ROBERT M. CAUDILL APPEALS v. GUS THOMAS
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RENDERED: AUGUST 3, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000644-MR
&
NO. 2006-CA-000884-MR
ROBERT M. CAUDILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00340
GUS THOMAS
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING APPEALS
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON, ACREE, AND WINE, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: Robert Caudill has twice attempted to appeal from a January 23,
2006 judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court ordering him to specifically perform a real
estate sales contract by conveying a lot and building he owns at 528 Main Street in
Shelbyville to Gus Thomas, the appellee. The judgment also awards Thomas damages
found to have arisen from Caudill’s refusal to perform the sales agreement. The first
issue before us is Thomas’s motion to dismiss Caudill’s appeals as untimely. Because
Caudill’s former counsel failed to serve CR 59.05 motions in time to interrupt the
running of Caudill’s appeal time, and because the trial court’s striking from the record a
mistakenly entered judgment did not reinstitute the period for appeal, we agree with
Thomas that Caudill’s attempted appeals are untimely and accordingly must be
dismissed.
As noted, following an August 2005 bench trial, the trial court entered
findings, conclusions, and a judgment on January 23, 2006. The judgment awarded
some, but not all, of the damages Thomas claimed. Apparently Thomas had submitted a
proposed judgment that awarded additional damages, and on January 30, 2006 the trial
court mistakenly entered that judgment as well, without revoking the prior judgment or
indicating that the new judgment was to supersede it. On February 2, 2006, Caudill’s
counsel filed a motion pursuant to CR 59.05 seeking reconsideration of the January 23rd
judgment. Accompanying the motion was counsel’s certification that the motion had
been served that same day on counsel for Thomas. Caudill’s counsel filed a second CR
59.05 motion and certification on February 9, 2006, in response to the January 30th
judgment. On March 3, 2006, counsel for Thomas responded to the CR 59.05 motions by
asserting that they had not been served within the ten-day limitations period. He averred
that he did not receive them until March and submitted their accompanying envelopes,
which bore postmarks of February 28, 2006 and March 2, 2006 respectively. On March
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8, 2006, the trial court denied Caudill’s CR 59 motions as “untimely and otherwise
unfounded.” Thereupon, Caudill hired new counsel and on March 17, 2006 filed a notice
of appeal from both the January 23rd and the January 30th judgments (2006-CA-000644MR). On March 27th, the trial court entered an order striking the January 30th judgment
from the record as having been entered in error and noting that the January 23rd judgment
represented the ruling of the court. Finally, on April 26, 2006, Caudill filed a second
notice of appeal from the March 27th order (2006-CA-000884-MR). Having considered
whether either of Caudill’s purported appeals is timely, we agree with Thomas that
neither is.
CR 73.02 provides that “[t]he notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days
after the date of notation of service of the judgment.” Our Supreme Court has held that
this rule is to be strictly applied:
[A] tardy notice of appeal is subject to automatic dismissal
and cannot be saved through application of the doctrine of
substantial compliance. . . .
Excel Energy, Inc. v. Commonwealth Institutional Securities, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 713, 71617 (Ky. 2000). Caudill notes that his April 26, 2006 notice of appeal was filed within
thirty days of the trial court’s March 27th order striking the January 30th judgment, an
order which Caudill contends reinstated the January 23rd judgment and so reinstituted the
period for filing an appeal. The order striking the January 30th judgment, however, did
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not have that effect. The trial court’s authority to enter its March 27th order comes from
CR 60.01, which provides that
[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative.
CR 60.01 rulings do not affect the time for appeal:
[Because] a motion to correct a clerical mistake does not lead
to relief from the underlying judgment . . . . the time for
appeal from the underlying judgment correspondingly dates
from the original rendition of judgment . . . and not from the
entry of an amended judgment.
United Tobacco Warehouse, Inc. v. Southern States Frankfort Cooperative, Inc., 737
S.W.2d 708, 709-10 (Ky.App. 1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court’s March 27th order striking the January 30th judgment did not
“reinstate” or otherwise alter the January 23rd judgment, but rather removed a cloud from
the record that had been introduced by mistake. It did not, therefore, provide Caudill
with a new opportunity to appeal from the January 23rd judgment, and thus his April
appeal was untimely.
Even if his April appeal must be dismissed, Caudill contends that his March
17th appeal was timely. He notes that under CR 73.02(1)(e) a timely CR 59.05 motion
resets the thirty day appeals clock, which recommences upon entry and service of the
order disposing of the motion. His March 17th notice of appeal was within thirty days of
the trial court’s March 3rd denial of his CR 59.05 motions, and thus, he contends, was
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timely. As Thomas points out, however, a motion under CR 59.05 must be “served not
later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment.” (emphasis added). An untimely CR
59.05 motion does not restart the time for appeal. Arnett v. Kennard, 580 S.W.2d 495
(Ky. 1979); Marrs Electric Co., Inc. v. Rubloff Bashford, LLC, 190 S.W.3d 363 (Ky.App.
2006).
Here, the trial court evidently found that although Caudill’s CR 59.05
motions had been filed within the ten-day limitations period they were nevertheless
untimely because not served within that period. CR 5.02 provides that service may be
made by mail and that “[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing.” CR 5.03 further
provides that proof of service “may be by certificate of a member of the bar of the
court.” Huddleson v. Murley, 757 S.W.2d 216 (Ky.App. 1988). Such proof, however, is
not conclusive, and where, as here, it is attacked with evidence tending to show that
service was not timely, the trial court may disregard the certification. Although generally
findings of fact are not required for the disposition of CR 59.05 motions, CR 52.01,
where findings are clearly implied, they may be disturbed on appeal only if clearly
erroneous. Id. Cf. Clark Equipment Company, Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417
(Ky.App. 1988) (adopting clearly erroneous standard of review for findings underlying
CR 11 ruling). In this case, Thomas’s proof that the CR 59.05 motions mailed to his
counsel had not been postmarked until February 28th and March 2nd was substantial
evidence tending to show that the motions had not been mailed, i.e. served, until well
after February 2nd and February 9th respectively, the deadlines for service. The trial
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court’s finding that Caudill’s CR 59.05 motions were untimely was thus not clearly
erroneous, and consequently Caudill’s motions did not restart the time for filing an
appeal. Because his March 17th notice of appeal came more than thirty days after the
January 23rd judgment, or even the mistakenly entered January 30th judgment, his appeal
is untimely.
Finally, Caudill suggests that his untimely CR 59.05 motions should be
deemed CR 60.02 motions, the denial of which then commenced a thirty-day appeal
period. Caudill’s motions did not invoke CR 60.02 or its standards. We reject this
suggestion, for not only would such a course tend to undermine the time restraints of CR
59 and CR 73, but it would also tend to blur the distinction between CR 59—which is
suitable for addressing appealable errors—and CR 60.02—which provides a means for
addressing issues that could not be raised in other proceedings. Faris v. Stone, 103
S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2003).
In sum, though time restraints can operate harshly, they are necessary if
judicial proceedings are to have any predictability or finality at all. Caudill’s former
counsel failed to meet the time restraints of CR 59 and CR 73, and the trial court’s
striking of the mistakenly entered January 30th judgment did not operate to recommence
the time for Caudill’s appeal. Accordingly, both of Caudill’s appeals are untimely and so
both must be, and hereby are, dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
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ENTERED: August 3, 2007
/s/ Lisabeth H. Abramson
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Oran S. McFarlan, III
Yunker & Associates
Lexington, Kentucky
Dennis J. Stilger
Louisville, Kentucky
C. Gilmore Dutton, III
Dutton Salyers & ZimLich PLLC
Shelbyville, Kentucky
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