EUGENIA SUE WYNN ROBINSON v. ROBERT DALE ROBINSON
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001095-ME
EUGENIA SUE WYNN ROBINSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DEBRA HEMBREE LAMBERT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00088
v.
ROBERT DALE ROBINSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ACREE, BARBER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE:
When the Rockcastle Circuit Court entered a
judgment dissolving the marriage of Eugenia “Gina” Sue Wynn
Robinson (Gina) and Robert Dale Robinson (Dale) on June 23,
2005, it awarded the couple joint custody of their three (3)
minor children with Gina as the “primary custodian.”1
1
On March
As in Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003),
[t]he trial court employed the term “primary custodian.” This is
undoubtedly a misnomer because the trial court awarded joint
custody. Aton v. Aton, Ky.App., 911 S.W.2d 612, 615
(1995)(“There can be no “primary custodian” in the joint custody
context. Joint custody prohibits a court from selecting a
primary custodian from two joint custodians. Such an act
annihilates shared decision-making, a fundamental principle of
joint custody. Although the statement quoted above is a
distortion of the law, the Chalupa [v. Chalupa, Ky., 830 S.W.2d
15, 2006, the circuit court modified the joint custody order by
making Dale the “primary custodian.”
modifying custody.
Gina appeals that order
For the reasons stated, we reverse.
On March 11, 2004, Gina filed her petition for the
dissolution of her fourteen-year marriage to Dale.
Dale had
previously removed himself from the marital residence and
resided for the pendency of this action with his parents.
Both
parties in their initial pleadings expressed a desire for sole
custody of their three (3) minor children.
Dale was first to move the court for an order of
temporary custody.
Prior to the hearing on that motion, the
parties were able to agree on certain issues.
On June 4, 2004,
the court made an entry on its docket sheet2 noting among other
things that mediation had resulted in the parties’ agreement
that Gina was to have possession of the marital residence until
the divorce was final.
Though not specifically stated in the
record, the parties apparently agreed that the children would
reside primarily in the marital residence with Gina.
Notably,
the court entered no temporary custody order nor did the court
order either parent to pay child support.
391 (1992)] opinion reiterates that although one parent may have
primary physical possession, the major decision-making is
shared.”). Accordingly, it is apparent that the trial court
intended to designate [Gina] as the primary residential custodian.
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 773 fn.8. Where the trial court or parties are quoted
in this opinion, the error is retained. Otherwise, the proper term is used.
2
Referred to by the circuit clerk as “Ct. Cal.” or Court Calendar.
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On July 17, 2004, Gina found it necessary to move the
court for temporary child support.
Dale responded on July 28,
2004, by moving the court for his own order that he “be
designated primary custodian” and that he also be awarded
exclusive use of the marital residence.
The court, still
without entering a custodial order, directed the parties to
“maintain status quo.”
Six months later, on January 14, 2005, still with no
custody or support order in place, Gina re-noticed her motion
for temporary child support.
At the hearing on the motion ten
days later, as reflected only on the docket sheet, the court
“set c/s [child support to be paid by Dale] as $575.00 which is
a $50.00 reduction for extra time.”
The “extra time” referenced
was one additional day beyond the standard visitation schedule
that the parties agreed would be Dale’s visitation.
Still, no
custody order was entered.
According to the Mandatory Case Disclosures filed by
Dale and Gina one week before the court’s entry of its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution (Decree),
custody continued to remain an issue.
The first custodial
ruling by the trial court appears in the Decree entered June 23,
2005.
It stated:
The court finds that the best interest of
the children will be served by awarding the
parties joint custody with the mother being
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the primary custodian, and the father having
standard visitation . . . .
The Decree went on to divide the marital and nonmarital assets and debts between the parties.
Finally, the
Decree contains the following relevant provision:
If either party should relocate their
residence more than 150 miles from
Rockcastle County, the time-sharing
arrangement from herein shall be subject to
de nova [sic] review and modification.
Shortly after entry of the Decree, Dale stopped paying
certain debts assigned to him.
Because the parties’ creditors
were not bound by the trial court’s distribution of the parties’
liabilities, the creditors pursued both Gina and Dale for
payment; that is, until Dale filed a petition in bankruptcy on
October 16, 2005.
Gina.
Thereafter, those creditors pursued only
This added $17,501.78 to her liabilities.
She soon was
compelled to list the marital property for sale.
It was about this time that Gina received and had been
contemplating an offer of employment and managerial training
from a Chili’s restaurant chain.
This employment would provide
her and her family with a substantially greater income.
However, if she accepted, she would be required to relocate to
the Memphis, Tennessee area.
On October 17, 2005, Gina brought a motion to modify
Dale’s mid-week visitation before the court because she believed
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that the relocation provision of the Decree required it.
motion was initially heard on October 21, 2005.
The
The court,
however, did not rule on Gina’s motion then or at any time.
Instead, Dale’s counsel requested additional time to
respond to the motion and indicated he would be moving to set
aside the Decree as to custody on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence that Gina desired to move out of state.
He
further informed the court that he realized Fenwick v. Fenwick,
114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003) would normally put the burden on his
client to show the contemplated move would endanger the
children.
He believed, however, that setting aside the Decree
would allow a de novo review of the permanent custody
determination without the need to show endangerment but,
instead, only the best interests of the children.
After hearing from both counsel, the court indicated
Dale’s need to take discovery to determine “whether or not it’s
in the children’s best interest or what the harm might be to
move to Memphis.”
TAPE No. 089; 10/21/05; 9:14:45).
The court
then gave Dale “ten (10) days to file motion for modification.”
Dale’s counsel stuck with his strategy and filed a
“Motion to Set Aside Custody Decree” pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02.
He further requested a
subsequent “de nova [sic] custody hearing pursuant to the
standard of Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.270, rather than
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KRS 403.340 . . . .”
([Appellee’s] Motion to Set Aside Custody
Decree, R.118).
The basis of Dale’s CR 60.02 motion was fraud and
newly discovered evidence.
He claimed he only agreed to allow
Gina to serve as their children’s primary residential custodian
because “during the pendency of this action, [Gina] repeatedly
assured [Dale], the Court, and her own attorney that she had no
plans to leave the state of Kentucky with the children.”
([Appellee’s] Motion to Set Aside Custody Decree, R.118).
Dale’s motion was heard on November 4, 2005.
During
the hearing, Dale’s counsel represented to the trial court that
there was a “clause in their joint decree that if Mrs. Robinson
relocated more than 1203 miles, that we would revisit the issue
of custody de novo.” (TAPE No. 092; 11/4/05; 9:21:35).
The
trial court accepted this representation at face value:
Court:
I guess we could have a de novo
hearing as to custody but the, if
the agreement [sic], and I wasn’t
aware of that, but if the separation
agreement [sic] does have the 120
mile distance provision in it, then
there would be a de novo hearing I
would imagine.
(TAPE No. 092; 11/4/05; 9:24:26).
The court then denied Dale’s CR 60.02 motion.
Without
stating a basis for continuing to consider modification, the
3
The Decree actually said “150 miles,” but this error is irrelevant since the
contemplated move was greater than 400 miles. This irrelevant error was
corrected in the order from which the appeal is taken.
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court ordered “de nova [sic] testimony to be taken by deposition
if Petitioner in fact moves 120 miles from Mt. Vernon per
separation agreement . . . .”
Faced with mounting expenses, Gina did make the
decision to pursue the significantly more lucrative managerialtrack employment with the restaurant chain in Memphis.
On
December 2, 2005, after being informed of Gina’s decision, the
circuit court ordered testimony to be taken by deposition and
submitted to the court.
On March 15, 2006, the trial court, in
pertinent part, ruled as follows:
. . . The parties, by agreement, acknowledge
that should either party relocate more than
150 miles from Rockcastle County, the
custody and visitation issues would be
subject to review and modification.
Petitioner has relocated to the Memphis,
Tennessee area, thus subjecting the decree
to de novo review on these issues.
. . . .
IT IS ORDERED that the custody award,
child support and visitation order be
modified [such] that the parties shall have
joint custody of the minor children . . . .
The father, Robert Dale Robinson, shall be
the primary custodian, and the mother,
Eugenia [sic] Sue Wynn Robinson, shall have
standard visitation . . . except there shall
be no midweek visitation. . . . The mother
testified . . . that her income would be
$35,000 per year. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED
that the mother shall pay child support to
the father in the amount of $710.84 . . . .
It is this order that Gina appeals.
Because the trial court
erred in its interpretation of the June 23, 2005, Decree and in
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its application of law, we must reverse and order enforcement of
the original permanent custody award contained in the Decree.
Child custody relocation litigation is not a new
phenomenon in Kentucky.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 293 Ky.
762, 170 S.W.2d 22, 154 A.L.R. 549 (1943)(“[S]ole question
presented . . . is whether the chancellor erred in modifying the
judgment so as to permit [the custodial parent] to move to
Pennsylvania and take the children with her.”).
The arrival of
the 21st century, however, heralded an accelerated evolution in
this area of the law.
This is true nationally4 as well as in
Kentucky where our courts continue to address increasing numbers
of such cases.5
Unfortunately, despite Kentucky’s recent
legislative efforts,6 Chapter 403 of the Kentucky Revised
4
Linda D. Elrod, Feature, States Differ on Relocation, 28 FAM. ADVOC. 8, 8
(Spring 2006)(“Lawyers and judges have noticed the increase in the number of
custody disputes in which relocation is an issue. The reasons are many: the
steady high-divorce rate; the number of joint-custody and shared-residency
arrangements; the shifting job market; remarriages; and the mobility of
today’s society.”).
5
Despite the Supreme Court’s comment in Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767
(Ky. 2003) that “the relocation issue, at least in the context of sole
custody, has been addressed and settled in Kentucky for more than a decade,”
Id. at 784, Kentucky law in this area continues to evolve at a fast pace.
Since 2000, the Kentucky appellate courts have addressed relocation/custody
issues in some form in the following cases: Crouch v. Crouch, 201 S.W.3d 463
(Ky. 2006); Brockman v. Craig, --- S.W.3d ---, 2006 WL 1951755 (Ky.App.
2006), mot. for disc. rev. filed, (Ky. Aug. 15, 2006)(No. 2006-SC-587-D);
Bowman v. Bowman, --- S.W.3d ---, 2006 WL 658938 (Ky.App. 2006)(Opinion
Final, May 5, 2006); Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517 (Ky.App. 2005); Cox v.
Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky. 2005); Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357, 359
(Ky.App. 2004); Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767, 779 (Ky. 2003); Scheer v.
Zeigler, 21 S.W.3d 807 (Ky.App. 2000). We could add to that list a fair
number of unpublished opinions.
6
In 2001, child custody litigation in Kentucky was significantly affected
when the state legislature amended KRS 403.340. The effect of the amendment
was to soften custody modification requirements when a motion for
modification is filed more than two years after the decree is entered.
Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky.App. 2004). For modification
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Statutes (Dissolution of Marriage ⎯ Child Custody) fails to
specifically address the special problem faced by our courts
when custodial parents desire to relocate with their children
subsequent to divorce.
The vast majority of state legislatures has passed a
wide variety of laws directly addressing the relocation issue;
nearly half require a relocating custodial parent to give
advance notice of the move to the other parent, the court, or
both.7
Kentucky is among the minority of states that have no
specific statute.
Therefore, until our legislature aligns with
the majority of states, we are compelled to address
within two (2) years of the award of permanent custody, the standard remains
as strict now as prior to the amendment.
7
The following states require 30 days’ notice prior to relocation: Florida
(FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(2006)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (2006)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1620 (2006)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§
1653(14) & 1657 (2006)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-217 (2006)), New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. § 40-4-9.1 (2006)), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.5 (2006)).
These states require 45 days’ notice: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 30-3-163 to 167
(2006)), California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 3024 (2006)) and Maryland (MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 9-106 (2006)). States requiring 60 days’ notice are: Arizona (ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-408 (2006)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.4 (2006)),
Missouri (MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2006)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:23-a (2006)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (2006)), Utah (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-37 (2006)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.405, et seq.
(2006)), West Virginia (W.VA. CODE § 48-9-403 (2006)) and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. §
767.481 (2006)). The 2006 session of the Indiana legislature recently
enacted a 90-day notice requirement (IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2.2-3 (2006).
“Reasonable” notice is required in Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-129
(2006)) and Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.159 (2006)). Finally, the
following states specifically address the relocation issue without
implementing a notice requirement: Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/609
(2006)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21D (2006)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
208, § 30 (2006)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.31 (2006)), Minnesota (MINN.
STAT. § 518.195, Subd. 7 (2006)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.200 (2006)), New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (2006)) and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 1409-07 (2006)).
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relocation/custody issues by applying the general custodial
modification statutes, KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350.
KRS 403.340(2) states:
No motion to modify a custody decree shall
be made earlier than two (2) years after its
date, unless the court permits it to be made
on the basis of affidavits that there is
reason to believe that:
(a)
The child's present environment may
endanger seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health; or
(b)
The custodian appointed under the prior
decree has placed the child with a de
facto custodian.
KRS 403.340(2).8
The companion statute, KRS 403.350, states, in
pertinent part:
A party seeking . . . modification of a
custody decree shall submit together with
his moving papers an affidavit setting forth
facts supporting the requested . . .
modification and shall give notice, together
with a copy of his affidavit, to other
parties to the proceeding, who may file
opposing affidavits. . . . The court shall
deny the motion unless it finds that
adequate cause for hearing the motion is
established by the affidavits, in which case
it shall set a date for hearing on an order
to show cause why the requested order or
modification should not be granted.
KRS 403.350.
Taken together, these statutes establish certain clear
prerequisites to the modification of a prior custody decree
where the modification is sought earlier than two years after
8
Formerly KRS 403.340(1).
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its entry.
Specifically, the motion to modify “must be
accompanied by at least two affidavits. [Citation omitted].
If
the applicable requirement is not met, the circuit court is
without authority to entertain the motion.”
S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1999).
Petrey v. Cain, 987
The filing of affidavits,
therefore, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Crouch v. Crouch,
201 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Ky. 2006)(“[T]rial court had no
jurisdiction to modify the [permanent custody] order unless a
motion to modify, along with a supporting affidavit, was filed
in the case.”).
However, before we find that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to modify the Decree regarding custody, we will
first examine the alternative means by which Dale attempted to
obtain custody modification.
As indicated by the comments of Dale’s attorney at the
October 21, 2005, hearing, Dale was aware of the requirement of
KRS 403.340(2) that he show Gina’s contemplated move would
endanger the children.
He sought to avoid both the
jurisdictional and substantive requirements of the statute by
filing a CR 60.02 motion, thereby obviating the need for
affidavits or proof of endangerment.
Dull v. George, 982 S.W.2d
227, 229 (Ky.App. 1998)(When CR 60.02 relief is sought,
requirements of KRS 403.340 do not apply), cited with approval
in Gullion v. Gullion, 163 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Ky. 2005).
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Under proper circumstances, relief from a court’s
final decree of divorce, including an award of custody, is
available by means of a CR 60.02 motion.
S.W.3d 463, 465 fn.2 (Ky. 2006).
Crouch v. Crouch, 201
Had the trial court granted
the extraordinary relief requested in Dale’s CR 60.02 motion,
the custody determination in the Decree would have been a
nullity.
The standard for determining custody then would not
have been a modification under KRS 403.340, but an original
determination of permanent custody under KRS 403.270.
Dull, 982
S.W.2d at 229.
Unfortunately for Dale, the trial court denied his CR
60.02 motion.
Dale did not appeal the trial court’s denial and
for good reason.
Dale’s deposition testimony made it clear that
he knew Gina had developed ties to the Memphis area long before
entry of the Decree.
The fact that relocation was addressed in
the Decree itself is further indication of a contemplated
potential move whether to Memphis or some other destination in
excess of 150 miles away.
Dale’s effort to revisit the custody issue should have
ended with denial of the CR 60.02 motion, but the trial court
continued toward modification and, in doing so, committed
reversible error.
In reviewing the record on appeal, including
the depositions and videotapes of the many hearings, it is clear
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the trial court did not follow KRS 403.340 in reaching its
decision to modify custody.
The trial court appears to have relied on Dale’s
counsel’s representation9 and did not examine the Decree.
If the
court had, the error in interpretation would have been
immediately apparent.
The provision in question permits review
only of the “time-sharing arrangement” – not of the custody
award.
The error mistaking a provision authorizing modification
of “time-sharing” for one authorizing modification of custody is
a decisive, and in this case reversible, error.
The difference is significant since a motion
to modify custody made within two years
after the date of the custody decree must be
made on the basis of affidavits that the
child’s or children’s present environment
may endanger seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health, or that the
custodian under the prior decree has placed
the child with a de facto custodian. KRS
403.340(2). Where the modification is one
of visitation only, however, the court may
grant an order modifying visitation rights
if it would serve the best interests of the
child. KRS 403.320(3).
Crossfield v. Crossfield, 155 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Ky.App. 2005).
Just as KRS 403.320(3) authorizes the court to modify
a visitation order whenever it would serve the best interests of
the child, the parties’ “time-sharing arrangement” can be
9
Having carefully reviewed these representations, they appear more cavalier
than intentional or negligent. Matters of this import, however, should not
be handled cavalierly either.
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similarly modified.10
This is certainly true where the court
anticipated such a need and identified in the decree events that
would trigger reconsideration.
Clearly, Gina was mindful of the correct purpose and
interpretation of the provision when she filed her “Motion to
Modify Mid-Week Visitation.”
The trial court was apparently
confused by the combination of Dale’s response in the form of
his own motion to modify custody and his attorney’s
representation that the Decree permitted such modification.
Our case law clearly holds that custody modification
falls exclusively within the purview of KRS 403.340 and 403.350,
and any other judicially-created “gateways” to custody
modification are inapplicable.
767, 784 (Ky. 2003).
Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d
Consequently, even if the Decree had
contained a provision setting up a standard for modification of
permanent custody, it would be invalid unless it was in complete
harmony with KRS 403.340.
This, however, was not the case.
Because Dale’s pursuit of custody modification
occurred within two years of the award of custody in the Decree,
Dale was required to file a motion pursuant to KRS 403.340(2)
and attach to his motion a minimum of two affidavits with the
10
Strictly speaking, neither joint custodian derives his or her visitation
rights from KRS 403.320. However, we agree with authority that the practice
of renaming visitation “shared time,” “time-sharing,” “parenting time,” or
any other similar term, even as to joint custodians, will not affect the
inherent nature of visitation nor the applicability of KRS 403.320 to modify
it. 16 LOUISE E. GRAHAM & JAMES E. KELLER, KENTUCKY PRACTICE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 22.1
(2nd ed. 1997).
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proper showing.
He failed to do so and the trial court had no
authority to modify custody.
Despite our statement in Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d
357 (Ky.App. 2004) that “Fenwick carries quite limited
precedential weight[,]” id. at 359, the Supreme Court’s holding
in that case remains sound law under KRS 403.340(2) where the
modification is sought within two (2) years of the original
award of permanent custody.
The following passage from Fenwick
applies in this case:
[W]hen a primary residential custodian gives
notice of his or her intent to relocate with
the parties' child, the burden is then upon
any party objecting to file a custody
modification motion within a reasonable time
and after that, to satisfy the modification
standard of KRS 403.340 in order to change
the designation of primary residential
custodian. If no motion is filed within a
reasonable time, the primary residential
custodian may relocate with the parties'
child.
Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d at 786.
pursuant to KRS 403.340.
Dale never pursued modification
In fact, he avoided it.
Custody
should not have been modified and Gina should have been
permitted to relocate with her children.
Furthermore, we have thoroughly examined the record
and see no substantive basis for preventing Gina from relocating
with her children to the Memphis area.
Although the “interaction and
interrelationship” of the children with
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their father and other persons where they
now live is a relevant factor in determining
the likelihood of harm by the proposed
relocation, [footnote omitted] the mere fact
that relocation may affect the frequency of
[Dale’s] time-sharing with his children and
the children's contact with other persons
does not, standing alone, support a finding
that the proposed relocation creates a
likelihood of serious harm to the children.
Id. at 788.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Rockcastle
Circuit Court modifying the joint custody award by designating
Robert Dale Robinson as “primary [residential] custodian” is
REVERSED and the custody order pursuant to which Eugenia Sue
Wynn Robinson is to have primary residential custody of the
children is ordered to be reinstated.
The case is remanded for
an order consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Scott M. Webster
London, Kentucky
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