M.W.S. v. M.A.S.; J.S., A MINOR CHILD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: AUGUST 31, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001856-ME
M.W.S.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 05-AD-00049; 05-AD-00051
M.A.S.; J.S., A MINOR CHILD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: M.W.S. appeals from an order of July 11, 2006, of the
Madison Circuit Court, Family Court Division, terminating his parental rights to his
minor son, J.A.S. Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings of the family court and,
therefore, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Michael Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
J.A.S. was born in 1999. On July 29, 2002, his parents, M.W.S. and
M.A.S., were divorced by decree of dissolution of the Estill Circuit Court. They were
awarded joint custody of J.A.S., with his mother, M.A.S, designated as the primary
residential custodian. M.W.S. was granted standard visitation privileges, and was ordered
to pay child support. He failed to meet his child support obligation, however, and on May
3, 2003, he was ordered to pay arrears of approximately $1,460.00 via wage assignment.
Shortly thereafter, M.W.S. was terminated from his employment at Paul Miller Ford due
to his addiction to drugs. On September 26, 2003, the circuit court entered an ex parte
emergency order awarding M.A.S. sole custody of J.A.S. after it was discovered that,
while exercising his visitation rights, M.W.S. had left the child unattended in a running
motor vehicle for approximately one hour. In its order, the court also noted that M.W.S.
had not exercised his visitation rights for ninety days, and had admitted to M.A.S. that he
was using crack cocaine.
M.A.S. initially filed a petition to terminate M.W.S.’s parental rights in the
Estill Circuit Court. M.W.S. filed a successful motion to dismiss the petition on grounds
of improper venue. M.A.S. then filed the petition in Madison Circuit Court, on October
21, 2005. M.W.S. responded by filing a petition for visitation on November 19, 2005. A
hearing was held on his petition on December 19, 2005, at which the court told M.W.S.
he would be granted supervised visitation with his son during the upcoming holidays if he
was able to pass a drug test, filed proof that he was undergoing drug treatment, and paid
his child support. M.W.S. failed a drug screening administered on that day, testing
-2-
positive for marijuana use. He made a single payment of $1,500.00 towards his child
support obligations. The following month, he entered the Hope Center in Lexington,
where he received treatment and counseling for his drug addiction. He was still residing
at the Hope Center on June 21, 2006, when the court held a hearing on M.A.S.’s
termination petition.
At the termination hearing, M.A.S. testified that M.W.S. had not exercised
visitation or seen his son for over three years. She described an inadvertent encounter
with M.W.S. on Halloween night of 2005, when M.W.S. was so intoxicated that he did
not recognize J.A.S. She stated that J.A.S. is afraid of M.W.S. and still recalls the
incident when he was left alone in the running automobile. According to M.A.S.,
M.W.S.’s child support arrears exceed $11,000.00. She also testified that he had failed to
maintain medical insurance for J.A.S. as required under the terms of the dissolution order.
M.A.S. explained that she has remarried and has been in a stable relationship with her
husband for four years. She testified that J.A.S. has bonded with his stepfather and calls
him “Daddy.”
M.W.S. testified that he has been addicted to drugs and alcohol since the
age of thirteen but that he had been sober for the past five months while living at the
Hope Center, where he was employed as a counselor earning $80.00 per week. He
admitted that he could show no proof that he was unable to obtain more lucrative
employment. He also admitted that he had previously resided at the Hope Center during
the summer of 2005. On that occasion, he had remained sober for fifty-nine days, but had
-3-
then relapsed. He also testified that he had driven under the influence of drugs several
times while J.A.S. was in the vehicle.
On cross-examination by J.A.S.’s guardian ad litem, M.W.S. admitted that
he had lied to her on one occasion when he told her that he was sober, that he had missed
two scheduled appointments, and was two hours late for his last appointment with her.
He also showed a lack of awareness of certain AA/NA (Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics
Anonymous) protocols and directives even though he had described himself as a
“counselor” at the Hope Center.
M.W.S.’s mother and sister testified that they knew of his lengthy addiction
to drugs and alcohol, and that he had suffered from these addictions while exercising
visitation with J.A.S., but denied that he had actually been under the influence of drugs or
alcohol during the visitation periods. They expressed a belief that M.W.S. had changed
and was now sober.
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, in the pleadings, and in the
earlier record of the case, the family court entered an order terminating M.W.S’s parental
rights. This appeal followed.
Under the terms of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 625.090(1), a circuit
court may terminate an individual’s parental rights only after completing a three-pronged
analysis. The court must find by clear and convincing evidence both that the child is
abused or neglected and that termination would be in the best interest of the child.
-4-
Additionally, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or
more of the grounds listed in KRS 625.090(2).
In this appeal, M.W.S. specifically contests the family court’s findings and
conclusions under the “best interest of the child” prong of the test.
Our standard of review requires that we accord considerable deference to the
findings of the lower court.
This Court’s review in a termination of parental rights action
is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR 52.01
based upon clear and convincing evidence, and the findings of
the trial court will not be disturbed unless there exists no
substantial evidence in the record to support its findings.
Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean
uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a
probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of
evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent-minded
people.
R.C.R. v. Commonwealth Cabinet for Human Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36, 38-39 (Ky.App.
1998)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether termination would be in the best interest of the
child, the court is directed to consider a series of six factors set forth in KRS 625.090(3).
In this case, the court relied on factors (d) and (f), which require the court to assess
(d)The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s
best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable
period of time, considering the age of the child;
[and]
-5-
(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of
substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to
do so.
The application of these factors to the evidence led the family court to conclude as
follows:
This Court specifically finds that the respondent [M.W.S.] has
not made the efforts and adjustments in his circumstances to
make it in the child’s best interests to return him to his home
within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the
child and considering the failure of the respondent to pay a
reasonable portion of substitute physical care and
maintenance as the respondent is able-bodied and financially
able to do so.
On appeal, M.W.S. argues that the family court failed to recognize and give
sufficient weight to his efforts to be a sober and productive individual and parent, namely,
his efforts to regain his visitation privileges, his attendance at a parent education clinic,
his payment of $1,500.00 towards his child support obligation, and his participation in
drug abuse treatment at the Hope Center. He contends that the court set him up to fail by
telling him at the hearing of December 19, 2005, that if he became sober, paid his child
support and received drug treatment, he would be allowed to regain his visitation
privileges. He contends that he has been trying to meet these conditions and has
succeeded in achieving sobriety, but has not been able to make child support payments
because he has not been able to work a regular job during his stay at the Hope Center. He
takes particular exception to the court’s comment that “there is nothing wrong with you
-6-
so that you can’t work.” He also describes as “clearly erroneous” the trial court’s
comment that “based upon the statute I have to terminate.”
Although there is evidence that M.W.S. has made some effort to improve
his situation, many of these efforts were made only after the filing of the petition to
terminate his parental rights. Significantly, M.W.S. made no effort to regain his
visitation privileges following the entry of the emergency ex parte order of September 26,
2003, until M.A.S. filed the petition for termination of parental rights some two years
later. He then filed his petition to regain visitation privileges, yet failed the drug test
administered on the very day the hearing on that motion was held. Although his
attendance at the Hope Clinic may well have hindered his efforts to gain more lucrative
employment, he had already accumulated significant child support arrears during the
period when he was apparently employed on a full-time basis at Paul Miller Ford. When
we add to these facts the evidence that he had resumed his drug use after attending the
Hope Center in 2005, that he left J.A.S. alone in a running car, admitted that he had
driven under the influence of drugs while J.A.S. was in the car, and neglected to keep his
appointments with J.A.S.'s guardian ad litem, we can only conclude that the circuit court
did not commit clear error in terminating his parental rights. The court’s comment that
“based upon the statute I have to terminate,” merely reflects the fact that when the
evidence is evaluated under the statutory criteria it strongly supports the decision to
terminate M.W.S.'s parental rights. While the analysis in such cases necessarily focuses
-7-
on the conduct of the individual whose parental rights are subject to termination, the
inquiry ultimately concerns the best interest of the child and that child's need for
“some stability and permanency.” Cabinet for Human Resources v. J.B.B., 772 S.W.2d
646, 647 (Ky.App. 1989) .
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Madison Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE M.A.S.:
Jason S. Wilson
Richmond, Kentucky
James W. Baechtold
Richmond, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE J.A.S.:
Nanci M. House
Winchester, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.