KALTON ADKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 31, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002414-MR
KALTON ADKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00326
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: In October 2000, a Pike County jury found Kalton Adkins guilty
of the November 6, 1999 murder of sixty-eight-year-old Richard Roberts. The
Commonwealth alleged that Adkins, who was addicted to cocaine at the time and who
was acquainted with Roberts, had bludgeoned Roberts to death in the course of stealing
money and perhaps other valuables to purchase drugs. In addition to murder, the jury
found Adkins guilty of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary. In a December 22,
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Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2000 judgment, the Pike Circuit Court sentenced Adkins in accord with the jury’s verdict
to a total of seventy years in prison. Our Supreme Court affirmed that judgment in an
opinion that became final in February 2003. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779
(Ky. 2003). In December of that year, prompted in part by a footnote in the Supreme
Court’s opinion noting that excludable habit evidence had not been objected to at trial,
Adkins moved for relief from his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42 and alleged that trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. His present appeal is from the October 24,
2005 Order of the Pike Circuit Court denying RCr 11.42 relief. He contends not only that
the trial court erred, but that counsel appointed to supplement his RCr 11.42 motion and
to represent him at the September 2005 hearing on the matter rendered ineffective postconviction assistance. Having reviewed the record and considered Adkins's contentions,
we affirm.
As our Supreme Court has noted many times, RCr 11.42 provides relief
only for errors, such as constitutional violations, that are serious enough to invalidate the
original conviction or sentence, and only for errors that were not subject to review upon
direct appeal. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003). The rule is also
limited to known errors; it is not a discovery mechanism. Id. To proceed under the rule,
therefore, the movant must allege specific facts which, if true, would constitute grounds
for relief. A motion asserting insufficient grounds, speculative allegations, or allegations
conclusively refuted by the record may be summarily dismissed. Id. A hearing is
required, however, if there is a material issue of fact that the record does not conclusively
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resolve, and in that case an indigent movant is entitled to the appointment of counsel to
supplement the motion and to assist with the hearing. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001). It is well established, of course, that the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel is a constitutional deprivation subject to challenge under RCr 11.42. Id.
In its initial response to Adkins’s motion, the trial court ruled that Adkins
had alleged six instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness that were not refuted on the face of
the record and that thus required the appointment of counsel and a hearing. Adkins
alleged that trial counsel (1) had failed, as the Supreme Court had noted, to object to the
introduction of inadmissible evidence concerning the victim’s habits; (2) had denied
Adkins his right to testify at trial; (3) had failed to obtain experts to refute portions of the
Commonwealth’s case; (4) had failed to conduct an adequate investigation and had not
been prepared for trial; (5) had not meaningfully cross-examined Ronnie Adkison,
Adkins’s brother, who testified concerning a purported confession; and (6) had labored
under a conflict of interest because of animosity counsel bore toward Adkins’s mother.
Numerous continuances and nearly a year later, appointed counsel informed the court that
he had nothing to add to Adkins’s pro se pleading and requested simply that the court
rule on the basis of the record as it stood, a basis the court had already indicated was
inadequate. Adkins, on his own behalf, promptly reminded the court that he had
requested a hearing and that the court had granted the request. The matter was heard in
September 2005.
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Adkins did not testify at his murder trial, nor did counsel call other
witnesses on his behalf. Counsel attempted, rather, through cross-examination of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, to make it appear likely that someone other that Adkins had
perpetrated the crime. Unfortunately for Adkins, the Commonwealth’s case, though
circumstantial, was a strong one. The Supreme Court summarized it as follows:
[T]here was evidence that (1) the victim was expecting
Appellant [Adkins] on the night of the murder; (2) Appellant
was absent from the mobile home he shared with Caudill
[Adkins’s girlfriend at the time] for two to three hours on the
night of the murder; (3) Appellant admitted being on
Roberts’s property that night; (4) the victim was well
acquainted with Appellant and would not have opened his
door clad only in underwear unless the visitor was a male
with whom he was well acquainted; (5) Appellant had
cocaine and funds to purchase a motel room when he returned
home that night; (6) the clothes Appellant wore that night
were stained with the victim’s blood; (7) Appellant’s
military-style brass belt buckle was found on a belt on the
blood-stained jeans in Caudill’s vehicle with the ratchet
missing; (8) a ratchet from a military-style brass belt buckle
similar in appearance to Appellant’s buckle was found at the
crime scene; (9) the victim’s shotgun and billfold were
missing and the billfold was found discarded along the route
Appellant admitted traveling to Wheelwright on the night of
the murder and the morning after; and (10) Appellant told his
brother that “I might have done it.”
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d at 786.
At the RCr 11.42 hearing, Adkins testified that he had argued for a defense
based on mental incapacity, an incapacity, he claimed, that arose from a blow to his head
about a month prior to the murder and from his drug addiction. He pleaded with counsel,
he claimed, to permit him to testify that he simply could not remember the events of that
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night when he had not been in his right mind. Counsel, he claimed, adamantly advised
him against that approach and insisted that his testimony would result in his conviction.
He conceded, however, that counsel had informed him of his right to testify, and, though
strongly urging him not to do so, had explained that the ultimate decision was his.
Adkins also complained at the RCr 11.42 hearing that counsel’s failure to call any
defense witnesses indicated a lack of investigation and preparation, and he again noted
the Supreme Court’s comment that counsel had not objected to the introduction of
excludable evidence about the victim’s habits.
Adkins’s trial counsel also testified at the RCr 11.42 hearing. She
acknowledged having advised Adkins not to testify, but explained that she had, consistent
with her regular practice throughout several years of defense representation, informed
him of his right to testify if he so decided. She also insisted that she and the investigator
assigned to the case had duly explored every lead Adkins suggested, but that none of
them produced favorable evidence. The record reflects, in fact, that counsel obtained a
psychiatric evaluation of Adkins, indicating that she did investigate the line of defense
Adkins claims he urged. The record does not include the results of the evaluation, but in
light of counsel’s testimony it is reasonable to infer that the results did not support a
mental impairment defense. Finally, counsel explained that she had not objected to the
introduction of evidence about the victim’s habits, indeed that she elicited much of that
evidence, because she hoped to show that those habits were inconsistent with the
Commonwealth’s theory of the case.
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The trial court first ruled that because Adkins had presented no evidence at
the RCr 11.42 hearing with respect to counsel’s alleged conflict of interest, her alleged
failure to obtain rebuttal experts, and her alleged failure meaningfully to cross-examine
Ronnie Adkison, those issues had been waived. The court then ruled that the evidence
elicited at the hearing refuted Adkins’s other claims. The court found that, as Adkins
admitted, counsel had not forbidden him to testify, but had only urged him not to in
pursuit of a reasonable trial strategy. Counsel’s investigation had been adequate, the
court found, particularly in light of Adkins’s admission that he had not been as
forthcoming with counsel as he might have been. And, finally, the court found that
counsel’s decision to elicit rather than object to evidence about the victim’s sleeping
habits was reasonable in the circumstances. Adkins challenges all of these rulings. He
contends that the trial court erred by failing to address the “waived” issues. He also
argues that the evidence supports rather than refutes his other claims. We disagree.
To be entitled to relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, an
RCr 11.42 movant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficiency was prejudicial. Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2005). There
is a strong presumption in counsel’s favor, which the movant must overcome by showing,
not that counsel failed to obtain a favorable result or that, with the benefit of hindsight, a
different course might have been chosen, but that counsel’s performance was
unreasonable in the circumstances, that she “made errors so serious that [s]he was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. At 327. The
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movant must also show that “there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 328.
Looking first at the issues the trial court did address, we agree with that
court that Adkins’s evidence did not establish any errors by counsel, let alone errors of
constitutional magnitude. At the RCr 11.42 hearing, Adkins conceded that counsel and
her investigator interviewed everyone connected with the crime and everyone he referred
them to. As noted above, the record reflects that counsel investigated Adkins’s
psychiatric status. Adkins has not identified any exculpatory evidence counsel
overlooked. His contention, rather, is merely that had counsel tried harder, something
might have turned up. Speculative claims like this, however, are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption, borne out in this case by the trial record and the testimony at
the hearing, that counsel’s investigation was adequate.
Nor has Adkins shown that counsel’s defensive strategy, including her
advice that Adkins not testify, was unreasonable. As noted above, the Commonwealth’s
case was a strong one, but, in the absence of exculpatory evidence, counsel’s strategy,
including her strategy of trying to show that the victim’s habits suggested that he had
opened his door that night to someone other than Adkins, at least put the Commonwealth
to its proof and offered a hope, however slim, that someone on the jury would doubt that
Adkins was the perpetrator. Adkins’s testimony that he could not remember the crime,
though he may have committed it, would not have helped that defense and may well have
undermined it. There is no evidence that counsel misrepresented Adkins’s right to
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testify, and we agree with the trial court that neither her advice against testifying nor her
use of habit evidence has been shown to be unreasonable.
Adkins’s other claims are similarly without merit. Even if the trial court
erred by deeming them waived, they do not entitle Adkins to relief. He contends, first,
that counsel should have obtained a series of experts: a blood spatter expert to discuss
why so little of the victim’s blood appeared on Adkins’s pants when photos of the crime
scene indicate that blood spattered widely, a psychologist to discuss why Adkins might
have made a false confession to his brother, and a DNA specialist to analyze hair and
skin samples apparently removed from under the victim’s fingernails.
In Mills v. Commonwealth, supra, our Supreme Court rejected a similar
claim that defense counsel should have retained a mental health expert to explore the
possible effects of abuse during the defendant's childhood. The Court explained that RCr
11.42 requires the movant to assert specific, known facts which justify relief. A
speculative claim “that certain facts might be true, in essence an admission that Appellant
does not know whether the claim is true, cannot be the basis for RCr 11.42 relief.” Id. At
328. Adkins’s claims are similarly speculative in that he does not allege that counsel
failed to discover any specific fact, only that she might have discovered useful facts had
she enlisted additional experts. As Mills indicates, that sort of speculative allegation is
not enough.
Adkins contends that counsel did not effectively cross-examine his brother,
Ronnie Adkison, concerning Adkins’s alleged confession. Apparently Adkison talked
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with Adkins not long after the murder and urged him, for their family’s sake, to own up
to the crime if he was in fact guilty. Adkins does not deny that he told his brother, just as
he maintained at the RCr 11.42 hearing, that he could not remember the crime, but he
was mentally distraught and could have done it. Adkins apparently contends that at trial,
counsel should have elicited testimony from Adkison making it clearer that the supposed
“confession” was not so much an admission of guilt but an admission of the bad mental
state into which Adkins had fallen. Even if counsel’s cross-examination could be deemed
lacking, however (though we do not suggest that it was), it is clear that putting a slightly
different spin on Adkison’s testimony is not reasonably likely to have had any effect on
the trial’s outcome. As noted above, Adkison’s testimony was only one small piece of a
large and compelling case against Adkins. Altering that piece or even removing it, is not
reasonably likely to have changed the result.
Finally, Adkins contends that a conflict of interest—counsel’s animosity
toward Adkins’s mother—interfered with counsel’s efforts on his behalf. Adkins hopes
to benefit from the rule according to which prejudice will be presumed where it is shown
that counsel’s performance was adversely affected because he or she actively represented
conflicting interests. See Gregory Sarno, “Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial
Conflict of Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel—State Cases,”
18 ALR 4th 360 (1982). In Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L. Ed.
2d 291 (2002), however, the United States Supreme Court strongly suggested that the sort
of ethical conflict Adkins alleges does not give rise to the presumption of prejudice that
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arises in cases of conflicted multiple representations. Even if the presumption were to
apply, Adkins is still obliged to show that counsel’s performance was adversely affected
by the conflict, and he has failed to make that showing. As discussed above, counsel’s
investigation and trial strategy were adequate under the Constitution and do not suggest
any diversion of trial counsel’s loyalty. We conclude, therefore, that Adkins is not
entitled to relief on any of the grounds the trial court declined to consider.
Finally, Adkins complains that his post-conviction counsel ineffectively
represented him in the RCr 11.42 proceeding. He notes counsel’s nearly year long delay
in reviewing the case; his failure to amend Adkins’s pro se pleading; and, most
especially, his failure to present evidence at the RCr 11.42 hearing on the three issues the
trial court deemed waived. We might add that, though there is no indication in the record
that RCr 11.42 counsel withdrew from the case, he apparently provided no assistance
with Adkins’s appeal, which, like the original motion, Adkins has pursued pro se.
As the Commonwealth notes, and as Adkins concedes, Adkins does not
have a right to RCr 11.42 counsel under either the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978
S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998). Those provisions, therefore, provide no remedy for RCr 11.42
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Adkins contends, however, that he does have a due
process right to fair and meaningful RCr 11.42 proceedings and that counsel’s
derelictions in this case deprived him of that right. At least one of our sister states has
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recognized the sort of due process claim Adkins asserts. Bahm v. State,789 N.E.2d 50
(Ind.App. 2003). We decline to address the constitutional issue, however, because it is
clear that Adkins, as an indigent whose RCr 11.42 motion raised material issues of fact
unresolved by the trial record, has a statutory right to counsel pursuant to RCr 11.42(5)
and KRS 31.110, Fraser v. Commonwealth, supra. This statutory right, our Supreme
Court has noted, “anticipates that the representation provided to indigent defendants will
be at least minimally competent.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Ky.
2006).
It appears that no published case in Kentucky has attempted to specify what
“minimally competent” RCr 11.42 representation entails, but sister courts, again,
construing statutory schemes similar to ours, have noted that collateral, post-conviction
counsel at least has the duty to consult with the movant; to review the trial court record,
including the trial if there was one; to review the movant’s pleading and to amend or
supplement it where necessary to conform to legal standards and to avoid, where
possible, obvious default; and to assist the movant with the presentation of his or her
claim at the post-conviction hearing. People v. Jennings, 802 N.E.2d 867 (Ill.App.
2003); Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super. 1998). See Gregory
Sarno, “Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s Representation of Criminal Client Regarding
Appellate and Postconviction Remedies,” 15 ALR 4th 582 (1982). We agree with our
sister courts that these duties are all included within the notion of “minimally competent”
RCr 11.42 representation. Where post-conviction counsel’s breach of these duties is so
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extensive as to amount to an abandonment of the movant and to virtually no
representation at all, the remedy is an automatic remand for new, adequately represented
RCr 11.42 proceedings. Id. Where counsel’s alleged dereliction is less egregious,
however, harmless error analysis is appropriate, and remand is not required unless it
appears that counsel’s errors prejudiced the RCr 11.42 proceedings. Finally, a movant
may raise on his own behalf the claim of ineffective RCr 11.42 counsel in the trial court
at the conclusion of RCr 11.42 proceedings, or on appeal from those proceedings, but
such a claim does not provide grounds for a successive RCr 11.42 motion. Moore v.
Commonwealth, supra.
In this case, although we agree with Adkins that post-conviction counsel’s
representation was not exemplary, counsel cannot be said to have abandoned Adkins or to
have prejudiced his RCr 11.42 claim. He did consult with Adkins, he apparently
reviewed the record, and he did, at least to some extent, provide assistance at the RCr
11.42 hearing. On the other hand, though we recognize the heavy case loads borne by
public defenders at all levels, it is distressing that counsel took a year to review the case
and Adkins’s motion, and then failed to supplement the motion in any way, not even
helping to clarify Adkins’s claims or the legal standards that would apply to them.
Nevertheless, even without counsel’s clarification, the trial court found six issues in
Adkins’s pro se motion which merited a hearing, so it can hardly be said that counsel’s
performance in this regard was prejudicial. It is also distressing that counsel utterly
neglected three of those issues at the hearing, which resulted in their being dismissed
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without trial court review. The avoidance of default is, of course, one of counsel’s most
important services, and here counsel performed little better than a layman. Again,
however, as we discussed above, the defaulted issues, had they been addressed, would
not have entitled Adkins to relief, so there was no prejudice. Accordingly, although
counsel's assistance was in part deficient, the deficiency does not require that Adkins's
RCr 11.42 proceeding be remanded.
In sum, we agree with the trial court that Adkins received reasonably
effective trial counsel and thus was not entitled to RCr 11.42 relief. Counsel adequately
investigated the case and presented a reasonable defense in the face of compelling
evidence of Adkins’s guilt. Counsel did not err by advising Adkins not to testify, by not
cross-examining Adkins’s brother in a different manner, or by not consulting additional
experts. Counsel’s performance was not impaired by her alleged animosity toward
Adkins’s mother. Finally, it does it not appear that more competent RCr 11.42 counsel
would have altered this result. Accordingly, we affirm the October 24, 2005 Order of the
Pike Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kalton J. Adkins, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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