MICHELLE WILSON v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 28, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001294-MR
MICHELLE WILSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00130
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Michelle Wilson appeals a denial of disability retirement benefits
from the Kentucky Retirement Systems, which was affirmed by the Franklin Circuit
Court. Upon review, we reverse.
Michelle Wilson was employed for nearly sixteen years by the Cabinet for
Families and Children, Department for Community Based Services, performing work as a
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Social Services Clinician, starting in 1986. Her job duties included investigating child
and adult abuse and neglect reports; assessing risk of harm; taking steps to protect
individuals on her caseload; preparing written reports and documents; and wearing a
beeper after hours on a rotating basis.
After an incident wherein a badly abused child, who had been in the
Cabinet's care and who was on Wilson's caseload, died in her arms in 2000, Wilson
claims to have suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, commonly referred to as
PTSD. No one disputes that Wilson is to be commended for dedication to her job and in
particular to this child. She claims that this incident “broke her” and that she suffered an
emotional breakdown approximately six months later but continued to work.
During the months from March through October 2001, the record is not
precise as to how many full days Wilson worked. She did not, however, work a regular
full-time schedule during these months and for some periods of time her physician put her
on leave.
In March of 2001, Wilson requested accommodations, which the Cabinet
granted. She testified at her disability hearing that during the period of accommodations,
she was on “light duty.” She testified there was a significant difference in her job
responsibilities while she was on light duty, including not having to wear a beeper after
hours. However, she also testified that beginning around October, she was required to do
intake, but not for high risk cases; nevertheless, she continued to work. She submitted
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her letter of resignation on November 5, 2001, and her last day of employment was
December 28, 2001.
Wilson applied for disability retirement with the Kentucky Retirement
Systems, first alleging disability because of physical and mental impairment. However,
later she dismissed her claim for disability based on physical impairment2 and relied
solely on mental impairment, namely PTSD.
Wilson's claim was denied based on the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ)
findings that (1) conditions for which she complained pre-existed her membership in the
Kentucky Retirement Systems and (2) the objective evidence established that Wilson was
not totally and permanently disabled from her job duties.
As to the ALJ's finding that Wilson's condition pre-existed her employment
with the Cabinet, the ALJ reviewed many of Wilson's health conditions resulting from her
1980 automobile accident when she was eighteen years of age. Additionally, the ALJ
found that Wilson's medical records “show a long history of stress related treatment
dating prior to the death of the child in claimant's care.” The ALJ further stated that
“[a]lthough [Wilson] did not seek psychiatric or therapeutic care, her treating medical
doctors recognized and treated her stress, anxiety and depression symptoms, (see, for
example, records at pages 156, 158, 413, 498, 512, 678).”
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When Wilson was eighteen years old, she was in a severe automobile accident, requiring
between thirty and thirty-five surgeries. Because of the severity of her injuries after this accident,
her medical record contained in the administrative record is quite lengthy. However, as
previously mentioned, she did not rely on these injuries and resulting impairments for her claim
of disability. Accordingly, they will not be recounted herein.
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A review of these records, however, does not support the ALJ's statements.
At page 156 in the administrative record are notations made during office visits with
Wilson's treating physician after her automobile accident. These records are dated
6/20/89, 7/14/89, and 8/15/89, and do not indicate depression, stress or PTSD. The
closest reference to stress is in the 8/15/89 notation wherein Wilson's doctor noted that
Patient returns. She is doing better. She has some tenderness
along the trapezious and along the scapular border on the
right. When she really gets tense and tired, she has increased
pain. She has good wrist and elbow and shoulder motion.
When she really gets tired, she gets discomfort. She has been
having some right flank pain. . . . As far as the shoulder, arm
and neck, it is doing better. When she gets really tired and
tense[,] she will be bothered by this.
No mention is made by Wilson's treating physician in 1989 of her suffering
from stress, depression or PTSD, nor was she treated for such. The only reference is that
Wilson got tired and tense.
Regarding the ALJ's reference to page 158, it is again a reference to
Wilson's 1989 treatment after the automobile accident. The report by her treating doctor
references much pain in her right trapezius area, with marked tenderness in that area.
Due to this condition, Wilson was prescribed Valium “as a muscle relaxant.” There is no
mention in this cited page to stress, depression or PTSD on Wilson's part.
The next cited page by the ALJ is 413, which is dated August 4, 1982, and
appears to relate to one of Wilson's thirty or so operations after the automobile accident.
There are no notations that Wilson suffered from stress, depression or PTSD. There is,
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however, a notation that she was given a Valium at 7:30 a.m., presumably prior to the
surgery as only local anesthesia was used during the surgery. Wilson was released at
10:30 a.m., and there are no notations that she was given a prescription for Valium at this
time.
Page 498, referenced by the ALJ, appears more recent but is undated. It is
apparent, however, that at the time this medical note was made that Wilson was working
for the Cabinet. Nothing on this page suggests that she suffered depression, stress or
PTSD prior to her employment with the Cabinet. At most the record states that Wilson
“had severe trauma when she was 18 yrs old with fractured pelvis, right foot, right ankle,
fractured jaw, facial fractures, fractured right [illegible] on the right were pretty much
demolished and she has chronic headache problems from post [illegible] headaches,
probably some component of sinus headaches.” Wilson's past medical history is noted
but does not include depression, stress or PTSD.
Page 512 of the administrative record is also a more recent medical record
but is not dated. It states that Wilson “came in through Triage with a complaint of neck
pain. Usually it occurs on the right sight of her neck. Right now it is in both shoulders
and the left side of her neck and is quite bothersome. Other things are going okay except
when she tried to take Celebrex again for her arthritis. . . .” Later in this record, the
doctor, Polly LeBuhn, M.D., included in her conclusions “depression/anxiety improved
but she is having weight gain from Paxil. They are tapering her off Paxil and trying
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Zoloft.” However, this medical record is undated and does not indicate that Wilson's
depression and anxiety pre-dated her employment with the Cabinet.
The final reference to the record by the ALJ is at page 678, which includes
notations made on two different days by the office of Charles D. Tucker, M.D., in 1993.
Included in these notations are that Wilson has been under a lot of stress recently and that
she has had a “racing of her heart for several days” and that “[s]he is under a tremendous
amount of stress with her work at Marshall Co.” Of course, during this time, she had
been working for the Cabinet since 1986. There is no notation that the stress-related
conditions are connected to her automobile accident in 1980.
Remarkably, most of the ALJ's report focused on physical problems predating Wilson's employment with the Cabinet. But, in the Findings of Fact, the ALJ
found that Wilson's “mental health condition pre-dates her membership in the retirement
system.”
Upon review by the Board, it adopted the ALJ's recommended order as the
final order of the Kentucky Retirement Systems. Thereafter, Wilson timely appealed
pursuant to KRS3 13B.120 to the Franklin Circuit Court. In its opinion, the Franklin
Circuit Court noted that the record supported that Wilson suffered from post-traumatic
stress “to a mild degree” but that her prognosis was excellent. Moreover, the circuit court
noted that a functional capacity assessment, on which the ALJ also relied, indicated that
“Wilson's ability to work on a sustained basis is 'not significantly limited' with respect to
3
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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the vast majority of the mental activities assessed and was not determined to be 'markedly
limited' with respect to any single mental activity.”
The circuit court also noted that the Cabinet had accommodated Wilson
with a “light duty” position and that Wilson had failed to prove that she is unable to
perform her duties as accommodated on her last date of employment. Accordingly, the
circuit court concluded that because Wilson
failed to establish by objective medical evidence the existence
of a permanent physical or mental impairment that would
prevent her from performing her job or job of like duties as of
her last day of employment, this Court need not address the
issue of whether or not Wilson's impairments preexisted her
membership in the Retirement Systems.
Pursuant to KRS 13B.090, when a claimant proposes that an agency grant a
benefit, the claimant has the burden of proof to show entitlement to the benefit sought.
McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Sys., 124 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Ky. App. 2003).
Accordingly, Wilson has the burden of proof to show that she should receive disability
retirement benefits.
Regarding factual issues, an agency is given great deference. Id. (citing
Aubrey v. Office of Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky. App. 1998) (citing
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 309 (Ky. 1972))).
“Unless action taken by an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence it is
arbitrary.” American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
and Zoning Com'n, 379 S.W. 2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964) “A reviewing court is not free to
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substitute its judgment for that of an agency on a factual issue unless the agency's
decision is arbitrary and capricious.” McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 458. (citing Johnson v.
Galen Health Care, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Ky. App. 2001)). Substantial evidence is
defined as “that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling v.
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W. 2d 406, 409 (Ky.
App. 1994). In other words, “where the fact-finder's decision is to deny relief to the party
with the burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in that
party's favor is so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded
by it.” Id.
Pursuant to KRS 61.600(3),
[u]pon the examination of the objective medical evidence by
licensed physicians pursuant to KRS 61.665, it shall be
determined that:
(a) The person, since his last day of paid employment, has
been mentally or physically incapacitated to perform the job,
or jobs of like duties, from which he received his last paid
employment. In determining whether the person may return
to a job of like duties, any reasonable accommodation by the
employer as provided in 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(9) and 29
C.F.R. Part 1630 shall be considered;
(b) The incapacity is a result of bodily injury, mental illness,
or disease. For purposes of this section, "injury" means any
physical harm or damage to the human organism other than
disease or mental illness;
(c) The incapacity is deemed to be permanent; and
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(d) The incapacity does not result directly or indirectly from
bodily injury, mental illness, disease, or condition which preexisted membership in the system or reemployment,
whichever is most recent. For purposes of this subsection,
reemployment shall not mean a change of employment
between employers participating in the retirement systems
administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems with no
loss of service credit.
Applying the standard of review of an appellate court reviewing an agency
decision under KRS 61.600, we determine that the ALJ's finding that the mental condition
of which Wilson complains pre-existed her employment to be capricious. The record
does not contain substantial evidence supporting a pre-existing condition. Based on our
determination of capriciousness, it is therefore appropriate for us to substitute our
judgment on this finding. McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 458 (citations omitted). The record
pre-dating Wilson's employment is so lacking in evidence regarding depression or PTSD
that no reasonable person could be persuaded that she suffered from PTSD prior to her
starting date of employment with the Cabinet. However, this determination does not end
our analysis.
Wilson still has the burden of proof to establish that she satisfies the
requirements under KRS 61.600(3)(a). As earlier mentioned, our review is whether the
evidence in Wilson's favor is so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to
be persuaded by it. McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 548 (citations omitted).
When Wilson left her employment with the Cabinet, she was on light duty,
with accommodations and for at least the months from March to October, did not work a
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regular full-time position. Our review includes whether she was capable of performing
her duties with reasonable accommodations. KRS 61.600(3)(a). The record supports that
Wilson's duties while on light duty included using a computer and keyboard and
answering the telephone as necessary. She was not required to do telephone intakes, do
investigations, make home visits, carry a beeper after hours and other duties which most
social workers were expected to perform.
At her administrative hearing, Wilson testified that job duties after she
requested accommodations in March of 2001 were much different than before. She was
involved in training new employees on investigation and intake, but this did not involve
physical abuse or any high risk cases. She did complain that in October of 2001, she was
asked to do some intake telephone calls and investigations, but these were not high risk
cases. She described them as “piddly little things.” On her last day of employment, she
testified that she really did not do much other than “cleaning up stuff.”
Even with her accommodations, Wilson's supervisor, Lois Smith, in a report
dated July 31, 2003, wrote that “[d]uring the last year of her employment, [Wilson]
became anxious; was easily upset; had difficulty completing a task; unable to focus;
became pre-occupied with the death of a child in her caseload; was no longer able to
fulfill the job requirements.”
We note that although it was undisputed that Wilson requested and received
accommodations, Smith, on the report, checked that Wilson had not done so.
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Nonetheless, in response to the question of whether Wilson had assistance available from
co-workers, Smith answered “[y]es, much assistance.”
Furthermore, in a report dated July 28, 2002, psychiatrist David Meyer,
M.D., F.A.C.P., reported that Wilson was “unable to tolerate the stress of working in her
profession, unable to cope with dysfunctional families, abuse cases.” In a letter dated
January 30, 2004, Dr. Meyer wrote that Wilson's “post traumatic anxiety and depression
have produced a level of symptomatology that it would be impossible for her to sustain
gainful employment, especially in the realm of evaluating and working with abused
children and their families.” Dr. Meyer again expressed his opinion that Wilson was not
capable of sustaining gainful employment.
Dr. Bruce Amber, Ph.D., a consulting psychologist, in a report dated June
12, 2002, concluded that it was “unlikely that [Wilson] will ever be able to return to
investigative employment as a social worker.” He further concluded that Wilson's
“capacity to adapt to the pressures of day-to-day employment would appear to be
impaired.”
Despite this evidence, the ALJ found that Wilson's records from her treating
mental health caregivers did not establish a total and permanent nature of her
psychological condition. We disagree and conclude that there is not substantial evidence
to support the ALJ's conclusion; hence, it was arbitrary. Accordingly, we reverse and
decide that Wilson has met her burden of proof for entitlement to disability retirement
benefits.
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STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent. There is substantial evidence by which the hearing
officer found that the appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish by objective
medical evidence that she was totally and permanently disabled as of her last day of paid
employment. Specifically, Dr. Stricklin noted in an April 5, 2001 office visit that
appellant had an excellent prognosis. Furthermore, a functional capacity examination in
October 2002 placed very minimal limitations on appellant’s abilities to work with
respect to understanding and memory, concentration and persistence, social interaction
and adaptation. The majority opinion correctly notes that “where the fact-finder’s
decision is to deny relief to the party with the burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on
appeal is whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so compelling that no reasonable
person could have failed to be persuaded by it.” McManus v. Kentucky Retirement
Systems, 124 S.W. 3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2004). Based upon the evaluations coupled
with the accommodated position made available to the appellant, the evidence in
appellant’s favor is not “so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be
persuaded by it.” McManus at 458. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the
Franklin Circuit Court.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Donna Thornton-Green
Paducah, Kentucky
Leigh Ann Jordan
Frankfort, Kentucky
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