COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. HEATHER ROSE
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW GRANTED BY SUPREME COURT:
(FILE NO. 2007-SC-0123-D)
AUGUST 15, 2007
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001211-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00003
v.
HEATHER ROSE
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON,1 JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has appealed from
an order of the Estill Circuit Court entered on May 17, 2005,
granting Heather Rose’s motion to suppress evidence of an
illegal search.
Having concluded that the search of the vehicle
was a lawful search incident to Rose’s arrest, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
1
Judge Rick A. Johnson completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
On January 26, 2004, Rose was indicted by an Estill
County grand jury on four counts of possession of stolen mail
matter,2 and three counts of criminal possession of a forged
instrument in the second degree.3
Rose filed a motion on January
28, 2005, to suppress evidence seized as a result of a search of
her purse following a traffic stop.
A suppression hearing was
held on May 5, 2005.
Deputy Kevin Hardy with the Estill County Sheriff’s
Department testified at the suppression hearing that on November
19, 2003, he was traveling to Rose’s home to serve two bench
warrants on her.
Dep. Hardy stated that one bench warrant from
Estill County was for “an old fine”, and the other warrant, from
Madison County, was for “bail jumping”.
Dep. Hardy testified
that he noticed Rose was a passenger in a vehicle traveling down
the same road, in the opposite direction.
Dep. Hardy turned his
vehicle around and stopped the suspect vehicle.
Dep. Hardy testified that as he approached the vehicle
he did not see Heather Rose in the passenger seat, but only saw
the driver, Danny Rose.4
Dep. Hardy questioned Danny as to
Heather Rose’s whereabouts, and Danny replied that she was “in
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.150.
3
KRS 516.060.
4
There was some discussion at the hearing as to whether Danny Rose was
married to Heather Rose. However, the status of their relationship is not
relevant to this appeal.
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the trunk”.5
Dep. Hardy removed Rose from the trunk, placed her
under arrest pursuant to the bench warrants, and put her in the
back seat of his police cruiser.
Dep. Hardy stated that after he arrested Rose he
returned to the vehicle and Danny consented to a search of the
vehicle.
Dep. Hardy further stated that he searched a purse on
the passenger-side floor and he found one check that did not
belong to Heather Rose.
He also searched a small leather bag he
found in the center console of the vehicle which contained two
stolen checks, and another stolen check was found in a small
change purse also located in the center console.
Once the
search was completed, Dep. Hardy allowed Danny to leave the
scene in the vehicle.
When Deputy Hardy arrived at the jail with Rose, he
questioned her regarding the checks he had found during the
search.
Rose gave a written statement admitting that the stolen
checks had been in her possession, but claiming the checks had
been given to her by another person.
In her motion to suppress this evidence, Rose claimed
that she had not consented to the search of her purse, and that
Danny could not have given consent to search her purse.
The
Commonwealth filed its response to the motion on May 12, 2005.
5
Dep. Hardy testified that the back of the Rose vehicle had a visible gap
between the back seats and the trunk. He testified that he thought Rose had
lowered the back seats and climbed into the trunk.
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On May 17, 2005, the trial court entered an order granting
Rose’s motion to suppress evidence and stated as follows:
The issue before the Court appears to
be whether or not the consent given by
[Danny] would go to the change purse and the
purse belonging to Heather Rose. The
Commonwealth has argued that the search was
incident to arrest, however, that is not
what the Deputy testified to.
As the Court finds that the search was
pursuant to the consent of [Danny] and that
[Danny] gave consent to search the vehicle,
however, no consent was given by Heather
Rose to search her purse or change purse or
leather bag which were located inside the
vehicle.
The Court finds that based on United
States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 (1993), the
evidence herein should be suppressed.
There is no evidence in the record that
the Deputy believed that [Danny] could give
him consent to search the valuables owned by
[Rose]. The Court finds that there is no
other exception to the Search Warrant
requirement to uphold the search of [Rose’s]
personal items.
This appeal followed.
In reviewing the decision of a circuit court on a
motion to suppress evidence following a hearing, this Court must
first examine the trial court’s factual findings for clear
error.
The findings of fact are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence.6
6
This Court must then perform
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78; Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967
S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998).
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a de novo review of the factual findings to determine whether
the trial court’s decision is correct as a matter of law.7
The law of search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes that
“[a]ll searches without a valid search warrant are unreasonable
unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule that
a search must rest upon a valid warrant.
The burden is on the
prosecution to show the search comes within an exception.”8
The rule allowing police officers to search a vehicle
following a lawful arrest is well-established.
In New York v.
Belton,9 police officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic offense
and ordered the driver and passengers out of the vehicle.
Each
was placed in handcuffs and stood outside of the vehicle while
officers searched the passenger compartment.
Officers searched
a leather jacket located inside the vehicle and found drugs in a
pocket.
The Court upheld the search as a valid search incident
to a lawful arrest which did not violate the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The
Supreme Court stated that the passenger compartment of the car
was within the arrestees’ immediate control and further held
that not only can police officers search the passenger
7
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App. 2000).
8
Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1979).
9
453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 678 (1981).
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compartment of a vehicle,10 but they may also examine the
contents of any containers found inside the vehicle.
“Such a
container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have.”11
In United States v. White,12 the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recognized the Belton rule.
In White, the
suspect was already handcuffed and secured in a police cruiser
when the search was performed.
The Court noted that even where
the arrestee is no longer in reach of the vehicle, a search is
valid as a search incident to arrest.
The Court clarified that
in a search incident to arrest, police officers can search any
area that is or was in the arrestee’s immediate control at the
time of the arrest.
The trial court’s reliance upon United States v.
Welch,13 as support for its decision to grant the motion to
suppress is misplaced.
Welch was passing counterfeit bills at a
casino when she and her co-defendant were detained and
10
See Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 744 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1987).
11
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
12
871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1989).
13
4 F.3d 761 (1993).
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questioned and then placed in separate rooms.
The co-defendant
gave officers permission to search a vehicle that he and Welch
had traveled in together.
Security officers located a purse in
the trunk of the vehicle and a subsequent search of the purse
revealed counterfeit bills.
to her.
Welch admitted the purse belonged
She was thereafter arrested.
In this case, Rose was arrested prior to the search of
the vehicle in which she had been an occupant.
It is of no
consequence that Danny gave permission to search the vehicle.
If an officer has made a lawful arrest of an occupant of a
vehicle, the officer can conduct a search of the passenger
compartment of that vehicle and any containers therein, even if
the suspect is detained in a police cruiser away from the
vehicle.
Likewise, Rose has misapplied the decision of Clark v.
Commonwealth.14
In Clark, the driver of the vehicle, Nutter, was
stopped and arrested for driving without a valid driver’s
license.
Approximately 40 minutes later, after Nutter had been
placed in the police cruiser, the officer conducted a search of
his vehicle.
In granting the motion to suppress, the trial
court found that the search was not limited to the area within
Nutter’s immediate control.
The trial court distinguished Belton
because Nutter’s arrest was made for a minor traffic violation
14
868 S.W.2d 101 (Ky.App. 1993).
-7-
rather than a serious crime as in Belton, and the search in
Belton took place immediately after the driver and passengers
exited the vehicle and were arrested.
Clark noted that the
search of the vehicle could not have been incident to Nutter’s
arrest because he was arrested outside of the vehicle and placed
immediately into the police cruiser and there was no belief that
Nutter could have gone back to the vehicle.
However, Clark is inconsistent with federal case law
regarding searches incident to arrest.
The Court concluded that
the passenger compartment did not come within Nutter’s area of
immediate control because he was arrested outside the car.
However, as stated in White, upon arrest, officers can search
the area that is or was in an arrestee’s immediate control.
In
Clark, the passenger compartment was within Nutter’s immediate
control when the officer initiated contact.
Here, Rose was
stopped while riding in the vehicle, and according to White, the
passenger compartment could be searched because it was in Rose’s
immediate control when the vehicle was stopped.
Also, the
search in this case was contemporaneous to the arrest, unlike
the 40-minute lapse of time from the arrest to the search in
Clark.
Therefore, we hold that the search of Rose’s purse,
and other containers located within the vehicle, was valid as a
search incident to arrest because Rose was a recent occupant of
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the vehicle when the deputy initiated contact and because Rose
was lawfully arrested before the search.
Even though Danny gave
permission for the vehicle to be searched, the search of the
containers challenged by Rose was valid incident to Rose’s
lawful arrest.
Accordingly, the order of the Estill Circuit Court is
reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
J. Brandon Pigg
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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