CLIFFORD DEWAYNE JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY SUPREME COURT: AUGUST 15, 2007
(FILE NO. 2007-SC-0216-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-002361-MR
CLIFFORD DEWAYNE JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 04-CR-00030 & 04-CR-00031
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY1 AND WINE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE:
Clifford Dewayne Johnson appeals a judgment
following a jury trial in the Butler Circuit Court convicting
him of one count of receiving stolen property over $300.
The
jury recommended a one-year sentence which was imposed by the
trial court.
The appellant’s motion for probation was denied
1
Judge Michael L. Henry concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of
his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed
by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
and the court sentenced him on November 10, 2005, to serve the
one-year sentence.
Johnson timely filed this appeal alleging
prosecutorial misconduct and errors while instructing the jury.
The facts are simple and straightforward.
On October
21, 2003, Paul Karch, operator of an auto parts business in
Bloomington, Indiana, discovered an enclosed trailer filled with
auto parts and an engine had been stolen from his place of
business.
Karch suspected two men seen earlier on October 20,
2003, and driving a white pickup truck with Kentucky license
plates may have been involved.
Subsequently in late October 2003, Kevin Anderson,
later identified by Karch as one of the two men he suspected,
swapped items stolen from the Bloomington business for car parts
belonging to the appellant Johnson.
Johnson and an employee
retrieved the parts from Anderson’s girlfriend’s home.
On November 1, 2003, Anderson sold some tools to
Johnson.
Johnson wrote a check for $400, the asking price.
Shortly thereafter, Anderson offered to sell an enclosed trailer
to Johnson, but Johnson declined the offer.
Johnson then offered the auto parts for sale.
One
intended customer was the dispatcher at the Butler County
Sheriff’s Office.
Johnson sold the engine to a buyer from
Tennessee.
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Karch contacted the Butler County Sheriff’s Office to
inquire about the possible sale of some of his stolen items.
The dispatcher contacted Johnson who in turn called Karch.
The
next day, November 15, 2003, Johnson voluntarily turned over the
remaining stolen auto parts, gave Karch directions to Anderson’s
girlfriend’s house as well as the address of the Tennessee
buyer.
Although Karch wrote a check to Johnson in the amount of
$500 for the remaining parts, he later stopped payment on the
check.
Later, the stolen trailer was found near the home of
Anderson’s girlfriend.
Johnson then recovered from Anderson the parts he had
exchanged for the items stolen from Karch.
On January 27, 2004, Johnson was subpoenaed to the
Butler County Grand Jury.
Johnson presumed he had been called
to testify as a witness against Anderson.
Prior to testifying
on February 2, 2004, Johnson was presented with a two-part form.
The top of the form, signed by Johnson, outlines the rights
typically associated with the case of Arizona v. Miranda, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The portion
of the form with the waiver of the delineated rights was not
signed.
Neither prior to nor during the grand jury appearance
was Johnson told he was a suspect or that he would be indicted.
During the grand jury testimony, Johnson made a full
disclosure of his involvement with the auto parts and engine.
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Subsequently, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an
indictment on February 12, 2004, charging Johnson with one count
of receiving stolen property over $300 as to the stolen auto
parts and one count of theft by unlawful taking over $300 as to
the check written by the Tennessee buyer.
On March 3, 2004, Karch received a phone call from an
individual who advised some of his tools were still at Johnson’s
place of business.
Karch in turn called Det. David West of the
Kentucky State Police with this information.
Det. West spoke
with the unknown individual on March 5, 2004.
Det. West then
prepared an affidavit, and a search warrant was signed by the
Butler District Court Judge on March 8, 2004.
A search
conducted on the same date resulted in the recovery of various
tools later identified as belonging to Karch.
On March 30, 2004, a second indictment was returned by
the Butler County Grand Jury charging Johnson with receiving
stolen property over $300 as to items recovered on March 8,
2004, and tampering with physical evidence.
Between the dates of the two indictments, a “press
release” was published in “The Banner,” a local newspaper
published in Morgantown, Butler County, Kentucky.
The press
release was authored by the local Commonwealth Attorney, charged
with the responsibility of prosecuting Johnson.
While the
prosecutor tries to avoid any direct comment about the
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indictment, he clearly accuses the local sheriff of failing to
fully investigate the case involving his friend, the appellant.
Appellant’s counsel moved to quash the indictments and
to recuse the local prosecutor for prosecutorial misconduct
alleging the commonwealth attorney had improperly tried to
influence the local population and potential venirepersons.
The
commonwealth attorney moved for a change of venue alleging that
the local sheriff would sway the jurors against the commonwealth
attorney and that pre-trial publicity would make it difficult
for the Commonwealth to receive a fair trial.
After a hearing,
to which opposing counsel objected to the respective motions,
the trial court denied both motions.
The two indictments were consolidated and a trial was
held on October 21, 2005.
Johnson was found guilty of the
charge of receiving stolen property over $300 contained in the
second indictment.
The trial court directed a verdict on the
charge of theft by unlawful taking over $300 as contained in the
first indictment.
two charges.
The jury acquitted the appellant on the other
The appellant challenged both the form and
substance of various questions asked by the prosecutor during
the trial.
The appellant claimed prosecutorial misconduct on
several grounds.
The appellant raises the prejudicial effect of the
statements contained in the press release of February 18, 2004.
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However, the appellant was tried more than 20 months after the
press release was issued.
Counsel had the right to and did
question jurors about any potentially damaging pre-trial
publicity about the charges against Johnson.
Another
appropriate remedy would be a change of venue pursuant to KRS
452.210.
However, the appellant objected to this very motion
when made by the commonwealth attorney.
The action of the
commonwealth attorney in providing the press release was
motivated by his dissatisfaction with the local sheriff.
Unfortunately, such action had the potential of depriving the
appellant of his right to a fair and impartial jury.
However,
the appellant can point to no actual prejudice, no juror on the
final panel had advised they were aware of or influenced by the
story, and finally the story was not part of the evidence
presented at trial.
United States v. Andrews, 347 F.2d 207 (6th
Cir. 1965).
The appellant also challenges the form and substance
of questions asked by the commonwealth attorney during the
trial.
Further, the appellant challenges the cross-examination
between the commonwealth attorney and himself.
Although not
required, the video of the examination was reviewed by this
Court.
It is readily apparent both examinations bordered on a
school ground exchange vis-à-vis the prosecutor and the witness.
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On several occasions the appellant’s answers were non-responsive
and the prosecutor’s questions were more like editorials.
When objections were made, the trial court ruled.
Great deference is given to the trial court when it exercises
its discretion in ruling on objections.
KRE 611.
This Court
can find no abuse of that discretion.
The appellant challenges the procedure of two separate
indictments, two charges of receiving stolen property over $300
as well as instructions for two separate counts of receiving
stolen property over $300.
From the facts presented, the
appellant clearly possessed or retained (KRS 514.110(1)) stolen
property on two separate occasions.
The jury acquitted the
appellant on the first count when he voluntarily returned the
stolen property to the owner and cooperated in assisting with
the recovery of other stolen property on November 15, 2003.
Once the appellant was aware some of the property was
stolen, the jury obviously questioned any defense that he was
not aware the tools were stolen or that he had forgotten he
purchased said tools.
Finally, the appellant challenges the practice of
issuing a subpoena to an individual to require him to testify
before the grand jury without advising him he is the target of
an investigation.
-7-
The grand jury may use subpoena ad testificandum to
obtain testimony.
A refusal to appear subjects an individual to
the contempt power of the court.
If an individual is a
defendant or otherwise the focal point of a criminal
investigation, the witness’s testimony should be taken only
after he is fully advised of his rights and then makes a knowing
and intelligent waiver.
Lofkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
97 S. Ct. 2132, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1977).
However a grand jury’s authority to investigate does
not include compelling a person to testify against himself.
Fletcher v. Graham, 192 S.W.3d 350 (Ky. 2006); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 51, 118 S.W.2d 140 (1938).
Kentucky Constitution § 11.
See also
Had all the charges and subsequent
conviction been contained in the first indictment, the
appropriate remedy under Taylor would have been to grant the
appellant immunity pursuant to Taylor.
However, because the
second indictment arose from an independent source, to wit the
search warrant and was obtained without the appellant’s grand
jury testimony, to grant immunity or to quash the second
indictment is not appropriate.
Clearly from the press release, the commonwealth
attorney believed Johnson should have been charged with
receiving stolen property over $300.
-8-
The prosecutor believed
the investigation was thwarted by the friendship between the
appellant and the sheriff.
While Johnson was advised of his rights, there is no
evidence he voluntarily waived those rights.
The record shows
he had minimal prior contact with the criminal justice system
(in fact, the prosecutor tried to raise an issue of a
dishonorable discharge from the military 30 years earlier to
challenge his credibility).
Johnson obviously cooperated with
the victim and willingly returned most of the stolen car parts.
Once the grand jury testimony was introduced at trial, Johnson
was forced to testify to explain his actions.
Absent the grand
jury testimony, there was no evidence as to the appellant’s
intent, a critical element of receiving stolen property over
$300.
This opened the door to challenge his credibility before
the jury.
Because the witness’s credibility is always crucial
at trial, this Court cannot find the error or admitting the
grand jury testimony to be harmless error.
Therefore, the conviction for the remaining charge is
reversed and this matter is remanded back to the trial court for
a new trial.
HENRY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS
IN PART AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART:
I concur in part and dissent in part.
Based on Taylor v. Commonwealth, 118 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1938), I
conclude that Johnson became immune from prosecution when he
testified before the grand jury after having been subpoenaed.3
Johnson was clearly suspected by the prosecutor as being
criminally involved in the case.
Thus, rather than reversing
and remanding for a new trial, I believe we should reverse and
remand for dismissal of the indictment because Johnson was
immune from prosecution.
The majority acknowledges that Johnson would have
immunity from prosecution as to the first count of knowingly
receiving stolen property.
However, it states that he would
only be entitled to a new trial as to the second count.
The
majority reasons that because that count was not based on
Johnson’s grand jury testimony but was based on the fruits of a
search pursuant to a search warrant, Johnson is only entitled to
a new trial.
In my opinion, Johnson was entitled to immunity as to
the second count as well.
The majority has agreed with the
Commonwealth that there were two separate offenses.
I disagree.
The mere fact that Johnson may have still had stolen property in
3
In Taylor, the court held that “appearing and testifying before a grand jury
in obedience to a subpoena is sufficient to entitle an accused person to
immunity.” Id. at 142.
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his possession when the officers returned to search for
additional stolen property does not create a second offense.
If
there was only one offense, then dismissal is required.
Furthermore, even if there were two separate
chargeable offenses, I do not believe the evidence could be
separated to such an extent as to hold that Johnson would have
immunity as to the first count but not as to the second count.
It is entirely possible that the jury may have relied on a
portion of Johnson’s grand jury testimony when it convicted him
of the second count.
In short, for the aforementioned reasons,
I believe Johnson is entitled to immunity on the second count as
well.
In addition, I believe it is clear that the prosecutor
violated SCR 3.130, Rule 3.6, when he issued a press release
implicating Johnson that was published in the local newspaper.
See Bush v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Ky. 1992).
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
W. Currie Milliken
Bowling Green, KY
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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