TIMOTHY KIRBY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 10, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002485-MR
TIMOTHY KIRBY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, SENIOR JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00179
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Timothy Kirby appeals from a judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court
in which the trial court determined that Kirby was not eligible for the victim of domestic
violence exception, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 439.3401(5), to the violent offender
statute, KRS 439.3401. On appeal, Kirby argues that the alleged accidental nature of the
shooting for which he was convicted does not preclude the shooting from being
connected to previous domestic violence. Kirby also argues that, at the evidentiary
hearing before the trial court, he presented ample evidence that the shooting was
connected to prior acts of domestic violence. Thus, the trial court erred when it
determined that he was not entitled to the benefit of the domestic violence exception to
the violent offender statute. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the record in the present case, Kirby was initially charged by
indictment with murder, a Class A felony, for killing his cousin, Brian Johnson. Kirby
shot Brian in the back after Brian had allegedly assaulted Miranda Kirby, Kirby's mother.
After Kirby was indicted, the Commonwealth extended a plea offer to him. In exchange
for Kirby's guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed to amend the charge from murder to
manslaughter in the first degree, a Class B felony, and to recommend a sentence of
fourteen and one-half years in state prison. The plea offer provided that “[i]t is
conceivable that a jury could determine that the reported attack on defendant's mother
created an extreme emotional disturbance with justification which supports Manslaughter
First Degree.” In reliance upon this plea offer, Kirby pleaded guilty to manslaughter in
the first degree. The Laurel Circuit Court subsequently sentenced Kirby to fourteen and
one-half years in the state penitentiary.
According to KRS 439.3401, Kirby qualifies as a violent offender, thus,
requiring him to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before being eligible for parole.
See KRS 439.3401(3). However, pursuant to KRS 439.3401(5),1 Kirby moved the trial
1
Section (5) of KRS 439.3401 reads:
This section shall not apply to a person who has been determined
by a court to have been a victim of domestic violence or abuse
pursuant to KRS 533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the
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court to be considered a victim of domestic violence, thus, exempting him from the
eighty-five percent rule. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
this motion.
Kirby appealed the denial of his motion to this Court. In Kirby v.
Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Ky. 2004) (hereinafter referred to as Kirby I), this
Court held that “KRS 439.3401(5) excepts from restricted parole eligibility those
defendants who commit any of the acts listed in 439.3401(1) against an individual who
has committed an act of domestic violence against a family member of the defendant.”
The Kirby I Court determined that Kirby's kinship fell within the definition of KRS
403.720(2) potentially making him eligible for the exception to the eighty-five percent
rule found in KRS 439.3401(5).
In Kirby I, the “reported attack” and plea agreement was characterized as
follows:
Kirby describes the shooting of [Brian] Johnson as being
done to prevent [Brian] Johnson from killing his mother;
however, his plea to manslaughter forecloses the possibility
that it could be a complete defense. The plea agreement by
implication characterizes the attack as one that did not create
an imminent risk of death or severe bodily injury but, rather,
was an event that precipitated an extreme emotional
disturbance which led to the shooting.
Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Kirby I Court held:
death of the victim or serious physical injury to the victim. The
provisions of this subsection shall not extend to rape in the first
degree or sodomy in the first degree by the defendant.
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[T]he Commonwealth has repeatedly described Kirby's
allegations regarding the attack on his mother as “refuted by
the physical evidence.” However, at this stage in the
proceedings there has been no evidence introduced which, of
course, precludes any factual determination. For this reason,
the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the truth of Kirby's allegations.
The circuit court's order denying Kirby's motion for relief is
vacated and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing
consistent with this opinion.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the mandate of the Kirby I Court was to determine if the evidence
supports that the shooting was a result of extreme emotional disturbance to prevent Brian
from killing Kirby's mother and that the shooting was related to an act of domestic
violence.
On remand, pursuant to the mandate of Kirby I, the trial court was to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine if Kirby should receive the benefit of the KRS
439.3401(5) exception based on his alleged justification for killing Brian as articulated in
Kirby I.
At the hearing, Kirby focused upon the alleged incident of domestic
violence and presented witnesses regarding the alleged choking incident. However,
before the evidence was closed, the trial court determined that the main issue was not
whether the choking actually occurred, but whether, assuming it did occur, it was related
to the shooting. Thus, before the Commonwealth had the opportunity to put on its
evidence, the trial court made a finding that the alleged choking incident had, in fact,
occurred. Despite this, the trial court went on to find:
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[T]he evidence presented shows a significant amount of time
elapsed between the choking and the shooting. This Court
finds that the domestic violence upon Miranda Kirby was too
remote in time to be directly connected to the shooting of
Brian Johnson.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that in order to be
eligible for the exception, a defendant must establish a
connection or relationship between the domestic violence and
the violent offense for which the defendant stands convicted.
See Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.2nd [sic] 422 (Ky.
2002).
The only evidence presented at the hearing was that the
shooting was accidental. As such, the shooting of Johnson was
not connected to the domestic violence against Kirby's mother.
(Italics added).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a criminal defendant seeks the benefit of the victim of domestic
violence exception to the eighty-five percent rule found in KRS 439.3401(5), the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was a victim
domestic violence. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). Not
only must the defendant prove that he or she was the victim of domestic violence, but he
or she must also “establish a connection or relationship between the domestic violence
and the violent offense for which the defendant stands convicted.” Commonwealth v.
Vincent, 70 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Ky. 2002). “[A] prior history of domestic violence
between a violent crime victim and the criminal defendant who perpetrated the violent
offense does not, in and of itself, make the defendant eligible for the parole exemption of
KRS 439.3401(5).” Id. To resolve a defendant's request to receive the exception, the
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trial court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings. Anderson,
934 S.W.2d at 278. As the fact-finder, the trial court has the sole responsibility to weigh
the evidence and judge the credibility of all witnesses. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky.
695, 151 S.W.2d 763, 764-765 (Ky. 1941). Furthermore, the trial court is free to believe
all of a witness's testimony, part of a witness’s testimony or none of it. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d at 278 (citing Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Ky.
1968)).
Upon review, this Court will not reverse the trial court's determination
regarding the applicability of KRS 439.3401(5) unless its ruling was clearly erroneous.
Anderson, 934 S.W.2d at 278. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has defined “clearly
erroneous” in those cases where the finding was against the party with the burden of
proof, like in the present case, and has held that a finding that is reasonable given the
evidence is by necessity not clearly erroneous. In contrast, a finding that is unreasonable,
given the evidence, is clearly erroneous. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643
(Ky. 1986).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Kirby argues that the trial court misunderstood the holding in
Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.3d at 422, and erred when it decided, based on its
misunderstanding, that he was not entitled to the benefit of the domestic violence
exception found in KRS 439.3401(5). We disagree.
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According to Kirby, in Vincent, the appellant shot and killed her exhusband. Id. at 423. After she was convicted of murder, the trial court held a hearing to
determine if the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence and, thus, entitled to
the exemption set forth in KRS 439.3401(5). Id. The appellant presented sufficient
evidence to establish that the victim had committed acts of domestic violence against the
appellant. Id. However, noting that the appellant had claimed that the shooting was
accidental, the Supreme Court held that the appellant had offered no evidence that the
shooting was connected to the prior acts of domestic violence. Id. at 425.
According to Kirby, the trial court misunderstood the holding in Vincent to
mean that if a shooting was accidental, then it could not possibly be connected to a prior
history of domestic violence. Kirby insists otherwise and argues that the Vincent court
held that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of KRS 439.3401(5) because she
had offered no evidence that would connect the shooting to the prior domestic violence,
not because the shooting was accidental.
In the alternative, Kirby argues that the trial court erred when it found that
the choking was too remote in time to be connected to the shooting. Kirby concedes that
Vincent requires a victim of domestic violence who has been convicted of a violent crime
to establish a connection between the prior domestic violence and the subsequent crime
for which the person has been convicted. Furthermore, he points out that the trial court
made a finding of fact that the choking occurred, but he insists that the trial court required
him to show that his shooting of Brian Johnson was “directly connected” to the choking;
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whereas, Vincent only requires that he establish a “connection” between the shooting and
the choking.
According to Kirby, he presented ample evidence to the trial court to
establish a connection between the shooting and the choking. In addition, he argues that
the domestic violence perpetrated by Brian against Miranda, Kirby's mother, did not end
with the choking. Kirby insists that the domestic violence included threats that Brian
allegedly made after the choking. According to Kirby, the acts of domestic violence
committed by Brian continued until Kirby accidentally shot Brian in the back.
Consequently, Kirby reasons that the accidental shooting of his cousin was connected to
prior acts of domestic violence committed by his cousin.
At the evidentiary hearing held on June 30, 2005, Miranda Kirby, the
appellant's mother, testified on Kirby's behalf. According to Miranda, at approximately
3:00 a.m. on the morning of October 14, 1999, she was awake, and she heard the victim,
her nephew Brian Johnson, knock on her back door. According to Miranda, she did not
answer the door, so Brian Johnson began banging on the outside walls and windows of
her trailer. Miranda testified that he did this for approximately fifteen-to-twenty minutes.
During that time, she heard Brian yell at Phillip Turner Neal, Miranda's live-in boyfriend
who was asleep in one of the trailer's bedrooms, and ask for a beer. Miranda testified that
she heard Neal reply that he did not have a beer. Despite the fact that Brian's behavior
went on for fifteen-to-twenty minutes, Miranda did not call the police. Brian then
knocked on the back door again, and this time, Miranda opened the door. Miranda
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testified that Brian immediately stepped into the trailer, allegedly stated, “Bitch, I'll kill
you,” and began choking her. At the evidentiary hearing, Miranda testified that the
choking lasted two seconds. Later, on cross-examination, she claimed that the choking
lasted a few seconds. According to Miranda, Brian let go of her when Miranda's mother
and Brian's grandmother, Rosa Johnson, entered the kitchen. Miranda testified that Brian
asked Rosa to accompany him from Miranda's residence. Miranda testified that Neal
then entered the kitchen, carrying a stick, and he intervened between Brian and Rosa.
Miranda testified that Brian and Neal struggled over the stick and that Brian took the
stick away from Neal. Apparently during this struggle, Miranda coaxed Rosa back into
bed. Miranda testified that after doing this, she swiftly exited the back door, ran fifty-toseventy-five feet across her backyard to Kirby's trailer. According to Miranda's
testimony, she heard Brian behind her as she ran toward Kirby's residence, and she heard
Brian yell, “Go get Tim.” When she arrived at Kirby's trailer, Miranda pounded on the
door and yelled “Brian just tried to kill me.” According to Miranda, fifteen minutes had
passed between the choking and the fatal shot.
During cross-examination, Miranda admitted that Brian had never assaulted
her before. Regarding the night in question, Miranda testified that Brian was in her home
approximately fifteen-to-twenty minutes. She testified that after the choking, she went
into Rosa's bedroom to calm Rosa and put her back to bed, and she admitted that she did
not witness the alleged struggle between Brian and Neal over the stick. Upon crossexamination, Miranda testified that she walked, not ran, to Kirby's trailer. She also never
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called the police. She further testified that, after Kirby exited his home, he fired three
shots into the air. At this point, Brian was walking back toward his father's trailer
unarmed and was approximately one hundred and eighty feet from where Miranda and
Kirby were. According to Miranda, Brian, who was now standing in the road, yelled,
“All you sons of bitches will be dead by morning.” Again, despite the fact the
opportunity was available, and Brian was a good distance away, and unarmed, no one
called the police.
Miranda testified that, by this time, Kirby, still armed, was escorting her
back to her trailer when he tripped over something causing his rifle to accidentally
discharge hitting Brian. During cross-examination, Miranda admitted that, at the time of
the shooting, she was not in any danger. Indeed, by this time at least fifteen-to-twenty
minutes had passed since the alleged choking, and Brian was at least one hundred and
eighty feet away from Miranda walking away from her home. Other than the choking,
the trial court did not find additional acts of violence against Miranda or against anyone
else by Brian.
The mandate of Kirby I included that the trial court hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the truth of Kirby's allegations, i.e., the alleged choking was “an
event that precipitated an extreme emotional disturbance which led to the shooting”
because Kirby was trying to prevent Brian from killing his mother. From any vantage
point, the evidentiary hearing did not verify Kirby's allegations. First, the evidence
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presented by Miranda was that the shooting was accidental -- a fact not included in Kirby
I or Kirby's plea agreement.
Second, and much more importantly, there was no evidence or testimony
presented at the evidentiary hearing that Kirby was acting under extreme emotional
disturbance at the time of the “accidental” shooting. Moreover, the trial court did not
find that Kirby was acting under extreme emotional disturbance at the time he shot Brian.
Rather, the trial court found that the domestic violence upon Miranda was too remote in
time to the shooting to be connected. Miranda was the only witness who had spoken with
Kirby before the shooting. She did not provide any testimony that Kirby was extremely
upset; rather, Miranda's testimony was that Kirby was walking her home when he tripped
and accidentally shot Brian in the back. Faced with a total lack of evidence of extreme
emotional disturbance by Kirby related to an act of domestic violence, the trial court did
not make any findings supporting Kirby's allegations as articulated in Kirby I, namely
that he was acting under extreme emotional disturbance -- a factual requirement for the
relief Kirby seeks.
Third, there was no evidence that the shooting occurred to prevent Brian
from killing Miranda. Indeed, Brian was a good distance from Miranda by that time and
unarmed.
In addition, upon cross-examination, Miranda acknowledged that when she
gave her statement to police on October 14, 1999, the day of the incident, she did not tell
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the police that Kirby tripped and accidentally shot Brian; instead, she told the police that
Kirby had fired the fourth and fatal shot up in the air.
After Miranda testified, Kirby called Phillip Turner Neal to the stand. Neal
testified that, at the time of the shooting, he had been living with Miranda, and, on the
evening of October 13, he had been drinking whiskey and beer and that Miranda had
been drinking beer. According to Neal's testimony, at about 1:00 a.m. on the morning of
October 14, he went to bed and passed out. He remembered that sometime later a loud,
unidentifiable noise woke him. Neal testified that he left his bedroom, walked through
the living room and the kitchen and entered Rosa's bedroom. According to Neal, Brian
was in Rosa's bedroom, and he was trying to convince Rosa to leave with him. At that
time, Miranda was in the kitchen, and Rosa was standing in the doorway just inside her
room. During this narrative, Neal did not mention being armed with a stick nor did he
mention struggling with Brian. After his initial narrative, Kirby's counsel asked whether
Neal had been carrying anything at the time. Neal then replied that he had been carrying
a stick. In response to another leading question by defense counsel, Neal testified that
Brian had jerked the stick out of Neal's hand. According to Neal, after Brian allegedly
took the stick away from Neal, Neal talked to Brian and convinced Brian to step outside
into Miranda's backyard. During direct examination, Neal denied witnessing the choking
incident, and he testified that he had only been awake fifteen minutes before the police
arrived at the scene after the shooting.
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Upon cross-examination, Neal testified that he did not remember what the
loud noise was that woke him. He reiterated that he had been armed with a stick, and he
described it as having bark on it. Neal testified that, after Brian allegedly jerked the stick
away from Neal, Neal cornered Brian against the kitchen table and told Brian to leave.
According to Neal, he and Brian did not struggle, and Neal denied that Brian ever
assaulted him. Instead, Neal insisted that he pinned Brian against the kitchen table,
talking to Brian. Neal testified that approximately fifteen minutes elapsed from the time
he awoke until the time Brian left Miranda's home, and Neal stated that Miranda left the
trailer approximately five minutes before Brian did. Neal testified that, after Brian left,
he did not remember hearing Brian yell anything from outside. Additionally, Neal
testified that he did not hear any gunshots; however, earlier during cross-examination,
Neal admitted that he was still drunk at the time of the shooting.
Kirby's last witness at the evidentiary hearing was Detective Russell Baker
of the London City Police Department. Detective Baker was one of the many officers
involved in the investigation regarding Brian Johnson's death. Detective Baker testified
that, on the morning of October 14, 1999, he was present when Detective Phelps of the
Kentucky State Police interviewed Miranda. In response to defense counsel's request,
Detective Baker read part of his report into the record.
On 10/14/99 at 0530 hours I was present while Detective
Johnny Phelps conducted a [sic] interview with Miranda
Kirby. Miranda stated she was setting [sic] at the kitchen table
when she heard a knock on the door she then heard Brian
Johnson at the back bedroom asking her friend Phillip Neal for
a beer. Brian then came back to the door and Miranda opened
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the door. Miranda stated that Brian started choking her. Brian
[sic] then went and got her son and told him what happened.
Tim then got his gun and fired up in the air, she then heard
Brian yell “You shot me”. ... I then took several photographs
of Miranda's neck [sic] their [sic] was [sic] no marks or bruises
visible on her neck at the time of the photographs.
Again, Miranda gave no indication that Kirby was emotionally disturbed by the alleged
domestic violence against her. Although Kirby, not the Commonwealth, had called
Detective Baker to the stand, Kirby's counsel, without court permission or objection by
the Commonwealth, treated the detective as a hostile witness. During cross-examination,
Detective Baker testified that, while investigating the shooting, the police found a blunt
instrument that Baker described as a stripped stick or club or baseball bat that appeared to
have blood on it.2
After Kirby had presented his witnesses, the Commonwealth called one
witness, Lonnie Owens of the Laurel County Sheriff's Department. Detective Owens
testified that he was the lead officer on the case. According to Detective Owens, the
police found Brian's body one hundred and eighty feet from the spent shell-casings from
Kirby's rifle. Detective Owens relayed that Brian had been shot in the right upper back,
and he was facing his father's house when shot. He was not armed. Detective Owens
also testified that the police found the spent shell-casings laying on the ground between
Kirby's trailer and Miranda's trailer.
2
There was no testimony that the substance that appeared to be blood was related to the events
at hand.
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In the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, it
noted that it had previously found, during the evidentiary hearing, that the choking
incident had occurred and was an act of domestic violence.3 Yet the trial court found that
the shooting of Brian Johnson was not connected to the domestic violence because the
evidence showed: 1) that a significant amount of time had elapsed between the choking
3
While we recognize that the issue of the choking is not before this Court because the
Commonwealth inexplicably failed to cross-appeal from the trial court's finding of fact that the
choking did occur, nevertheless, we wish to address the issue briefly due to the numerous
inconsistencies in the testimony and the leading questions by defense counsel.
During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the choking probably occurred.
However, the trial court stated that it viewed the evidence in the best light favorable to Kirby
before the Commonwealth had an opportunity to put on its evidence. This was the wrong
standard. It is incumbent upon the movant, in this case, Kirby, to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was a victim of domestic violence. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). By viewing the evidence in the best light favorable to Kirby, the
trial court shifted the burden of proof from Kirby to the Commonwealth. We are perplexed that
the Commonwealth did not object when the trial court made its finding, and we are further
baffled that the Commonwealth did not cross-appeal on this issue.
Turning to the evidentiary hearing, during direct examination of Miranda Kirby, Kirby's counsel
produced two sets of photographs, one set taken by the police and one set taken by one of
Miranda's daughters, Tammy Kirby. During direct examination, Kirby's trial counsel handed one
of the police photographs to Miranda and, pointing to a specific part of the photograph, asked,
“Would you say there's some redness there?” Miranda, in response to the leading question,
replied yes. Kirby's counsel then repeated this process with the remaining police photographs.
At no time did the Commonwealth object to counsel's use of leading questions. After showing
Miranda all of the police photographs, Kirby's counsel asked, “Is it your testimony here today
that the redness that is in these pictures came about as a result of Brian Johnson's choking of
you?” In reply to this leading question, Miranda answered yes. Kirby's counsel then asked
Miranda if she had bruises, and, oddly enough, Miranda answered that she did not look at herself
but that other, unidentified people had remarked about her being bruised. We think it is
important to note that, during Kirby's direct examination of Miranda, the trial court did not have
a copy of the police photographs so it was unable to contemporaneously compare Miranda's
testimony about the photographs with the photographs themselves in order to ascertain whether
she was testifying accurately.
After showing Miranda the photographs taken by the police, Kirby's counsel showed Miranda
two photographs that had been taken by Tammy. These two grainy photographs depicted
Miranda sitting at her kitchen table. Kirby's counsel showed Miranda one of the pictures,
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and the shooting, and 2) the shooting was accidental. The trial court made no other
findings of domestic violence, either verbal or physical. Nor did the trial court find that
Kirby acted under extreme emotional disturbance when he shot Brian, and no evidence
was presented on this issue.
pointed to a specific part of the pictures and asked if Miranda saw redness and bruising. Not
surprisingly, Miranda responded yes. Defense counsel showed Miranda the second photograph
and asked if Miranda saw any bruising. Miranda responded affirmatively. After that, Kirby's
counsel stated that she wanted the record to reflect that Miranda was pointing to the area under
her chin and going down her neck. As with the police photographs, the trial court did not have
copies of Tammy's photographs; thus, it was not able to contemporaneously compare Miranda's
testimony to the actual photographs.
After Phillip Neal had testified, Kirby's counsel called Tammy Kirby to the stand. According to
Tammy, she observed bruises on Miranda's neck on October 14, 1999. In addition, Tammy
testified that, on October 15 and October 16, she had taken photographs of her mother to
document the trauma to Miranda's neck. Kirby's counsel presented one of the photographs that
Tammy had taken to Tammy and stated that she wished to direct Tammy's attention to the neck
area. Tammy then testified that “it” showed up in the picture. Kirby's counsel then showed
Tammy the second photograph and told Tammy to look at the neck. Then Kirby's counsel asked,
“Is that bruised?” Tammy then pointed to her own neck just underneath her chin and replied yes.
Once more, the trial court had no copies of Tammy's photographs, missing another valuable
opportunity to contemporaneously compare the testimony regarding the photographs to the
actual photographs.
After Tammy testified, Kirby's counsel called Detective Baker to testify. While on the stand,
Detective Baker testified about the photographs and Miranda's alleged injuries. Detective Baker
testified that on the morning of October 14, 1999, he observed Miranda and saw no marks or
bruises on her neck. Detective Baker testified that he took photographs of Miranda's neck that
morning. He then testified that he photographed Miranda's neck a second time later that day or
the next day. Kirby's counsel handed Detective Baker a copy of Detective Owens's report and
asked him to read part of it. Detective Baker read part of Detective Owens's report into the
record, and it revealed that Detective Baker had taken another set of photographs at 2:32 p.m.
The report also revealed that Detective Owens had observed no signs that Miranda had been
choked or involved in a struggle. Kirby's counsel then handed the police photographs to Baker
and, pointing to a specific area of one photograph asked, “Is that red or not?” Detective Baker
closely scrutinized the photograph and responded that the area to which Kirby's counsel had
pointed looked like a suntan, not red. Kirby's counsel handed Baker another photograph and,
pointing to a specific area, demanded. “Does that look red?” Detective Baker responded that that
the area indicated by Kirby's counsel looked more red than other parts of Miranda's neck. As a
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Turning to the evidence adduced at the hearing, Miranda's testimony
revealed that the choking lasted for an extremely brief period of time, somewhere
between two seconds and a few seconds. However, using leading questions,4 Kirby's
counsel attempted to use Miranda's testimony to paint a picture of continuing domestic
violence. Miranda testified that Brian and Neal struggled over the stick, testified that
side note, Miranda had been working outside that day.
After Baker testified, the Commonwealth called Detective Owens, the lead detective. During
cross-examination, Detective Owens testified that, on October 14, 1999, when he initially made
contact with Miranda, he did not see any injuries to Miranda's neck. According to the detective,
he saw no marks on Miranda to lead him to think that she had been assaulted.
It is our opinion that the evidence adduced at the hearing was not sufficient, based on the proper
standard, to support a finding that Miranda had been choked. Miranda testified that she had been
choked, yet two of the investigating officers who observed Miranda only a couple of hours after
the alleged attack testified that they saw no marks or injuries to Miranda's neck. In fact,
according to Detective Owens's report, he saw Miranda several hours after the alleged attack and
he still did not see any marks or injuries.
Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing, Kirby's counsel insisted that both the police photographs
and Tammy's photographs showed injury to Miranda's neck. However, when Kirby's counsel
questioned Miranda regarding the police photographs, Kirby's counsel solicited testimony from
Miranda that the photographs revealed injury, in the form of redness, to the lower part of
Miranda's neck. However, when Kirby's counsel questioned Detective Baker regarding this
redness, he testified that it appeared to be a suntan. We have carefully examined the police
photographs and note that the photographs do reveal a uniform, light redness on the lower part
of Miranda's neck and chest that appears to be a suntan or sunburn. However, the police
photographs reveal no evidence of trauma caused by choking. Furthermore, when Kirby's
counsel questioned both Miranda and Tammy regarding Tammy's photographs, Kirby's counsel
solicited testimony from both women that the photographs revealed bruising on the upper part of
Miranda's neck underneath the chin. This is, of course, inconsistent with both Miranda's
testimony and Detective Baker's testimony regarding the police photographs. We have carefully
examined Tammy's photographs as well and note that they do not reveal any evidence of
bruising underneath Miranda's chin.
Reviewing the record, the only evidence that we can find that supports Miranda's claim that
Brian choked her is her own testimony. Neither set of photographs reveal any injury and neither
did the testimony of the investigating officers. Apparently, Miranda never sought medical
treatment for her alleged injuries, so there is no medical evidence to support her claim either.
Given the lack of evidence and the trial court's use of the incorrect standard of evidence, it is our
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Brian followed her out of the trailer as she ran across her backyard to Kirby's trailer, and
testified that, while outside, Brian made threatening statements. However, despite
defense counsel's use of leading questions with Neal, he contradicted Miranda's
testimony. He testified that he did not struggle with Brian. In fact, he did not mention
the alleged stick until prompted by Kirby's counsel. He testified that Miranda had left the
trailer four-to-five minutes before Neal had convinced Brian to leave, thereby
contradicting Miranda's testimony that Brian followed her from the trailer. Neal also
testified that he did not hear Brian yell threats once he had left the trailer. According to
Detective Baker's summary of Detective Phelps's interview with Miranda, which Kirby's
counsel had Detective Baker read into the record, Miranda did not tell the police that
Brian had made threats after leaving her trailer. Furthermore, during cross-examination,
Miranda testified that immediately before Kirby fired the fatal shot, he was escorting her
home and that she was not in any danger. In addition, Detective Owens testified that
Brian was at least one hundred and eighty feet from both Miranda and Kirby when Kirby
fired the fatal shot and that Brian was facing towards his father's residence with his back
turned toward Kirby, unarmed.
As the finder of fact, the trial court had the sole responsibility to weigh the
evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Dunn, 151 S.W.2d at 764-765.
Additionally, it could choose to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness's testimony.
opinion that the trial court erred when it found that the choking had occurred.
4
Kirby's counsel repeatedly used leading questions while directly examining both Miranda and
Neal. In essence, Kirby's counsel used both Miranda and Neal as mere props in order to testify.
However, the Commonwealth never objected to defense counsel's use of leading questions.
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Anderson, 934 S.W.2d at 278. Because of the trial court's discretion, it could believe
parts of Miranda's testimony such as the choking lasted two seconds and that Brian
remained in her trailer for fifteen-to-twenty minutes after the choking, and it could
disbelieve her testimony regarding the alleged struggle over the stick and the threats
Brian allegedly made after leaving the trailer. Discounting Miranda's inconsistent and
contradicted testimony, the trial court was left with evidence showing that, after the
alleged choking, the situation was relatively calm for at least fifteen minutes prior to the
fatal shooting. Indeed, the trial court found no other acts of domestic violence, either
verbal or physical, other than the brief choking. Furthermore, because Kirby's guilty plea
regarding intent was not conclusive, the trial court could consider and believe Miranda's
testimony that Kirby tripped, while escorting Miranda home, and accidentally shot Brian
in the back. However, even if the shooting was intentional, the trial court's finding that
the shooting was not connected to the choking was highly reasonable given the evidence.
Giving the trial court the proper deference required by the case law, combined with the
lack of evidence and the absence of a finding regarding extreme emotional disturbance on
Kirby's behalf or a finding of continuing domestic violence, we conclude that the trial
court did not err when it found that the shooting was not connected to the prior act of
domestic violence.
Furthermore, in Holland v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Ky.
App. 2006), this Court stated that:
As the amicus brief aptly points out, however, defendants who
are acquitted have no need of the probation and parole
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exclusions afforded to domestic violence victims by the
General Assembly. The General Assembly thus obviously
intended to provide leniency to victims who could not
establish self-defense. The class of defendants raising
allegations of domestic abuse under these statutes [KRS
533.060(1) and KRS 439.3401(5)] “is provided multiple
opportunities to raise the abuse in mitigation of their criminal
conduct.” See generally, Sue McClure, Note, The Battered
Woman Syndrome and the Kentucky Criminal Justice System:
Abuse Excuse or Legitimate Mitigation? 85 Ky. L.J. 169
(1996-1997). We agree that these statutes are intended to give
domestic violence victims additional opportunities to secure
leniency beyond the defenses they might raise at trial.
(emphasis and italics added).
Additionally, the Holland Court stated that:
The “battered woman syndrome” “tends to explain why a
person suffering from the syndrome would not leave her mate
and would be driven by fear of continuing episodes of
increased aggression against herself to perceive certain
conduct was necessary in her self-defense, even though
another person not suffering from such a condition might
believe or behave differently.” Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588, 590-591 (Ky. 1987). In general, the legislative
enactment relating to domestic violence victims is intended to
provide leniency to persons for whom the traditional notions of
self-defense do not apply.
Id. at 438.
We agree with the Holland Court that the domestic violence exception set
forth in KRS 439.3401(5) was meant, in part, to give leniency to those women who have
suffered from “battered woman syndrome.”5 This condition was initially researched by
Lenore E. Walker, and she defined a battered woman as “a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce
5
Obviously, this could likewise apply to men who have suffered abuse.
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her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights.” Sue
McClure, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and the Kentucky Criminal Justice
System: Abuse Excuse or Legitimate Mitigation? 85 Ky. L.J. 169, 170 (1996-1997)
(quoting Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman ix, 11 (1979)) (emphasis added).
According to Miranda Kirby's own testimony, Brian Johnson had never
assaulted her prior to the alleged choking, making the choking an isolated incident,
assuming that it happened in the first place. So, according to the record, Miranda was
never “repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical . . . behavior by” Brian nor was she
in “fear of continuing episodes of increased aggression” from Brian. Kirby has already
received leniency via his plea bargain with the Commonwealth. He simply does not
deserve the benefit of the domestic violence exception, a leniency that is reserved for
those individuals who have acted in response to having suffered abuse.
Our conclusion does no injustice to the law of the case under Kirby I
because our Court held therein that Kirby fell within the class of individuals covered by
KRS 439.3401(5) if his allegations were true -- that he was acting under extreme
emotional disturbance when he shot Brian to prevent Brian from killing his mother. Even
where domestic violence is one act like the case at hand, assuming an act of domestic
violence even took place, this case fails to meet the spirit and intent of the leniency given
under KRS 439.3401(5). Had Kirby walked in while Brian was allegedly choking his
mother or threatening her with further imminent violence, we might conclude otherwise.
Furthermore, given the facts of this particular case, we believe that for
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Brian's allegedly hostile act to be considered as domestic violence, it must have some
causal connection to the family relationship between Brian and Miranda other than mere
happenstance. There is no evidence that Brian intruded upon Miranda in the early
morning hours of October 14 because she was his aunt. Apparently, he intruded because
her home was a convenient place to possibly obtain a beer. Miranda and Brian could
have easily been two unrelated neighbors. However, to apply KRS 439.3401(5) under
the circumstances of this case belittles the plight of those victims who act when they
believe there is no other alternative to secure their safety or their family members' safety
when risk of harm is imminent from an abusive family member.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth supra, the judgment of the Laurel Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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