TAMMY DAY v. COMMONWEATLH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 16, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000896-MR
TAMMY DAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00154
COMMONWEATLH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: On March 1, 2006, a jury found Tammy Day (Day) guilty of
Promoting Contraband in the First Degree and Possession of Methamphetamine.2 The
trial court imposed the jury's recommended sentence of four years' imprisonment. On
appeal, Day asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it permitted a handwritten
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
We note that, in November of 2005, Day stood trial on the same charges, the jury was unable
to reach a verdict, and the trial judge declared a mistrial.
statement from Sheriff's Deputy Brown (Brown) to be introduced into evidence and
published to the jury; (2) the convictions of promoting contraband and possession of
methamphetamine amounted to double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred when it did not
grant Day's motion for directed verdict; and (4) testimony regarding Day's silence after
receiving her Miranda warning violated her right to remain silent and her right to due
process. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties presented diverse versions of the facts in this matter. Therefore,
we will outline the basic undisputed facts, then summarize the relevant testimony from
the witnesses. Day pled guilty to driving under the influence and served one day of her
seven-day sentence in June of 2005. Because her daughter had been in an accident in
June of 2005, Day requested and obtained a thirty-day furlough so that she could care for
her daughter before serving the rest of her sentence. Day reported to serve the remainder
of her sentence on Friday, July 15, 2005. Prior to reporting to jail on July 15, 2005, Day
thought she had arranged for work release so that she could care for her seriously ill
brother.
Prisoners who receive work release change from their jail uniforms into
their street clothes before leaving the jail. Each prisoner's jail uniform is then placed in a
green drawstring bag and put in the property room. When a prisoner returns, she is given
the appropriate drawstring bag so that she can change from her street clothes into her jail
uniform. The prisoner's street clothes are then placed in the drawstring bag and returned
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to the property room. Each prisoner is permitted to bring in clean underwear and socks
and prisoners are permitted to have a limited number of photographs and Zippo lighters.
Prisoners are also permitted to have AM/FM radios with headphones; however, radios
must be purchased from the jail's commissary. Prisoners are not permitted to have butane
lighters or tape recorders.
A. Day's Testimony
On Saturday, July 16, 2005, Day learned that jail personnel had not
received any orders from the district court providing for work release. When she learned
she was not going to be released, Day became concerned that her brother was needlessly
suffering from lack of care. Because of her concern for her brother's well-being, Day
asked several jail personnel, in particular Deputy Jailer Donna Wiley (Wiley), to check
on the status of the order granting work release. According to Day, Wiley was less than
helpful.
On Monday, July 18, 2005, the district court judge signed a work release
order providing that Day was to be released from jail at 7:00 a.m. and was to return by
3:00 p.m. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Day was not released from jail
until approximately 8:30 a.m.3 After her release, Day called the jail and asked if she
could return later because she had not been released on time. Day was advised by Wiley
that she had to return as set forth in the order. Day then advised Wiley that she would
3
Although there is no direct testimony regarding this issue, the order was signed the morning of
July 18, 2005, and it appears that the order simply was not transmitted to the jail in time for Day
to be released any earlier.
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speak with Wiley's supervisor, which Day did. Wiley's supervisor also advised Day to
return to the jail by 3:00 p.m.
At approximately 3:15 p.m., Day returned to the jail. When she returned,
Day was carrying a paper bag containing clean underwear, socks, and a photograph of her
daughter. Day also had a tape recorder and butane lighter, which she had on her person,
not in the bag. When Day reached the booking area, Wiley took her bag and went into
the jail, leaving Day in the booking area for approximately 20 minutes. When Wiley
returned, she had Day's paper bag and another bag, and Wiley told Day that she had to be
strip-searched. While Day was removing her blouse, her jail wrist identification bracelet
fell off and, when Day bent down to pick up the bracelet, Wiley stated that the bracelet
looked like drugs. Wiley then pulled a bra from one of the bags and said, "What is this?"
pointing to holes in the bra cups and plastic bags sticking out of the holes. Day was
surprised to see the bra and stated that it was not hers. Deputy Jailer Loretta Drake
(Drake) then appeared and Wiley handed the bra to Drake and told her to take the bra out
of the room. Day finished dressing in her jail uniform, and Wiley took her to a holding
cell.
Several minutes later, Brown attempted to interrogate Day in the holding
cell. When he arrived in the holding cell, Brown read the Miranda warning to Day, and
Day stated that she wanted to speak with an attorney. Day did not say anything else to
Brown or Wiley.
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B. Wiley's Testimony
Wiley testified that she did not remember having any conversations with
Day regarding the initiation of work release or regarding extending the time for work
release. Any such questions Wiley would have referred to her supervisor.
On July 18, 2005, Day returned from work release at or near 4:00 p.m.
When she came into the booking area, Day had a plastic bag. Wiley took the plastic bag
from Day, gave Day her green drawstring bag containing Day's jail uniform, and told Day
to go into the changing room to change clothes. Wiley then searched the contents of the
plastic bag and found a photograph that had a slit in the back and some type of powdery
residue. After searching the plastic bag, Wiley went into the changing room and told Day
that she would have to be strip-searched. Day had already changed into her jail uniform
and she began removing her blouse. When Day removed her blouse, Wiley saw a plastic
bag fall to the floor. Day picked up the bag and put it in the back of her pants. After
removing her blouse, Day seemed reluctant to remove her bra, and Wiley had to tell her
to do so twice, the second time in a commanding tone of voice. After Wiley told Day to
remove her bra the second time, Drake came into the changing room. Day removed her
bra and Wiley saw holes in the bra cups and three plastic bags, two containing white
powder and one bag containing a green leafy substance.4 Wiley then gave the bra to
Drake and told Drake to take it out of the room. Day continued disrobing and Wiley
found a tape recorder and butane lighter hidden in Day's pants. After Drake left the
4
It is uncontested that the white powdery substance was methamphetamine and the green leafy
substance was marijuana.
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room, Day told Wiley that the bra was not hers and that she had just bought it at the
Salvation Army.
Day finished dressing in her jail uniform, and Wiley took her to a holding
cell, where Day was interrogated by Brown. While Wiley was in the holding cell, Day
told Brown that the bra was not hers and that she had just bought it at the Salvation
Army.
C. Drake's Testimony
When Day returned to the jail from work release, she was carrying two
plastic bags of clothes. Wiley took Day to the changing room sometime between 3:30
and 4:00 p.m. While Wiley was in the changing room with Day, Drake heard Wiley raise
her voice. Drake then went into the changing room to see if Wiley needed any assistance.
When Drake went into the changing room, Day was holding her bra to her chest and
wearing white boxer shorts. Day gave the bra to Wiley who noted the holes in the cups
and the plastic bags. Wiley then gave the bra to Drake and told Drake to take the bra out
of the room. Drake did not hear Day say anything about the bra.
D. Brown's Testimony
Brown received a call from the jail indicating that a prisoner had attempted
to smuggle contraband substances into the jail. Shortly after receiving the call, Brown
arrived at the jail and went into the holding cell. He asked Day "what was going on" and
Day stated that, "This isn't my bra. I bought this bra at the Salvation Army." Brown then
read Day the Miranda warning and Day stated that she wanted to talk to an attorney.
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On cross-examination, Brown admitted that none of his official reports
contained any mention of the statement by Day about the Salvation Army. However,
Brown did have a "personal note" (the note) regarding Day's statement about the
Salvation Army. Brown testified that he prepared the note at the same time he prepared
the official reports. Day objected to admission of the note into evidence because the note
had not been part of the official police record. However, Day admitted that the existence
and the contents of the note were not a surprise. The trial court, noting that Day was
aware of the note and that the note had been admitted into evidence during Day's prior
trial, overruled Day's objection. The court then permitted the note to be published to the
jury. While the jurors were passing the note around, the court took a brief recess. The
court advised the jurors to just leave the note on a chair to be collected with the other
exhibits.
E. Carla Miller's Testimony
Day testified that she never told anyone that she had purchased the bra at
the Salvation Army. However, Carla Miller (Miller), an employee at the clerk's office,
testified that Day said that what happened was not true and that she did not "know about
the bra" which she "got . . . at the Salvation Army."
With this factual background in mind, we will analyze the issues presented
by Day. We will address the standard of review for each issue in turn.
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ANALYSIS
A. Admission of Brown's Note
The standard of review on evidentiary issues is whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). "The
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
As noted above, the trial court admitted into evidence the note reflecting
Day's statement that she purchased the bra at the Salvation Army. Day argues that the
trial court denied her the right to be present during every stage of the proceedings when it
permitted the note to be introduced into evidence, published to the jury, and taken to the
jury room during deliberations. However, since Day was present in the courtroom when
Brown reviewed and read the note and when the note was published to the jury, her real
argument is that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to take the note into the
jury room during deliberations. Day's secondary argument is that Brown's written
statement constitutes hearsay and therefore should have been excluded from evidence.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Day's arguments lack merit both factually
and legally. We will address Day's hearsay argument first.
Day argues that the note "while not an official police report, is clearly a
hearsay report by a police officer." In support of that argument, Day cites Manning v.
Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2000). However, Day's reliance on Manning is
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misplaced. In Manning, the Commonwealth sought to introduce into evidence a copy of
the investigating officer's report. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the police
report was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, KRE
803(6), because the report contained information the investigating officer obtained from
an unidentified witness. Id. at 613-14. As the Court noted,
[U]nder the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, if a report is
admissible pursuant to KRE 803(6), then all parts of the
report must be admissible under some hearsay exception. If a
particular entry in the record would be inadmissible for
another reason, it does not become admissible just because it
is included in a business or public record. Moreover, hearsay
within hearsay, i.e. “double hearsay,” is inadmissible unless
each part of the combined statements conforms with a
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Prater v. Cabinet
for Human Resources, Ky., 954 S.W.2d 954, 958-959 (1997).
Consequently, anything in the police report regarding what an
unidentified white female may have told Officer Leach, or
what anyone else may have said, would be inadmissible, as
these statements do not qualify for admission under any other
hearsay exception.
Manning, 23 S.W.3d at 614.
Manning is distinguishable because the statement in the note that the bra
had been purchased at the Salvation Army came directly from Day, not from an
unidentified witness. Day's statement to Brown was an admission of a party and
therefore admissible under KRE 801A(1)(b).
As to whether the trial court erred by permitting the jury to take the note
into the jury room, we agree with the Commonwealth that there is no evidence that the
note was taken into the jury room. The record reflects that, after the note was introduced
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into evidence, it was published to the jury. While the jurors were circulating the note, the
court went into recess and the jurors were told to leave the note on a chair at the end of
the jury box so that it could be placed with other exhibits. It is unclear what, if anything,
happened with the note after that.
However, even if the jury did have Brown's written statement in the jury
room, Day must establish that the trial court committed an error that affected Day's
"substantial rights." RCr 9.24. As noted above, Brown, Wiley, and Carla Miller testified
that Day said that she had purchased the bra at the Salvation Army. Therefore, even if
permitting the jury to take the note into the jury room was error, it was harmless error as
there is no evidence that Day's substantial rights were in any way affected.
Finally, we note that Day's reliance on Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d
366 (Ky. 2001), and Berrier v. Bizer, 57 S.W.3d 271 (Ky. 2001), is misplaced. In Mills,
the jury listened to tapes of witness interviews in the jury room when those tapes had not
been played in court during the trial. The Supreme Court held that the jury should not
have been permitted to listen to the tapes because neither Mills nor his counsel were
present when the tapes were played, violating Mills's right to be present during all stages
of the proceedings. Mills, 44 S.W.3d at 371. In the case herein, Brown testified that Day
told him that she purchased the bra at the Salvation Army and he read the note in court.
Therefore, Day, unlike Mills, was present during all stages of the relevant proceedings.
In Berrier, Bizer's attorney interviewed a number of Bizer's employees and
generated summaries of those interviews. At the conclusion of each employee's
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testimony at trial, Bizer admitted into evidence the appropriate summary. The Supreme
Court held that the trial court committed error when it admitted the summaries into
evidence because the summaries contained facts and opinions to which the witnesses did
not testify. Berrier, 57 S.W.3d at 276-77. As noted above, Brown testified to the
contents of his written statement and that written statement contained information that
Brown obtained from Day. Therefore, Berrier has no application to Day's case.
B. Double Jeopardy
If multiple convictions arise out of a single course of conduct, then a
defendant may have been placed in double jeopardy. KRS 505.020, Commonwealth v.
Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Ky. 1996). The court must "determine whether the act or
transaction complained of constitutes a violation of two distinct statutes and, if it does, if
each statute requires proof of a fact the other does not." Burge 947 S.W.2d at 811. In
order to make that determination, we must examine the statutes under which Day was
convicted.
KRS 520.050(1)(b) provides that "[a] person is guilty of promoting
contraband in the first degree when: [b]eing a person confined in a detention facility or a
penitentiary, he knowingly makes, obtains, or possesses dangerous contraband." KRS
520.010(3) defines, in pertinent part, dangerous contraband as "any quantity of
marijuana." Based on the preceding, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Day
was confined in a detention facility and that she possessed a quantity of marijuana.
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KRS 218A.1415(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: a
controlled substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine[.]" Based on the
preceding, the Commonwealth was required to prove only that Day had a quantity of
methamphetamine, but was not required to prove that Day was confined in a detention
facility. Since promoting contraband requires proof of a fact that possession of a
controlled substance does not, i.e., confinement in a detention facility, Day's conviction
of both crimes does not violate her constitutional right to be protected from being placed
in double jeopardy.
C. Directed Verdict
When reviewing a jury verdict, this Court is restricted to determining
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant or in granting a directed verdict. In doing
so, this Court must consider all evidence favoring the prevailing party as true and may
not determine the credibility or weight to be given to the evidence. Lewis v. Bledsoe
Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1990). Furthermore, we must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the defendant while refraining from questioning the
credibility of the defendant and while refraining from assessing the weight that should be
attributed to the evidence. United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468
(Ky. 1999). This Court may reverse the jury only when the verdict is so flagrantly
against the weight of the evidence as to indicate passion or prejudice. Bierman v.
Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Ky. 1998).
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Day argues that Wiley and Brown lacked credibility because neither
completed an official report documenting Day's statement that she purchased the bra at
the Salvation Army. Ignoring for the moment the fact that credibility is an issue for the
jury and not one to be addressed on appeal, we note that Day's argument fails to address
the note. Brown testified that he prepared the note at the same time he prepared his
police report. Day's argument also fails to account for Miller's testimony that Day told
her about purchasing the bra at the Salvation Army. Miller's testimony supports the
testimony from Wiley and Brown, and there is nothing in the record that brings into
question Miller's credibility. Reviewing this testimony in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we cannot say that the jury's verdict was flagrantly against the weight of
the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Day's motions for directed
verdict.
D. Testimony Regarding Day's Silence
Day is correct that a defendant's silence following a Miranda warning
cannot be used to impeach her. See Green v. Commonwealth, 815 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky
1991). However, because Day failed to preserve the issue before the trial court, we must
analyze it using the palpable error standard. RCr 10.26. Palpable error is an irregularity
which affects a party's substantial rights and, if the appellate court does not address the
irregularity, it will result in a manifest injustice to the party. Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Ky. 2003). To determine if an error is palpable,
“an appellate court must consider whether on the whole case there is a substantial
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possibility that the result would have been any different.” Commonwealth v. McIntosh,
646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983). To be palpable, an error must be "easily perceptible,
plain, obvious and readily noticeable." Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997)
citing Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1995).
During direct examination, Brown testified that, after Day stated that she
purchased the bra at the Salvation Army, he advised her of her right to remain silent.
Day then stated that she wanted to speak with an attorney. This testimony by Brown was
not used to impeach Day but simply to set forth the timeline with regard to Brown's
interrogation of Day. Furthermore, as noted by the Commonwealth, Day used Brown's
testimony regarding her silence on cross-examination to impeach Brown. Therefore, we
discern no error.
However, even if Brown's testimony should have been excluded, there is no
evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been any different. The
Commonwealth did not refer to Day's silence in its opening statement or closing
argument. Furthermore, as noted above, there was sufficient evidence, absent any
testimony regarding Day's silence, to support the jury's verdict. Therefore, if admitting
Brown's testimony constituted error, that error was not palpable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court did not err when
it admitted Brown's handwritten statement; that Day was not subjected to double
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jeopardy; that Day was not entitled to a directed verdict; and that testimony regarding
Day's silence was not error. Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Hoffman
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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