APPLIED SEALING TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. B&R RUBBER AND SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 5, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001351-MR
APPLIED SEALING TECHNOLOGY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANTHONY FROHLICH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-02014
B&R RUBBER AND SUPPLY COMPANY,
INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD AND WINE, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: Applied Sealing Technology (“Applied”) appeals the
Boone Circuit Court judgment awarding $128,392.00 to B&R Rubber and Sealing
Company (“B&R”) in a breach of contract claim. We affirm.
This is a breach of contract case, originating when B&R alleged Applied
had failed to pay for product orders that had been delivered and received. Applied is a
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Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
Kentucky corporation, engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing
industrial rubber and plastic supplies, with its principal place of business located in
Walton, Kentucky. B&R is a Kentucky Corporation, specializing in the wholesale
distribution of industrial rubber and plastics, based in Louisville. The two parties have a
history of dealings between the years of 1994 and 2005.
Sometime around August 21, 2001, B&R provided Applied with the first of
a number of orders which form the basis of the debt in question. The orders continued
until approximately December 15, 2001. In the meantime, on October 4, 2001, as a result
of their previous business relationship and in an effort to strengthen their position in their
industry, Applied and some of the individual owners of B&R created an enterprise known
as BRAST Industrial Solutions, LLC (“BRAST”). In anticipation of this joint venture,
scheduled to commence on January 1, 2002, the parties began pooling their resources.
During and after the creation of the joint venture the two original companies, Applied and
B&R, continued to maintain their individual status as separate corporate entities.
According to the testimony and pleadings, the debt pertaining to the deliveries made
between October and December of 2001 remained unpaid and on the books of both
companies.
BRAST continued to do business until 2005, when the business relationship
between the parties began to break down. As a result, on August 5, 2005, Applied
withdrew itself from the BRAST venture. B&R then sought payment for the August
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2001 through December 2001 deliveries and subsequently brought suit to recover those
sums. The matter was set for trial on April 20, 2006 before the Master Commissioner.
Prior to the trial date, and after deposing several people and discovering the
creation of a new business, AST Sales, LLC (“AST”), B&R filed a motion to amend its
original petition to add AST and AST's original owners as defendants under an alter-ego
theory of corporate fraud. B&R also filed a motion to bifurcate the fraud issue from the
previously alleged issue of breach of contract. The Trial Court sustained both motions
and clarified that only the breach of contract issue would be heard by the Master
Commissioner on the April 20 trial date.
After the conclusion of the trial, the Master Commissioner issued a Report
containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended judgment. The
report was in B&R's favor, awarding it damages in the amount of $128,392.00. On June
6, 2006, the Circuit Court adopted and incorporated the report in an Order and Judgment
awarding B&R the full recommended amount. Applied filed a motion to alter, amend or
vacate the judgment of June 6, 2006. That motion was overruled and this appeal
followed.
Before us, Applied raises three arguments: 1) the Circuit Court committed
reversible error when it bifurcated the contract issue from the fraud allegation; 2) the
Circuit Court committed reversible error by applying the incorrect statute of limitations;
and 3) the awarded damages are excessive and contrary to the evidence submitted.
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“The trial court is vested with a broad discretion in granting or refusing a
new trial, and this Court will not interfere unless it appears that there has been an abuse
of discretion.” Whelan v. Memory-Swift Homes, 315 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Ky. 1958).
As support for its argument that the Circuit Court bifurcation was reversible
error, Applied contends that it denied the newly added defendants (AST and its owners)
from participating in discovery and having an opportunity to defend themselves. Applied
also argues all defendants, new and original, were prejudiced by the addition of the new
parties. We do not believe the Circuit Court abused its discretion when allowing the
addition of the new defendants and the bifurcation of the trial. In fact, it appears that the
Circuit Court bifurcated the trial specifically to protect the parties. Appellant has failed
to establish how the new defendants were negatively affected by the finding that there
was a breach of contract between Applied and B&R. The only way in which the
judgment may affect them is after the finding of additional facts in the second part of the
trial. There is no reason to believe that the Circuit Court will not provide the new
defendants with ample time to prepare for this second trial. Therefore, we affirm.
The issue of limitation centers around two sections of KRS, the four year
statute KRS 355.2-725(1) and the five year statute KRS 413.120(10). The relevant
language of KRS 355.2-725(1) is “An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued.” KRS
413.120(10) allows five years for “an action upon merchant's account for goods sold and
delivered, or any article charged in such store account.” The Master Commissioner's
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reasons for applying the 5 year statute were that it was more recent, more specific, and
provides the longer period of time. We agree.
Our rules of statutory construction are that a special statute
preempts a general statute, that a later statute is given effect
over an earlier statute, and that because statutes of limitation
are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer
period of limitations should prevail where two statutes are
arguably applicable.
Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525,528 (Ky. 1987). Again, we see no abuse of
discretion present on this issue and affirm.
Applied next brings forth the issue of damages. CR 59.01(D) states:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: . . .
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice or in
disregard of the evidence or the instructions of the court.
Applied's officers admitted, in deposition, that money was owed to B&R. Although the
exact amount was never confirmed, it was agreed that it was in excess of $100,000.00. In
his report, the Master Commissioner outlines clearly the manner in which he arrived at
the $128,392.00 figure. In light of the evidence submitted, the award does not appear to
be excessive. Applied contends that a portion of the debt was paid to BRAST and
BRAST failed to pay it on to B&R. If that is true, it was Applied's duty to join BRAST
in the action or, in the alternative, pursue a separate action against BRAST.
As part of its brief, Applied refers to the Master Commissioner's Report
that Applied was in an unfortunate situation. The role of the court often requires a
disregard of personal feelings and the rendering of unsavory decisions. Failure to
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exercise better business practice, as unfortunate as it is, does not relieve Applied of their
legal obligations.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick J. Monohan
Florence, Kentucky
Edward S. Monohan
Florence, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
C. Richard Colvin
Brian F. Eviston
Ft. Wright, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Edward S. Monohan
Florence, Kentucky
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