LEWIS N. LEE v. LT. TAMMY MITCHELL
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 5, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002128-MR
LEWIS N. LEE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00140
LT. TAMMY MITCHELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND KELLER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Lewis Neil Lee, appeals pro se from an order of the Lyon
County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for a declaration of rights filed pursuant to
KRS 410.040, challenging a prison disciplinary action. Having concluded that Appellant
has not shown that he possessed a liberty interest subject to due process protection, we
affirm.
1
Senior Judge J. William Graves, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Appellant is presently a state inmate incarcerated at the Western Kentucky
Correctional Complex in Lyon County, Kentucky. During an institutional shake down on
or about March 9, 2006, Sergeant Tony Harris discovered a Department of Corrections 5year pin in Appellant's locker. An Adjustment Committee hearing was held on March 16,
2006, and based upon the information presented, Appellant was found guilty of
Possession of Staff Uniform Clothing or Uniform Related Items, a Category 6-7 offense
of the Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures. He was assigned to 45-days
disciplinary segregation, which was suspended for 180 days. Appellant then filed an
appeal to the Warden, who concluded that some evidence did exist to support a finding of
guilt and that procedural due process was provided.
Appellant thereafter filed a petition for a declaration of rights in the Lyon
Circuit Court claiming that he was denied a fair disciplinary hearing because he was not
afforded the opportunity to speak in his own defense and explain to the Committee that
he thought the pin was a Sunday School pin similar to one his grandmother had owned.2
The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition, ruling that he failed to demonstrate the
deprivation of any due process rights under the United States Constitution.
On appeal to this Court, Appellant again argues that the prison disciplinary
action violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. While Appellant does
not deny being in possession of the pin, he believes that he should have been afforded the
2
We would note that on Disciplinary Report Form Part II, the Adjustment Officer commented
that Appellant admitted to having a Master's Degree and clearly knew the pin stated “Kentucky
Department of Corrections.”
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opportunity to explain to the Adjustment Committee why he had such. He further asserts
that the Lyon Circuit Court failed to grant him a full and fair hearing. We disagree.
KRS 418.0403 has become the vehicle whereby inmates may seek review of
Prison Adjustment Committee proceedings. Polsgrove v. Kentucky Bureau of
Corrections, 559 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 1977). A petition filed pursuant to KRS 418.040
invokes the circuit court's authority to act as a court of review, seeking “not to form its
own judgment, but, with due deference, ensure that the agency's judgment comports with
the legal restrictions applicable to it.” Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky.App.
1997) (citing American Beauty Homes Corporation v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964). As this Court has noted,
“courts only review the decisions of the Adjustment Committee and prison officials are
afforded broad discretion.” Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky.App. 2003).
Further, independent findings of fact are not only unnecessary, but unauthorized. Smith,
supra. Finally, assessment of penalties for disciplinary infractions is within the
discretionary authority of prison officials and court interference is generally discouraged.
Gilhaus v. Wilson, 734 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.App. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 14th Amendment
Due Process Clause protects an inmate's state-created liberty interest. See Kentucky
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104
3
KRS 418.040 reads:
In any action in a court of record of this Commonwealth having general jurisdiction wherein it is
made to appear that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for a declaration of rights,
either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of rights, whether
or not consequential relief is or could be asked.
-3-
L.Ed.2d 506 (l989). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-567, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 297882, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (l974), the Court held that although prison disciplinary actions are not
subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards, inmates are entitled to the minimum
requirements of procedural due process including, (1) advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) a written statement by the fact-finders of the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals;
and (4) impartial fact finders. The Court approved these minimal procedures after
balancing the prison administration's profound interest in maintaining order against the
inmate's relatively minor interest in avoiding a portion of his sentence. Id.
Further, the requirements of due process are satisfied if there is merely
“some evidence” in the record to support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct.
2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). See also Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 486 (6th Cir.
1995). In Smith v. O'Dea, supra, at 358, Kentucky adopted the federal “some evidence”
standard, holding that it provides courts with a “sufficient check upon adjustment
committee fact-finding” and does not compromise Section 2 of our Constitution.
We conclude that Appellant's claim of procedural due process violations
associated with the disciplinary action was properly dismissed because he failed to show
that a constitutionally protected right was impacted. In Marksberry v. Chandler, 126
S.W.3d 747 (Ky.App. 2004), this Court explained the factors necessary to raise a due
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process cause of action associated with prison disciplinary actions. Under the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132
L.Ed.2d 418 (l995), in order to establish a "liberty" interest protected by the due process
clause, an inmate must show both state statutes or prison regulations restricting the
discretion of prison officials, and sanctions that impose "atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." See Marksberry, supra
at 750 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300). Factors relevant to
determining whether a particular disciplinary penalty constitutes atypical and significant
hardship include: "(1) the effect of the segregation on the length of prison confinement
under the original sentence; (2) the extent to which the conditions of the segregation
differ from other routine prison conditions; and (3) the duration of the segregation
imposed." Id. (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87, 115 S.Ct. at 2301-02). In Marksberry,
we held that 15 days disciplinary segregation with no loss of good time credit did not
constitute atypical and significant hardship and cited to several cases finding periods
significantly longer than 15 days, including a 30 day period in Sandin, did not rise to the
level of atypical and significant hardship. Marksberry, supra, at 750-51 and footnote 16.
The record herein establishes that Appellant was afforded all applicable due
process requirements. The disciplinary report shows that the Appellant waived his 24hour notice and his right to call witnesses. Moreover, there was more than “some
evidence” to support the Adjustment Committee's finding that Appellant committed the
offense charged. After the finding of guilt was entered, a penalty of 45 days disciplinary
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segregation was imposed upon Appellant, which was suspended for 180 days. The
imposition of the penalty did not result in the loss of any good-time credit, or otherwise
affect the length of Appellant's confinement under the original sentence. Therefore, we
find nothing to support Appellant's claim that he was deprived the due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution. Thus, the Lyon Circuit Court correctly dismissed Appellant's
petition.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lewis Neil Lee, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
James D. Godsey
Justice & Public Safety Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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