JAMES HOLLAND A/K/A JAMES COLLINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and STELLA SPRAGUE A/K/A JANE DOE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 29, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000368-MR
JAMES HOLLAND A/K/A JAMES COLLINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00138
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND:
NO. 2006-CA-000380-MR
STELLA SPRAGUE A/K/A JANE DOE
v.
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00137
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEE
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: In these consolidated appeals, James Holland and Stella Sprague
challenge their convictions following a joint jury trial for first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance. Both allege that the judgments entered against them should be
reversed because the Commonwealth failed to provide an accurate address for a
confidential informant and because the trial court erroneously permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce into evidence an audiotape of the undercover drug
transaction while allowing the jury to review a transcript of the transaction during closing
arguments. They also contend generally that they were denied a fair and impartial jury
and judge. We find no error and affirm both judgments.
On June 16, 2004, Detective Leah Worley of Operation Unite met with a
confidential informant, Judy Minix, for the purpose of conducting an undercover drug
transaction at the Appellants' residence in Falcon, Kentucky. Upon entering Holland's
and Sprague's home, Worley and Minix encountered Sprague in the living room and
Holland in the kitchen. After engaging in some conversation, Worley and Minix
indicated to Holland their interest in purchasing Oxycontin pills. After stating that he had
some available, Holland had Sprague join them in the kitchen where Worley and Minix
watched Sprague retrieve a variety of pills wrapped in cellophane from under her shirt.
Worley and Minix subsequently purchased two Oxycontin pills for $100.00, after which
they left the house.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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As a result of the transaction, Holland and Sprague were indicted for firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance. Following a jury trial in the Magoffin
Circuit Court held on December 19, 2005, each defendant was convicted of the charged
offense and the jury set a penalty of ten years in prison for each offense. On January 19,
2006, the trial court sentenced both Holland and Sprague in accordance with the jury's
verdict. This appeal followed.
Holland and Sprague first contend that the Commonwealth failed to provide
them the correct address of the confidential informant, Minix. Kentucky Rule of
Evidence (KRE) 508(a) provides in relevant part that the Commonwealth has a privilege
to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information relating to an
investigation of a possible violation of law without implicating a defendant's
constitutional right to confront his or her accusers. Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54
S.W.3d 147 (Ky. 2001). However, disclosure may be required where the informant was,
as Appellants allege in this case, a material witness to the crimes charged. Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1998).
As the Commonwealth notes, the record indicates that the Appellants were
provided with Minix's name in February 2005. Further, Detective Worley provided them
Minix's name and address, believed to have been current as of August 2005, in late
September or early October of that same year,2 between two-and-a-half to three months
prior to the date of trial. On the day of trial, Appellants' counsel stated that he was not
2
Sprague and Holland contend that they received Minix's purported address for the first time on October
5, 2005.
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prepared to proceed because the sheriff had been unable to locate Minix to serve her with
a subpoena to testify. Citing the Commonwealth's inability to provide a valid address for
Minix, he orally moved to continue the trial. Though he offered no explanation as to the
expected nature of Minix's testimony or why he believed that it was necessary to the
Appellants' defense, he asserted that Minix was a material witness and the trial could not
proceed without her. We disagree.
According to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.04,
[a] motion by the defendant for a postponement [of a trial] on
account of the absence of evidence may be made only upon
affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to
be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it.
If the motion is based on the absence of a witness, the
affidavit must show what facts the affiant believes the witness
will prove, and not merely the effect of such facts in
evidence, and that the affiant believes them to be true.
Further, “the granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id.
In the present matter, the Appellants did not comply with this standard in that no affidavit
was tendered and nothing was offered describing the nature of Minix's expected
testimony. In short, there is no basis for a finding that the trial court abused its discretion
when it overruled the motion for a continuance. Pennington v. Commonwealth, 371
S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1963); McFarland v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1971).
Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that counsel for Sprague and
Holland exercised “due diligence” in attempting to locate Minix. Though he was
provided with Minix's name and address over two months prior to the trial date, he waited
until the week before trial to attempt service of a subpoena upon her. By that time, Minix
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could not be located. When questioned by the trial court, counsel stated that the only
other effort made to locate Minix was to “check with people [he] thought might know
her.” In Cornwell v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1975), our Supreme Court
addressed similar circumstances. On the date of trial in Cornwell, the defendant moved
for a continuance based on the unavailability of a witness he had subpoenaed. In
affirming the McCracken Circuit Court's denial of the motion, the Supreme Court stated:
[O]n the day of trial appellant and his counsel first learned
that the witness had not been served with the subpoena and
would not be available to testify. The responsibility of a
person charged with the commission of a criminal offense and
that of his counsel does not stop merely with having issued a
subpoena. There is no showing that any effort was made by
appellant or his counsel to learn whether his witness would be
available. As a matter of fact, there is no statement made that
the witness actually was in Phoenix, Arizona, or if he could
be located, or if he would be available to testify at a future
date. Had appellant made diligent effort to locate this witness
prior to the issuance of the subpoena, or even at the time of
the issuance, and learned of his absence, his present
whereabouts may have been ascertained and his presence
secured.
Id. at 227. Based upon the record in the present matter, we, like the Supreme Court in
Cornwell, simply do not believe that Appellants' counsel, by delivering a subpoena to the
sheriff just a few days before trial, exercised the “due diligence” required by RCr 9.04 in
attempting to locate Minix. As a result, we again find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's decision to deny the motion for continuance.
Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth to play a tape recording made by Detective Worley during her
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undercover drug transaction with them while, at the same time, allowing the jury to view
a transcript. In support of their position, Appellants rely on Sanborn v. Commonwealth,
754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court held that it was error
for a trial court to admit into evidence a written transcript of the defendant's taperecorded statement that was prepared by the prosecutor and included his interpretation of
several inaudible portions of the tape. Appellants' reliance, however, is misplaced.
Sanborn does not dictate that it is automatically error for a trial court to
admit a tape recording that contains inaudible portions. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90
S.W.3d 39, 45 (Ky. 2003), the Supreme Court held that it is not an abuse of discretion for
a trial court to admit recordings if they are “sufficiently audible to be probative.” This is
not a rigorous standard, and a trial court will not be held to have abused its discretion
even if many parts of the recording are inaudible so long as some parts are “sufficiently
audible to be probative.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously ruled that in
circumstances differing from those in Sanborn, allowing a jury to review a prosecutor's
transcript of a recording is not error. In Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632 (Ky.
App. 1994), we found that a trial court's decision to allow a jury to review a transcript did
not violate Sanborn because, unlike the circumstances in Sanborn, in Norton the
prosecutor accurately reflected on the transcript those portions of the recording that were
inaudible without attempting to offer his own interpretation. Further, while the trial court
did allow the jury to review the transcript when listening to the tape, unlike Sanborn, the
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transcript was not admitted into evidence and was not sent into the jury room during
deliberations.
Applying these principles herein, we find nothing to support the Appellants'
claim that the trial court abused its discretion. On the date of trial, the record reveals that
Appellants' counsel objected to the tape and the transcript on the ground that the
prosecutor had altered the recording. However, when questioned by the trial court,
counsel's concern centered on a portion of the tape after the transaction in question that
contained recordings unrelated to the present matter. When informed by both the trial
judge and the prosecutor that this portion of the tape did not relate to his clients' case and
was therefore not included in the transcript, he did not press his objection any further and
simply stated “OK.” Though Appellants again argue in their briefs herein that “[c]hanges
had been made,” they do not state what, if any, those alterations are and offer nothing
else to support their allegation. Moreover, the record does not support Appellants'
allegation that the transcript was used in closing arguments or given to the jury during
deliberations. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to admit the tape
into evidence and to allow the jury to review a transcript thereof while listening to it
during the course of the trial.
Finally, Appellants argue that they were denied a fair trial and an impartial
jury by “the conduct of the Trial Judge,” making it “impossible for the Appellants[] and
his attorney to object . . . .” Appellants do not, however, state precisely how the trial
judge rendered their trial unfair other than by overruling their objections on the matters
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pertaining to the confidential informant and the tape recording. Having concluded those
matters were properly handled by the trial judge, we need not address this issue any
further.
For the foregoing reasons, the January 19, 2006 judgments in the
Appellants' respective cases are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lowell E. Spencer
Paintsville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Clint E. Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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