LORETTA CRAWFORD v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 30, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001237-MR
LORETTA CRAWFORD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-03515
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Loretta Crawford has appealed from the dismissal of her
employment discrimination action against Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government
(LFUCG), arguing that the Fayette Circuit Court erred in granting a summary judgment.
We affirm.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Crawford is an African-American female with a date of birth of December
28, 1959.2 As a teenager, she sustained a gunshot injury, which left her paralyzed below
the T3 level of her spine and has caused her to be confined to a wheelchair. Crawford did
not obtain a college degree, although she attended Lexington Technical Institute for
approximately one and one-half years. She began working for the Mayor's Training
Center (“MTC”), a part of LFUCG, as a part-time, temporary receptionist in 1988. Soon
thereafter, Crawford obtained a permanent, full-time position, and she has continued to
work in the MTC. She currently works as a Staff Assistant Senior, and her job
responsibilities include Management Information System work, testing and certification,
as well as occasional receptionist duties.
This case had a lengthy procedural history in the circuit court, much of
which was caused by the evolution of the applicable law. For a full understanding, we
shall set forth that history. In early 1997, Crawford filed a Charge of Discrimination with
the Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights Commission, alleging that she had been
subject to discrimination and unlawful employment practices based upon her gender,
disability, and race. Because she did not believe that she was receiving fair treatment
from the Human Rights Commission, she withdrew her claim and obtained a Notice of
Right to Sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Crawford filed suit
against LFUCG on October 7, 1997, seeking damages pursuant to KRS Chapter 344 for
racial, gender, and disability discrimination and for retaliation, citing LFUCG's failure to
promote her; for breach of contract; for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
2
At the time she filed her complaint in 1997, Crawford was thirty-seven years old.
-2-
fair dealing; for intentional infliction of emotional and physical distress/outrageous
conduct; and for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. LFUCG filed an answer
specifically asserting that Crawford's claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as well as by her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Discovery
ensued.
On LFUCG's motion, the circuit court granted a partial dismissal of
Crawford's suit on August 20, 1998, holding that her common law claims for breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; intentional infliction of emotional and
physical distress; and fraud, deceit and misrepresentation were barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The circuit court took Crawford's breach of contract claim under
advisement. In late 1999, the matter was set for a jury trial to take place in April 2000.
However, prior to trial, the circuit court placed the case in abeyance pending decisions in
the appellate courts addressing the impact of a person's decision to seek redress for
discrimination through the Human Rights Commission on the right to pursue a civil
action under KRS Chapter 344. The effect of sovereign immunity on those actions was
addressed by the appellate courts as well.
Once the decisions in those cases became final, the present action was
returned to the active docket in early 2001. LFUCG immediately filed a motion for
summary judgment on Crawford's claims of discrimination, retaliation, and breach of
contract. On March 28, 2001, the circuit court issued a 17-page Opinion and Order
-3-
granting LFUCG's motion on all but Crawford's retaliation claim. We shall summarize
the circuit court's holdings below:
●
Crawford's claims for breach of contract and for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing were dismissed based upon the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
●
Election of Remedies: The circuit court determined that Crawford
“elected” her remedy with regard to her claims of disability
discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act that arose prior to
the date she filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Human Rights
Commission, relying upon the case of Founder v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 23 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. 1999). For this reason, the circuit court
held that Crawford was precluded from raising those claims for
disability discrimination that occurred prior to the date she filed her
Charge of Discrimination in her civil suit.
●
Discrimination due to failure to hire: The circuit court held that
Crawford could not establish a prima facie claim of race, gender, or
disability discrimination and that no direct evidence or conduct
indicated that a discriminatory animus existed on the part of LFUCG.
While Crawford met the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas3 test as
she is an African-American female with a disability, she was unable to
3
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973).
-4-
prove that she was qualified for the positions she applied for, but did not
receive. Furthermore, the circuit court held that even if she had met her
burden, there was no evidence that LFUCG's failure to hire her was
based upon reasons that were a pretext for illegal discrimination.
●
Discrimination for failure to provide training: The circuit court found
no evidence to support Crawford's claims that she was not allowed to
attend various motivational and/or training seminars due to her race,
gender, or disability.
●
Retaliation: Citing Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, 827
S.W.2d 697 (Ky.App. 1991), the circuit court denied LFUCG's motion
for summary judgment on Crawford's retaliation claim:
By failing to grant summary judgment on this issue this
Court is in no way indicating that there exists a prima
facie case of retaliation, only that it is possible that the
Plaintiff could meet her burden based on the evidence
in the record. The Plaintiff clearly did engage in a
protected activity by filing a claim with the EEOC and
filing this subsequent suit, but it is unclear whether she
was disadvantaged by an act of the LFUCG. The term
“disadvantaged” is so vague under case law that this
court has little choice but to find that it is possible that
Plaintiff could present evidence sufficient to meet this
requirement of a prima facie retaliation case. The
Plaintiff routinely in her deposition points to instances
where she gained new work responsibilities after the
date of the initiation of her discrimination actions.
Additionally, it is not impossible for the Plaintiff to
show that certain disadvantageous actions taken by the
LFUCG were because of the filing of the various
discrimination claims.
-5-
Crawford moved the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate its ruling on
April 9, 2001, arguing that the circuit court's reliance on Founder was misplaced. She
also asserted that her discrimination claim was based upon a hostile work environment, as
opposed to a failure to promote. In its response, LFUCG addressed the Founder
argument, but asserted that Crawford had not stated a claim for hostile work
environment. Furthermore, LFUCG argued that the circuit court properly held that
Crawford failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. On January 15, 2002,
the circuit court entered an order denying Crawford's motion to alter, amend, or vacate,
holding that it must follow Founder's holding regarding election of remedies pursuant to
the doctrine of stare decisis. As to permitting Crawford to present her discrimination
claims on the basis of a hostile work environment, the circuit court stated that LFUCG
did not move for summary judgment on that issue, that it did not consider the issue in its
previous order, and that the issue was therefore not properly before it on the motion to
alter, amend, or vacate.
The following day, Crawford moved the circuit court to set aside its
January 15, 2002, order and hold the case in abeyance pending a final determination in a
newly released opinion of the Court of Appeals addressing the election of remedies. The
circuit court granted the motion and set aside its January 15, 2002, order in light of the
pending decision in Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, 75 S.W.3d 229 (Ky.App. 2001). The
Wilson opinion became final in June 2002 upon the denial of a motion for discretionary
review by the Supreme Court. At that time, Crawford requested that the circuit court set
-6-
aside its previous ruling and reinstate her claims, arguing that any reliance on Founder
was misplaced because of Wilson's holding that the filing of administrative charges had
no impact on her claims in the civil suit. In response, LFUCG pointed out that the circuit
court limited its ruling regarding the election of administrative remedies issue to
Crawford's claim for disability discrimination that occurred prior to the date she filed her
Charge of Discrimination (January 23, 1997). Thus, LFUCG maintained that Crawford's
request to set aside was flawed, as the only claim that could be reinstated would be her
disability discrimination claim. However, LFUCG disputed the effect Wilson's holding
would have on this case, and asserted that, in any event, Crawford failed to establish a
prima facie case. Finally, LFUCG requested that the circuit court return the case to the
active docket solely to reconsider its ruling on Crawford's retaliation claim based upon
the Court of Appeals decision of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority v.
Brooks, 1999-CA-001578-MR.4 LFUCG followed up on July 12, 2002, with another
motion for summary judgment on Crawford's retaliation claim and urged the circuit court,
on reconsideration, to enter a summary judgment on her disability discrimination claims
that it had decided to reconsider in light of Wilson. After resolving, in LFUCG's favor, a
dispute as to whether LFUCG's motion for summary judgment was timely, the circuit
court permitted Crawford to file a response and LFUCG to file a reply, which they both
did. Crawford also filed an affidavit in support of her claims. The matter stood
4
At the time LFUCG made this request, the decision of the Court of Appeals was pending on a
motion for discretionary review, which was later granted. The Supreme Court issued its opinion
in May 2004. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790
(Ky. 2004).
-7-
submitted upon the filing of LFUCG's reply on September 27, 2002.
Although the matter was ripe for a decision, no further action was taken in
the case until the circuit court entered a notice to dismiss for lack of prosecution in July
2004. The matter stayed on the docket, and the parties filed status briefs delineating the
pending motions and setting forth their respective positions as to the case as a whole.
After issuing another notice to dismiss for lack of prosecution eighteen months later, the
circuit court entered the following Order on February 23, 2006:
This matter is before the Court for clarification of this
Court's previous rulings as well as reconsideration or renewal
of previous motions. The parties were present before the
Court and represented by counsel. The Court, having
considered the arguments of counsel, the pleadings and the
record herein and being sufficiently advised, hereby renders
the following order.
It is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff argues she has made a claim for hostile work
environment. The Court has reviewed the pleadings herein
and hereby finds Plaintiff has not asserted a specific claim for
hostile work environment against Defendant. Though there
may be short vague references to some of the elements that
are required to be alleged in a claim for hostile work
environment, the Court finds there is no such specific claim
made in these proceedings.
2. The Court in its Opinion and Order of March 28, 2001
overruled Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff's claim of retaliation. Subsequent to the Court's
Opinion and Order Defendant moved the Court to reconsider
the Court['s] prior ruling and/or renewed its prior motion of
summary judgment. Both parties have had the opportunity to
file briefs setting forth their respective positions on the issue
as well as the Court has considered the arguments of counsel
at the most recent hearing conducted on January 10, 2006.
-8-
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently rendered the
opinion of Brooks v Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government [sic], Ky., 132 S.W.3d 790 (2004) wherein the
Kentucky Supreme Court adopted federal law in determining
a[] claim of retaliation. Specifically, the Kentucky Supreme
Court found a material adverse change in the terms and
conditions of employment forming an actionable retaliation
claim must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or
an alteration of job responsibilities such as termination,
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, less
distinguished title, material loss of benefits or diminished
material responsibilities or other indices that might be unique
to a particular situation. Brooks. The Court finds there is no
such material adverse change in Plaintiff's employment
conditions, taking all allegations in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, and accordingly there being no issue of material
fact Defendant is entitled to a summary judgment on the
retaliation claim as a matter of law.
3. Finally, the Court will reconsider its ruling as to the claim
of disability discrimination. The Court previously ruled
based upon the election of remedies issue without addressing
the underlying factual issues. The Court, finds it[s] reliance
on Founder v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky., 23 S.W.3d
229 [sic] (2001) was misplaced and the Court erred in
dismissing the claim under the election of remedies theory.
However, the Court finds that summary judgment is
appropriate on this claim as well in that Plaintiff has failed to
set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination there
being insufficient evidence presented to support the claim.
The Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact[.
T]he defendant is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter
of law.
Accordingly, for the reasons as herein expressed as
well as the rulings and reasons as set forth in this Court['s]
Opinion and Order dated March 28, 2001 the within matter is
hereby dismissed with prejudice. There being no just cause
for delay this is a final and appealable judgment.
-9-
Thereafter, Crawford moved the circuit court to alter, vacate, or amend its
order, asserting that the ruling was overly broad in that it went beyond the scope of what
the parties were directed to address in their status briefs. For this reason, she argued that
she was not permitted to address the merits of her claims. In response, LFUCG
continued to assert that Crawford failed to establish a prima facie case of any type of
discrimination or retaliation and did not plead a claim for hostile work environment. The
circuit court denied Crawford's motion, and this appeal followed.
Our standard of review in an appeal from the entry of a summary judgment
is well settled in Kentucky:
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a
motion for summary judgment is "whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." The trial court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and summary judgment should be granted only if it appears
impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and then the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present "at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial." The trial court "must
examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if a real issue exists." While the Court in Steelvest[,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky. 1991),] used the word "impossible" in describing the
strict standard for summary judgment, the Supreme Court
later stated that that word was "used in a practical sense, not
in an absolute sense." Because summary judgment involves
only legal questions and the existence of any disputed
material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the
- 10 -
trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.
(citations in footnotes omitted)
Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001). With this standard in
mind, we shall address the issues Crawford raises.
First, we disagree with Crawford's assertion that the circuit court erred by
prematurely dismissing her claim, before she was permitted to properly address the
merits of the case. The record clearly establishes that Crawford exhaustively addressed
all of the issues that had been raised in the various motions. We perceive no error in the
circuit court's entry of an order dismissing, as this case had been pending for several
years on substantive motions for summary judgment or to alter, amend or vacate previous
orders. Accordingly, we shall turn our attention to the merits of Crawford's appeal.
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
Throughout the course of this litigation, the parties have disputed whether
Crawford stated a claim for hostile work environment in her initial complaint. While
Crawford argues that she had provided testimony supporting such a claim, LFUCG
maintains that she failed to sufficiently plead one. Rather, it argues that Crawford based
her cause of action for discrimination on LFUCG's failure to promote her. Based upon
our review of the record, in particular the complaint, we agree with LFUCG that
Crawford did not state a cause of action for hostile work environment.
In the Factual Background of her complaint, Crawford specifically
referenced being passed over for promotions:
- 11 -
10. Over the past nine years, certain employees of the
LFUCG have received promotions to various positions with
the LFUCG, notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff applied for
and was better qualified and more experienced than the
individuals promoted to said positions and/or had complied
with the appropriate criteria which the other individuals had
not yet successfully completed. Moreover, Plaintiff had to
train numerous of these employees as to certain of their job
functions after they received their promotions, and was also
asked for advice by these employees and instructions on how
they should perform their job duties and responsibilities.
11. On various occasions, Plaintiff complained to
Defendant, as to Plaintiff's concerns about having been passed
over for promotions and as to claims with respect to possible
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability.
Under Count I of her complaint, Crawford outlined her claim for race, gender, and/or
disability discrimination. In support of her claim, Crawford specifically pled:
16. Throughout Plaintiff's tenure with the LFUCG, in
spite of Plaintiff's qualifications and suitability for each
position, the LFUCG failed to promote and/or rejected
Plaintiff for enhanced positions. Each employee placed into
these positions achieved a pay level and benefit level
substantially above those offered to Plaintiff.
17. Despite several promotional openings that became
available in the LFUCG during Plaintiff's tenure, Defendant
systematically refused to offer these positions to Plaintiff,
while placing less qualified employees, most of whom had
less seniority than Plaintiff, into higher paid positions.
18. Plaintiff's service and qualifications were
persistently ignored in favor of less able and less qualified
employees, including specifically male Caucasian employees.
In addition, after Defendant informed Plaintiff that she would
not be considered for positions she was amply qualified for,
in favor of less qualified male Caucasian employees, and after
Plaintiff filed formal discriminatory charges, Plaintiff has had
- 12 -
to endure an increased amount of discriminatory and
retaliatory behavior by the Defendant herein.
Crawford then relied upon her complaints of the same practices in Count II, in which she
pled her case for retaliation.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the cause of action for a
hostile work environment in Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2000):
In order to establish a racially hostile work environment
under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that the conduct in
question was severe or pervasive enough to create an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive, and that the victim subjectively regarded it as
abusive. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658-59
(6th Cir. 1999); see also Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980,
982-83 (6th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must also prove that his
employer “tolerated or condoned the situation,” or knew or
should have known of the alleged conduct and did nothing to
correct the situation. See Jackson, 191 F.3d at 659.
There is no question that Crawford did not plead a cause of action for hostile work
environment in her complaint; she based her entire complaint on the allegation that she
was not promoted. Furthermore, although the issue was argued earlier, it does not appear
that Crawford sought to amend her complaint to include such a cause of action until
2006, almost nine years after she filed her complaint. Even if we were to consider this
claim, we would not hold that the record establishes the existence of a hostile work
environment. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court properly found that Crawford did
not plead a cause of action for hostile work environment and did not abuse its discretion
in denying her motion to amend her complaint.
- 13 -
RETALIATION
We shall now address Crawford's claim that she was retaliated against in
violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. She focuses this argument for the most part
on the allegation of a hostile work environment, which we have determined she did not
raise. Nevertheless, we shall review this issue as it was established in the record.
Through KRS 344.280(1), the General Assembly enacted legislation
making it unlawful for a person:
To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person
because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
In Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 803
(Ky. 2004), the Supreme Court of Kentucky defined a prima facie case of retaliation as a
demonstration:
(1) that plaintiff engaged in an activity protected by Title VII;
(2) that the exercise of his civil rights was known by the
defendant; (3) that, thereafter, the defendant took an
employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there
was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action.
Id. citing Christopher v. Strouder Memorial Hospital, 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 658, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991). In the present matter,
there is no dispute that Crawford engaged in a protected activity by filing a Charge of
Discrimination with the Human Rights Commission, and later a civil suit, and that
LFUCG was aware that she had exercised her civil rights. Where Crawford fails in her
- 14 -
efforts to establish a prima facie case is under the third prong; namely, that LFUCG took
an employment action adverse to her.
In Brooks, the Supreme Court addressed the adverse employment action
element, relying upon several federal court cases:
A materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
employment must be more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A
materially adverse change might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation.
Brooks, 132 S.W.3d at 802, citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc, 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.
1999). In addition, the Brooks Court stated, “[a] material modification in duties and loss
of prestige may rise to the level of adverse action.” Id. at 803.
Turning to the present case, Crawford testified that the retaliation started
days after she filed her complaint with the Human Rights Commission. She received
reprimands from her superior, was forced to work overtime, kept out of meetings, forced
to stay in her workstation, and was either ignored or given dirty looks in the hallway by
her superior. In her affidavit, Crawford made several additional allegations, including
having to work alone in an unsafe environment, and that she had been “repeatedly
humiliated by my supervisor, screamed at, belittled, and degraded in front of my coworkers, staff, and customers, to the point of having to receive medical treatment.”
- 15 -
However, the record fails to support Crawford's allegations. Although we shall not
address every issue raised by Crawford, as LFUCG adequately addressed these issues in
its brief, we do note that the oral warning dating from September 1997 was certainly
justified, because Crawford left work early without informing her supervisor.
Looking again to Brooks, we cannot hold that Crawford established that she
sustained a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment.
She was not terminated or demoted, was not given a lesser title, and did not experience a
loss of benefits or responsibilities. Even in a light most favorable to her, we hold that
Crawford failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Accordingly, the circuit
court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of LFUCG on this cause of action.
DISCRIMINATION
For this claim, Crawford argues that she was subject to discrimination on
the basis of her race, gender, and disability.
In KRS 344.040(1) of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, the General
Assembly made it an unlawful practice for an employer:
To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of the individual’s race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age forty (40) and over, because the
person is a qualified individual with a disability, or because
the individual is a smoker or non-smoker, as long as the
person complies with any workplace policy concerning
smoking[.]
- 16 -
The United States Supreme Court set out the elements a plaintiff must establish in order
to prove a prima facie case of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973):
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.
In the arena of disability discrimination, the elements differ slightly:
[A] plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability
discrimination if she proves that (1) she was “disabled”
within the meaning of the Act; (2) she was qualified for the
position, with or without an accommodation; (3) she suffered
an adverse employment decision with regard to the position in
question; and (4) a non-disabled person replaced her or was
selected for the position that the disabled person had sought.
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court set out the burden shifting formula applicable in
discrimination actions in McDonnell Douglas. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, “[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802. If the employer meets this burden, “the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dept.
- 17 -
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d
207 (1981).
The circuit court's original 2001 ruling on this issue exhaustively detailed
the facts related to Crawford's discrimination claim and appropriately applied the law to
those facts. Therefore, we shall adopt those portions of the circuit court's March 28,
2001, order as our own:
There is absolutely no direct evidence of
discriminatory animus in this case. Interpreting all evidence
in favor of the Plaintiff one finds nothing which directly
indicates that any action taken against her was based on her
race, gender, or disability. “Direct evidence of discrimination
would be evidence which, if believed, would prove the
existence of a fact without interference or presumption.”
Carter v. Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1989).
“[C]ourts have found that only the most blatant remarks,
whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate . . . ,
to constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. at 582.
The Plaintiff tries hard to hide the absence of direct evidence
by pointing to a host of supposedly egregious occurrences,
but not one of these occurrences indicate an action taken
directly because of race, gender, or disability. One must not
be mislead [sic] by the Plaintiff's mis-characterization of the
evidence in the record. While this court is obligated to view
the record in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff and resolve
all doubts in her favor, this court is not obligated to accept the
Plaintiff's view of the record.
Because of the absence of direct evidence of
discriminatory animus, analysis will focus on the process
outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.
...
It is impossible for the Plaintiff herein to make out a
prima facie case of discrimination. There can be no argument
- 18 -
that the Plaintiff meets the first element of a prima facie case
being that she is an African American female with a
handicap. However, the Plaintiff cannot meet the second
element of a prima facie case. Based on the record the
Plaintiff was not qualified for the positions for which she
applied and did not receive: Eligibility Counselor Senior and
Eligibility Counselor.
The position of Eligibility Counselor Senior was not
open to someone in the Plaintiff's position. All positions in
the LFUCG are classified civil service positions unless
otherwise designated. (Charter, LFUCG Code of Ordinances,
Section 9.02; KRS 67A.210). Positions designated as
'exempt' from the classified civil service rules by the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Council (the “unclassified
civil service” positions) are set forth by Local Ordinance,
Chapter 22. (Charter, LFUCG Code of Ordinances, Chapter
22).
Only “classified” civil service employees are
“internal” employees who are eligible to apply for positions
which are posted as being open to “internal” applicants only.
The Eligibility Counselor Senior position was such a position
open only to “internal” applicants. The job posting
announcement for the position clearly identified the position
as such. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3. As an employee in the
Mayor's Training Center, the Plaintiff is an “unclassified”
civil service employee. Because Plaintiff was an
“unclassified” civil service employee, rather than a
“classified” civil service employee, she was not an “internal”
applicant and therefore was not eligible for the position of
Eligibility Counselor Senior. Plaintiff was then not qualified
for the position, and she cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in this regard. As the Defendant indicates,
Plaintiff's subjective belief and misunderstanding that the job
was open to all LFUCG employees at the time she applied is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
or to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 11. Plaintiff even acknowledges her
- 19 -
misunderstanding as to the true nature of the position in her
deposition. See Loretta Crawford Depo. p. 105-107.
The Eligibility Counselor position was not limited to
internal applicants. However, the minimum qualifications for
the position were rather strict. Most telling was the
requirement that the applicant, to be considered for the
position, have
completion of two years of college-level work
in social sciences or directly related discipline
and two (2) years of responsible experience in
public assistance programs and the delivery of
social services, or equivalent combination of
experience, education and training which
provides the required knowledge, skill, and
abilities.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit 5 (Emphasis added). Under the LFUCG's
Civil Service system, when a civil service position is vacant,
a job vacancy is posted, applications are received, and the top
five applicants are certified to be considered for hiring by the
department where the position is open. An applicant must
meet the minimum qualifications for the position and make
the “Top 5” certified list of eligible candidates in order to be
considered for a position. See KRS 67A.270(1). Based on
these requirements only five individuals, out of one hundred
and fifty-five who applied, were certified as eligible
candidates for the position of Eligibility Counselor in the
Division of Adult Services. Because the Plaintiff did not
have the requisite education, experience and/or training, she
did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position and
was not certified as one of the “Top 5” for consideration by
the department where the position was open. Loretta
Crawford Depo. p. 109. Various parties' depositions make
this lack of qualification clear. Most telling, Diane Simpson,
who was the Human Resources Analyst in the Division of
Human Resources who reviewed the applications for the
Eligibility Counselor position in the Division of Adult
Services, testified that she stood by her decision to reject
Plaintiff from the job process because she did not meet the
- 20 -
minimum qualifications as set forth in the job specification.
Simpson 9/10/98 Depo. p. 119. The Plaintiff was not
qualified for the position of Eligibility Counselor.
As the Defendant states in his motion, an employer is
entitled to establish its own preferred qualifications (See
Hassen [sic] v. Auburn University, 833 F.Supp. 866, 872
(M.D.Ala. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994)) and
may legitimately consider experience as a major factor in
evaluating candidates (See Shipkovitz v. Board of Trustees of
Univ. of District of Columbia, 914 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1996), aff'd 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C.Cir. 1997)). Additionally, no
discrimination exists where an employer chooses a candidate
it believes is more suitable to its needs. See Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259.
It should be pointed out as well that this Court's
finding that there is insufficient evidence to support the
contention that the Plaintiff was qualified for the positions
which she applied in no way makes this Court unique. There
exist[] numerous cases where the ruling court determined that
the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because of lack of qualification for the
position(s) sought. See Turner v. The [sic] Pendennis Club,
Ky.App., 19 S.W.3d 117 (2000); Browning v. Rohn & Haas
Co., 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 28513 (6th Cir. 1999).
It is important to note as well that the Plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to
the positions for which she did not apply. There are certain
situations where an individual alleging discrimination need
not establish that he applied for the position in question, but
none of those situations are present here. In Babrocky v.
Jewel Food Co. and Retail Meatcutters Union, Local 320
[sic], 773 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1985), female meat wrappers
brought a Title VII action alleging they had been denied
meatcutter positions solely because of their sex. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that their failure to formally apply for the
positions in question was not fatal “[b]ecause an employer
may create an atmosphere in which employees understand
that their applying for certain positions is fruitless, even nonapplicants can in appropriate circumstances qualify for
- 21 -
relief.” Id. at 867. Further in Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 613 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980), it was indicated that
victims of gross and pervasive discrimination are not required
to formally apply for a position if they can establish that but
for the employer's discriminatory practices they would have
applied for a job. There are no allegations or evidence that
these types of situations exist in the present case.
Therefore, Ms. Crawford can only allege a prima facie
case of discrimination for the positions she applied. Cases
such as Box v. A. & P. Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986), apply more to her
situation. In Box an employee brought a Title VII action
alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her sex.
With regard to her failure to formally apply for a promotion,
the Seventh Circuit held that if her employer “had a formal
system of posting job openings and allowing employees to
apply for them, [her] failure to apply for [a promotion] would
prevent her from establishing a prima facie case.” Id. at
1376. See also, Wanger v. G.A. Gray Comp. [sic], 872 F.2d
142 (6th Cir. 1989); Williams v. Hevi-Duty Elec. Co., 819
F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1987). It has also been established that in
such a situation as that outlined above, a generalized
expression of interest in a position is insufficient to qualify as
an application for employment. Wagner [sic] v. G.A. Gray
Company, 872 F.2d 142, 145-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Williams v.
Hevi-Duty Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1987).
It is clear from the record that the LFUCG had a
formal system of posting job openings and allowing
employees to apply for them through an application process.
The Plaintiff testified in her deposition that when positions
became open they were posted on a bulletin board in the
Mayor's Training Office. Loretta Crawford Depo. Vol. 1 p.
110. She also indicated throughout her deposition that
positions were gained through a formal application process.
The Plaintiff then can only allege a case of prima facie
discrimination for the positions she applied. Requiring a
plaintiff to apply for a position before allowing her to bring a
claim of discrimination “is grounded in common sense. For if
an application were not necessary, then nearly every decision
to hire or promote would be subject to challenge.” Reilly v.
- 22 -
Friedman's Express [sic], Inc., 556 F.Supp. 618, 623
(M.D.Pa. 1983).
The above determination is critical because the
Plaintiff has spent a large amount of time and energy
attempting to prove a prima facie case of discrimination in
relation to the position of Client Assessment Counselor, but
the Plaintiff never formally applied for this position even
though she knew it to be open. Crawford Depo. Vol. 1, pp.
104-112. She did submit a letter expressing interest in the
position, but when the position ultimately became available
she never formally applied for it. Crawford Depo. Vol. 1, pp.
76-77. As indicated by the cases cited above, expressing a
general interest in a position is not the same as applying for it
when the employer utilizes a formal application process to
file the position. She therefore cannot allege a case of prima
facie discrimination in regards to the position of Client
Assessment Counselor.
In conclusion, this Court finds that there is absolutely
no evidence to support a case of prima facie discrimination
with respect to the positions Plaintiff formally applied for.
Furthermore, even if she had meet [sic] her prima facie
burden there is absolutely no evidence from which it can be
concluded that the Defendant's reasons for not hiring her were
a pretext for illegal discrimination. There is no evidence that
any action taken against the Plaintiff in any way had anything
to do with her race, gender, or disability. There is also no
evidence that Walker Skiba in anyway impacted the
application process for the positions above. The Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of race,
sex, and disability discrimination.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
- 23 -
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James M. Morris
Sharon K. Morris
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert L. Roark
Erica L. Keenan
Lexington, Kentucky
- 24 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.