MYANH COLEMAN v. BEE LINE COURIER SERVICE, INCORPORATED
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RENDERED: AUGUST 10, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000994-MR
MYANH COLEMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-010337
BEE LINE COURIER SERVICE,
INCORPORATED
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: The Appellant, Myanh Coleman (“Coleman”), seeks review of an
Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
the Appellee, Bee Line Courier Service, Inc. (“Bee Line”). Finding no error, we affirm.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On December 11, 2003, the vehicle
driven by Coleman was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Frank Huff, an employee of
Bee Line and while in the course of his employment by Bee Line. Coleman’s vehicle
suffered property damage which was settled between Coleman and Bee Line without the
aid of counsel.
Coleman sought chiropractic care to address her personal injuries and
subsequently retained counsel to represent her on a personal injury claim.
On March 23, 2004, Coleman, through her counsel, sent a letter to Bee Line
demanding $21,000 to settle the personal injury claim.1 Included with the letter were the
treatment records of Coleman’s chiropractor. The letter was sent to the attention of
“Louie.” In subsequent discovery, it is clear “Louie” is Norman L. Seger, the vicepresident of Bee Line. On March 25, Steven Price (“Price”), a claims representative for
Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. (“Gallagher-Bassett”), sent a counter-offer for $6,500 to
settle the personal injury claim. Subsequently, on March 29 by telephone voice mail, and
on March 30 by fax, Coleman, through counsel, accepted the offer of $6,500. The
acceptance letter was signed by Grover S. Cox (“Cox”).
Thereafter, on March 30, 2004, at 12:52 p.m., Price faxed a form styled
“Release of All Claims” (“Release”) to Cox for Coleman’s signature. The Release was in
fact signed by Coleman, and witnessed and notarized by Cox on March 30.
The Release reads in part as follows:
This Indenture Witnesseth that I, Myanh Coleman, in
consideration of the sum of $6,500.00, do hereby for my
heirs, personal representatives and assigns, release and
forever discharge Frank Huff, Bee Line Courier Service,
1
Although Coleman initially questioned whether Bee Line was self-insured, that issue was not
preserved for review. If Bee Line had not filed the requisite form to be self-insured, it could still
be liable for a reimbursement claim pursuant to KRS 304.39-070(2). See City of Louisville v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 194 S.W.3d 304 (Ky. 2006).
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Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Zurich Insurance and any
other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with
responsibility or liability, their heirs, representatives or
assigns, from any and all claims, demands, costs, expenses,
loss of services, actions and causes of action arising from any
act or occurrence up to the present time, and particularly on
account of all personal injury, disability, property damages,
loss or damages of any kind sustained or that I may hereafter
sustain in consequence of an accident that occurred on or
about the 11th day of December, 2003, at or near Louisville,
KY.
. . . The undersigned agrees to hold the released
parties harmless and indemnify them from any claims
asserted by any third parties or lien holders, including but
not limited to, all medical providers and any other
insurance carriers against the proceeds of this settlement.
(Emphasis added).
On March 31, Gallagher Bassett issued a check in the amount of $6,500.
Sometime thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) sought to
recover from Bee Line $5,737 in Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits it paid to or on
behalf of Coleman. Bee Line asked Coleman to either defend against or make payment
on this claim. When Coleman refused, Bee Line negotiated a settlement in the amount of
$4,737, which it paid to Nationwide. Bee Line sought indemnification from Coleman,
relying on the language set out above in the Release signed by Coleman. Coleman
refused and Bee Line filed the underlying action in December 2004. Coleman answered
timely and filed a counterclaim alleging violation of the Fair Claims Settlement Practice
Act, infliction of emotional distress and tortious bad faith.
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When Coleman attempted to depose Price, the adjuster, Bee Line moved to
dismiss the counterclaim and to stay all discovery on the counterclaim until the trial court
ruled on the motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, Bee Line also moved for summary
judgment. By February 11, 2005, Coleman responded to each of those motions and filed
her own motion for summary judgment.
A pre-trial conference was held on February 14 to address the motion to
hold discovery in abeyance. On February 22, the trial court granted Coleman’s motions
to depose Price and compel discovery from Bee Line. Further, the court allowed
Coleman twenty days from the completion of discovery to file answers to Bee Line’s
motions to dismiss the counterclaim and for summary judgment.
On February 22, 2005, Bee Line filed with the trial court a Notice of
Submission of Case for Final Adjudication. This form is commonly referred to as the
AOC-280 form. Bee Line designated the two pending motions for summary judgment as
those the court was to consider. A copy was mailed to counsel for Coleman.
Thereafter, both Coleman and Bee Line filed responses to requests for
interrogatories. On May 19, Coleman filed a motion to dismiss Bee Line’s complaint.
On May 31, Coleman again filed a motion to compel discovery. Simultaneously, Bee
Line filed a motion to stay discovery and bifurcate Coleman’s bad faith claim from Bee
Line’s contract claim and to disqualify Coleman’s counsel. Included in Bee Line’s
motion was a final paragraph which states:
Bee Line and Defendant have asserted and fully briefed
cross motions for summary judgment on Bee Line’s
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contract claim. An AOC-280 Form was submitted
February 22, 2005. The survival of Defendant’s
counterclaims hinges upon the adjudication of Bee Line’s
contract claim, which supplies even more support for
bifurcation of Defendant’s Bad Faith claims and a stay of
discovery regarding those claims.
(Emphasis added).
The trial court passed the motions for a hearing on July 15, 2005.2 On June
20, 2005, at the request of Bee Line’s counsel, the hearing was rescheduled to August 12,
2005. However, on July 6, the trial court ruled on the pending summary judgment
motions, granting summary judgment in favor of Bee Line and denying Coleman’s
motion.
Coleman moved to vacate the summary judgment entered on July 6 and
asked that she be heard on the previously scheduled date of August 12. Arguments were
heard on that date.
The trial court explained that because an AOC-280 form had been filed and
because nearly five months had passed since that notice was filed, she believed discovery
for those issues had been completed. Further, she explained the filing of an AOC-280
form triggered an inquiry from the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) as to
why there had not been a decision after ninety days.
On April 13, 2006, the trial court denied Coleman’s motion to vacate and
this appeal followed.
2
According to the clerk’s case history, only the motion to disqualify defendant’s counsel was
passed to July 15. Neither oral arguments nor a hearing on the summary judgment motions was
ever set.
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The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996). The trial court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary
judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will
be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. The moving
party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and
then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). The
trial court “must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a
real issue exists.” While the court used the word “impossible” in describing the strict
standard for summary judgment, the Supreme Court later stated that the word was “used
in a practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Id. at 480. Because this summary
judgment involves only legal questions and not the existence of any disputed material
issues of fact, this Court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the
issue de novo.
This action began as a simple breach of contract claim. Bee Line argues
that the Release signed by Coleman clearly provides that she must indemnify Bee Line
against any third party. Coleman defended against the suit, claiming it was never the
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intention of the parties that she should be responsible for any reimbursement claims for
PIP benefits made by her insurance carrier, Nationwide.
As set out in the July 6, 2005 opinion, the trial court considered the entire
record in determining the parties’ motions for summary judgment as well as the crossmotions to dismiss. The court’s analysis turned on the interpretation of the language in
the Release, including the pivotal sentence, “The undersigned agrees to hold the released
parties harmless and indemnify them from any claims asserted by any third parties or lien
holders, including but not limited to, all medical providers and any other insurance
carriers against the proceeds of this settlement.”
Nationwide, as a reparation obligor, has a separate right of recovery for PIP
amounts expended on behalf of Coleman. KRS 304.39-070(3). Having made basic
reparation benefit payments, Nationwide may intervene in Coleman’s tort action against
the tortfeasor, Bee Line, in order to assert a direct claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer,
which is again, Bee Line. It is well established that a policy of insurance cannot abrogate
a mandatory provision of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mattox, 862 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. 1993). The
release/indemnification agreement signed by Coleman does not compromise
Nationwide’s right to assert a basic reparation benefit subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor or its insurer. Rather, it shifts the responsibility for paying the claim from Bee
Line to Coleman.
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The court found while Coleman had no statutory obligation to reimburse
Nationwide for its PIP payments, she did have a contractual obligation to reimburse Bee
Line for the amounts it was forced to expend to settle Nationwide’s claim.
“A release is nothing more than a contract between the party executing it
and the party released. Where the contract is silent we must interpret the intent of the
parties.” Richardson v. Eastland, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Ky. 1983), abrogated on other
grounds by Abney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Ky. 2006).
As with any contract generally, the language of the release determines the
parties’ intentions. See Woodruff v. Bourbon Stock Yards Co., 149 Ky. 576, 149 S.W.
960, 962 (1912). “When no ambiguity exists in the contract, we look only as far as the
four corners of the document to determine the parties’ intentions.” 3D Enterprises
Contracting Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 174
S.W.3d 440, 448 (Ky. 2005). “The fact that one party may have intended different
results, however, is insufficient to construe a contract at variance with its plain and
unambiguous terms.” Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S.W.3d
381, 385 (Ky.App. 2002). “Generally, the interpretation of a contract, including
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law for the courts and is
subject to de novo review.” Id.
Here, the Release is clear and unambiguous as it releases Huff, Bee Line,
Gallagher Bassett, Zurich and their heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns,
and all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable.
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Further, the Release clearly provides that Coleman shall indemnify those released against
any third party. Contrary to Coleman’s argument, nothing in the Release would suggest
indemnification is limited to health care providers, Medicare or Medicaid.
Coleman also argues that the contract was complete upon the faxed offer
from Bee Line and her acceptance of the offer for $6,500 for personal damages. She
further argues that the Release was outside the terms of an oral contract. This analysis is
flawed.
The general requirements for any contract are offer and acceptance, full and
complete terms, and consideration. Cantrell Supply, 94 S.W.3d at 384; Hines v. Thomas
Jefferson Fire Insurance Co., 267 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1954). As to the first requirement of
an enforceable contract, it is clear from the face of the faxed correspondence there was an
offer and acceptance between the parties. The second requirement is that the contract
terms must be full and complete. Until the Release was tendered by Bee Line, the only
term discussed in the correspondence was how much Bee Line was willing to pay
Coleman for her personal injuries. Following Coleman’s agreement to accept $6,500,
Bee Line sent a Release which needed to be signed before the settlement money was to
be paid. The Release was the contract, whereas the faxed letters were the negotiations
between the parties. It was incumbent upon Coleman and her counsel to reject the
Release if it did not accurately portray the terms of their agreement. She was free to
refuse to sign the Release and the parties could have proceeded with the lawsuit. An
unambiguous contract does not become ambiguous when a party asserts – especially post
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hoc, and after detrimental reliance by another party – that the terms of the agreement fail
to state what it intended. Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 107 (Ky.
2003). In Frear, the pre-settlement correspondence made no mention of indemnification.
However, included with the final settlement contract was a release and indemnification
agreement tendered by the appellees. The appellants objected to the indemnification
language. The Supreme Court held, absent an explicit provision to the contrary, “we hold
that an agreement to sign ‘a release’ contemplates only a release from liability and not
indemnification from third party claims.” Id.
Consideration is the final requirement for an enforceable contract.
Typically, where an agreement is founded solely upon reciprocal promises, the contract is
wanting in consideration. Pace v. Burke, 150 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky.App. 2004), citing
David Roth’s Sons, Inc. v. Wright & Taylor, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1961).
However, where each party has assumed some legal obligation to the other, the
agreement is considered valid and enforceable. Here, Bee Line agreed to pay Coleman
$6,500 and Coleman agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Bee Line against any third
party claims. Those terms in the Release are clear and unambiguous.
The contention that the trial court acted prematurely is unpersuasive. In the
case of Hartford Insurance Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579 S.W.2d 628
(Ky.App. 1979), only six months expired between the filing of the complaint and the date
of judgment. In that case, the Court indicated that this was ample time in which to
engage in discovery or inform the court why judgment should not be granted. It is not
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necessary that discovery actually be completed but only that a suitable opportunity to do
so was available. Hollins v. Edmonds, 616 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Ky.App. 1981). Likewise,
in the case sub judice, more than six months passed from the time of the filing of the
action and over four months passed after Bee Line advised the court the summary
judgment motions were ready for submission. While there were pending motions for
discovery, those were only relevant if the terms of the Release were ambiguous.
Additionally, Coleman argues that the court failed to hold a hearing on the
motions for summary judgment. Coleman properly cited to Jefferson Circuit Court Local
Rule 401(A), which provides that motions for summary judgment “shall not be noticed
for a hearing,” but that prior to submission, counsel could file a motion for an oral
argument. In this case, Bee Line and Coleman filed their motions for summary judgment
along with a supporting memorandum. Neither party requested a hearing on the motions.
Nor is the trial court required to hold a hearing prior to ruling on the motion for summary
judgment. Coleman does not cite to this Court any hearing, order or agreement that there
would be oral arguments on the motions for summary judgment.
Further, Coleman had at least two opportunities to advise the court that the
case was not ready for a final decision by the court. First, when the notice of submission
was filed on February 22, 2005, and then again on May 31, 2005, when Bee Line again
advised the court that the matter was ready for submission. While, as argued by
Coleman, the AOC 280 form is not a dispositive motion requiring a response, it is
recognized as a fundamental method of advising the court that a ruling is expected.
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Coleman acknowledged this important function when on September 23, 2005, she filed a
similar form after the August 12, 2005 hearing on her motion to vacate. As stated by the
court during that hearing, to remain silent only fostered the belief of the court that
discovery on those issues had been completed and the parties were ready for it to rule.
Under the peculiar facts of this case, we conclude that summary judgment
in favor of Bee Line should have been granted. Because the trial court properly granted
Bee Line’s motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary to address Coleman’s
motion for summary judgment or her motion to dismiss. Both become relevant only if
the language in the Release was ambiguous. Because it was not, we cannot find the trial
court erred in dismissing Coleman’s counterclaims. Likewise, because of the clear
language in the Release, we cannot find the trial court erred in granting Bee Line’s
motion to dismiss Coleman’s counterclaims.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment entered on July 6, 2005, and
the April 13, 2006 order denying Coleman’s motion to reconsider as entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Grover S. Cox
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeremiah A. Byrne
Louisville, Kentucky
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