MICHAEL ALLEN HALLUM v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 11, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001636-MR
MICHAEL ALLEN HALLUM
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00061
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Michael Allen Hallum appeals from a judgment of conviction and
final sentencing entered by the Logan Circuit Court on June 24, 2004, in which Hallum
was convicted, after a jury trial, of five counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, a Class
D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to serve a total of fifteen years in state
prison. On appeal, Hallum first argues that the victim testified about other uncharged
acts of sexual contact in violation of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b).
Second, Hallum argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a mistrial
due to a social worker's testimony that she found the victim believable and credible.
Third, Hallum argues that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial due to the
prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument. Fourth, he contends that the trial court
erred by allowing an unqualified juror to sit on the jury, and lastly that the trial court
erred when it expressed an improper opinion regarding Hallum's guilt. After a careful
review of the record, we find no error and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2000, the victim, C.K., told her mother that from age six
until age twelve, she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, Michael Allen Hallum.
C.K.'s mother contacted the Cabinet for Families and Children, now the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services, and a social worker, Missy Perry, investigated C.K.'s
allegations of abuse. While meeting with Perry and Detective Fitts of the Kentucky State
Police, C.K. divulged four specific incidents of sexual contact with Hallum and one
incident of attempted rape. Id. at 18. After Perry and Detective Fitts completed their
investigation, a Logan County grand jury indicted and charged Hallum with four counts
of sexual abuse in the first degree, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.110, and one
count of rape in the first degree, KRS 510.040.
On April 22, 2004, Hallum's case proceeded to trial. At trial, the
Commonwealth presented no physical evidence regarding the alleged sexual abuse;
instead, the Commonwealth relied upon the testimony of C.K., C.K.'s friend, C.K.'s
mother, social worker Missy Perry, and Detective Fitts. While on the stand, C.K.
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testified in detail about incidents of sexual abuse. She also testified that the abuse
occurred on a regular basis and that Hallum had molested her approximately fifteen-toforty times over a six-year period. After hearing the evidence, the jury convicted Hallum
of five counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. The jury recommended that Hallum
serve three years on each count, consecutively, for a total of fifteen years. At Hallum's
final sentencing, the trial court sentenced Hallum in accordance with the jury's
recommendation.
II. ANALYSIS
A. APPELLANT'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hallum's first assignment of error addresses the trial court's decision
allowing testimony regarding prior bad acts. When reviewing a trial court's evidentiary
decision, we will not disturb the lower court's ruling unless it has abused its discretion.
Colston Investment Co. v. Home Supply Co., 74 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Ky. App. 2001) (citing
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000)). If a trial
court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles, only then has it abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
2. PRIOR BAD ACTS CLAIM.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave Hallum notice that it intended to
have C.K. testify that Hallum had molested her fifteen-to-forty times over a six-year
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period. On the morning of trial, in the trial court's chamber, Hallum pointed out that such
testimony would be evidence of prior bad acts. In chambers, C.K. told the trial court that
when the various incidents occurred her brother was present but never witnessed anything
because he was usually napping. She also stated that the incidents always occurred while
her mother was at work. The trial court decided that the proposed testimony was
admissible as evidence of motive, opportunity, preparation, or plan under the exceptions
set forth in KRE 404(b)(1). In addition, the trial court determined that C.K.'s proposed
testimony was admissible pursuant to the one exception set forth in KRE 404(b)(2)
allowing testimony that is inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the
case.
At trial, C.K. testified in detail regarding five incidents of abuse committed
by Hallum. According to C.K., the first incident occurred when she was in the fourth
grade. C.K. had asked Hallum for a new pair of tennis shoes. Hallum told her that he
would get her the shoes if she would do something for him. He then took C.K. into her
bedroom, removed her clothes, held her down, and fondled her breasts and vagina for
approximately fifteen-to-twenty minutes. According to C.K., at the time of the incident,
her mother was at work and her brother, who was five years younger than her, was
napping. C.K. testified that the second incident occurred when Hallum took her into a
guest bedroom. Once there, Hallum removed C.K.'s clothes, held her down, and fondled
her vagina. According to C.K., her mother was at work and her brother was either asleep
or not there. C.K. testified that the third incident occurred while she was lying on the
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living room floor watching television. According to C.K.'s testimony, Hallum
approached her from behind and picked her up by her ankles. He then rubbed her
buttocks up and down on his erect penis. C.K. testified that during this incident, she was
clothed. According to C.K., the fourth incident occurred when Hallum entered her
bedroom, lowered his pants, and sat down on her bed. He then removed her pants and
underwear, and, holding her from behind, he lowered C.K. onto his erect penis in an
attempt to force sexual intercourse. C.K. testified that she screamed and ran from the
room. C.K. testified that the fifth incident occurred around the time of Christmas. C.K.
stated that while she was in the garage, Hallum entered the garage, cornered her, and took
off her clothes. Hallum then fondled C.K.'s vagina for twenty-to-thirty minutes.
According to C.K., she escaped Hallum by running outside while still naked.
In addition, C.K. testified that these five incidents were not the only ones.
According to C.K.'s testimony, Hallum molested her not less than fifteen times but no
more than forty times. C.K. pointed out that all the incidents occurred at the same house
and all the incidents occurred when her mother was at work and her brother was asleep.
C.K. testified that during each incident, Hallum would hold her down and fondled her
vagina except for the one time he tried to penetrate her.
On appeal, Hallum argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed C.K. to testify about prior and contemporaneous acts of molestation committed
by Hallum against C.K. Hallum insists that the Commonwealth failed to establish the
proper foundation to introduce C.K.'s testimony as required by Billings v.
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Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky. 1992). According to Hallum, the
Commonwealth had to show that there was such a high degree of similarity between the
charged and uncharged acts that it established a direct relationship between the charged
and uncharged acts that was independent of the defendant's character.
According to KRE 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential
to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
party.
However, despite this rule, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that
evidence of similar acts perpetrated against the same victim is almost always admissible
to prove intent or plan. Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002). In
Noel, the victim testified that the defendant had sexually abused her “more than one
time.” Id. The Supreme Court held the victim's testimony did not violate the prohibition
found in KRE 404(b) against the introduction of evidence regarding uncharged prior bad
acts. Id.; see also Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Ky. 2002). The
trial court, thus, did not abuse its discretion when it allowed C.K. to testify that Hallum
had molested her on a regular basis and that this had happened approximately fifteen to
forty times.
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B. APPELLANT'S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Hallum's second assignment of error addresses one of the trial
court's evidentiary rulings, we will not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse of
discretion. Colston Investment Co., 74 S.W.3d at 765.
2. CLAIM THAT THE SOCIAL WORKER VOUCHED FOR THE VICTIM'S
CREDIBILITY
At trial, the Commonwealth called Miss Perry, the social worker that
investigated C.K.'s allegations, to testify on the Commonwealth's behalf. During direct
examination, the prosecutor asked Perry if C.K. had displayed “anything emotionally”
when Perry interviewed her. Perry responded that she found C.K. to be “very credible
and very believable in what she was saying[.]” Hallum immediately objected to Perry's
testimony and asked the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard it. The trial court
sustained Hallum's objection and informed the jury that it was improper for one witness
to address another witness's credibility and admonished the jury to disregard Perry's
testimony.
On appeal, Hallum recognizes that, in general, a jury is presumed to follow
an admonition, but he notes there are two exceptions to that rule. One of those
exceptions is “when there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to
follow the court's admonition and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the
inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant[.]” Johnson v.
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Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003). According to Hallum, Perry was an
expert on sexual abuse, so he reasons that the jury was unlikely to disregard her
testimony. Furthermore, because his defense was actual innocence, Perry's testimony
vouching for C.K.'s credibility devastated his defense. Thus, Hallum concludes that the
admonition was not sufficient and the trial court should have granted a mistrial despite
the fact that Hallum never requested one.
If a criminal defendant claims that he is entitled to a mistrial, then it is
incumbent upon him to make a timely motion with the trial court for such relief. West v.
Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989). In addition, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has previously held that if a party has failed to move for mistrial after objecting
and receiving an admonition from the trial court, then such a failure indicates that the
party was satisfied with the admonition. Id. In the present case, Hallum asked for an
admonition regarding Perry's testimony, and he received that admonition as requested.
Furthermore, the record indicates that Hallum never requested a mistrial. Hallum now
contends that the admonition was not sufficient to cure the error and insists that the trial
court should have declared a mistrial. However, Hallum received the relief that he
requested at trial, so he cannot now ask for further relief on appeal. See Templeman v.
Commonwealth, 785 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1990). Because Hallum received the
requested relief from the trial court, there was no abuse of discretion.
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C. APPELLANT'S THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Hallum's third assignment of error, he alleges that the admonition given
by the trial court did not cure the prosecutor's alleged misconduct. However, it is
presumed that when a trial court admonishes a jury, the jurors will heed the admonition.
Boone v. Commonwealth, 155 S.W.3d 727, 729-730 (Ky. App. 2004).
2. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM
At trial, the prosecutor stated during the Commonwealth's closing
argument, “But I ask you to go back and find these guilty verdicts, and perhaps we can
protect some future young lady[.]” Hallum immediately objected to the prosecutor's
statement about protecting future victims and argued that it suggested that the jury had a
responsibility to protect society and such a suggestion was improper. At the bench,
Hallum's trial counsel asked that the jury disregard the prosecutor's remark, and Hallum's
counsel stated, “I want to ask for a mistrial, I guess.” The trial court then said to
Hallum's counsel, “So you want me to admonish the jury to disregard this.” Hallum's
counsel replied, “This last statement about finding him guilty in order to protect other
people.” The trial court then admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remark
about finding Hallum guilty in order to protect other people.
In his third assignment of error, Hallum first notes that the Supreme Court
of Kentucky has condemned a prosecutor's remarks suggesting that a jury should convict
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a criminal defendant in order to protect future victims. Ice v. Commonwealth, 667
S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984). Because such remarks are condemned, Hallum insists that the
trial court's admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks was not sufficient
to cure the prosecutorial misconduct. Relying on the exceptions found in Johnson, 105
S.W.3d at 441, Hallum argues that prosecutor's remarks created an overwhelming
probability that the jury could not disregard his remarks because the prosecutor left the
words “guilty” and “protect” on a large tablet in front of the jury. According to Hallum
these words acted as a constant reminder to the jury regarding the prosecutor's improper
remarks. In addition, Hallum argues that there was a strong probability that the
prosecutor's remarks were devastating to his defense because the present matter was a
classic “he said/she said” case requiring the jury to resolve the case based on the
credibility of the witnesses.
In Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332, 350 (Ky. 2004), the
defendant made a particular motion in limine, but the trial court never ruled upon the
motion. The Supreme Court held that the issue was not preserved for appeal because the
defendant did not ask the trial court for ruling after initially arguing the motion. Id. In
other words,
[t]he policy of RCr 9.22 and 10.12 is to require a defendant in
a criminal case to present to the trial court those questions of
law which may become issues on appeal. The appellate court
reviews for errors, and a nonruling is not reviewable when the
issue has not been presented to the trial court for decision.
Turner v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. 1970).
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In the present case, in response to the prosecutor's remarks, Hallum
requested both an admonition and a mistrial. Pursuant to Hallum's request, the trial court
admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper remarks. However, the trial
court did not rule on Hallum's request for a mistrial, and Hallum never argued for a
mistrial and never requested a ruling. Thus, Hallum failed to preserve that issue for
appellate review. See Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 350. Because Hallum received the
admonition that he requested and failed to request a ruling on his request for a mistrial,
we must presume the jury heeded the trial court's admonition regarding the prosecutor's
inappropriate comment. Boone, 155 S.W.3d at 729-730. Accordingly, we find no error
regarding this claim.
D. APPELLANT'S FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hallum's fourth assignment of error was not preserved for appeal; therefore,
he asks us to review it pursuant of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
10.26. RCr 10.26 reads:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by
an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised
or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted
upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from
the error.
According to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, palpable error is an
irregularity that affects the substantial rights of a party and will result in a manifest
injustice if it is not addressed by an appellate court. Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95
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S.W.3d 830, 837 (Ky. 2003). In other words, after considering the whole case, if we do
not believe that there is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any
different, then we will deem the irregularity to be non-prejudicial. Id.
2. CLAIM THAT A POTENTIAL JUROR HAD THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL ON
HIS PERSON
During voir dire, the bailiff told the trial court that he thought he smelled
alcohol on the breath of one of the potential jurors. The trial court then informed both
parties about the situation. Two hours later, the trial court called the potential juror to the
bench, and the following exchange occurred:
Trial Court: How are you doing today . . .? Make it alright
today?
Potential Juror: Yes, sir.
Trial Court: The reason I asked you to step up here is that
somebody had mentioned that you might not be feeling very
well today. Are you feeling OK today?
Potential Juror: Yeah, pretty fair.
Trial Court: You feeling fine? OK. Any problems with you
sitting on the case today?
Potential juror: No.
Trial Court: OK. I just want to be sure you're feeling alright.
Alright, any questions from counsel?
After this exchange, neither counsel asked the potential juror any questions,
and the trial court commented that it had not detected the odor of alcohol on the potential
juror's person. Hallum's trial counsel stated that he did not detect the odor of alcohol
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either. Later, the potential juror served on the jury that convicted Hallum, without any
further suspicion of alcohol consumption or questionable behavior.
On appeal, Hallum argues that the trial court erred because it did not
sufficiently investigate the potential juror to determine if alcohol had impaired his ability
to perform his duty as a juror. State v. Hart, 566 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio 1945). In addition,
Hallum opines that the trial court was required to directly ask the potential juror whether
he had consumed alcohol on the morning of the trial and to do so in a timely fashion
because the odor of alcohol dissipates over time.
We note that there is nothing in the record, other than the baliff's
suspicions, to indicate that the potential juror was intoxicated or had even been drinking
alcohol on the morning of Hallum's trial. The trial court stated on the record that he
detected no odor of alcohol and gave Hallum's trial counsel ample opportunity to explore
the possibility that the potential juror had been drinking. However, Hallum's trial counsel
declined the trial court's offer and acknowledged that nothing had surfaced to substantiate
the bailiff’s initial concern.
We are unable to locate any case law in the Commonwealth that directly
addresses this particular issue. Yet, despite this dearth of case law, we believe it is fair
and within constitutional limitations to hold that, absent a showing that a juror is in fact
intoxicated or absent a showing that the consumption of alcohol has prevented said juror
from acting in a reasonable and appropriate manner, the mere suspicion that a juror may
have the odor of alcohol on his person during voir dire does not affect a defendant's
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substantial rights and does not result in manifest injustice. See RCr 10.26;
Schoenbachler, 95 S.W.3d at 837. Thus, we conclude that, in the present case, the mere
suspicion of alcoholic consumption without any further questionable behavior on the part
of a potential juror does not rise to the level of palpable error.
E. APPELLANT'S FIFTH ASSINGMENT OF ERROR
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hallum's fifth assignment of error was not preserved for appeal; therefore,
we review it pursuant to RCr 10.26 for palpable error.
2. CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY EXPRESSED HIS
OPINION REGARDING APPELLANT'S GUILT
According to Hallum, during the bench conference regarding the
prosecutor's comment about protecting future victims, the trial court stated, “I don't want
them, yeah, I want them to focus on the instructions, I want them to find guilt, well, even
though that may be a consequence of finding guilt, if they believed it beyond a reasonable
doubt[.]” Citing and relying on KRS 26A.015(2), Hallum argues that a judge shall
disqualify himself when he has “expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
proceeding.” Citing Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1992), Hallum
reasons that the trial court expressed an opinion regarding the merits of the present case;
thus, the trial court should have declared a mistrial and should have recused himself from
any subsequent re-trial.
It is clear from a review of the complete record, and not just a small section
taken out of context, that the trial court was merely expressing the desire that the jury
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find guilt if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Hallum was guilty. Contrary to
Hallum's argument, this comment was not “an opinion concerning the merits of the
proceeding” but was an appropriate and expected position for a trial court to take.
Furthermore, the trial court made this remark during a bench conference;
thus, the jury never heard it. Additionally, Hallum has failed to cite any other instance
where the trial court appeared to be unfair or partial to either side. We find nothing in the
record to lead us to the conclusion that the trial court acted in any inappropriate manner.
See Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1995). This fragment, taken out
of context, is not sufficient proof for us to decide the trial court was biased in any way.
See Howerton v. Price, 449 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Ky. 1970).
Ultimately, Hallum received a fundamentally fair trial. None of his state or
federal constitutional rights was violated; thus, his substantial rights were not affected,
nor was there any manifest injustice. In the present case, we hold that the trial court's
comments did not rise to the level of palpable error.
III. CONCLUSION
Finding no merit to any of Hallum's assignments of error, we AFFIRM the
judgment of conviction entered by the Logan Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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