JEFFREY SCOTT BELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000647-MR
JEFFREY SCOTT BELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-01480
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Jeffrey Scott Bell (hereinafter “Bell”) appeals the final judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court entered on March 7, 2006, sentencing him to serve one year of
imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree2 and twelve
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415, a Class D felony.
months for possession of drug paraphernalia.3 Imposition of sentence was suspended and
Bell was placed on probation for a period of three years. The conviction resulted from
entry of a conditional guilty plea4 in which Bell reserved the right to appeal the trial
court’s denial of a motion to suppress items seized during a search of his vehicle
following a traffic stop for speeding and his subsequent arrest for operating a vehicle
while having a suspended license. Having concluded the trial court properly denied
Bell’s motion to suppress, we affirm the conviction.
On October 18, 2005, Officer Brad Riley (hereinafter “Officer Riley”) of
the Lexington Metro Police Department was using a speed tracking device to check the
speed of inbound traffic on Versailles Road when he observed a box truck traveling at
seventy-two miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. Officer Riley motioned for
the driver to pull over, which he did, and the officer parked his motorcycle about ten to
fifteen feet behind the truck. Officer Riley approached the driver’s side of the truck and
asked to see the driver’s license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration. Bell, the
driver and sole occupant of the truck, said his license was at home but he did provide
proof of vehicle insurance and registration. Based upon identifying information Bell
provided orally, Officer Riley learned Bell’s license had been suspended, a fact of which
Bell said he was unaware. Another Lexington Metro Police Officer, Matt Hutti
(hereinafter “Officer Hutti”), stopped and offered assistance. Bell exited the truck and
Officer Riley arrested him for operating a vehicle on a suspended license. After
3
KRS 218A.500, a Class A misdemeanor.
4
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
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searching Bell and advising him of his rights, Officer Riley escorted Bell to the officer’s
motorcycle and he asked Officer Hutti to search the truck cab.
Behind the truck’s passenger seat, beneath a jacket and blanket, Officer
Hutti found a leather pouch containing a marijuana pipe and three pill bottles filled with
an unknown substance. A straw and a syringe were also found under a blanket in the
truck. There was also a pen that smelled as if it had contained marijuana. Bell initially
denied all knowledge of the items seized from the truck, but after being transported to the
Fayette County Jail he admitted the pill bottles contained liquid methadone.
On November 16, 2005, Bell was indicted by a Fayette County grand jury
for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, possession of drug
paraphernalia, operating a motor vehicle on a suspended operator’s license,5 license to be
in possession,6 speeding,7 and failure to wear a seat belt.8 At arraignment on November
20, 2005, he entered a plea of not guilty. On January 13, 2006, he moved to suppress all
the evidence seized during the search of his truck.
A brief suppression hearing was held on January 17, 2006, at which Officer
Riley was the sole witness. Following argument by both sides, the trial court denied
Bell’s motion to suppress evidence. The court found: the stop was based on articulable
5
KRS 186.620.
6
KRS 186.510.
7
KRS 189.390.
8
KRS 189.125.
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and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because Officer Riley observed the truck
speeding; Bell was arrested for a serious offense, operating on a suspended license; he
was not arrested for a minor traffic offense; the arrest was not a pretext to search Bell’s
truck; and, the search was consistent with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct.
2860, 69 L.E.2d 768, 775 (1981).
On January 27, 2006, Bell entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
a controlled substance in the first degree and possession of drug paraphernalia. Four
other counts against Bell were dismissed and he reserved the right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion. Final judgment was entered on March 7, 2006. This appeal
followed.
Relying upon cases9 decided prior to rendition of Belton in 1981, Bell
claims the warrantless search of his truck violated both the Fourth Amendment10 to the
United States Constitution and Section 1011 of the Kentucky Constitution. He does not
contest the validity of either the stop or the arrest, only that the trial court wrongly denied
his suppression motion because at the time of the search he was under the control of a
9
Bell cites McHone v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1978) and Commonwealth v.
Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971). Both were decided before Belton, supra, was announced by
the United States Supreme Court in 1981 and both stand for the proposition that an arrest for a
minor traffic violation does not justify a complete vehicle search.
10
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
11
“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, from
unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation.”
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motorcycle officer, he was ten to fifteen feet away from his vehicle so he could not reach
a weapon or destroy evidence inside the vehicle, and there was no evidence to be found
inside the truck that would have proved he was driving on a suspended license. In light
of the evidence and controlling case law, we find Bell's argument unpersuasive.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence
following a hearing this Court must first examine the trial court’s factual findings for
clear error. The trial court’s findings of fact will be deemed conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); RCr 9.78.
We must then review the trial court's decision de novo to determine whether it is correct
as a matter of law. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App. 2000)
(citations omitted). Because the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and the
court has correctly applied the law, we affirm.
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are unreasonable
unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.12 The
government must show the search falls within an exception. Gallman v. Commonwealth,
578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1979). Here, the Commonwealth convincingly established the
warrantless search of Bell’s truck was reasonable because it occurred incident to Bell’s
lawful arrest for a serious offense.
The exception allowing police officers to search a vehicle following a
lawful arrest is well-established. In Belton, supra, a lone police officer stopped a car for
12
Recognized exceptions include: (1) consent; (2) plain view; (3) search incident to arrest; (4)
probable cause; (5) exigent circumstances; and (6) inventory. Stewart, supra, at 379 (citations
omitted).
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speeding. Neither the driver nor any of the three occupants owned the vehicle nor was
related to the owner. Additionally, the officer smelled burnt marijuana emanating from
the car and he saw a “Supergold” envelope, which he associated with marijuana, on the
floorboard. The officer ordered the driver and passengers out of the vehicle and placed
each one under arrest for possession of marijuana. He patted down each of the four men,
handcuffed them and separated them so they could not physically touch one another. The
officer then searched the passenger compartment of the car finding a leather jacket
belonging to Belton on the back seat. Upon unzipping a pocket of that jacket, the officer
discovered cocaine. Thereafter, the officer collected the “Supergold” envelope, the
leather jacket and the four suspects, placed them in his cruiser, and drove to a nearby
police station. The United States Supreme Court determined the Belton search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it was incident to a lawful arrest. The Supreme
Court of Kentucky followed Belton in Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 744 S.W.2d 418, 419
(Ky. 1987) wherein it upheld the search of a car’s interior because it was
contemporaneous with an arrest for driving under the influence and driving without a
valid operator’s license.
Belton specifically allows the passenger compartment of a vehicle, as well
as any containers therein, to be searched incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Belton, 453
U.S. At 461. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72
L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). These rules apply whether the arrestee is an occupant of the vehicle
or a recent occupant; it matters not that the person has been separated from his vehicle
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and secured in a police cruiser. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623-4, 124
S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.E.2d 905 (2004).
In United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized the Belton rule. In White, the suspect was already
handcuffed and secured in a police cruiser when the search was performed. The Sixth
Circuit noted that even where the arrestee is no longer in reach of the vehicle, a search is
valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest and police officers may search any area that is
or was in the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of the arrest.
Bell urges us to reverse the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion
based on this Court’s decision in Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101 (Ky.App.
1993). Finding Clark distinct, we decline to do so. In Clark, the driver of a vehicle,
Nutter, was stopped and arrested for driving without a valid driver’s license. An officer
searched the vehicle he was driving, but not until about forty minutes after Nutter had
been placed inside a police cruiser. In reversing the trial court’s denial of Nutter’s
suppression motion, this Court found the search exceeded the area within Nutter’s
immediate control. Clark distinguished Belton on two grounds. First, Nutter was
arrested for only a minor traffic violation (driving on a valid learner’s permit without
being accompanied by a licensed driver) rather than for a more serious drug offense
(possession of marijuana in Belton). Second, the search of Nutter’s vehicle was not
contemporaneous with his removal from the vehicle whereas the search in Belton
occurred immediately after the driver and passengers exited their vehicle and were
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arrested. Clark held the vehicle search could not have been incident to Nutter’s arrest
because he was arrested outside the vehicle and was immediately placed into the police
cruiser and thus there was no belief that Nutter could have returned to the vehicle to
secure a weapon or to destroy evidence.
Since Clark was rendered in 1993, several cases have distinguished it, but
none have overruled it. In Commonwealth v. Wood, 14 S.W.3d 557 (Ky.App. 1999), this
Court distinguished the facts before it from Clark and upheld a search incident to an
arrest. Relying upon Belton, supra; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); and Ramsey, supra, we held:
Thus, in a typical arrest situation such as in the case
before us, we must adhere to the Belton rule that a warrantless
search of an arrestee and his vehicle is to be upheld provided
the arrest is proper and the scope of the search does not
exceed that which is necessary to protect society’s interest in
the safety of police officers (and third persons) and in the
preservation of evidence. Unlike the arrest in Clark, there is
no question that arrest is typical for the offense of driving on
a license suspended for DUI. The search in this case
immediately followed the arrest and there was the additional
concern of a passenger in the vehicle. Therefore, although
Wood, who had been removed from the vehicle prior to the
search, posed no immediate threat to the officer or others,
evidentiary concerns remained.
Wood, 14 S.W.3d at 558-59. Clark is inconsistent with federal case law regarding
searches incident to arrest. In Clark, a panel of this Court concluded the passenger
compartment of a car did not come within Nutter’s area of immediate control because he
was arrested outside the car. However, as stated in White, supra at 44, upon lawful
arrest, officers can search the area that is or was in an arrestee’s immediate control. In
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Clark, the passenger compartment was within Nutter’s immediate control when the
officer initiated contact. Here, Bell was stopped while driving the vehicle and, according
to White, the passenger compartment could be searched because it was within Bell’s
immediate control when he was removed from the vehicle. Also, the search in this case
was contemporaneous to the arrest. There was no forty minute delay between arrest and
search as in Clark.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of a
search incident to an arrest in Thornton, supra. An undercover officer noticed a vehicle
slow down to avoid driving beside an unmarked patrol car. The officer ran the license
plate and learned the plate was registered to another vehicle. Before the officer was able
to stop the car, Thornton pulled into a parking lot, parked and exited the car. He
approached Thornton who was sweating and nervous. Thornton agreed to a pat-down
search which revealed marijuana and crack cocaine. At that point Thornton was arrested,
handcuffed, and placed in the back seat of a patrol car. The officer then searched
Thornton’s car and found a nine millimeter handgun under the driver’s seat. Thornton
moved to suppress evidence seized from the automobile. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s denial of Thornton’s motion to suppress because the search
of the vehicle was valid under Belton. The Supreme Court stated:
In so holding, we placed no reliance on the fact that the
officer in Belton ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, or
initiated contact with them while they remained within it.
Nor do we find such a factor persuasive in distinguishing the
current situation, as it bears no logical relationship to Belton’s
rationale. There is simply no basis to conclude that the span
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of the area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control
is determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the
officer’s direction, or whether the officer initiated contact
with him while he remained in the car. We recognized as
much, albeit in dicta, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), where officers
observed a speeding car swerve into a ditch. The driver
exited and the officers met him at the rear of his car.
Although there was no indication that the officers initiated
contact with the driver while he was still in the vehicle, we
observed that “[i]t is clear . . . that if the officers had arrested
[respondent] . . . they could have searched the passenger
compartment under [Belton].
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is
next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer
safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who
is inside the vehicle. An officer may search a suspect’s
vehicle under Belton only if the suspect is arrested. . . . A
custodial arrest is fluid and “[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty,” Robinson, supra, at 234-235, and n.5,
94 S.Ct. 467 (emphasis added). See Washington v. Chrisman,
455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982) (“Every
arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the
arresting officer”). The stress is no less merely because the
arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor
is an arrestee less likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to
destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in control of, the
vehicle. In either case, the officer faces a highly volatile
situation. It would make little sense to apply two different
rules to what is, at bottom, the same situation.
....
To be sure, not all contraband in the passenger
compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a “recent
occupant.” It is unlikely in this case that petitioner could
have reached under the driver’s seat for his gun once he was
outside of his automobile. But the firearm and the passenger
compartment in general were no more inaccessible than were
the contraband and the passenger compartment in Belton.
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The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police
officers and not depending on differing estimates of what
items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any
particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which
Belton enunciated. Once an officer determines that there is
probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow
officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by
searching the entire passenger compartment [footnote
omitted].
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620-23.
In applying our standard of review, we conclude first that the trial court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Officer Riley testified at the suppression
hearing that he observed Bell’s truck traveling seventeen miles per hour over the speed
limit. Upon stopping Bell’s vehicle, Officer Riley learned Bell’s operator’s license had
been suspended and placed him under arrest. Since operating a vehicle on a suspended
license usually results in an arrest, Commonwealth v. Wood, 14 S.W.3d 557 (Ky.App.
1999), we uphold Bell’s arrest as being lawful.
Next we conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
Bell’s arrest was for a serious offense, not a minor traffic violation. As such, under
Belton and its progeny, Officer Riley was authorized to search Bell’s entire vehicle and
any containers within it. Contrary to Bell’s theory of error, it matters not that he was
separated from his vehicle and could not readily reach a weapon or destroy evidence
within his truck. The warrantless search was proper under Thornton, supra, because the
truck was within Bell’s immediate control just prior to his arrest. Penman v.
Commonwealth, 194 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 2006). See also White, supra. Ultimately, since
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Bell’s arrest was proper, the search of his vehicle, contemporaneous to his lawful arrest,
was also proper. Ramsey, supra.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert T. West
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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