FREDA MATTHEWS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 30, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001169-MR
FREDA MATTHEWS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00346
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Freda Matthews (“Matthews”) appeals from a May 12, 2006,
opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming the denial of her application for
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
disability retirement benefits by the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement
Systems (hereinafter “System”). We affirm.
Matthews was born in 1952. She married when she was eighteen and bore
two children. On September 1, 1979, she joined the Lake Cumberland Head Start
Program where she worked until August 31, 1981. She rejoined the program on
September 1, 1987. Her last day of paid employment was January 8, 2002. During this
time she served as a preschool teacher, a home visitor, and finally as a family advocate.
At the time of her termination, she had accrued 176 months (14.67 years) of service in the
County Employees Retirement System (CERS).
In July 2001, Matthews was hired by Lake Cumberland as a family
advocate and began a six-month probationary employment period. Although no formal
job description was provided to us, Matthews testified she was responsible for creating a
new early education program for three-year-olds and shepherding it through the licensing
process. She described some of her duties as meeting with families, preparing
paperwork, and transporting children to medical appointments. Her job duties were
classified as sedentary to light2 and included lifting children, carrying supplies, and
moving furniture and playground equipment. She attended monthly community meetings
which lasted anywhere from an hour to a full day. She testified she worked fourteen and
fifteen hour days because she was the only employee of the four hired to staff the
program having any experience with children. She said she sought help in performing
2
KRS 61.600(5)(c) classifies work as sedentary, light, medium, heavy or very heavy depending
upon the physical exertion requirements of the particular job.
-2-
her essential job duties, but her request went unanswered because her co-workers were
unable to do their own jobs. Matthews said she requested reasonable accommodations,3
but the record does not specify the nature of any such request. On the job description
form submitted by her employer, the response to the “accommodations” section was
simply “Dismissed 1/8/02.” Toward the end of 2001, Matthews went on medical leave
when her migraines worsened. According to Matthews, as the migraines intensified her
blood pressure would become elevated and this in turn increased her headaches and pain.
The record before us is replete with medical records from fourteen doctors
and four other health care professionals who have treated and evaluated Matthews for
various maladies. These records span a period from 1997 through 2003, but medical
histories contained within them show Matthews has had mental and physical problems
for many years, some of which relate back to the sexual, physical and emotional abuse
she experienced when she was a child of just six or eight years of age. A lifelong
asthmatic, she admitted suffering from anxiety and depression since she was in her
twenties. The health issues and diagnoses of greatest relevance to this appeal are: heart
problems, sleep problems, asthma, fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression, obsessivecompulsive disorder, back and hip pain culminating in back surgery, and migraine
headaches.
3
KRS 61.665(2)(a) requires a person seeking benefits to file with the retirement office
“evidence that the person has made a request for reasonable accommodation. . . .” Similarly,
KRS 61.665(2)(b) requires the employer to “submit a detailed description of reasonable
accommodations attempted.”
-3-
At the suggestion of her primary care physician, Dr. Mary Jane Castro (“Dr.
Castro”), Matthews took a three-week medical leave of absence in November 2001.
While on leave, as was her yearly custom, Matthews called area businesses and solicited
donations of Christmas gifts for Head Start children. With Dr. Castro’s approval,
Matthews returned to work the following month but remained on the job just five days
before Dr. Castro advised her to take a second leave of absence. While on medical leave
in December 2001, Matthews received a letter of suspension from her employer. When
she questioned the reason for her suspension, Matthews says she was told she should
have used her medical leave to focus on her own health. Then, on January 8, 2002,
Matthews was fired for becoming upset with a business that declined to donate to the
holiday drive.4
On February 2, 2002, Matthews applied for disability retirement benefits
alleging she suffered from fibromyalgia, asthma, chronic bronchitis, mild hypertension,
tachycardia, migraine headaches, general anxiety disorder with panic attacks, and
depression. Between April 5, 2002, and October 1, 2002, medical evidence submitted by
Matthews was reviewed fifteen times by members of the Medical Review Board
(“Board”). On October 2, 2002, a letter was sent to Matthews informing her the Board
4
Matthews has consistently claimed she was fired because a medical condition prevented her
from doing her job. The System challenges this contention because Matthews' employer never
assessed her ability to work. Copies of Matthews' suspension and termination letters are not
included in the record. On May 22, 2003, Matthews told Dr. Paul Ebben (“Dr. Ebben”), an
Independent Psychological Evaluator (IPE), she was fired because she “wasn’t very nice” to a
company that declined to participate in a Christmas gift solicitation. Notes from Dr. Castro
dated December 20, 2001, say Matthews was “suspended from work regarding complaints from
a company.”
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had denied her application for benefits. Comments from the medical reviewers indicated
the application was being denied generally because her medical complaints pre-existed
her reemployment and she had less than sixteen years of service credit. The doctors who
reviewed her claims found numerous reasons to deny her application for benefits. For
example, much of her current condition stemmed from abuse suffered when she was just
six or eight years old and nothing refuted that conclusion. She performed well on a
functional capacity evaluation (FCE), completing all requested tasks without complaining
of any functional restrictions. The record failed to describe any total and permanent
physical limitations. According to the record, Matthews was a lifelong asthmatic.
Matthews' cardiologist specifically denied any disability from a cardiac condition, a
diagnosis that upset Matthews. A psychiatric report indicated Matthews was receiving
treatment and her mental health status was expected to improve even though she was
noncompliant with a proposed treatment regimen. While the presence of fibromyalgia
was confirmed, there was no objective proof that Matthews was totally and permanently
disabled because of this condition and there was no description of any physical limitation
resulting from it that would prevent her from being a family advocate. The record
contained no objective proof that Matthews' was permanently disabled because of
depression, anxiety, or sleep apnea. Matthews' complaints were mostly subjective in
nature without objective medical support. Finally, there was no demonstrated joint,
muscle or neurological change and no evidence her range of motion was limited.
-5-
On November 25, 2002, Matthews submitted additional evidence from Drs.
Castro and Kelly Cole and requested further review by the Board. Following additional
review, on January 30, 2003, Matthews was again notified her claim had been denied for
similar reasons.
At Matthews’ request, a hearing was held on September 12, 2003, with
Matthews as the sole witness. Thereafter, each party filed a position statement and a
reply. On November 14, 2003, the hearing officer issued her findings of fact which
stated in relevant part:
1. Claimant applied for disability retirement benefits on
February 14, 2002.
2. Claimant has 176 months of CERS membership.
3. Reasonable accommodations were not requested, as
Claimant was terminated from her probationary
employment on January 8, 2002.
4. The objective medical evidence establishes that
Claimant suffered from a psychological and/or
psychiatric condition prior to her membership in the
retirement systems, and thus she is ineligible for
disability retirement benefits based on these
conditions, as she has less than 16 years of
membership.
5. There is no evidence that Claimant’s mental health
condition was substantially aggravated by a workrelated accident or injury.
6. The objective medical evidence does not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Claimant is totally
and permanently incapacitated from her job duties by
reason of any physical condition, or that any such
incapacity is likely to remain for a period of not less
than 12 months from her last date of paid employment.
As a result of these findings, the hearing officer recommended denial of the request for
disability retirement benefits. Following the filing of exceptions by Matthews, for which
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we find no ruling in the record, the System entered its final order on February 9, 2004,
adopting as its own the hearing officer’s findings and recommended order denying
benefits.
Matthews timely petitioned the Franklin Circuit Court for judicial review5
on March 5, 2004, alleging the System’s denial of benefits was unsupported by
substantial evidence and she was entitled to disability retirement benefits because the
medical proof in the record demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she
was disabled. In answering the allegation, the System argued the denial of benefits was
proper because it was based upon substantial evidence.
On January 25, 2006, Matthews moved for summary judgment to which the
System filed a response on March 10, 2006. The System argued Matthews had not
offered objective medical evidence showing she was permanently functionally
incapacitated, either physically or mentally, from her duties as a family advocate or from
work with similar duties. The System further argued all of Matthews’ physical and
mental conditions either pre-existed, or were directly or indirectly related to conditions
that pre-existed, her reemployment. Denying that it had “cherry picked” the evidence,
5
Matthews also argued, for the first time, that she was entitled to receive disability retirement
benefits under KRS 61.600(3)(b) because her brief return to work in December 2001 constituted
a “trial period” therefore rendering KRS 61.600(2) inapplicable. In response, the System argued
the only statutory reference to a “trial basis” appears in KRS 61.615(1) and applies only to those
employees with a minimum of sixteen years service who are already receiving disability
retirement benefits. Since Matthews had only 14.67 years of service and she was not receiving
disability benefits, she could not claim any benefit from this provision. Matthews appears to
have abandoned this portion of her argument on appeal to this Court.
-7-
the System argued it had considered all the proof and ultimately relied upon the evidence
it found to be the most convincing.
On May 12, 2006, an opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court
denying the appeal was entered. The court found evidence that Matthews’ psychological
condition pre-existed her reemployment since she admitted being an obsessive
perfectionist6 as a young adult and further admitted her perfectionism caused anxiety at
work. Since Matthews was not already receiving disability retirement benefits she did
not qualify for benefits under KRS 61.615. The Board is permitted to give more weight
to the objective results of an FCE than it gives to contrary conclusions drawn by an
independent medical examiner (IME). Objective medical reports established Matthews’
back pain was not disabling. Matthews’ asthma pre-existed her reemployment date and
was not shown to be disabling. Matthews’ cardiologist stated she was not disabled due to
a cardiac condition. There was no evidence Matthews was permanently incapacitated as
a result of migraine headaches and, even though Matthews had been diagnosed with
fibromyalgia, she was able to manage her pain with medication. Ultimately, the circuit
court found the Board’s decision denying Matthews’ claim for disability retirement
6
This revelation came during Dr. Ebben's psychological examination of Matthews. At the
request of the Board, on September 25, 2002, Dr. Ebben reviewed Matthews’ medical records
and recommended denial of benefits because her psychological condition predated her
reemployment. On January 2, 2003, he reviewed additional medical records and still
recommended denial of the claim because her “current condition originated during childhood.”
On May 22, 2003, he met with Matthews. It is at this time that Matthews spoke of being
“exceptionally perfectionistic” and suffering from obsessive-compulsive personality disorder
since she was eighteen; suffering panic attacks and anxiety before she began working for Lake
Cumberland; and suffering migraines for fifteen or more years.
-8-
benefits was supported by substantial evidence and denied the appeal. This appeal
followed.
Matthews alleges she proved she is disabled by a preponderance of the
evidence and therefore should be awarded benefits. Disagreeing, the System argues
Matthews is not entitled to benefits because she has not alleged any error by the circuit
court and the record contains substantial proof that all Matthews’ ailments pre-existed her
reemployment date or can be traced to a pre-existing condition.
In reviewing a circuit court’s opinion affirming an administrative agency’s
action we are guided by Jones v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 710 S.W.2d 862, 866
(Ky.App. 1986) which directs:
In an appeal of an administrative action by an agency, the
circuit courts are to provide review, not reinterpretation.
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commissioner v. King,
657 S.W.2d 260 (Ky.App. 1983). Thus, when substantial
evidence exists in the record to support an administrative
agency’s action, the circuit court has no authority to overturn
it. Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d
298 (Ky. 1972). Our task is to determine whether or not the
circuit court’s findings upholding the Cabinet are clearly
erroneous. CR 52.01; See also Kirk v. Jefferson County
Medical Society, 577 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Ky.App. 1978).
Thus, for us to reverse the circuit court and remand the case as Matthews requests, she
must convince us the System’s denial of benefits was unsupported by substantial
evidence and the circuit court clearly erred in finding it was. After reviewing the
evidence and the trial court’s analysis, we are convinced only that Matthews has failed to
carry her burden. Hence, we affirm.
-9-
Between 1997 and 2003, Matthews saw a wide variety of doctors for a
multitude of physical conditions. Several of the doctors and specialists suggested she
meet with a mental health professional, but she did not do so until January 2002, just
prior to being terminated from her job. Many of the medical doctors attributed her
physical problems to various stressors within her family life as well as her need to be in
control, a condition which Matthews told Dr. Ebben that she herself noticed when she
was an eighteen-year-old bride.
Matthews alleges a plethora of health concerns which we will address
individually. To justify an award of disability retirement benefits, there must be
objective medical proof of four items: (1) since leaving her job, and considering any
reasonable accommodation provided by her employer, Matthews must be “mentally or
physically incapacitated” to work as a family advocate or a job with similar duties; (2)
her incapacitation must be the “result of bodily injury, mental illness, or disease”; (3) she
must be permanently incapacitated; and (4) her incapacity cannot “result directly or
indirectly from bodily injury, mental illness, disease, or condition which pre-existed
membership in the system or reemployment, whichever is most recent.” KRS 61.600(3).
Back and hip pain culminating in back surgery in early 2003. Nearly
one year after being fired as a family advocate, Matthews awoke on December 27, 2002,
with severe pain in her right hip and thigh. An MRI showed a herniation and in early
February 2003 Dr. El-Naggar performed back surgery. When Dr. Dennis Lane examined
her on April 14, 2003, Matthews complained of pain in the right hip and leg but had a full
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range of motion in her right leg and only a very mild increase in lower extremity pain.
Since Matthews’ back complaints arose after her last date of paid employment, they
cannot be the basis for awarding disability retirement benefits.
Asthma. Matthews is a lifelong asthmatic. Medical records from her
pulmonologist, Dr. John Rodrigues, show Matthews underwent spirometry studies in
October 1997, November 1997, and July 1998, with the latest test showing her lung
function to be “essentially within normal limits.” As of January 2, 2002, Matthews’
asthma was under “good control” with medication. Because her asthma pre-dated her
reemployment and her asthma alone is not disabling, this condition cannot be the basis
for awarding disability retirement benefits.
Cardiac. Dr. Natarajan Thannoli became Matthews’ cardiologist in
January 1997. At that time, Matthews was able to work “without much difficulty” and
was generally maintaining good health. A February 1992 echocardiogram was normal.
As early as 1997, Dr. Thannoli encouraged Matthews to curb her caffeine intake and
noted she was highly stressed because of numerous family issues. In 2000 he found her
to be borderline positive for lupus and perhaps fibromyalgia but suspected her main
problem was an anxiety disorder. In May 2001, he concluded Matthews had a regular
heart rhythm without any cardiac symptomatology. On June 18, 2002, Dr. Thannoli
wrote, “from the cardiac status she has no evidence of disability.” Because Matthews has
no disability of a cardiac nature, this condition cannot be the basis for awarding disability
retirement benefits.
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Migraines. Matthews has suffered from migraines for fifteen years or
more, however, no evidence was offered as to the length, severity or frequency of her
headaches. Because no objective medical evidence was introduced showing Matthews'
migraine headaches are permanently incapacitating, this condition cannot be the basis for
awarding disability retirement benefits.
Fibromyalgia. Matthews was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 1999.
However, there is no objective medical evidence that she is functionally disabled as a
result of this condition. Doctors recommended physical therapy, water aerobics and
home exercise, as well as meeting with a mental health professional to decrease the
effects of the fibromyalgia. It was also strongly suggested that she curtail her intake of
caffeine. Matthews did not pursue any of these courses of treatment. Instead, she relied
upon medication beginning with hydrocodone, progressing to methadone, and finally
moving to oxycontin to which Dr. Syed Umar believed she had developed an addiction.
While it is true that Dr. Castro and Dr. John Nickerson (“Dr. Nickerson”),
an independent medical evaluator, both concluded Matthews' fibromyalgia was totally
incapacitating, those conclusions are not supported by objective medical findings and
indeed were based upon highly subjective statements from Matthews. Dr. Nickerson
examined Matthews on June 13, 2002. Although she exhibited a full range of motion in
her shoulders, elbows, wrists, and lower extremities at the hips, knees and ankles she
claimed to be in constant pain. As a result, Dr. Nickerson found her fibromyalgia to be
disabling and opined that other health conditions contributed to her disability. He
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deemed her 100 percent permanently disabled from her occupation as a family advocate
and from every other occupation for which she was qualified. He strongly suggested she
undergo an FCE, but was confident Matthews:
will not be able to perform the activities of a functional
capacity evaluation very well given her functional level at this
time and I am certain that it will cause increased discomfort
and not be very helpful from a standpoint of being able to
transfer her functional activities on an FCE to what she could
do eight hours per day, five days per week, forty-eight weeks
a year.
Upon receiving Dr. Nickerson’s report, Dr. Castro referred Matthews to
Jeff Parmelee for a modified FCE. That test was conducted on June 27, 2002, and
Matthews “gave maximum, consistent effort” throughout the exam. According to
Parmelee, Matthews showed “no deviations with her gait, transfers or with her mechanics
while performing the functional lifts.” She also “demonstrated a fast gait moving from
one testing area to another.” While she had “difficulty performing the floor to shelf lift,
due to improper mechanics,” in eighty-two seconds she lifted “20 pounds safely through
5 repetitions from a floor to waist lift.” She also lifted twenty-five pounds from her waist
to her crown four and one-half times before being instructed to stop due to unsafe lifting
techniques. She was also able to lift fifteen pounds five times with “very good form and
technique.” Five times she did a horizontal lift of fifty pounds, and, without difficulty,
she carried thirty pounds for five repetitions. During all trials she showed “good force
curves.” Three times, while maintaining a good heart rate, she ascended and descended a
flight of ten steps in twelve seconds “showing good symmetry and speed.” When asked
- 13 -
to demonstrate her normal walking speed, she traveled one-quarter mile in eight minutes
and twenty-five seconds on a treadmill. Finally, she scored on the average/above average
borderline in terms of hand coordination.
As far as significant deficits, Matthews “showed no gross musculoskeletal
deficits in regard to function” although she did exhibit weakness in her left ankle due to
an old sprain. Because of unsafe lifting mechanics, Parmelee suggested Matthews lift no
more than twenty pounds from the floor, but he acknowledged this limitation was not
“necessarily permanent.” When giving his assessment, Parmelee wrote:
The patient has demonstrated very well, that she is able to
perform all major functional tasks. It should also be noted
that she does not complain of any functional restrictions. The
patient’s complaints are that of chronic pain and inability to
function at times due to her discomfort. As mentioned
previously, the patient had taken her pain medication prior to
this test. She did perform the tests with no problems and was
very pleasant and cooperative. In taking a long history from
this patient, it is evident, that her limitation is not
musculoskeletal, but from dealing with anxiety, stress, and
other related issues, which in turn limit her function.
When faced with contradictory medical evidence, the finder of fact is
authorized to evaluate all the evidence and rely upon that which it finds to be the most
convincing. As stated in Wheatley v. Shields, 292 F.Supp. 608, 616 (D.C. 1968), “it is
the exclusive province of the administrative trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.” See also Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky.App. 1995). Furthermore,
as explained in Com. Transp. Cabinet Dept. of Vehicle Regulation v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d
- 14 -
591, 594 (Ky.App. 1990), “the trier of facts in an administrative agency may consider all
of the evidence and choose the evidence that he believes. (citation omitted)” In this case,
the System considered all the proof and in its view the most credible evidence happened
to be the results of Matthews’ functional capacity exam. As required by McManus v.
Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky.App. 2003), and a long line of
cases before it, we must give “great latitude” to that decision. Pitting the subjective
statements made by Drs. Castro and Nickerson against the objective test results from
Parmelee, we cannot say the circuit court was clearly erroneous in finding Matthews'
fibromyalgia, as the System stated, was not incapacitating and could not be the basis for
awarding disability retirement benefits .
Anxiety and depression. In 1997, the beginning point of the medical
records submitted for review, Dr. Thannoli urged Matthews to see a mental health
professional. At that time, he thought Matthews' main problem was an anxiety disorder.
She did not seek help until January 2002.
On May 22, 2003, Dr. Ebben examined Matthews. The history he took
from her and the psychological tests he performed on her that day revealed a number of
salient facts. At the age of eighteen, Matthews became “exceptionally perfectionistic”
and began suffering from anxiety, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Prior
to being employed by Lake Cumberland Head Start, Matthews began experiencing panic
attacks. On May 20, 2002, Matthews was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome
and major depressive disorder by Dr. John Gatschenberger, a psychiatrist who examined
- 15 -
her for a Social Security Disability claim.7 Dr. Nickerson deemed her “totally disabled”
with severe pain on a constant basis. Additionally, while she has endured migraines for
at least fifteen years, she is able to control them with medication.
During Dr. Ebben's exam, Matthews completed the Miller Forensic
Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) which is designed to identify possible
symptom exaggeration or malingering. Her total score was eighteen, suggesting she was
probably malingering or exaggerating her mental illness. She also completed the
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). However, her responses indicated she may
have been deliberately distorting the clinical picture of her condition and thus
invalidating the results. Matthews also completed the Pain Patient Profile (P-3). Again
her scores were unusually high, being just one point away from being ruled invalid.
Because Matthews’ test scores were questionable, Dr. Ebben was unable to
draw reliable and meaningful conclusions. He suspected she was experiencing some
amount of physical and mental distress, including depression, anxiety, a somatoform
disorder, and a personality disorder, but he could not quantify it or determine whether it
was total and incapacitating. He did, however, believe it was permanent since it would
last at least twelve months. He concluded a portion of her psychiatric condition pre7
Matthews suggests disability retirement benefits should be awarded to her because she is
receiving Social Security Disability benefits and disability benefits from a private insurance
carrier. Contrary to her allegation, the criteria for awarding disability retirement benefits is
stated in KRS 61.600 and is not influenced by awards from other sources. As stated in Ledford
v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, --- S.W.3d ----, 2007 WL 2141819 (Ky.App. 2007), “while the
hearing officer may consider the medical records supporting an award of SSDI benefits, the
Retirement Systems is not bound by factual or legal findings of other state or federal agencies.
105 Kentucky Administrative Regulation 1:210 § 8(1) & (2).”
- 16 -
existed her reemployment and while some facets of her condition probably arose after she
began working for Lake Cumberland Head Start, he concluded they would still be related
to her longstanding personality disorder and would not in and of themselves be disabling.
Furthermore, there was “no evidence Matthews’ psychiatric condition was substantially
aggravated by ‘an accident or injury’ arising out of, or during the course of,
employment.” Ultimately, Dr. Ebben recommended denial of the claim because a portion
of Matthews' condition pre-existed her reemployment and there was evidence she tried to
distort the test results.
Carrie Schultz, a licensed clinical social worker, began seeing Matthews in
January 2002. She provided no test results showing the onset of anxiety and depression
was recent. Given that Matthews herself told Dr. Ebben she had suffered from
perfectionism and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder since the age of eighteen
and that her perfectionism caused anxiety at work, the System correctly found this preexisting condition could not be the basis of an award of disability retirement benefits.
When viewing the evidence as a whole, there is substantial evidence upon
which to conclude Matthews' many health concerns stem from abuse she suffered as a
child and for which she still seeks resolution. Because these maladies pre-existed her
reemployment, they cannot be considered in determining whether Matthews meets the
statutory criteria for an award of benefits. Other medical conditions may have developed
after she began working, but based upon reasonable medical probability, they can still be
traced to events occurring when Matthews was between the ages of six and eight and
- 17 -
again when she was eighteen. KRS 61.600(3) requires that these complaints be excluded
from consideration. Matthews’ other conditions are controlled by medication or are
otherwise not disabling or permanently incapacitating and therefore cannot be
considered. Thus, we must agree with the trial court and affirm the System's denial of
disability retirement benefits.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Paul Jones II
Monticello, Kentucky
Jennifer A. Jones
Frankfort, Kentucky
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