MATTHEW W. RANKIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002548-MR
MATTHEW W. RANKIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00078
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Matthew W. Rankin (hereinafter “Rankin”) has appealed from an
order entered by the Oldham Circuit Court on November 15, 2006, which denied his
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
the trial court's final judgment and sentence of imprisonment without holding an
evidentiary hearing. Having concluded the trial court did not err in denying Rankin's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
On September 2, 2004, Rankin, with the assistance of counsel, entered a
negotiated guilty plea to two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.1 On November 4,
2004, Rankin was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement to five years' imprisonment
on each count, to run concurrently for a total sentence of five years' imprisonment.
Rankin was also ordered to submit to DNA and HIV testing, to undergo a sexual offender
assessment and any recommended follow-up treatment, and to become a lifetime sexual
offender registrant pursuant to KRS 17.495. His term of imprisonment was probated for
a period of five years.
On October 4, 2006, Rankin filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate
the judgment of conviction and requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion. On
November 1, 2006, the Commonwealth filed its response to the motion. The trial court
entered an order on November 15, 2006, denying the motion to vacate without holding a
hearing. This appeal followed.
Rankin contends on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective: (1) for failing
to fully investigate the allegations; (2) for coercing Rankin into entering a guilty plea; and
(3) for misinforming Rankin of the complete consequences of his guilty plea. He further
alleges counsel's ineffectiveness rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Additionally,
Rankin contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his
RCr 11.42 motion.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.110.
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A movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an RCr
11.42 motion unless there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of
the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993). “Where the
movant's allegations are refuted on the face of the record as a whole, no evidentiary
hearing is required.” Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986)
(citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ky.App. 1985)). Upon a
careful review of the record, we hold each of Rankin's claims is refuted on the face of the
record. Thus, Rankin was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea was set forth in
Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986), wherein it was stated:
The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). There must be
an affirmative showing in the record that the plea was
intelligently and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969). However, “the validity of a guilty plea
is determined not by reference to some magic incantation
recited at the time it is taken but from the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it.” Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565
S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978), (citing Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970)).
In Commonwealth v. Crawford, 789 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Ky. 1990), the
Supreme Court of Kentucky endorsed the use of written guilty plea forms to satisfy the
due process concerns of Sparks and Boykin. The Crawford court noted that the
“Certificate of Counsel” indicating the voluntariness of the defendant's plea coupled with
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the defendant's waiver of rights created a record that was “adequate to show that the
petitioner intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty.” Id.
In the case sub judice, Rankin signed a “Motion to Enter Guilty Plea”
which attested that his judgment was not impaired by drugs, alcohol or medication, and
further that he had fully discussed his case with his attorney prior to executing the
document. The written motion also contained a detailed recitation of the constitutional
rights he would be waiving by entering his guilty plea, and the consequences of entering
such a plea. In addition, the form stated:
I declare my plea of “GUILTY” is freely, knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily made; that I have been
represented by counsel; that my attorney has explained my
constitutional rights to me, as well as the charges against me
and any defenses to them; and that I understand the nature of
this proceeding and all matters contained in this document.
Rankin executed the guilty plea form on September 2, 2004. Immediately below his
signature is a certificate executed by counsel, affirming, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, Rankin was fully informed of the consequences of entering his plea, and that the
plea was freely, knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
Further, during the detailed plea colloquy on September 2, 2004, Rankin
verbally reaffirmed his written statements to the trial court. Given these facts, we
conclude that his guilty plea was valid.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy a twopart test showing both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair and
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unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465 (Ky. 2002); Foley v. Commonwealth,
17 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000). The burden is on the movant to overcome a strong
presumption that counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the
circumstances counsel's action might be considered “trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689; Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1998); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998).
A court must be highly deferential in reviewing defense counsel's
performance and should avoid second-guessing counsel's actions based on hindsight.
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978
S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998). In assessing counsel's performance, the standard is whether the
alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms
based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89;
Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at 470; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1999). “‘A
defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by
hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance.’” Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 911 (quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949
S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997)). In order to establish actual prejudice, a movant must show a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different or
was rendered fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Bowling
v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2002).
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Rankin has failed in his burden of overcoming the strong presumption of
effectiveness. None of his alleged claims of ineffective assistance are borne out by the
record on appeal. However, regardless of the arguable existence of such acts or
omissions, Rankin's guilty plea precludes his ability to assert the defense of ineffective
assistance of counsel. “In fact, the effect of a plea of guilty is to waive all defenses other
than that the indictment charges no offense.” Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d
693, 694 (Ky. 1970) (citing Commonwealth v. Watkins, 398 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1966) cert.
denied, Watkins v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 965, 86 S.Ct. 1596, 16 L.Ed.2d 677, Boles v.
Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1966)). Rankin has failed to demonstrate that he
received ineffective assistance as a matter of fact, and further, as a matter of law, he is not
entitled to raise such a claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Oldham Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Scott C. Byrd
Olgin & Byrd
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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