UNITED PROPANE GAS, INC. v. FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; LAW FIRM OF SCOTT B. YOUNG; THE LAW FIRM OF RENDIGS, FRY, KIELEY & DENNIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 16, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001101-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-001111-MR
UNITED PROPANE GAS, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00217
FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY; LAW FIRM OF SCOTT B.
YOUNG; THE LAW FIRM OF RENDIGS,
FRY, KIELEY & DENNIS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: WINE, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGES.1
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: United Propane Gas, Inc. (UPG), appeals from
orders of the McCracken Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Federated Mutual
Insurance Company (Federated) (Appeal No. 2005-CA-001111-MR) and the law firm of
Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judges by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
1
Rendigs, Fry, Kieley, & Dennis (Rendigs, Fry) (Case No. 2005-CA-001101). UPG
alleges that Federated, UPG’s insurance company, breached the insurance policy and
acted in bad faith by settling a lawsuit filed by a UPG customer following a propane gas
explosion and that Rendigs, Fry engaged in professional malpractice in its representation
of UPG in the lawsuit. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gasper River Propane Gas, Inc. (Gasper River), is a subsidiary of UPG. On
November 19, 2001, Gasper River made a propane gas delivery of 300 gallons to one of
its customers, Joe Brown, in Simpson County, Kentucky. The delivery was made by
Gasper River employee Bud Davenport. Shortly after the delivery, Brown attempted to
light his water heater and an explosion and fire occurred.2 Brown was seriously injured
as a result of the incident and suffered second and third degree burns over 30 percent of
his body, including his face and hands.3 The residence was also totally consumed by the
fire.
Brown and his wife, Dorothy, filed a personal injury lawsuit naming, as
amended, Gasper River and UPG as defendants. The Browns sought damages as follows:
past medical expenses - $260,000; future medical expenses - $100,000; past pain and
suffering - $3,500,000; future pain and suffering - $2,000,000; loss of consortium It is alleged by UPG that Brown had illegally bought and installed the water heater and that
this would be a significant factor in allocating fault for the explosion.
2
The record also refers to an amputation; however, the details of the amputation are not clear
from the record.
3
2
$1,000,000; property damage – unknown; punitive damages - $2,800,000. Thus, the
Browns sought damages of $9,660,000 plus an additional amount for property damages.4
At the time of the accident, the propane companies were covered by a
commercial general liability policy issued by Federated providing $2,000,000 in coverage
and a commercial umbrella liability policy, also issued by Federated, providing
$20,000,000 in coverage. The policy also provided that Federated would supply legal
counsel to defend in the event of a lawsuit covered under the policy. The Brown lawsuit
was so covered.
In compliance with its obligation to provide legal counsel, Federated hired
the law firm of Rendigs, Fry, whose offices are located in Cincinnati, Ohio. At UPG’s
suggestion that local counsel should also be assigned to the case, Federated hired the law
firm of English, Lucas, Priest, and Owsley of Bowling Green, Kentucky. Later, UPG, at
its own expense, hired the law firm of Stinson, Morrison, and Hecker, LLP, of Kansas
City, Missouri, a firm specializing in propane gas litigation.
The matter went through mediation, at which time the Brown’s sought
$4,500,000 to settle. On February 13, 2003, Federated settled the lawsuit filed by the
Browns for $2,500,000. Following the settlement, Federated cancelled UPG’s insurance
policy, and UPG’s replacement insurance with another carrier was at a significantly
higher premium because of the Brown settlement.
On March 1, 2004, UPG filed a lawsuit in the McCracken Circuit Court.
Named as defendants were Federated; Scott B. Young, a claims adjuster for Federated;
4
The destroyed residence is described in the record as “modest.”
3
and Rendigs, Fry. As against Federated, the complaint alleged (1) breach of contract for
“failing to properly investigate the Brown claim, improperly refusing UPG to retain
independent counsel, [and] unreasonably settling a claim for an amount far in excess of
its value knowing that UPG would be damaged when future coverage was obtained” and
(2) bad faith based upon substantially the same reasons. As against Rendigs, Fry, UPG
alleged legal malpractice for providing legal services in the Brown litigation in a
negligent manner. As against Young, the complaint alleged agent malpractice for
breaching his duty to properly process the Brown claim. Damages were identified as the
increased annual insurance premiums in the amount of $1,600,000 UPG was required to
pay following the Brown settlement. The defendants answered, denying liability under
the claims.
In due course the defendants moved for summary judgment. On May 3,
2005, the circuit court, by separate orders, granted summary judgment to Federated and
Rendigs, Fry.5 UPG filed separate notices of appeal to the orders. Because the two
appeals involve the same circuit court case number and the same factual background, we
address them together.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996); Kentucky Rules
The summary judgment orders do not reference Young, and UPG raises no issues concerning
him in this appeal. We accordingly presume that UPG has abandoned its claim against Young.
5
4
of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. “The trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only if it
appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor.” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.
App. 2001), citing Steelvest v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480-82 (Ky.
1991).
“The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary
judgment to present ‘at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.’” Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 436, citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at
482. The trial court “must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if a real issue exists.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. The Kentucky Supreme
Court has held that the word “impossible,” as set forth in the standard for summary
judgment, is meant to be “used in a practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Lewis, 56
S.W.3d at 436. “Because, summary judgment involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the
trial court's decision and will review the issue de novo.” Scifres, supra.6
UPG contends that these appeals should be reviewed pursuant to the judgment on the pleadings
standard applicable to CR 12.03. However, because the motions for summary judgments, and
the responses thereto, contained matters outside of the pleadings, and were therefore considered
by the circuit court in its decision, the appeals should be reviewed pursuant to the summary
judgment standard. When matters outside the pleadings are considered in ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the motion is converted to one for summary judgment. See Bowlin v. Thomas, 548
S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky.App. 1977).
6
5
APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-001111-MR
In Appeal No. 2005-CA-001111-MR, UPG contends that the circuit court
erred by granting summary judgment to Federated upon its claims of breach of contract
and bad faith.
Breach of Contract
Interpretation and construction of an insurance contract is a matter of law
for the court. See Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 810
(Ky.App. 2000). In the absence of ambiguities that call the meaning of the policy into
question or a statute to the contrary, the terms of a policy of insurance are to be enforced
as written. Goodman v. Horace Mann Insurance Company, 100 S.W.3d 769, 772
(Ky.App. 2003). Unless the terms employed in the policy have acquired a technical
meaning in law, they are to be interpreted “according to the usage of the average man and
as they would be read and understood by him in light of the prevailing rule that
uncertainties must be resolved in favor of the insured.” Fryman v. Pilot Life Insurance
Company, 704 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Ky. 1986).
UPG’s Commercial General Liability Coverage policy with Federated
contains the following provision:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or
“property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will
have the right and duty to defend the insured against any
“suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no
duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages
for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this
insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion,
6
investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or
“suit” that may result. . . . (Emphasis added).
The policy language “We may, at our discretion, investigate any
‘occurrence’ and settle any claim or ‘suit’ that may result,” according to the usage of the
average man and as it would be read and understood by him, vests Federated with the
right to settle a claim according to its best judgment.7
When the policy contains a right to settle clause such as the policy at issue
here, the insurer is authorized to compromise or settle any claim it considers just and
advantageous providing it acts in good faith in so doing. American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. J.
F. Schneider & Son, Inc., 307 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ky. 1957), overruled on other grounds
by Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1976).
Under Kentucky law, in order to recover in any action based on breach of a
contract, a plaintiff must show the existence and the breach of a contractually imposed
duty. Strong v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 240 Ky. 781, 43 S.W.2d 11, 13 (1931).
UPG cites us to no specific contract provision it alleges Federated to have breached;
however, “[i]n every contract, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.” Ranier v. Mount Sterling National Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ky. 1991).
The covenant imposes a duty on the parties to do everything necessary to carry out the
purposes and provisions of the contract. Id., citing Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Jones, 262
S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1953). However, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
The umbrella policy contained the language “[w]e may make any investigation and settlement
of any claim or suit we deem expedient.” This language would likewise be understood by the
average person as vesting Federated with the discretion to settle a claim according to its best
judgment.
7
7
prevent a party from exercising its contractual rights. Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of
Georgetown, Kentucky v. Willmott Hardwoods, Inc., 171 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Ky. 2005). Since
Federated had a right to settle under the contract and therefore was merely exercising a
contractual right, and UPG has otherwise cited us to no specific policy provision alleged
to have been breached, we affirm the circuit court’s award of summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim.
Bad Faith
As concerns UPG’s bad faith claim, we can find no Kentucky case
corresponding to the claim as raised by UPG. However, the elements of a bad faith claim
under the more common situation - an insurer’s failure to pay a claim to a third party - is
stated as follows:
“[A]n insured must prove three elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for alleged refusal in bad faith
to pay the insured's claim: (1) the insurer must be obligated to
pay the claim under the terms of the policy; (2) the insurer
must lack a reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the
claim; and (3) it must be shown that the insurer either knew
there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim or acted
with reckless disregard for whether such a basis existed. . . .
Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993).
From the foregoing we may extrapolate the following test for the type of case involved
herein:
“[A]n insured must prove three elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for alleged settlement in bad
faith of a claim against the insured over its objection: (1) the
insurer must have settled the claim over the insured’s
objection; (2) the insurer must have lacked a reasonable basis
in law or fact for settling the claim, both as to liability and
8
amount; and (3) it must be shown that the insurer either knew
there was no reasonable basis for settling the claim, both as to
liability and amount, or acted with reckless disregard for
whether such a basis existed.
Under the foregoing test, we believe the circuit court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Federated. The present record is replete with information
and facts from the Brown case that demonstrate that Fidelity had a reasonable basis for
settling the Brown claim based upon the liability of UPG. For example, in response to a
discovery request by UPG seeking identification of the negligent acts of UPG/Gasper
River, the Browns responded as follows:
1. Defendants did not properly educate their employees about
their customer’s equipment and needs, in that they did not
have any practice in place to verify safe equipment, the age of
equipment, the condition of elements of the system, etc. A
fairly minimal inspection of each new customer’s systems,
from the tank to the appliances, would have provided a
baseline with which individual delivery persons could
compare what they observe. Bud Davenport’s testimony
points this out very clearly.
2. Defendants failed to identify and act with respect to outof-date and dangerous equipment in the Browns’ propane
system. Whether Defendants wish to be in the service
business or not, they did not meet the standard of care when
Bud Davenport failed to take steps he was trained to take,
including a check for the existence of a second stage
regulator. Defendants are in the safety business.
3. Defendants’ agent did not inspect the Browns’ tank, let
alone the rest of the system. The basis for this contention is
the testimony of Bud Davenport and the company documents
produced by counsel. Defendants should have addressed the
flow of propane into a “T” intersection underground, which
would not normally advise the average customer of a
problem. One properly trained in propane systems would
have immediately perceived the configuration of the piping
9
around the low pressure regulator as a problem. According to
Mr. Small, President of UPG and Gasper River, it “wasn’t
pretty.” It is unacceptable in the industry for delivery persons
to have ignored the collar and lid above the underground tank,
which, according to Mr. Davenport, would have caused him
to be curious and investigate. The plain presence of another
vessel opposite the service line leading to the house, should
point up several other potential problems, including another
source for leaks and odorant fade.
4. Defendants did not adequately train their employees,
including Mr. Davenport and, as of the time of this writing,
Mr. Steve Perdue. Davenport was not properly trained to
respond to information from customers concerning propane
safety issues. Davenport’s testimony reveals his negligence
in responding to the Browns’ out of gas situation. He did not
properly respond to other statements he recalls Mr. Brown
making.
5. Defendants’ safety training program is inadequate and
does not meet the standard of care among reasonably prudent
propane distributors because it was not carried out in practice,
but existed almost completely on paper. Defendants did not
insure that employees like Bud Davenport stayed current with
company policies and stated company safety philosophy.
6. Bud Davenport took no steps to identify the destination of
the service line, or observe the presence of another,
underground storage vessel tied together with the aboveground vessel. These simple steps are required by safe
practice and well-known to the industry. There was pressure
on the underground tank at the time of delivery, and this
would have been easily visible to someone curious about the
route the propane would take once it was out of the tank.
This would have been further reason not to fill the tank, but
instead, to investigate the integrity and the extent of the
system.
8. Defendants’ refusal to perform service functions, even in
situations where their internal standards and industry
standards call for it; and in situations where it is clear a
customer cannot safely burn the propane Defendants deliver,
is a breach of the standard of care. That standard is embodied
10
in the Codes and industry standards and the Defendants have
adopted that standard in their publications. The depositions
of Eric Small and Bud Davenport bear this out.
9. Defendants did not instill in their employees the
importance of thorough customer education and training
when delivering propane. Had Mr. Davenport offered even to
show Mr. Brown how to light pilots, the incident may well
not have occurred. In this set of circumstances, however, it
was incumbent on Mr. Davenport to go into the dwelling and
take several active steps, including lighting the water heater
and furnace. Defendants’ practice of compensating delivery
drivers in part by commission (override on number of gallons
delivered), created an atmosphere in which drivers like Mr.
Davenport have no incentive to spend necessary time with
customers. Instead, the exact opposite motivation is pressed
on them by the Defendants.
10. There is no evidence the propane Bud Davenport
delivered to the Browns was sufficiently odorized, so as to
meet industry and governmental standards. There is no
objective evidence that Mr. Davenport verified the smell of
the propane at the Browns. In addition, one ancillary benefit
of requiring the distributor’s personnel to enter the residence
is that he may have several exposures to the fuel as he is
closing and re-opening the valves at the various appliances.
This is a very useful exercise to gauge the presence of air in
lines, dilution of propane with air, etc., in a system that has
been dormant and is freshly pressurized. This was not done.
11. Defendants breached the provisions of KARS Title 815,
Chapter 10:06, specifically, but not limited to, Section 9.
Defendants may have violated provisions of Chapter 234 of
Kentucky Revised Statutes relating to propane safety.
While we recognize that the foregoing is limited to a presentation of the
plaintiffs’ theory of the case, nevertheless, their theory sets forth, at a minimum, a
reasonable basis for Federated to conclude that a jury might assign fault to UPG/Gasper
River for the occurrence.
11
Also contained in the record is an e-mail dated December 4, 2002, from
counsel of the Kansas City law firm Stinson, Morrison, and Hecker, a firm retained by
UPG at its own expense which specializes in propane gas litigation, to in-house counsel
for UPG. The e-mail expresses concern that UPG had failed to provide a particular
manual to Gasper River. The e-mail further states, “[t]he more I think about it the more I
am concerned about UPG and punitives.” Hence, counsel for the law firm retained by
UPG specializing in propane gas litigation is concerned not only with a jury finding of
liability based upon negligence, but punitive damages based upon gross negligence.
Further, the record discloses that Davenport’s supervisor believed that the company had a
duty to inspect a customer’s propane system and that he would have “red tagged”
Brown’s tank because it was empty when the propane delivery was made. In summary,
Federated had a reasonable basis for settling the claim based upon its determination that
UPG was subject to liability.
The record also demonstrates that Federated had a reasonable basis for
settling for the amount of $2,500,000. Brown’s burns were serious. The record discloses
that as a result of the fire and explosion Brown suffered second and third degree burns
over 30% of his body including his face and hands. Such burn injuries would palpably
result in significant pain and suffering and thereby risk a significant jury award for those
injuries. Moreover, there is a reference in the record that Brown underwent an
amputation, though it is not clear what the amputation involved. In addition, Brown
incurred over $260,000 in medical expenses. Further, the residence was totally
consumed by the fire. And finally, as previously noted, counsel for Stinson, Morrison,
12
and Hecker, a law firm specializing in propane litigation, expressed a concern that UPG
was at risk for punitive damages.
While UPG asserts that the settlement amount was clearly excessive, a
party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rely merely on the unsupported
allegations of his pleadings, but is required to present “some affirmative evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Hallahan v. The Courier
Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Ky.App. 2004).
We note that there is an inherent safeguard against excessive settlement in a
case like this because of the insurance company’s economic self-interest in not entering
into a settlement unless it would be financially advantageous to do so. Further, UPG has
cited to no evidence of record that the sum settled for, $2,500,000, was unreasonable.
For example, it has cited us to no jury award studies or expert legal testimony which
would demonstrate that the settlement amount was excessive. At best, UPG has merely
identified a difference in opinion as to the worth of the Brown lawsuit. A difference of
opinion, however, does not demonstrate bad faith. Rather, this difference of opinion
simply underscores the facts that the policy provision provided Federated the discretion
to settle and that Federated was merely exercising its rights under that provision.
Moreover, as noted by Federated, and unrebutted by UPG, UPG, for an
additional premium, could have obtained a term in the policy which would have given it
the right to approve a settlement. Having not done so, and having adduced no objective
evidence that the settlement amount was excessive, it should not now be heard to
complain over a mere difference of opinion concerning the worth of the Brown lawsuit.
13
In light of the foregoing, as a matter of law, Federated had a reasonable
basis for settling the claim - both as to liability and amount - instead of risking a jury trial
with the attendant possibility of a greater award. UPG has presented no affirmative
evidence demonstrating that Federated did not have a reasonable basis for settling the
Brown’s claim. As such, the circuit court did not err by granting Federated summary
judgment on UPG’s bad faith claim.
APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-001101-MR
In Appeal No. 2005-CA-001101-MR, UPG contends that the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Rendigs, Fry. UPG argues that there
are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Rendigs, Fry breached its duty to
UPG in providing legal representation in the Brown case.
A plaintiff in a legal malpractice case has the burden of proving: “1) that
there was an employment relationship with the defendant/attorney; 2) that the attorney
neglected his duty to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably competent attorney acting
in the same or similar circumstances; and (3) that the attorney's negligence was the
proximate cause of damage to the client.” Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Ky.
2003). Based on these factors, a legal malpractice case is the “suit within a suit.” Id.
“To prove that the negligence of the attorney caused the plaintiff harm, the plaintiff must
show that he/she would have fared better in the underlying claim; that is, but for the
attorney's negligence, the plaintiff would have been more likely successful.” Id.
In its motion for summary judgment before the circuit court, and before us,
Rendigs, Fry contends that because Federated independently chose to exercise its right
14
under the insurance policy to settle the claim, UPG is unable to establish causation for the
damages alleged in its lawsuit against the law firm (an increase in premiums as a result of
the settlement). We agree.
UPG cites to various factors in support of its allegation of breach of duty;
however, as noted in our discussion in Appeal No. 2005-CA-00111-MR, Federated
lawfully exercised its right to settle the case under the terms of the insurance policy.
Consequently, causation for the increase in premiums - the damages claimed in the
present lawsuit - cannot be attributed to the representation provided by Rendigs, Fry.
UPG cites us to nothing in the record which would support the notion that Rendigs, Fry
had the authority to prevent Federated from settling the lawsuit. Since Federated could
settle the Brown lawsuit under the terms of the policy, Rendigs, Fry’s representation of
UPG in the Brown litigation was not a cause of its subsequent increase in insurance
premiums. See New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron, 99
Cal.App.4th 799, 802 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 2002).
As a separate basis for affirming summary judgment, we note that UPG has
failed to provide expert testimony that Rendigs, Fry breached the standard of care owed
to UPG in the Brown litigation. We acknowledge that the rule in this Commonwealth is
that expert testimony is not essential in malpractice cases where the negligence is
sufficiently apparent that a layman using his own general knowledge would have no
difficulty recognizing it. Stephens v. Denison, 150 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Ky.App. 2004).
However, this is not such a case, and expert testimony would have been necessary to
15
assist the jury in assessing UPG’s allegations concerning Rendigs, Fry’s negligence in the
Brown litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the McCracken Circuit Court
granting summary judgment to Federated Mutual Insurance Company and the law firm of
Rendigs, Fry, Kieley & Dennis are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Todd A. Farmer
L. Lansden King
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE FEDERATED
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY:
Michael D. Risley
Jack A. Jeziorski
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE RENDIGS,
FRY, KIELEY & DENNIS, LLP
Edward H. Stopher
Tiara B. Silverblatt
Clinton J. Elliott
16
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.