RUSSELL McCAULEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002649-MR
RUSSELL McCAULEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 05-CR-00019 AND 05-CR-00020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE: Russell McCauley appeals from an order of the
Marion Circuit Court denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea he entered in the
above captioned indictments. We affirm.
In Indictment No. 05-CR-00019 McCauley was indicted on various drug
and firearm charges. In Indictment No. 05-CR-00020 he was indicted for receiving
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Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
stolen property over $300.00. McCauley was also indicted for first degree persistent
felony offender in both cases. In Indictment No. 05-CR-00021 McCauley's step-daughter
and co-defendant, Robin Crystal Tungate, was indicted for various drug charges in
connection with allegations overlapping with the charges in the appellant's Indictment
No. 05-CR-00019.
McCauley eventually entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth resolving both Indictments 05-CR-00019 and 05-CR-00020. Pursuant to
the plea agreement various counts were dropped, the persistent felony offender charge
was reduced to second-degree, an unrelated indictment was dismissed, McCauley pled
guilty to various of the counts, and the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence
of a total of 18 years to serve. On June 9, 2006, a plea agreement hearing was held at
which time the trial court accepted the plea agreement. McCauley's trial counsel at the
time of the plea agreement was Dawn Spalding.
Prior to sentencing, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea upon
the basis that a term of his plea agreement with the Commonwealth was that his stepdaughter's charges in Indictment No. 05-CR-00021 be dropped, and the Commonwealth
had failed to comply with this aspect of the agreement.
On December 4, 2006, an evidentiary hearing was held on McCauley's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Prior to the hearing new trial counsel was substituted
in place of Spalding. At the hearing Spalding's former secretary, McCauley's brother, and
McCauley all testified to the effect that Spalding had informed McCauley that the
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Commonwealth would agree to drop the charges against his step-daughter if he would
agree to plead guilty under the terms as described above. Spalding, however, firmly
testified that she had stated no such thing. She testified that she had only indicated that
the step-daughter may get pre-trial diversion, which could ultimately lead to dismissal of
the charges.
In its December 15, 2006, order denying McCauley's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, the trial court made findings rejecting McCauley's claim that there had
been an agreement that charges against his step-daughter would be dismissed if he pled
guilty. McCauley appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
Before us, McCauley contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We disagree.
We first note that in its December 15, 2006, order the trial court made
findings rejecting McCauley's claim that the Commonwealth had agreed to dismiss the
charges against his step-daughter in return for his guilty plea. “Findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR2 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported
by substantial evidence.” Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.App. 2002).
“Substantial evidence” is “evidence of substance and relevant consequence sufficient to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.” Id. As stated in R.C.R. v.
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36 (Ky.App. 1998), “when
the testimony is conflicting we may not substitute our decision for the judgment of the
trial court.” Id . at 39.
The trial court's finding that there was no agreement that the charges against
McCauley's step-daughter would be dismissed in return for his guilty plea is supported by
substantial evidence. Spalding's testimony alone supports the trial court's finding. In
addition, the issue was not included in the written plea agreement documents, nor was it
raised at the plea agreement hearing. As such, we undertake the remainder of our review
based upon the premise that there was no agreement that the Commonwealth would
dismiss the charges against McCauley's step-daughter in return for his guilty plea.
RCr3 8.10 provides that “[a]t any time before judgment the court may
permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted.” The decision to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea is firmly committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 187,
188 (Ky. 1974). A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision which is
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by legal principles. Edmonds v.
Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 570 (Ky. 2006).
As previously noted, the trial court determined that the Commonwealth had,
in fact, not offered to dismiss the charges against McCauley's step-daughter in return for
his guilty plea. Moreover, the premise that the Commonwealth had made such an offer
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Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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was the underpinning of McCauley's motion to withdraw. As the underpinning for
McCauley's motion has been subverted, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. McCauley cites us to no
other basis why his otherwise knowing and voluntary guilty plea should be withdrawn,
and we will accordingly not disturb the trial court's denial of the motion.
In the alternative McCauley argues that his guilty plea should be set aside
based upon ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process.
However, McCauley does not cite us to his preservation of this issue as required by CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv).
In any event, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally will not
be reviewed on direct appeal because there usually is no record or trial court ruling
specifically on the issue and there is a potential problem of conflict of interest for trial
counsel filing notices of direct appeal. See Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d
870, 872 (Ky.1998) (indicating the better approach involving claims not preserved by trial
counsel is to first file a RCr 10.26 substantial or palpable error motion in the appellate
court, and then if unsuccessful, to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a
post-judgment collateral attack); Hibbs v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 642, 643
(Ky.App.1978). However, where the ineffective assistance claim is specifically raised in
a new trial motion and ruled on by the trial court, it may be reviewed on direct appeal.
Humphrey, supra. As the trial court did not rule upon McCauley's claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel, the issue is not properly before us. His remedy is to pursue this
claim through a post-conviction motion pursuant to RCr 11.42
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Marion Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel Todd Spalding
Labanon, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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