RODERICK LEE STEWART v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 31, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002506-MR
RODERICK LEE STEWART
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-01588
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Roderick Lee Stewart appeals from a judgment reflecting a guilty
plea on one count each of trafficking in cocaine and marijuana possession. Stewart
contends that a traffic stop for a motor vehicle violation was unnecessarily prolonged by
the police officer for the improper purpose of giving another officer time to bring his
drug-sniffing dog to the scene. He also argues that the dog’s positive reaction to the drug
odor coming from his vehicle did not constitute probable cause sufficient to justify a
search of the vehicle’s interior. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment on
appeal.
On November 11, 2005, Lexington Police Officer Scott Givens observed a
motor vehicle driving through a high crime area of Lexington, Kentucky. Officer Givens
noticed that loud music was emanating from the vehicle in violation of a noise ordinance,
and he pulled the vehicle over. When Officer Givens approached the vehicle on foot, he
noted that the driver, Roderick Lee Stewart, was trembling and nervous.
After speaking with Stewart, Officer Givens returned to his vehicle and
radioed for Officer Grayhouse - a canine officer - to come to the scene. At some point,
Officer Cobb arrived and directed Stewart to exit his vehicle. Officer Givens then
checked Stewart’s name and personal information on Givens’ computer, and proceeded
to write a citation for the noise violation. While Givens was writing the ticket, Officer
Grayhouse arrived on the scene. According to the record, Grayhouse arrived
approximately 5 to 8 minutes after being summoned by Givens.
Officer Grayhouse then walked his drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of
Stewart’s vehicle, which took less than one minute. Grayhouse observed that the dog
alerted to the odor of drugs. Based on the dog’s reaction, the officers searched the
interior of Stewart’s vehicle and found one Ziploc-type bag containing 15.3 grams of
cocaine, and two other bags containing marijuana. Stewart was arrested.
On December 12, 2005, Stewart was indicted by the Fayette County grand
jury on one count each of trafficking in marijuana (less than 8 ounces) and trafficking in a
controlled substance (cocaine). On January 31, 2006, Stewart filed a motion to suppress
the evidence discovered in his vehicle. In support of the motion, he maintained that the
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evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search. Specifically, he argued that the
vehicle stop was improper and that Officer Givens unnecessarily prolonged the stop to
allow the canine officer to arrive.
Upon considering the arguments, the Fayette Circuit Court rendered an
order denying the motion to suppress. The court found that Officer Givens properly
stopped Stewart’s vehicle as a result of the noise violation, and that the duration of the
stop - approximately 13 minutes - was reasonable under the circumstances.
Stewart later entered a plea of guilty on one count of first-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance, and one count of possession of marijuana. The plea was
conditioned on the reservation of Stewart’s right to appeal the order denying his motion
to suppress. Stewart was sentenced to five years in prison on the trafficking count and
twelve months for marijuana possession, to be served concurrently for a total sentence of
five years in prison. This appeal followed.
Stewart now argues that the circuit court committed reversible error in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the vehicle search. He maintains
that the Lexington Police officers unnecessarily prolonged the vehicle stop for the
improper purpose of giving the canine officer additional time to respond to the scene.
While acknowledging that the police had a legitimate basis for the traffic stop, he argues
that he may not be detained without cause for the sole purpose of giving the canine
officer time to arrive. He also notes that although he was driving through a high crime
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area and may have appeared nervous when stopped, neither of these factors are violations
of the law and they do not form a basis for the detention.
Stewart also argues that the drug dog’s positive reaction indicating the
presence of a drug odor did not give rise to probable cause supporting a vehicle search.
He maintains that the drug odor only indicated that drugs may have been present in the
vehicle at some time in the past, and did not constitute probable cause to believe that
drugs were still in the vehicle at the time of the vehicle stop. Since the officers had no
reason to believe that drugs were still in the vehicle, he claims that probable cause was
lacking and that the circuit court erred in failing to so rule.
We find no error with the circuit court’s conclusion that the officers did not
improperly delay the vehicle stop, nor its conclusion that the drug dog alerting to the odor
of drugs provided probable cause to search the vehicle. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 179
S.W.3d 882 (Ky.App. 2005) is factually very similar to the instant matter, and is
dispositive of both claims of error. As in the matter at bar, the Johnson defendant moved
to suppress evidence obtained in a vehicle search upon claiming that the officers
improperly delayed the vehicle stop for the purpose of giving a canine officer additional
time to reach the scene. In examining the claim of error, a panel of the Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court’s finding that the brief period of detention lasted no longer than
was necessary to achieve the purpose of the stop. This finding was based on evidence
adduced from the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing which detailed the actions
of the officers after the vehicle was stopped. The trial court in Johnson found that the
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investigating officers pulled a vehicle over for traffic violations in a high crime area,
whereupon an officer spoke with the driver and then began writing a citation for improper
registration. While the officer was carrying out these duties, the canine officer arrived.
The court noted that it took the canine officer approximately five to seven minutes to
arrive, and it found no basis for concluding that the vehicle stop was unnecessarily
delayed.
In the matter at bar, Stewart acknowledges that the initial vehicle stop was
proper. Much like the Johnson facts, Officer Givens first spoke with Stewart and then
issued a citation based on Stewart’s violation of the noise ordinance. Stewart attempts to
distinguish the instant facts from those of Johnson by noting that Officer Givens
improperly delayed the vehicle stop by entering Stewart’s personal information into a
computer to look for outstanding warrants. The record indicates, however, that the time
it took for Officer Givens to look at the computer was minimal, and further that Officer
Grayhouse arrived at the scene between five and eight minutes after he was first
contacted by Givens. This is very similar to the five-to-seven-minute time frame noted in
Johnson, wherein a panel of this Court found the duration of the vehicle stop to be
reasonable. We find no basis for distinguishing Johnson, nor for concluding that the
Fayette Circuit Court erred on this issue.
As for Stewart’s claim that the drug dog alerting to the odor of drugs did
not create probable cause sufficient to justify the vehicle search, the Johnson court stated
with clarity the long-standing notion that a drug dog alert does constitute probable cause.
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“After the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, the officers undoubtedly had probable
cause to search the vehicle.” Id. at 886. Probable cause for a search requires something
more than a bare suspicion but less than what is needed to support a conviction.
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 199 S.W.3d 765 (Ky.App. 2006). That is to say, the alert is
not held out as proof of criminal wrongdoing, but rather is a rational basis upon which an
officer’s suspicion of criminal wrongdoing may be formed.
As the United States Supreme Court has remarked, probable
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely
requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” that certain items
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of
a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004).
So while Stewart is correct that the alert does not prove the presence of
illegal drugs, no such proof is required to justify the search. The alert given by Officer
Grayhouse’s dog constituted probable cause sufficient to justify the vehicle search, and
the Fayette Circuit Court properly so found.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order and judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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