DAVID L. BAKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 17, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001699-MR
DAVID L. BAKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. DOUGLAS KEMPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-001862
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: David L. Baker appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court that revoked his shock probation. After our review, we affirm.
On June 17, 2004, the Commonwealth filed an information against Baker in
the Jefferson Circuit Court charging him with one count of illegal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine), a Class D felony pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415. On the same day, Baker accepted a plea offer from
the Commonwealth and filed a motion to enter a guilty plea. As part of its offer, the
Commonwealth agreed to recommend a one-year sentence of imprisonment or a threeyear sentence if the trial court decided to probate the sentence; the Commonwealth
agreed to leave the question of probation fully within the discretion of the court. In
accordance with the offer and Baker’s motion, the trial court entered a judgment on
August 23, 2004, finding Baker guilty of the charged offense and sentencing him to
three-years’ imprisonment; however, the court suspended execution of the sentence and
placed him on probation for five years.
On December 15, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke
Baker’s probation. In support of its motion, the Commonwealth alleged that Baker had
committed the following probation violations: (1) use of a controlled substance (cocaine);
(2) use of a controlled substance (marijuana); (3) failure to comply with treatment
program for substance abuse; (4) absconding from probation supervision; (5) failure to
pay a supervision fee as directed; (6) failure to maintain full-time employment; (7)
possession of a knife; and (8) associating with a convicted felon. A hearing was held on
March 22, 2005, in which Baker stipulated that he had violated the conditions of his
probation. Baker’s probation was consequently revoked in an order entered on March 23,
2005, and he was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve out
his original three-year sentence.
On June 6, 2005, Baker, pro se, filed a motion for shock probation.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and suspended his sentence for
five years in an order entered on August 17, 2005; however, the court imposed a number
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of conditions -- including that Baker successfully complete the Jefferson County Drug
Court Program.
On October 31, 2005, a bench warrant was issued for Baker’s arrest after he
failed to appear for Drug Court. The Division of Probation and Parole subsequently
issued a report on November 21, 2005, which indicated that Baker had again absconded
from supervision and reciting the following grounds in support of its recommendation
that his probation again be revoked: (1) use of alcohol; (2) use of cocaine; (3) use of
marijuana; (4) failure to comply with treatment; (5) a discharge from Drug Court for noncompliance; (6) failure to obtain or maintain employment; and (7) absconding from
supervision. The report also noted that Baker had tested positive for marijuana and
cocaine on October 19, 2005, and that he had not been seen at Drug Court or otherwise
heard from after his counselor told him to report to the Men’s Healing Place for
detoxification and treatment. On November 30, 2005, the Commonwealth officially filed
a notice of its intent to seek to revoke Baker’s probation.
Baker was eventually found by a fugitive task force in Des Moines, Iowa,
on April 28, 2006. On July 6, 2006, a hearing was held on the Commonwealth’s motion
to revoke Baker’s shock probation, and the trial court granted the motion. The court
entered an order on July 12, 2006, reflecting this decision, and Baker was remanded to
the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve out the remainder of his sentence.
This appeal followed.
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The decision as to whether probation should be revoked when the
conditions of probation are violated rests firmly within the discretion of the trial court and
may be overturned only when the court abuses that discretion. Tiryung v. Commonwealth,
717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky.App. 1986). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Baker argues
on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his shock probation
without properly considering whether the circumstances supported revocation of only
part of his probated sentence. He contends that trial courts are required to consider
partial revocation pursuant to the alternative sentencing provisions of KRS 533.010(6),
arguing that it is reversible error for a court to fail to do so before revoking a probated
sentence in its entirety.
Baker admits, however, that he did not raise this particular argument before
the trial court; the record reflects instead that he sought only to have his probation
reinstated in full. It is well established that appellants are not permitted to make one
argument to a trial judge and a different one to the appellate court. Kennedy v.
Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976). Thus, Baker’s argument is not
preserved for our review. Even if Baker had appropriately presented this contention to
the trial court, we are not persuaded that it has merit. There is nothing within the
language of KRS 533.010(6) that mandates a trial court to consider any of the alternative
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sentences contained in the statute before revoking an appellant’s probation in full. The
statute provides as follows:
[u]pon initial sentencing of a defendant or upon
modification or revocation of probation, when the court
deems it in the best interest of the public and the
defendant, the court may order probation with the
defendant to serve one (1) of the following alternative
sentences:
(a) To a halfway house for no more than twelve (12) months;
(b) To home incarceration with or without work release for no
more than twelve (12) months;
(c) To jail for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months with
or without work release, community service and other
programs as required by the court;
(d) To a residential treatment program for the abuse of
alcohol or controlled substances; or
(e) To any other specified counseling program, rehabilitation
or treatment program, or facility. (Emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute provides that a trial court may order a
person whose probation is being modified or revoked to serve an alternative sentence.
There is nothing to suggest that a court is required to give consideration to such an
alternative -- particularly in circumstances where there has been no request made to the
court that an alternative sentence be considered. “[U]nder general rules of statutory
construction, this Court may not interpret a statute at variance with its stated language.”
General Motors Corp. v. Book Chevrolet, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Ky. 1998). We
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note that KRS 446.010(20) provides that when the word may is used, the provision is
permissive – as distinguished from the use of the mandatory shall. KRS 446.010(30).
Baker also relies upon KRS 533.020(1) and 533.030(6). We have not
discovered any language in those statutes to support his argument that a trial court is
obligated to consider partial revocation before revoking probation in full. KRS
533.020(1) sets forth, in part, that a court:
may modify or enlarge the conditions [of probation] or, if the
defendant commits an additional offense or violates a
condition, revoke the sentence at any time prior to the
expiration or termination of the period of probation.
(Emphasis added). KRS 533.060(6) sets forth, in part, that:
[w]hen imposing a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge, the court, in addition to conditions imposed under
this section, may require as a condition of the sentence that
the defendant submit to a period of imprisonment in the
county jail or to a period of home incarceration at whatever
time or intervals, consecutive or nonconsecutive, the court
shall determine.
(Emphasis added). Again, there is no requirement that a trial court consider partial
revocation or alternative sanctions before revoking probation. On the contrary, the
decision as to whether to consider or implement any such alternatives to full revocation
rests entirely within the discretion of the court.
We have discovered no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to revoke
Baker’s probation. Baker was granted probation in lieu of imprisonment – not once, but
on two separate occasions – with the second award of probation occurring even after he
had tested positive for drug use and had absconded from supervision. Baker was given
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multiple opportunities to rehabilitate himself and to avoid prison; he failed to take
advantage of them. He does not dispute that even after being given a second chance
through shock probation, he violated multiple conditions of his parole and once again
absconded from supervision after failing to satisfy the requirements of the Drug Court
Program. “One may retain his status as a probationer only as long as the trial court is
satisfied that he has not violated the terms or conditions of the probation.” Tiryung, 717
S.W.2d at 504.
We conclude that the trial court did not come close to abusing its discretion
in holding that Baker’s probation should be revoked and that he should serve out the
remainder of his prison sentence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Office of the Louisville Metro Public
Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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