DEBRA RANKIN v. BRAD COFFMAN
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RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW GRANTED BY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 15, 2007
(FILE NO. 2007-SC-0348-DE)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001559-ME
DEBRA RANKIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA ADDINGTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00984
BRAD COFFMAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Debra Rankin has appealed the Hardin Family Court's May 30,
2006, order modifying custody of her two children, and its July 9, 2006, order denying
her motion to alter, amend, or vacate its prior order. For the following reasons, we
reverse.
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Debra Rankin and Brad Coffman were divorced by a decree of the Barren
Circuit Court on January 8, 2001. Within the divorce action, the parties were awarded
joint custody of their two minor children, with Debra being the primary residential
custodian and Brad being granted standard visitation according to the Barren Circuit
Court's local rules. Both parties and their children continued to reside in Hardin County.2
There was never an issue regarding visitation, and the parties routinely modified the
standard schedule in an effort to ensure that both saw the children as much as possible.
Both parties subsequently remarried, and continued to work together amicably with
respect to all matters concerning the children.
Debra divorced her second husband in 2003, and shortly thereafter she
became engaged to be married to Dr. Tom Rankin, with plans to relocate from Hardin
County. Brad became troubled by information he obtained from an investigation of Dr.
Rankin, particularly regarding Dr. Rankin’s past history of oral narcotics addiction,
depression, and suicidal tendencies. Brad concluded that Debra was unstable due to her
numerous failed relationships, and that Dr. Rankin's troubled past would only exacerbate
her instability.
On May 20, 2004, Brad filed a petition for child custody in the Hardin
Family Court, as all parties involved were current residents of that jurisdiction. While
styled as though this was a motion for initial determination of custody, the petition was
2
As used herein, all references to geographic locations or political subdivisions are located
within the confines of the Commonwealth unless otherwise expressly stated.
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actually a request for modification of the prior Barren Circuit Court's custody order.3
Brad failed to file a separate affidavit along with his moving papers as technically
required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.350, but the petition was verified and
Brad's signature was witnessed by a Notary Public. Brad's motion alleged that Debra had
become unstable since the divorce, that the children now attended school in a district not
associated with their actual place of residence, and that Debra's forthcoming marriage to
Dr. Rankin would be detrimental to the children.
On June 23, 2004, Debra filed her verified response in which she denied the
substantive allegations contained in Brad’s motion. An affidavit was attached to the
response addressing some of the issues Brad raised, and raising different concerns with
respect to the relationship between the children, Brad, and the paternal grandmother.
Concurrently with the filing of the above verified response, Debra filed a motion for
leave to relocate with the children to Jefferson County. Debra attached an affidavit to her
motion stating that the request was based upon her impending marriage to Dr. Rankin,
who was then a resident of that county, that her employment was located in Jefferson
County, that she would fully cooperate with Brad to accommodate his visitation with the
children, and setting forth the facts and circumstances leading up to the filing of the
motion, including discussions she allegedly had with Brad regarding the proposed move.
Brad filed no written response to Debra's motion.
3
The issue of venue was not raised in the trial court nor on appeal, but a review of the record
reveals concurrent jurisdiction was vested in Barren Circuit Court and Hardin Family Court for
purposes of custody determinations and modifications.
-3-
On July 31, 2004, a hearing was held on Debra's motion. Brad objected to
the proposed move. Both parties testified and were cross-examined by counsel. Upon
consideration of the testimony given and arguments presented by the parties' counsel, the
family court granted Debra’s motion.4 Shortly thereafter, Debra and Dr. Rankin were
married and relocated with the children to Jefferson County.
Subsequent to the move, Brad continued to exercise his visitation with the
children, and Debra continued to allow him more time than was required by the prior
court orders. She testified that this was done in an effort to maintain as strong of a bond
as possible between the children and their father and paternal grandmother. The children
attended and became active in their schools in Jefferson County and participated in some
extracurricular activities which they had previously enjoyed in Hardin County. The
children had near perfect attendance and seemed to be doing quite well with their studies,
as evidenced by information presented by a school representative at trial.
Brad's motion for modification of custody remained pending until a trial on
the matter was held on February 23, 2006. While several discovery depositions were
taken in the interim time period, no explanation was advanced for the lengthy delay
experienced by the parties in obtaining a trial date for this portion of the case. However,
a review of the record indicates that both parties requested continuances at differing times
throughout the nearly two-year period of delay.
4
Although the issue is not properly before us on this appeal, we note that the family court's
ruling on this matter could easily have been construed as an implicit denial of Brad's motion for
change of custody. However, the trial court chose to allow Brad to continue to pursue the
modification.
-4-
At trial, testimony was taken from the parties, the children,5 11 witnesses,
and the depositions of two additional witnesses who were unavailable on the date of trial
were admitted into evidence. Much of the testimony centered upon the history of Dr.
Rankin, including his mental and emotional stability and issues relating to his career.
There was testimony that each of the parties were good parents to their children. No
testimony was elicited as to the past or current psychological status of the children, and
no experts were requested to perform evaluations. In fact, little of the testimony involved
the children in more than a cursory manner.
After the lengthy trial, the family court took the matter under advisement
and issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, decree and order on May 21,
2006. That order set forth, in great detail, the facts and law the family court utilized in
making its decision. The family court ultimately granted Brad's motion for modification
making him primary residential custodian of both children, granted Debra visitation in
accordance with the local rules, recalculated the child support obligations of the parties,
and dealt with the issue of health care expenses and insurance for the children. Debra
promptly filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the May 21, 2006, order. A hearing
was held on June 27, 2006, and the family court entered an order denying the requested
relief on July 9, 2006. This appeal followed.
Debra assigns error to the family court on three separate matters. First,
Debra argues that the family court abused its discretion in evaluating the evidence before
5
We note that the children were interviewed separately by the family court in camera and
outside the presence and hearing of either of the parents or their counsel.
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it, and that the ruling was ultimately made in contravention of the weight of the evidence
presented. She next argues that the family court committed error by failing to grant her
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the prior order. Finally, Debra alleges that Brad failed
to comply with the requirements of KRS 403.350, thus depriving the family court of
subject matter jurisdiction.
We find Debra's jurisdictional argument to be both persuasive and
dispositive. We will therefore focus our discussion on that point, addressing the other
issues only as necessary.
Brad argues that Debra failed to preserve the jurisdictional issue for our
review and insists we summarily dismiss this part of her argument. However, subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be obtained by consent nor can it be waived. The issue can be
raised at any time and is reviewable by the appellate courts whenever it is raised.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.08(3). See also Doe v. Golden & Walters,
PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky.App. 2005); Goff v. Goff, 172 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Ky.
2005); Gullett v. Gullett, 992 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky.App. 1999); and Commonwealth,
Department of Highways v. Berryman, 363 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. 1962). Therefore, it is
not only proper, but imperative, that we discuss the jurisdictional issue complained of
herein.
KRS 403.350 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A party seeking a temporary custody order or
modification of a custody decree shall submit together with
his moving papers an affidavit setting forth facts supporting
the requested order or modification and shall give notice,
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together with a copy of his affidavit, to other parties to the
proceeding, who may file opposing affidavits. . . . The court
shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for
hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, in which
case it shall set a date for hearing on an order to show cause
why the requested order or modification should not be
granted.
Brad failed to file a separate affidavit along with his petition. Debra argues that this
failure is fatal to his request. While we believe the better practice would be to file a
separate document, the verified petition herein technically meets the requirements of
being an “affidavit.”
CR 43.13(1) defines an affidavit as “a written statement or declaration
sworn to or affirmed before an officer authorized to take depositions by [these rules].”
Subsection 2 of this rule sets forth further requirements for subscriptions and
certifications for affidavits. Here, there is no argument that Brad's verified complaint was
a written statement or declaration, signed by Brad, and sworn to before a Notary Public6
who was authorized by CR 28.01 to take depositions and who inscribed the date and
location of such affirmation. Thus, while not holding that a verified complaint will
always meet the legal requirements of being an affidavit, we find in this case that Brad's
verified complaint technically fulfilled the requirements of CR 43.13.
Having found that Brad technically complied with the statutory requirement
of filing an “affidavit,” we next turn to the remaining portion of KRS 403.350 which
6
We note that the notary certificate states that the document was “subscribed, sworn to and
acknowledged” by Brad. With no evidence to the contrary, we will take this assertion as true.
We further note that a mere acknowledgment before a Notary Public is not an oath and would
not meet the requirements of being an affidavit. See Meigs v. Black, 960 P.2d 770, 772
(Kan.App. 1998).
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requires the family court to determine whether “adequate cause” exists to consider the
requested modification, based solely upon the facts contained in the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, if any. In the event of a failure to show adequate cause, the family
court is required to summarily deny the motion. Petrey v. Cain, 987 S.W.2d 786, 788
(Ky. 1999). See also Quisenberry v. Quisenberry, 785 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1990); Betzer v.
Betzer, 749 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.App. 1988); and West v. West, 664 S.W.2d 948 (Ky.App.
1984). In West, this Court stated:
Adequate cause, in this context, requires more than prima
facie allegations which might permit inferences sufficient to
establish grounds for a change in custody. . . . [T]he movant
must present facts in his affidavit that compel the court's
attention. He cannot simply assert the statutory requirements
for modification [of the original custody determination].
Id. at 949.
Debra initially argues that the family court erred by not making a specific
finding of “adequate cause” on the record, and that such failure alone is sufficient to
warrant reversal. We disagree. While the statute specifically requires the courts to make
this threshold finding, we find nothing therein to support Debra's contention that such a
finding must be specifically placed in the record. The trial court's scheduling of a hearing
on the matter is sufficient to reveal that such a determination has been made. Otherwise,
an order denying relief on the basis of a failure to show adequate cause would be
required. The error complained of is without merit.
We then must determine if the family court was correct in its finding that
adequate cause existed based solely upon the face of the parties' pleadings. Our review of
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this issue, as elucidated in West, supra, is limited to a determination of whether the trial
court clearly abused its discretion when making its ruling. We find it did.
A review of Brad's petition reveals allegations that Debra's lifestyle was
unstable due to her remarriage, divorce, and interim dating habits; that the children were
attending school in a system associated with his address rather than Debra's; that Debra
intended to marry an older man “who had severe problems in his own life”; and that he
believed it would be in the children's best interest to have the custody modified. There
were no further substantive allegations contained in the petition, nor was there any
mention of a risk of serious endangerment to the children's physical, emotional, mental
and moral health based upon their present environment. Betzer, 749 S.W.2d at 694.
We find that the vague and conclusory allegations contained in Brad's
petition do not rise to the level required by KRS 403.350 to justify a finding of adequate
cause. Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d 658 (Ky.App. 1987). Without a sufficient factual
basis to support a finding of adequate cause, the family court abused its discretion by
setting the matter for a hearing rather than denying Brad's motion outright, as the court
had nothing further to consider. Robbins v. King, 519 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1975). Thus, the
family court's May 21, 2006, order making Brad the children's primary residential
custodian was invalid. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand this matter with
instructions for the family court to return residential primary custody of the minor
children to Debra, and to conduct such further proceedings as are necessary to recalculate
-9-
child support obligations, health insurance issues, and any other matters affected by the
earlier ruling.
Moreover, on the merits, it appears that the family court's determination to
modify custody was not based upon substantial evidence, but rather upon conjecture and
speculation. While we are bound to give deference to the family court's findings of fact
and its ability to judge the credibility of witnesses, Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336
(Ky. 2003); CR 52.01, we are persuaded that, based upon the evidence received, we
would have been required to hold that the findings of the family court were clearly
erroneous and constituted an abuse of discretion. Our review of the record reveals that
there was insufficient evidence presented to show that the children's environment
endangered seriously their physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, or that the harm
caused by modification would be outweighed by the advantages of such a change.
Furthermore, the evidence was insufficient to show that the change in custody was in the
best interest of the children under the guidelines set forth in KRS 403.340 and KRS
403.270(2). The mere fact that Dr. Rankin had suffered mental health problems in his
past, alone, and without a showing of current issues affecting the children's well-being,
would not necessarily provide a sufficient basis upon which to disturb custodial rights.
The family court also apparently ignored the wishes of the children in its decision in that
it made no mention of their desires in its decision. These factors indicate that the family
court's order was clearly erroneous and constituted an abuse of discretion.
- 10 -
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin Family Court is
reversed and remanded with directions that primary residential custody of the parties'
children be returned to their mother, Debra Rankin, and for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. The primary
reason given by the majority for reversing the judgment entered by the family court is
that Brad's verified petition, filed pursuant to KRS 403.350, fails to set forth adequate
cause sufficient to warrant the family court's review. I do not believe our Court can
resolve the appeal for this reason since it was not properly preserved below for our
review.
I agree with the majority that the verified petition filed by Brad with the
family court constituted an affidavit under KRS 403.350 sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the petition for custody modification. Having acquired
subject matter jurisdiction, the family court was then duty bound under KRS 403.350 to
deny the petition if the affidavit(s) failed to show adequate cause for a hearing on the
petition. This is a substantive issue, rather than jurisdictional, that looks to the merits of
the claims as to whether they are statutorily adequate to warrant a hearing. The family
court proceeded to schedule a hearing that the majority correctly finds to be a
determination by the family court that the petition presented adequate cause to schedule a
- 11 -
hearing. The majority then concludes that the allegations in the petition do not justify a
finding of adequate cause and that the family court abused its discretion in making such a
determination. However, at no time from the date of filing of this petition on May 20,
2004, through the evidentiary hearing conducted by the court on February 23, 2006, did
Debra object to this “finding” of adequate cause by the family court. In fact, during the
almost two years that this case proceeded, Debra engaged in discovery and produced
witnesses at an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. It is well-established
that our Court will not review nor decide issues not raised in the lower court. Regional
Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1989); Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d
658 (Ky.App. 1987). While I agree that the substantive allegations in the verified
petition to justify adequate cause for a hearing are meager at best, Debra's failure to
object below precludes our review on this issue.
After concluding that the family court should not have conducted a hearing
on the merits for lack of adequate cause, the majority gratuitously and summarily
addresses the merits of the appeal, concluding that “it appears that the family court's
determination to modify custody was not based upon substantial evidence, but rather
upon conjecture and speculation.” I submit that “appearance” is not a sufficient legal
basis for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the family court under the
circumstances of this case.
Our review of the merits in a child custody case is succinctly set out by
Judge Johnson in B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213 (Ky.App. 2005) as follows:
- 12 -
Since the family court is in the best position to evaluate the
testimony and to weigh the evidence, an appellate court
should not substitute its own opinion for that of the family
court. If the findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence and if the correct law is applied, a family court's
ultimate decision regarding custody will not be disturbed,
absent an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion implies
that the family court's decision is unreasonable or unfair.
Thus, in reviewing the decision of the family court, the test is
not whether the appellate court would have decided it
differently, but whether the findings of the family court are
clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or
whether it abused its discretion.
Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted).
As noted previously, this case was actively practiced before the family
court for almost two years. The record reflects that there were six discovery depositions
taken in this case. The family court conducted an evidentiary hearing where it heard the
testimony of eleven witnesses in addition to the parties to this action. The parties' minor
children were also interviewed in camera. Two of the six discovery depositions were
considered by the family court as evidence. The family court entered exhaustive findings
of fact and conclusions of law that totaled almost seventeen pages. Based upon the
totality of the evidence considered by the family court, I cannot conclude that the family
court's findings were clearly erroneous or that the family court abused its discretion in
awarding custody to Brad. There being no dispute as to the application of the correct law
in this case, I would affirm the family court's order granting custody of the children to
Brad.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
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Barry Birdwhistell
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
William L. Hoge, III
Louisville, Kentucky
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