MARY BOURQUE; THE HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000093-MR
AND
NO. 2006-CA-000151-MR
MARY BOURQUE; THE HARTFORD
INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-005773
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE: Mary Bourque and the Hartford Insurance Company
appeal a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which directed a verdict in favor of CSX
Transportation Incorporated (CSX) on Bourque's claims under the Federal Safety
Appliance Act (FSAA). The appellants allege the trial court’s erred in failing to submit
the FSAA claim to the jury. The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in
1
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
instructing the jury on her common law negligence claim and in admitting photographs
that were untimely disclosed. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 11, 1999, Bourque sustained personal injuries when she fell
from the upper deck of a CSX rail car. At the time of the injury Bourque was employed
by ARS, Incorporated and was part of a crew that loads CSX auto rail cars with Ford
trucks at Ford's Kentucky Truck Plant. After driving a truck onto the upper deck of a
CSX auto rail car, she assisted another employee in removing a bridge plate. She then
attempted to transition to the side ladder of the rail car from the upper deck. Bourque
testified that she placed her left hand on the vertical handhold/grab-iron and her left foot
at the end of the deck. As she attempted to move her right hand to the side ladder, the
door moved away from what appeared to be the locked open position making it
impossible for her to reach the side ladder with her right hand and she lost her footing on
the side ladder with her right foot. This sudden movement caused her to fall from the
upper deck to the concrete below. As a result of the fall Bourque suffered multiple
fractures in her vertebrae, a fractured right wrist, a fractured left elbow, and a torn rotator
cuff in her left shoulder. Bourque attributes her fall to a faulty locking mechanism on the
door to which the grab iron was attached.
Bourque subsequently filed a complaint against CSX in Jefferson Circuit
Court seeking damages for the personal injuries sustained in the accident. The complaint
2
CSX has filed a protective cross-appeal, Case No. 2006-CA-000151-MR, which, based upon
our disposition of the principal appeal, is moot and is not addressed on the merits.
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alleged grounds for relief based upon CSX's violation of the FSAA, the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), and common law negligence. Bourque's FELA claim
was dismissed prior to trial. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of CSX on
the FSAA claim. The case was submitted to the jury upon Bourque's common law
negligence theory, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of CSX. This appeal followed.
Before us, the appellants contend that the trial court erred by directing a
verdict on her FSAA claim, by failing to instruct the jury of its duty to warn users of the
proper method for locking the rail car doors, and by admitting photographs which were
untimely disclosed.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON FSAA CLAIM
The appellants' first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
granting CSX a directed verdict upon Bourque's FSAA claim. More specifically they
argue that the trial court erred in determining that the locking mechanism was not part
and parcel, and inseparably intertwined with the handhold/grab iron.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, “the trial court must consider
the evidence in its strongest light in favor of the party against whom the motion was
made and must give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable [inference] that the
evidence can justify.” Lovins v. Napier, 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky. 1991). A directed
verdict must not be entered “unless there is a complete absence of proof of a material
issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of facts exists upon which reasonable men
could differ.” Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.App. 1985). “On appeal, the
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appellate court considers the evidence in the same light.” Lovins, 814 S.W.2d at 922.
But “[o]nce the issue is squarely presented to the trial judge, who heard and considered
the evidence, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge
unless the trial judge is clearly erroneous.” Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18
(Ky. 1998). Following this standard, we cannot find that the trial court clearly erred by
granting a directed verdict in favor of CXS.
We first note that FSAA does not create a private cause of action, but,
rather, employees who allege they have been injured as a result of a FSAA violation may
sue under FELA. See Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 395 U.S. 164, 166, 89
S.Ct. 1706, 1708, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Magelky v. BNSF Ry Co., 491 F.Supp.2d 882,
888 (D.N.D. 2007). As previously noted, Bourque's FELA action was dismissed by
summary judgment prior to trial. It follows that her FSAA claim was no longer viable at
the time of trial.
In any event, the section of the Act relied upon by the appellants, 49 U.S.C.
§ 20302 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
a) General.--Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section and section 20303 of this title, a railroad carrier may
use or allow to be used on any of its railroad lines-(1) a vehicle only if it is equipped with-(A) couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable
of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals
going between the ends of the vehicles;
(B) secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes; and
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(C) secure ladders and running boards when required by the
Secretary of Transportation, and, if ladders are required,
secure handholds or grab irons on its roof at the top of each
ladder;
(2) except as otherwise ordered by the Secretary, a vehicle
only if it is equipped with secure grab irons or handholds on
its ends and sides for greater security to individuals in
coupling and uncoupling vehicles;
(3) a vehicle only if it complies with the standard height of
drawbars required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary;
(4) a locomotive only if it is equipped with a power-driving
wheel brake and appliances for operating the train-brake
system; and
(5) a train only if-(A) enough of the vehicles in the train are equipped with
power or train brakes so that the engineer on the locomotive
hauling the train can control the train's speed without the
necessity of brake operators using the common hand brakes
for that purpose; and
(B) at least 50 percent of the vehicles in the train are equipped
with power or train brakes and the engineer is using the
power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in the train.
Generally, a statute is open to construction only if its language is
ambiguous. If the language is clear and the application of its plain meaning would not
lead to an unreasonable result, then further interpretation is unnecessary. Overnite
Transp. Co. v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ky.App. 1990). However, if a statute is
ambiguous and its meaning uncertain, then legislative intent should be determined by
considering the whole statute and the purpose to be accomplished. Dep’t of Motor
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Transp v. City Bus Co., 252 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1952). Furthermore, we presume the
legislature is familiar with the law on issues on which it legislates, on notice of previous
legislation, and judicial construction of statutes. Manning v. Ky.Bd. of Denistry, 657
S.W.2d 584, 587 (Ky.App. 1983).
By its plain language the statute does not include rail car door locking
mechanisms. As such, we believe the trial court properly granted a directed verdict upon
Bourque's FSAA claim. Bourque argues, in effect, that since the grab iron was connected
to the door which, in turn, was attached to the locking mechanism, the locking
mechanism should be considered part and parcel to the grab iron. However, we believe
the connection between the grab iron and locking mechanism is too attenuated to support
this argument. We accordingly affirm upon this assignment of error.
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON DUTY TO WARN
Borque also contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
“that CSX had a specific duty to adequately instruct or warn users on the proper method
of locking the doors.” We disagree.
In the Commonwealth, trial courts are required to instruct the jury on the
whole law of the case including “instructions applicable to every state of the case
deducible or supported to any extent by the [evidence].” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995
S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999). Additionally, we consider any alleged errors regarding jury
instructions to be questions of law; thus, we review such assignments of error de novo.
Hamilton v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006).
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Bourque's negligence claim was submitted to the jury upon the following
instruction:
It was the duty of the defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. to
exercise ordinary care to maintain its railcars in a reasonably
safe condition for the use of its customers, including plaintiff
Mary Bourque. You will find for plaintiff May Bourque if
you [are] satisfied from the evidence that on September 11,
1999:
(a) that by reason of the door locking mechanism, the railcar
was not in a reasonable safe condition for the use of its
customers, including plaintiff Mary Bourque;
AND
(b) that in the exercise of ordinary care, defendant CSX
Transportation, Inc., should have anticipated that a customer
would be injured as a result of the door locking mechanism.
Otherwise, you will find for defendant CSX Transportation,
Inc.
Ultimately, the jury found that the rail car was in a reasonably safe
condition, implicitly rejecting Bourque's theory that there was an unsafe condition
associated with the locking mechanism. Thus, in substance, this argument is premised
upon the contention that reversible error occurred because Bourque was denied a jury
instruction stating that CSX had a duty to warn against something that was eventually
determined by the jury not to be unsafe.
We do not believe reversible error occurred as a result of the trial court's
failure to give the instruction. The proposed instruction presupposed that the door
locking mechanism was unsafe and that there was something to warn about. Ultimately,
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this premise was rejected. As such, any error was harmless. CR3 61.01 (“No error in
either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties”).
ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS
The appellants' final argument is that the trial court erred by permitting
CSX to introduce at trial photographs which were submitted to them 60 days prior to trial
whereas the trial court's pretrial order required disclosure of all trial exhibits 90 days prior
to trial. The appellants also contend that introduction of the photographs was improper
because they were taken by counsel for CSX, thereby preventing them from crossexamining the photographer concerning the circumstances under which the photographs
were taken.
As a general rule, we review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the photographs. Though the photographs were provided 60 (rather than the required 90)
days prior to trial, nevertheless, this provided the appellants with ample time to review
the exhibits, have them examined by their experts, and prepare any necessary rebuttal.
Moreover, the appellants have identified no specific prejudice resulting from their
inability to cross-examine the photographer. As such, we find no reversible error relating
the the admission of the pictures.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert J. Drummond
Bernard R. Nevoral
Chicago, Illinois
David R. Monohan
James T. Blaine Lewis
Louisville, Kentucky
James C. Ludwig
Timothy P. O'Mara
Louisville, Kentucky
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