon the before and after fair market value of the
property:
This Court is aware that the McIntoshes will not have any
expert testify for them with regard to their damages. They
will not have any appraisal of their property to determine the
“before taking” and “after taking” fair market values. They
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have communication with no one concerning the fair market
value of the right-of-way easement subject matter of this
action. The McIntoshes inform this Court that they intend to
testify themselves as to their damages.
....
Under the rule set forth in Slusher, in order to present
testimony regarding the the value of property, one must first
qualify under all three of the Kentucky prerequisites. To be
qualified to testify as to property values, the landowners must
be acquainted with property values in the vicinity, must also
know the property to be valued, and must understand the
standard of value. According to Mr. McIntosh's [sic]
deposition testimony, he is unaware of the difference between
a permanent easement and a fee simple taking. Further, he
has stated that he also does not know the standard for
damages in a condemnation action. In light of the Slusher
requirements and based on the McIntosh's [sic] testimony, the
Respondents here cannot establish the requisite qualifications,
as landowners, to give their opinion of fair market value. If
this action were to proceed to trial, the jury would be forced
to speculate on testimony with regard to fee simple values
without testimony as to the value of a permanent easement.
Conversely, the McIntoshes maintained that they were qualified to express an opinion
upon the before and after fair market value of the property; thus, they argue that their
testimony created an issue of fact upon the proper amount of compensation for the jury to
decide.
In this Commonwealth, an owner of real property is not “presumed” to be
qualified to render an opinion as to the market value of that property. Com. v. Fister, 373
S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1963). Rather, a witness, including the owner of land, may be qualified
to give an opinion as to the market value of real property. Com. v. Slusher, 371 S.W.2d
851 (Ky. 1963). To be so qualified, a lay witness must “know the property to be valued
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and the value of the property in the vicinity, must understand the standard of value, and
must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable inference.” Id. at 853. The issue of
a witness's qualification to testify is a question for the court to determine. Com. v. Tyree,
365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1963).
In determining that the McIntoshes were not qualified to express their
opinions upon fair market value, the circuit court specifically cited to Larry's deposition
testimony. Therein, Larry was specifically asked if he knew the measurement of
damages in a condemnation case? His reply was “no.” He was also questioned about
whether he possessed any independent knowledge of property values in the area? Again,
he replied “no.” In Lynn's deposition testimony, it was apparent that she was unaware of
whether the Board was taking a permanent easement or fee simple title.
The McIntoshes attempted to cure their deposition testimony deficiencies
by filing affidavits in response to the motion for summary judgment. As a general
proposition, a deposition is more reliable than an affidavit. Lipsteuer v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732 (Ky. 2000). However, affidavits may not be ignored
if the affidavit explains the inconsistency between the deposition and the affidavit. Id. In
this case, the affidavit did not explain the prior inconsistencies and was nothing more
than a self-serving statement attempting to create an issue of fact. Under this
circumstance, the circuit court correctly disregarded the affidavits.
Viewing the record as a whole, we do not believe that the McIntoshes
adequately understood the value of property in the area, the proper standard of value in a
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condemnation action, or the extent of the property taken. As such, we conclude that the
McIntoshes were not qualified to express an opinion upon the before and after fair market
value of the property. Accordingly, we hold that the McIntoshes failed to present
evidence creating an issue of fact as to proper compensation; thus, the circuit court
properly entered summary judgment in the amount of the commissioners' award,
$1,931.00.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Oldham Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Stephen B. Early
Crestwood, Kentucky
Alan N. Linker
Louisville, Kentucky
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