BONNIE JEAN RIGDON v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 9, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001860-MR
BONNIE JEAN RIGDON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE A. WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00677
DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
WINE, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND HENRY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE:
Bonnie Jean Rigdon appeals from the Warren
Circuit Court’s entry of a directed verdict in favor of Dollar
General Corporation as to her Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
Chapter 344 discrimination and retaliation claims.
She also
raises a number of evidentiary issues in conjunction with her
appeal.
1
Upon review, we affirm.
Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Michael L. Henry, sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 21.580.
BACKGROUND
Rigdon was employed by Dollar General from November
23, 1993 to August 12, 2002.
Rigdon began working for Dollar
General as a sales clerk, but over the next two years she was
promoted to assistant manager and then manager of Dollar General
Store No. 2120 in Bowling Green, Kentucky.
As store manager,
Rigdon was responsible for hiring decisions, stocking, running
cash registers, supervising employees, deposits, inventories,
and assisting other stores.
Barbara Sosh was the district
manager for the district that included Rigdon’s store, and was
Rigdon’s direct supervisor from July 2002 until August 12, 2002.
David Neale held the district manager position before Sosh.
Rigdon apparently had a history of problems and confrontations
with Neale and had been written up by him on a number of
occasions for offenses ranging from poor control of payroll
expenses to smoking on the sales floor.
On August 8, 2002, Sosh and Rosa Browning, another
Dollar General store manager, were working in Store 2120
transferring inventory when Rigdon offered to drive the three of
them to lunch in her truck.
Later that day, Sosh reported to
Dollar General Field Employee Relations Coach Sharon Hager that
when she and Browning were stepping into Rigdon’s truck, Rigdon
made the statement, “Watch out.
Don’t step on my gun.”
Sosh
also reported that both she and Browning saw the gun lying on
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the floor in the back of the truck.
Dollar General has a
company policy that prohibits its employees from bringing
weapons onto Dollar General property, including in a vehicle, a
policy of which Rigdon was aware.
Hager asked Sosh to provide
statements from both she and Browning as to what had occurred.
After reviewing these statements, Hager concluded that
terminating Rigdon’s employment was the appropriate action and
instructed Sosh to do so.
Accordingly, on August 12, 2002, Sosh
traveled to Store 2120, with Neale - who was now the manager of
another district – serving as a witness, to fire Rigdon.
On May 9, 2003, Rigdon filed suit against Dollar
General in the Warren Circuit Court alleging that her
termination was the result of discrimination and retaliation for
complaints she had previously made about Neale, both of which
were violations of KRS Chapter 344 - the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act (“KCRA”).
On January 14, 2005, Dollar General filed a
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Rigdon could not
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, age
discrimination, or retaliatory discharge.
Dollar General
further contended that, even if Rigdon could show a prima facie
case as to any of her claims, it would still be entitled to
summary judgment because she could not demonstrate that the
stated reason for her termination – having a handgun in her
vehicle - was pretextual.
On March 23, 2005, the trial court
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entered an order overruling Dollar General’s motion, and the
case proceeded to trial.
On March 30, 2005, following the presentation of
Rigdon’s evidence, the court entered an oral ruling granting
Dollar General’s motions for directed verdict as to both of
Rigdon’s claims.
On April 11, 2005, the trial court entered an
order granting Dollar General’s motion for directed verdict
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01 and
setting forth a final judgment dismissing Rigdon’s action.
Rigdon’s subsequent motion to set aside was rejected in an order
entered on August 22, 2005.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review for an appeal of a directed
verdict is firmly entrenched in our law.
A trial judge cannot
enter a directed verdict unless there is a complete absence of
proof on a material issue or there are no disputed issues of
fact upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Gibbs v.
Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 495 (Ky.App. 2004).
“Where there is
conflicting evidence, it is the responsibility of the jury to
determine and resolve such conflicts.” Id.
“A motion for
directed verdict admits the truth of all evidence favorable to
the party against whom the motion is made.” Id.
“Upon such
motion, the court may not consider the credibility of evidence
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or the weight it should be given, this being a function reserved
for the trier of fact.” Id.
With this said, however, “[w]hile it is the jury’s
province to weigh evidence, the court will direct a verdict
where there is no evidence of probative value to support the
opposite result and the jury may not be permitted to reach a
verdict based on mere speculation or conjecture.” Id. at 496.
“The trial court must favor the party against whom [a directed
verdict] motion is made, complete with all inferences reasonably
drawn from the evidence.
The trial court then must determine
whether the evidence favorable to the party against whom the
motion is made is of such substance that a verdict rendered
thereon would be palpably or flagrantly against the evidence so
as to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.
In such a case, a directed verdict should be given.
Otherwise, the motion should be denied.” Id. (Internal
quotations omitted).
With these standards in mind, we turn to
Rigdon’s arguments.
ARGUMENT
A. The Trial Court’s Decision to Grant Dollar General’s Motion
for Directed Verdict as to Rigdon’s Disparate Treatment Gender
Discrimination Claim Was Not Erroneous.
Rigdon’s first claim against Dollar General is that
her termination was motivated by disparate treatment
discrimination - specifically gender discrimination – which is
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prohibited by KRS 344.040.
Of particular concern to Rigdon’s
claim is KRS 344.040(1), which provides – in relevant part –
that “[i]t is an unlawful practice for an employer ... [t]o fail
or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of the individual’s . . . sex.”
This category of discrimination occurs when an
“employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396
(1977).
“Absent direct evidence of discrimination, [Rigdon]
must satisfy the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)” in
order to prevail on her claim. Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005).
“The reasoning behind the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach is to allow a victim
of discrimination to establish a case through inferential and
circumstantial proof.” Id.
With this said, however, “[w]hile
intentional discrimination may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, there must be cold hard facts presented from which the
inference can be drawn that race or sex was a determining
factor.” Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, 827 S.W.2d
-6-
697, 700-01 (Ky.App. 1991).
As Rigdon notes in her brief, her
claim of disparate treatment gender discrimination is supported
solely by circumstantial evidence.
The McDonnell Douglas
framework is therefore relevant to our review.
In conjunction with this framework, Rigdon bears the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of gender
discrimination due to disparate treatment pursuant to KRS
344.040. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at
1824; Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing
Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 797 (Ky. 2004); Jefferson County v.
Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583, 590 (Ky. 2002).
To do so, she must
satisfy a four-prong test first set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, supra, by showing that “(1)
she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to
an adverse employment decision; (3) she was qualified for the
position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the
protected class, or similarly situated non-protected employees
were treated more favorably.” Peltier v. U.S., 388 F.3d 984, 987
(6th Cir. 2004).2
2
Kentucky courts have historically interpreted the civil rights provisions of
KRS Chapter 344 consistent with the applicable federal anti-discrimination
laws. See Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005);
Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 802
(Ky. 2004). Accordingly, we look to federal, as well as state, law for
authority in considering this appeal. See Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91
S.W.3d 583, 586 (Ky. 2002); Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Com.,
Dept. of Justice, 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky.App. 1979).
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The parties do not dispute that Rigdon satisfies
prongs (1)-(3) of the test, which leaves only prong (4) in
issue.
Moreover, as Rigdon was replaced as manager of Store
2120 by another woman, the only question remaining for our
consideration is whether similarly situated male employees were
treated more favorably than her.
Such a comparison can be made
only if the male employees that she has identified are
“similarly situated in all respects” to her. Gragg v. Somerset
Tech. College, 373 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2004); Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
In support of her position that similarly situated
male employees were treated differently than her, Rigdon points
to the testimony of Phil Ausbrooks, a male manager of another
Dollar General store in Auburn, Kentucky.
Ausbrooks testified
that, although his store experienced “shrinkage,” or inventory
loss, he was not written up for it or terminated.
Rigdon, on
the other hand, was written up for the “shrinkage” that occurred
at Store 2120.
Rigdon contends that - because Ausbrooks dealt
with the same supervisor as her (David Neale), was subject to
the same company standards as to “shrinkage,” and engaged in the
“same conduct of being a Dollar General store manager” – he was
a similarly situated male employee, and she consequently
established a prima facie case of disparate treatment gender
discrimination.
We disagree.
-8-
Had Rigdon been terminated for purported violations of
Dollar General’s “shrinkage” policy, her claim here would
arguably have merit.3
Instead, the conduct in issue used by
Dollar General as the justification for Rigdon’s firing was her
alleged possession of a handgun on company property.
The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that employees to whom a
plaintiff compares herself in a disparate treatment case such as
this must “have engaged in the same conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would
distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them
for it.” Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.
2002), quoting Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583.
Put another way, the
plaintiff must establish that the other employees’ actions were
of “comparable seriousness” or of “the same magnitude” to the
infraction leading to the plaintiff’s termination.
See
Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583; see also Reynolds v. Humko Products,
756 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1985); Lanear v. Safeway Grocery, 843
F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1988).
Moreover, the other employees
must have received better treatment thereafter.
See Mitchell,
964 F.2d at 582-83.
Accordingly, the comparison of Rigdon to other Dollar
General employees in her position who violated the company’s
3
We say “arguably” because the record reflects that Rigdon’s store had
“shrinkage” in excess of 3%, while Ausbrooks testified that he did not
receive a write-up because his “shrinkage” was “minute” in comparison.
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handgun policy is of primary concern to her case.
There is
nothing in the record to indicate that Ausbrooks was ever
accused of having a handgun in his possession on company
property and subsequently disciplined – or not disciplined –
because of it.
Given that such possession is the conduct in
issue here, we consequently cannot say that Ausbrooks is
“similarly situated” to Rigdon for purposes of her suit.
As Dollar General further notes, Rigdon and former
district manager Donna Butler testified that they were unaware
of any male employee who had allegedly violated the company’s
handgun policy without being subsequently terminated.
To
counter this, Rigdon points out that Sharon Hager testified that
she recalled one or two instances in which a Dollar General
employee possessed a handgun on company property without her
giving a recommendation that they be terminated; however, in
both cases, the employees either had not received a copy of the
company’s policy in issue or had protective orders allowing for
such possession.
Here, Rigdon testified that she was aware of
Dollar General’s policy and that she did not have a protective
order.
Moreover, the gender of the individuals mentioned by
Hager was never revealed at trial, nor their position with the
company or who their supervisors were.
It was therefore never
shown that these employees were “similarly situated” to Rigdon
for purposes of establishing a case of disparate treatment
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gender discrimination.
Without the production of such evidence,
Rigdon’s claim must necessarily fail.
Consequently, as Rigdon has failed to establish that
similarly situated male employees of Dollar General were treated
more favorably than her under prong (4) of the McDonnell Douglas
test as to the conduct in question in this case, we must
conclude that she failed to meet her burden of showing a prima
facie case that her termination was the result of gender
discrimination by disparate treatment under KRS 344.040
The
trial court’s entry of a directed verdict as to this claim was
therefore appropriate and we find no error.
B. The Trial Court’s Decision to Grant Dollar General’s Motion
for Directed Verdict as to Rigdon’s Retaliation Claim Was Not
Erroneous.
Rigdon next argues that the trial court erred in
granting Dollar General’s motion for directed verdict as to her
KRS 344.280 retaliation claim against the company.
That statute
makes it unlawful for one or more persons “[t]o retaliate or
discriminate in any manner against a person because he has
opposed a practice declared unlawful by this chapter, or because
he has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.” KRS 344.280(1).
Because Rigdon
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, we find
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that entry of a directed verdict as to the claim was
appropriate.
In order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff is required to show (1) that she
engaged in an activity protected by the Act; (2) that the
exercise of her civil rights was known by the defendant; (3)
that, thereafter, the defendant took an employment action
adverse to her; and (4) that there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. See Brooks, 132 S.W.3d at 803.
In cases where there is
no direct evidence of a causal connection, “the causal
connection of a prima facie case of retaliation must be
established through circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 804.
“Circumstantial evidence of a causal connection is evidence
sufficient to raise the inference that [the] protected activity
was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Id. (Internal
quotations omitted).
“In most cases, this requires proof that
(1) the decision maker responsible for making the adverse
decision was aware of the protected activity at the time that
the adverse decision was made, and (2) there is a close temporal
relationship between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Id.
It is with these standards in mind that we address
Rigdon’s claim.
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At trial, Rigdon testified about conversations that
she had previously had with Dollar General higher-ups Fred Wine
(in August 2000), Jimmy Lemmons (in February 2001), and Bob
Warner (in March 2002) about her problems with Neale.
On direct
examination, Rigdon indicated that she was complaining about
“female discrimination” when she spoke to these individuals;
however, on cross-examination, she could recall no instances
from the conversations in which she gave direct, specific
complaints to these individuals that Neale or anyone else at
Dollar General was engaging in sexual discrimination towards
her.
Instead, she testified only in vague generalities about
expressing her dissatisfaction with Neale’s conduct towards her.
“An employee may not invoke the protections of the Act by making
a vague charge of discrimination.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989).
From the
testimony in the record, we simply do not believe that the
conversations here have been sufficiently shown to be “protected
activity” under KRS Chapter 344.
Even if we were to assume, however, that Ridgon’s
complaints to these individuals did constitute “protected
activity,” we do not believe that she has demonstrated a “causal
connection” between the complaints and her termination.
None of
these individuals was involved in the decision to fire Rigdon,
and their conversations with her took place – in all instances –
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five months or more before her firing.
Accordingly, we do not
believe that a “close temporal relationship” between Rigdon’s
complaints to these individuals and her termination has been
shown in this case, particularly given that Rigdon introduced no
evidence that she was harassed or treated differently by her
supervisors at Dollar General following her March 2002
discussion with Bob Warner.
We are therefore disinclined to
conclude that the trial court erred in holding that these
complaints, in and of themselves, do not constitute evidence
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
However, Rigdon also cites to a conversation that she
had with district manager Barbara Sosh on August 8, 2002 – only
four days before her termination - contending that she also
complained about gender discrimination towards her by Neale on
this occasion.
the case.
Again, however, we simply do not find this to be
Rigdon’s testimony about her “very brief” discussion
with Sosh simply does not reflect that the issue of gender
discrimination was ever raised in a direct and specific manner.
Instead it appears as if the purpose of the conversation was for
Rigdon to advise Sosh that she had had previous problems with
Neale – who was no longer her supervisor – in an effort to
explain some of the write-ups in her file.
Although Rigdon also
testified that she told Sosh about her previous complaints about
Neale during this conversation, she did not specifically
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indicate whether or not she advised Sosh that her complaints
were predicated on gender discrimination.
We also note that
Rigdon herself testified at trial that her last “complaint”
about Neale was made to Bob Warner in March 2002.
Again, however, even assuming that Rigdon’s
conversation with Sosh could be considered “protected activity,”
we again fail to see that a “causal connection” between the
activity and Rigdon’s termination was shown. Although Field
Employee Relations Coach Sharon Hager testified that she worked
in partnership with Bosh in deciding to fire Rigdon, she
specifically indicated that she “encouraged” and “instructed”
Sosh to fire Rigdon after receiving the statements about the
subject incident, an indication that she was the ultimate
decision-maker responsible for Rigdon’s termination.
Hager
further testified that she had no knowledge of the complaints
previously made by Rigdon or her conversation with Sosh on the
day of the incident, and that these events were not considered
in her determination.
Consequently, there is no evidence to
support a “causal connection” between the alleged complaints and
Hager’s decision.
We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not err in entering a directed verdict as to this claim.
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C. Rigdon’s Claim That She Did Not Receive a “Level Playing
Field” at Trial Is Without Merit.
We finally address a number of issues raised by Rigdon
relating to her claim that she did not receive a “level playing
field” at trial.
Specifically, she complains that (1) she was
not allowed to review David Neale’s personnel file; (2) the
trial court would not allow testimony from Sharon Hager as to a
phone call purportedly made by Rigdon to Dollar General’s
Employer Response Center on March 25, 2002; (3) the trial court
refused to admit into evidence the deed to Store 2120’s parking
lot; (4) the trial court made inappropriate comments before the
jury; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by not
allowing testimony from Sara Reece and Donna Butler.
We reject
all of these claims as meritless for the reasons set forth
below.
1. David Neale’s Personnel File
Rigdon first complains that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to prohibit her from reviewing
David Neale’s personnel file because of the possibility that the
file might contain complaints that she had made about him.
Rigdon requested the file in discovery, but Dollar General
objected.
Rigdon subsequently took no action with respect to
this objection until February 16, 2005, when she filed a motion
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to compel.
However, the trial court denied the motion as
untimely.
Rigdon raised the issue again at trial, and the court
this time decided to review the personnel file – which counsel
for Dollar General had in her possession – to determine if any
possibly relevant information was contained therein.
After
conducting this review in camera, the court concluded that the
file did not contain anything relevant to the issues in this
case – including any documents reflecting any complaints made by
Rigdon – and denied her request to review the file.
Rigdon has
provided us with nothing in terms of legal authority to suggest
that the trial court abused its discretion in acting and in
ruling in this manner, and we accordingly find no error in its
determination.
2. The Phone Call to the “Employer Response Center”
Rigdon next complains that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow her to further question Sharon Hager as to her
testimony that Rigdon called Dollar General’s Employer Response
Center on March 25, 2002 at 9:01 a.m. from Store 2120 and as to
a document memorializing that call.
Rigdon contends that such
questions would be “directly on point to determine or
substantiate the complaints [Rigdon] made to corporate Dollar
General about David Neale’s disparaging treatment of her.”
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However, as Dollar General points out, it was
demonstrated at trial that Hager did not work at the Center and
had no personal knowledge of the call or of the document.
Moreover, it was shown that the call pertained to Rigdon seeking
advice as to how to handle a customer issue and did not raise a
claim of discrimination.
Indeed, counsel for Rigdon noted
during a bench conference on the matter that the call simply
reflected that Rigdon was “doing a good job.”
A trial court’s
ruling on evidentiary matters is reviewed under an “abuse of
discretion” standard. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson,
11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
The test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
Given
the facts set forth here, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in prohibiting further testimony as to
this issue.
3. The Parking Lot Deed
Rigdon next complains that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow her to introduce the deed to Store 2120’s
parking lot into evidence, given Sharon Hager’s testimony that
finding a gun in Rigdon’s truck would have been a “non-issue” if
Dollar General did not own the parking lot.
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As Dollar General
points out, however, it stipulated early in the trial that,
although it did not own the parking lot in question, it did
lease it in conjunction with its leasing of the store.
Dollar
General further notes that Hager’s testimony – taken as a whole
– actually reflects that leased premises, including parking
lots, are included in the definition of “Dollar General
property” under the company’s weapons policy.
Given that the
fact of ownership - or lack thereof - was stipulated, we again
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
ruling in this fashion.
4. The Trial Court’s Comments Before the Jury
The next complaint raised by Rigdon as to her
contention that she was subjected to a “non-level playing field”
is a vague reference to a number of purportedly “inappropriate”
comments made by the trial court before the jury that she
alleges “hurt” her in the jury’s eyes.
After reviewing the
comments in question, however, we fail to see how they were
inappropriate.
Moreover – and more importantly - as the case
was subjected to a directed verdict after the close of Rigdon’s
evidence, we fail to see how we can possibly find that any such
comments somehow prejudiced her in the eyes of the jury.
Consequently, we must again conclude that no reversible error is
present here.
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5. The Trial Court’s Exclusion of Testimony from Sara Reece and
Donna Butler
The final complaint raised by Rigdon is that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow certain
testimony from Donna Butler and Sara Reece as to Neale’s prior
treatment of Rigdon to be presented to the jury.
After
reviewing the arguments of the parties, we do not believe that
the trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to admit
the testimony in question.
We also do not find that the trial
judge unnecessarily “rushed” Butler in her avowal testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Warren
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Elizabeth S. Washko
Nashville, Tennessee
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