INTEGRATED ELECTRICAL v. GEORGE HUSSEY; ELLIOT ELECTRIC/ KENTUCKY, INC.; HONORABLE W. BRUCE COWDEN JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002216-WC
INTEGRATED ELECTRICAL
& DATACOM
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NO. WC-04-01720
GEORGE HUSSEY; ELLIOT ELECTRIC/
KENTUCKY, INC.; HONORABLE W. BRUCE
COWDEN JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD1 AND WINE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
HOWARD, JUDGE: Integrated Electrical & Datacom (hereinafter Integrated Electrical)
petitions for review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board which affirmed an
1
Judge James I. Howard completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his appointed term of
office on December 6, 2007. Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge David Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
award by the Administrative Law Judge, finding that George Hussey (hereinafter Hussey)
was jointly employed by Integrated Electrical and Elliot Electric/Kentucky, Inc.
(hereinafter Elliot Electric) and that Hussey's award should be enhanced by the threemultiplier pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. Finding no error, we affirm.
George Hussey was employed by Integrated Electrical as a licensed
electrician from 1997 until it was acquired by Elliot Electric on June 1, 2004. Hussey
testified that in early May 2004, the owner of Integrated Electrical, Dale Marshall,
informed him that Elliot Electric was buying Integrated Electrical. Hussey further
testified Mr. Marshall also told him at that time that the Nicholasville, Kentucky, project
on which Integrated Electrical was working was to be an "Elliot job," even though
Integrated Electrical continued to pay Hussey's wages until it was formally acquired by
Elliot Electric. Hussey testified that Marshall told him that after Elliot Electric acquired
Integrated Electrical, "we're [Integrated Electrical] going to change the names on the
truck and keep right on going, no change." An administrative assistant at Elliot Electric,
Barbara McNees, testified that Integrated Electrical employees who passed a drug test
were provided the opportunity to work for Elliot Electric, and that a meeting was
conducted on May 26, 2004, for Hussey and other Integrated Electrical employees to
complete employment and insurance forms. It was during this May 26 meeting that
Hussey sustained an injury to his back and right hand when the metal folding chair in
which he was sitting collapsed. Elliot Electric acquired Integrated Electrical on June 1,
2004, and Hussey worked for Elliot Electric until August 13, 2004.
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The Adminstrative Law Judge, the Honorable W. Bruce Cowden, found that
Hussey was employed by both Integrated Electrical and Elliot Electric when he was
injured. The ALJ found that Hussey sustained a six percent permanent impairment rating
and that Hussey could not return to the type of work he performed at the time of his
injury, awarding Hussey the enhancement of benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1.
Prior to the ALJ's final decision, Elliot Electric and Hussey settled. Integrated Electrical
appealed to the Workers' Compensation Board, which affirmed the ALJ decision.
Integrated Electrical petitioned for review of the board's decision.
On review, our duty is to correct the Board only where it "has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827
S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992).
Integrated Electrical first contests the finding that Hussey was injured in the
course and scope of his employment with Integrated Electrical. It acknowledges that
Hussey was still employed by Integrated Electrical on the date of his injury, but argues
that he was in a “dual employment,” rather than a “joint employment” and that he was
not performing any services for the benefit of Integrated Electrical at the time of his
injury. Hussey responds that “the inner workings of Integrated and Elliot were so
intertwined that whatever activity he was performing that related to his job was done for
the benefit of both.” After a consideration of the arguments and the record, we adopt the
following excerpt relating to this issue from the Board's well-reasoned decision:
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The ALJ also found that Hussey was jointly employed by
Integrated and Elliott (sic) at the time of his injury and cited
the "joint employment" doctrine as legal authority for his
conclusion.
Professor Larson offers the following definition of "joint
employment":
Joint employment occurs when a single
employee, under contract with two employers,
and under the simultaneous control of both,
simultaneously performs services for both
employers, and when the service for each
employer is the same as, or is closely related to,
that for the other. In such a case, both
employers are liable for workmen's
compensation.
****
Joint employment is possible, and indeed fairly
common, because there is nothing unusual
about the coinciding of both control by two
employers and the advancement of the interests
of two employers in a single piece of work.
Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 68.01, Desk
Ed. (1998).
Putting an even finer point on the matter, Professor Larson
discusses joint business arrangements creating joint
employment situations in the following excerpt from his
treatise:
The joint employment may come about simply
because of the joint character of the business
arrangement between the two employers. The
most obvious illustration is that of a classic
joint venture. For example, the owner of a
ferris wheel furnished it to the operator of a
carnival, while the latter furnished and paid for
all help necessary for its operation, the net
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proceeds being equally shared. They were held
to be joint adventurers. Joint employment may
also be found when work is performed for
affiliated or closely related corporations or
businesses. Again, the coincidence of interest
and control may occur because one employer
is the proprietor of a business that the other is
involved in liquidating.
Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 68.03, Desk
Ed. (1998). (Emphasis added [by the Board]).
The ALJ cited ample evidence in the form of testimony from
McNees, Marshall and Hussey to establish coincidence of
interest and joint control on the part of Integrated and Elliott
(sic) over Hussey's work on the Town Square Bank project.
As much of that evidence is relevant to our consideration of
Integrated's argument on the issue of course and scope of
employment, it will be summarized in that context, below.
Throughout its first argument, Integrated repeats the refrain
"there is absolutely no evidence" that Hussey was in the
course and scope of his employment with Integrated when the
accident at issue occurred. Integrated's argument relies
heavily on what it characterizes as a total lack of evidence
that Integrated compelled, encouraged or received any benefit
from Hussey's attendance of the orientation required for him
to become an Elliott (sic) employee. We disagree with this
assessment of the evidence.
McNees testified that the sale of Integrated to Elliott (sic) was
announced in a meeting jointly conducted by Marshall and
the Vice President and General Manager of Elliott (sic), Jim
Kemper. The meeting took place prior to May 26, 2004. All
Integrated employees were given an opportunity to go to
work for Elliott (sic), assuming they passed a drug test. In
fact, Marshall went to work as an Account Executive for
Elliott (sic) after the transfer of ownership.
Hussey testified that Marshall explained the sale to him by
stating, "[W]e're going to change the names on the truck and
keep right on going, no change." In fact, Hussey came to
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discover that he would appreciate a reduction in his hourly
rate of pay, a loss of insurance coverage, a loss of accrued
vacation, a loss of all benefits he had enjoyed under
Integrated's ownership. He discovered this two weeks into
Elliott's (sic) ownership of the company. We believe the
foregoing evidence is sufficient for the ALJ to infer that
Integrated encouraged Hussey and its other employees to go
to work for Elliott (sic). It is undisputed that attendance at
the orientation was necessary for Hussey to become Elliott
(sic) employee.
Elliott (sic) purchased all of the assets of Integrated and took
over the servicing of its accounts, as well. McNees testified
that the amount of work being taken over by Elliott (sic)
necessitated the hiring of all Integrated employees who
elected to accept the transfer and passed the drug test.
McNees testified that Elliott (sic) went outside the pool of
Integrated workers in order to supplement the loss of workers
who did not accept the transfer or did not pass the drug test.
However, we believe it is reasonable for the ALJ to infer
from the testimony of McNees, which is consistent with the
deposition testimony of Marshall, that the availability of
Integrated's workforce was part and parcel of the planned
acquisition by Elliott (sic). By extension, the consent of
Hussey and other Integrated employees to work under the
new ownership, which facilitated the acquisition, produced a
tangible benefit to the company.
In other words, we disagree with Integrated's assertion that
there is no evidence whatsoever that Integrated encouraged
its employees to go to work for Elliott (sic) or benefited from
their doing so. Thus, the ALJ's determination is in accord
with the two-pronged test of "compulsion" and "benefit to the
employer" set out in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
and cited by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Spurgeon v.
Blue Diamond Coal Co., 469 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1971).
We believe the finding that Hussey was jointly employed by both Integrated
Electrical and Elliot Electric during the liquidation of Integrated Electrical is supported
by substantial evidence and we therefore affirm the Board in this respect.
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Integrated Electrical also contends that the ALJ erred in enhancing Hussey's
award by the three multiplier, claiming that Hussey will "begin earning the same or
greater wages and continue to do so for the indefinite future." Integrated Electrical cites
the recent Kentucky Supreme Court opinion in Adams v. NHC Healthcare, 199 S.W.3d
163 (Ky. 2006), which held that when either the KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 multiplier or the
KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 multiplier can be applied, the ALJ must choose the more
appropriate subsection. See also Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003).
The Board squarely addressed Integrated Electrical's argument as follows:
The primary substantive difference in the facts presented in
Adams, supra, and those in the case sub judice is that the
evidence before the ALJ below did not establish that Hussey
currently has the capacity to earn wages equal to or greater
than those earned at the time of injury. Integrated's argument
is based on Hussey's speculation as to what he should be able
to earn once he has completed his training and become
certified as a house inspector. Hussey has never worked as a
house inspector and, in fact, must complete the training
program and inspect 50 houses before he may apply for
certification. In Adams, supra, on the other hand, the ALJ
found that, as of the final hearing, the claimant had the
physical capacity to perform medium duty work, including
that of a medical technician, a job for which the claimant was
already qualified, which he had held in the past and which
would pay wages equal to or greater than his AWW [average
weekly wage].
It is also plain that the claimant's lack of credibility was a
factor influencing the ALJ's decision in Adams, supra. There,
the claimant had returned to his regular job after his injury
earning equal or greater wages than his AWW, but voluntary
(sic) resigned his position prior to the final hearing, where he
argued he did not retain the physical capacity to return to any
gainful employment at all. Here, at the time he filed his Form
101, Hussey had secured work as an electrical supervisor
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earning $23.00 per hour. He was involuntarily laid off from
that job in January 2005 because he was unable to perform all
of the physical tasks required of him. He found work in
September 2005 earning just $10.00 per hour, but with the
expectation of a significant increase in pay once he completes
his training and becomes certified as a house inspector.
Hussey testified that this job requires him to climb stairs and
ladders to access attic spaces and roofs, inspect plumbing and
wiring, etc.
Notwithstanding Hussey's optimism with respect to his ability
to perform this work and earn substantially greater wages, it
was within the ALJ's discretion to conclude that, as of the
date the claim was submitted for decision, Hussey did not
have the physical capacity to return to his former work nor the
ability to access other employment at wages equal to or
greater than his AWW. In other words, unlike the claimant in
Adams, supra, there was substantial evidence upon which the
ALJ reasonably could conclude that, were Hussey at that
moment capable of earning higher wages, he would have
availed himself of the opportunity. Of course, it is for the
ALJ alone to assess the credibility of witnesses. Magic Coal
Co. v. Fox, [19 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2000)].
Having reviewed the evidence, we agree with the Board that the ALJ's
decision to apply the three-times multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) is supported by
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. The Board did not err in affirming the
ALJ in this respect.
The decision of the Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Gregory L. Little
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE GEORGE
HUSSEY:
McKinley Morgan
London, Kentucky
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