CARL Q. QUIRE v. SHELBY MOTOR CO., INC.; HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 3, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000862-WC
CARL Q. QUIRE
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-93-91805
SHELBY MOTOR CO., INC.; HON. J.
LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Carl Q. Quire petitions for review of an
opinion of the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board, which
affirmed an opinion and order of an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).
The ALJ had concluded that Quire’s claim for permanent
partial disability benefits was untimely filed under
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statues (KRS) 342.185.
The
statute provides the time-frames within which a claim for
workers’ compensation benefits must be made as follows:
(1)
either within two years of the date of the work-related
accident; (2) or within two years following the suspension of
income benefits if any were made to the injured employee.
Quire received temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits following a workplace accident that occurred on
February 26, 2003.
The ALJ determined that this accident merely
exacerbated an earlier injury that had occurred on October 9,
2002.
The issue on appeal is whether the payment of benefits
for the second injury served to toll the two-year deadline for
filing the claim for workers’ compensation benefits for the
first injury.
The appellee, Shelby Motor Company, Incorporated,
argues that the tolling issue was not adequately preserved for
our review.
Quire has been employed as an automobile technician by
Shelby Motor Company, a Chevrolet dealership, since 1995.
On
February 26, 2003, he slipped on a puddle of oil while he and a
co-worker were carrying an automobile transmission.
Quire fell
onto another transmission, striking his head and shoulders;
meanwhile, the transmission that he and his co-worker had been
carrying fell onto his lower body.
He was rendered unconscious
for a few minutes, and a clear fluid oozed from his nose and
eyes.
He was taken to the hospital emergency room where he was
described as conscious but dazed.
After X-rays and CT scans were performed at the
hospital, he was advised to consult his family physician, Dr.
David Wallace.
and back.
Quire complained of pain in his neck, shoulders,
Dr. Wallace sent Quire to physical therapy and took
him off work.
The therapy eased the pain in Quire’s shoulders
and neck, but the pain in his back persisted and intensified.
Quire received TTD benefits for approximately one month
following the accident; he returned to work on March 30, 2003.
Dr. Wallace instructed him to avoid bending and restricted him
to lifting no more than twenty pounds.
Prior to the accident of February 26, 2003, Quire had
been working between eighty (80) and one hundred twenty (120)
hours every two-week pay period on a commission basis.
After
returning to work, he was able to average only forty (40) to
sixty (60) hours every two weeks due to the restrictions on
bending and lifting.
His supervisor, Mark Stivers, the general
manager of Shelby Motor Company, testified that Quire is “as
straight as they come” and a “topnotch mechanic” who performs
most of the dealership’s important warranty work.
Because Shelby Motors wanted to keep Quire in its
employment, it placed him on a salary about two months after his
injury.
As a result, he now earns the equivalent of what he
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would have earned if he were still working eighty (80) hours biweekly on a commission basis.
Even under this arrangement,
however, Quire testified that he earns approximately $4,000.00
to $5,000.00 less per year than he did before the accident.
Quire filed a claim for workers compensation benefits on March
16, 2005 -- two weeks shy of two years of the last payment of
the TTD benefits.
Prior to the hearing, the employer stipulated:
(1)
that the injury occurred or became disabling on February 26,
2003; and (2) that Quire had given due and timely notice of the
injury.
In the medical reports submitted by Quire and through
his own testimony, evidence was revealed that he had suffered
other back injuries at work about five months before the
accident of February 26, 2003.
The first of these incidents
occurred on October 9, 2002, when Quire strained his back
working with a transmission.
attention at that time.
He did not seek any medical
Two days later, he slipped in a puddle
of oil and went down on his knee.
He consulted a physician and
was placed in physical therapy for two weeks.
restrictions were placed upon him.
No medical
He missed one day of work
and testified that he recovered completely from the fall -except that his back would become slightly sore when he
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performed heavy work.
He did not file workers’ compensation
claims in connection with either of these accidents.
Some of the medical evidence, however, indicated a
connection between the accidents of October 2002 and the fall on
February 26, 2003.
Dr. Mark A. Myers, an orthopedic specialist
who saw Quire at the recommendation of Dr. Wallace, stated in
his report of April 24, 2003, that:
[Quire] reports a 3 or 4 year history of
episodic, mild back pain with no prior
severe symptoms. In October of last year,
he developed severe back pain after lifting.
His symptoms then resolved in about three
weeks. In February of this year, he was
lifting and fell when he developed a
recurrent pain “everywhere.” He reports a
constant, dull lumbosacral pain since then
with no change over time.
In a report dated August 19, 2003, Dr. Tinsley
Stewart, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation,
stated that Quire “was injured in two separate accidents on the
job.
The first occurred on October 9, 2002.”
Dr. Stewart noted
that Quire experienced significant low back pain immediately
after the October injury, that he was treated with physical
therapy, and that the pain had resolved by the time he returned
to work.
Dr. Stewart assigned a permanent 13% impairment of the
whole person and found that “[i]t is within reasonable medical
probability that the patient injured himself in the first
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[October 2002] and reinjured himself in the second [February
2003] fall while on the job.”
At the hearing, the ALJ, sua sponte, raised the issue
of amending the claim to include the October injury.
The
following exchange took place:
ALJ: I’ve got a question here, guys.
Mr. Levy [attorney for the claimant]: Okay.
ALJ: Are we dealing with two injuries? I
seem to keep hearing about an October 9,
2002 injury.
Mr. Levy: We – we didn’t make a claim for
it, and I don’t think that there was ever .
. .
ALJ: Okay.
Mr. Levy: We didn’t make a claim for it, and
I think it’s probably too late to amend.
ALJ: Do what?
Mr. Levy: Too late to amend.
ALJ: Okay.
Mr. Levy: I mean, I – I can ask to amend and
include that, but I think that’s putting
Pete on – that’s putting Pete on – that’s
putting Mr. Glauber on the spot too, because
. . .
Mr. Glauber [attorney for the employer]:
Well, I mean, by this point in time . . .
ALJ: It’s barred anyway.
Mr. Glauber: It’s barred by the statute of
limitations, but – year, 2002, it would be
over two years.
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Mr. Levy: Unless it could relate back to
when we filed this claim on time.
ALJ: Which was March 16, 2005.
Mr. Levy: Which is when he stopped receiving
TTD.
Mr. Glauber: Well, he wasn’t paid TTD from
the first injury, so . . .
Mr. Levy: Correct.
Mr. Glauber: So, basically . . .
Mr. Levy: But I – I . . .
Mr. Glauber: I would object.
objecting.
I’m just
Mr. Levy: I guess if – the question is, if
he hasn’t – he has one incident and then –
but returns to work, and then has another
incident all within the same time frame, and
then is on – is drawing TTD, he wouldn’t be
thinking to file any claim for the first
incident either, and would that – would that
hold the statute for the first claim, but .
. .
ALJ: Well, I’m not going to do anything
unless somebody makes a motion, and – and
all that kind of stuff, so . . .
Mr. Levy: Can I – can we – if it’s not – if
it’s a questioning of time, why don’t I file
a motion within five days – oh, by the end
of the week?
ALJ: Well, because nothing’s going to be
filed after today, that’s why, because . . .
Mr. Levy: I just don’t want to put it –
okay, I just don’t want to put Mr. Glauber
on the spot. I mean, I – I could make the
motion and make sure, but what I wanted to
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make sure of, for their sake too, is that if
there’s other prejudice because there could
be other matters investigated in between,
then it’s not fair to raise it, but if we
have everything before the Court any how,
and it’s just a question of whether it’s
time barred, then I would make the motion.
And I don’t know that – if Mr. Glauber has
had the case long enough to be able to make
that evaluation.
Mr. Glauber: Well, don’t worry about me.
I’ll just . . .
Mr. Levy: I’m always worried about you.
Mr. Glauber: If there’s a motion, I – we
would object on the basis of the statute of
limitations if there is a motion.
Mr. Levy: I’d make the motion to – to also
consider the October 2002 . . .
ALJ: So, you have moved to amend to add the
– the injury date of October 9, 2002?
Mr. Levy: It appears to be like October 9
and October 11 of 2002.
ALJ: Okay.
Mr. Glauber: Let me object, and I’m going to
object, because it is barred by the
limitations. And, then, there was no time
loss . . .
ALJ: Well, wait a minute now. Wait – wait –
now, you – let’s handle first the motion to
amend.
Mr. Glauber: Yes, sir.
ALJ: And whether or not it’s time barred,
you know.
Mr. Glauber: Okay.
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ALJ: Do you object to the motion to amend?
Mr. Glauber: Not to the objection to amend.
ALJ: I’m sorry?
Mr. Glauber: I won’t object to the motion to
amend.
ALJ: All right; well, all that evidence has
come in anyway, so . . .
Mr. Glauber: yes, sir; that’s right.
ALJ: We’re going to amend it to conform to
the evidence, all right? And, the claim is
amended to add an injury of October 9 or 11
of 2002.
Mr. Levy: Okay; another issue then for
briefing?
ALJ: Now, you need to file a – a special
answer. I assume you’re going to file an
answer – a special answer asserting the
statute.
Mr. Levy: We’ll waive it if – if that’s okay
with – with the Court. I don’t – I mean, if
that’s the only special answer that you’re
filing is the time statute . . .
Mr. Glauber: That’s with the statute –
that’s what the answer would be is – is . .
.
ALJ: I’m going – I’m going to then allow the
– the employer to, on the record state a
special answer.
Mr. Glauber: All right.
ALJ: And I assume your special answer is . .
.
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Mr. Glauber: It’s barred by the statute of
limitations in KRS 342.185 – I believe it
is.
ALJ: All right – all right; then, I’m going
to make the decision based on that, okay?
Mr. Glauber: Thank you; so, I won’t have to
file a written one now?
ALJ: You don’t have to file a written
response.
Mr. Glauber:
Okay.
Mr. Levy: Can we brief – can we just include
a . . .
ALJ: That’s going to be included in your
briefs. Your briefs will be due September
12, 2002, okay?
Mr. Levy: Okay.
ALJ: So include all that in there.
Although the ALJ verbally instructed the parties to
brief the issue of the October 2002 injury in an amended claim,
Quire submitted a brief which addressed only the injury of
February 26, 2003.
Similarly, in its brief, Shelby Motor did
not allude to the October 2002 injury.
Shelby argued only that
since Quire had fully recovered from the February injury, he was
not entitled to any permanent partial disability benefits.
After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ agreed that
Quire was permanently, partially disabled.
However, he
concluded that Quire’s claim was barred by the statute of
limitations since it had been filed on March 16, 2005 -– more
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than two years after the October 2002 injury.
His opinion
linked the two injuries as follows:
Both Plaintiff and his employer were
excellent witnesses. There is no doubt that
Plaintiff is a valued and trusted employee
of Defendant Employer. There is also no
doubt in my mind that Plaintiff is telling
the truth as is Mr. Stivers. The problem
is, from all of the medical evidence, it
appears that Plaintiff’s low back injury
causing impairment occurred in October of
2002 and was exacerbated in February of
2003. . . . It is my impression, from the
totality of the evidence, that Plaintiff did
have an injury in October of 2002 which
resulted in a functional impairment rating
[of 13%] as assigned by Dr. Stewart.
However, that injury is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations [KRS
342.185]. The work related injury which
occurred February 26, 2003 exacerbated the
low back condition caused by the October of
2002 injury and, as an exacerbation, was not
a compensable injury. Calloway County
Fiscal Court v. Winchester, 557 S.W.2d 216
(Ky. 1977).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Quire filed a petition for reconsideration in which he
argued that the two-year limitations period pertaining to the
October 2002 injury had been tolled under KRS 342.185 by the
payment of TTD benefits for the February 2003 injury.
He also
raised the issue of the statute of limitations, contending that
Shelby Motors was barred from raising the statute of limitations
as a defense because the company had failed to comply with the
terms of KRS 342.040(1).
That statute provides that upon the
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termination of a worker’s compensation benefits, and employer
must “notify the executive director . . . and the executive
director shall, in writing, advise the employee . . . of right
to prosecute a claim under this chapter.”
(Emphasis added.)
KRS 342.040(1).
Shelby Motors failed to make that statutorily
mandated notification after the termination of Quire’s TTD
payments following the February injury.
[A]n employer’s failure to strictly comply
with KRS 342.040(1) estops it from raising a
limitations defense, without regard to
whether the failure is attributable to bad
faith or misconduct.
Akers v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 171 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.
2005).
The ALJ denied the petition for reconsideration.
The
Board also rejected Quire’s arguments regarding estoppel as to
Shelby Motor and its limitations defense.
The ALJ reasoned that
these arguments were procedurally barred because Quire asserted
them in his petition for reconsideration rather than raising
them in his original brief.
Despite the preservation problem,
however, the Board nonetheless reviewed his first argument:
that the payment of the TTD benefits for the second injury had
tolled the limitations period for the first injury.
concluded that the tolling argument lacked merit.
followed.
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The Board
This appeal
The function of the Court of Appeals in reviewing a
decision of the Board is “to correct the Board only where the
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
1992).
The first issue before us on appeal concerns the
procedural problem of the preservation of Quire’s arguments.
The arguments allegedly barred by preservation concern:
(1) the
tolling of the limitations period and (2) the effect of the
employer’s failure to follow the notification procedure of KRS
342.040.
The Board discussed and rejected Quire’s tolling
arguments -- despite the alleged problem of preservation.
This
review by the Board was sufficient to preserve it for our
consideration.
In Brasch-Barry General Contractors v. Jones,
175 S.W.3d 81 (Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized
the crucial role played by the Board in insuring that decisions
of an ALJ are “in conformity with Chapter 342 (the Workers’
Compensation Act) and that such determinations constitute
questions of law, and not fact.”
Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
While the Board accords great deference to the ALJ’s discretion
and judgment concerning the weight of evidence on questions of
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fact, questions of law are another matter:
“issues regarding
questions of law need not be preserved pursuant to a petition
for reconsideration, but rather, may be appealed directly to the
Board.”
Id.
While Quire failed to raise his arguments in his brief
to the ALJ, he did raise them in his petition for
reconsideration.
His tolling argument presented a question of
law properly subject to review by the Board.
The Board did
elect to address it -- additionally preserving it for our
review.
The substantive portion of Quire’s first argument is
that the payment of TTD benefits following the February 26,
2003, injury tolled the running of the two-year period following
the October 2002 injury.
The Board rejected that reasoning on
the ground that there was no relation between the TTD benefits
and the October injury, discussing the implications of the
February 2003 injury as follows:
Although the ALJ found the February 26,
2003 work incident was only a temporary
exacerbation, it was technically
nevertheless viewable, by statutory
definition, as an “injury.” KRS
342.0011(1). Indeed, since the rendition of
Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64
S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2001), this Board has
consistently held that following the
December 12, 1996, amendments to the
Workers’ Compensation Act, it is possible
for a claimant to submit evidence of a
temporary injury for which TTD and temporary
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medical benefits may be paid and yet fail in
his burden to prove a permanent harmful
change to the human organism as a result of
that injury for which permanent benefits are
appropriate. Hence, even though permanent
benefits were not awarded herein for the
February 26, 2003 incident since it was a
temporary injury, it does not follow as a
matter of law that the TTD benefits paid
from February 26, 2003 through March 30,
2003 were for the October 2002 injury rather
than a February 26, 2003 injury.
Thus, according to the Board, the TTD payments were a discrete
benefit paid only for the temporary injury that occurred on
February 26, 2003, and having no connection with the October
injury.
The ALJ, however, had characterized the February 2003
injury as an “exacerbation” of the earlier October 2002 injury.
The Board directly and deliberately departed from the linkage of
the injuries.
Quire thus finds himself in a legal “no man’s land.”
If the ALJ was correct in linking the two injuries, the statute
of limitations is a problem.
If, however, the Board is correct
in refusing to connect the two, the ALJ’s computation of time
for the October 2002 injury is erroneous, rendering Quire’s
tolling argument unnecessary as the February 2003 reference
point would render his claim automatically timely.
Despite the
inherent contradiction between the ALJ and the Board, we shall
address this unique issue on tolling as addressed by the Board.
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The Board relied on Robertson, supra, in reaching its
conclusion, but we have found Robertson to be significantly
distinguishable from the case before us.
In Robertson, the
claimant had a pre-existing, non-work related condition that was
temporarily exacerbated by a workplace injury.
benefits for the injury.
He received TTD
The Court concluded that upon his
return to work, he was not entitled to future benefits and was
limited to compensation solely for the transient, “temporary
flare-up” of the pre-existing condition resulting from the
workplace injury.
Robertson, 64 S.W.3d at 286.
Quire, by
contrast, was first injured at work and then was injured again
at work.
The second injury actually led to a considerable
worsening of his back problems; that worsening has not abated.
The issue of the tolling of the limitations period
under these precise factual circumstances is a matter of first
impression.
This Court has addressed a situation in which TTD
benefits were paid for a second injury that occurred after the
running of the original two-year period for filing a claim for
the first injury.
(Ky.App. 2001).
See Lawson v. Wal-Mart, 56 S.W.3d 417, 419
We reviewed that question in light of the
policy underlying KRS 342.185 as it was explained by our Supreme
Court:
While statutes of limitation protect
employers from the problems associated with
litigating stale claims, the statutory
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exception recognizes that a worker may be
lulled into a false sense of security by
voluntary payments and might fail to
actively pursue a claim.
Id. at 419, citing Newberg v. Hudson, 838 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1992).
In Lawson, we held that the limitations period was not tolled,
relying heavily on the fact that the first limitations period
had expired before the second injury occurred.
Therefore, there
was no likelihood that the claimant’s receipt of TTD had lulled
him into believing that he need not file a claim according to
the analysis of Newberg v. Hudson, supra.
Quire’s case, however, is both distinguishable and
unique.
The TTD benefits for the second injury were paid within
the two-year period in between his two injuries.
Thus, the two-
year period following the first injury never expired before TTD
payments were made (assuming that we accept the reasoning of the
ALJ that the first injury was a necessary point of temporal
reference under his “exacerbation” theory).
All of the evidence
indicated that Quire’s symptoms became permanently disabling
only after the February 26, 2003 injury.
Shelby Motor has pointed out that Quire was
represented by counsel as early as August 2003.
At that time,
he was examined by Dr. Tinsley Stewart, who made a connection
between the October 2002 and February 2003 injuries.
Shelby Motor argues that:
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Therefore,
it is obvious that Appellant was aware of
and/or should have been aware of the need to
file a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits for his October 2002 injury by
October 2004, and, for whatever reasons,
chose not to do so.
(Appellees’ Brief at 8).
The language of the medical reports is
by no means conclusive regarding the nature of the connection
between the October and February injuries.
Much more
significantly, Shelby Motor received copies of the medical
reports and never raised the issue of the October injuries.
As
noted earlier, Shelby Motor stipulated that Quire’s injury
occurred or became disabling on February 26, 2003.
The ALJ, sua
sponte, made the linkage.
The contradiction between the ALJ and the Board is
essentially incapable of resolution.
The ALJ linked the
injuries, holding that the latter injury was an exacerbation of
the earlier -- and thus non-compensable since the significant
time from which to measure the necessary filing was October
2002.
issue.
Because of that reasoning, Quire raised his tolling
The Board then concluded that there was no connection
between the injuries at all, thus rejecting the tolling issue -which would indeed become unnecessary under the Board’s
analysis.
We could simply conclude that the Board erred in
failing to address the ALJ’s exacerbation ruling and further in
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rejecting the tolling issue.
However, we have instead analyzed
and distinguished Robertson upon which the Board relied.
We
hold that this case presents an issue of law unique from the
Robertson case.
We hold that the Board clearly erred in
construing Robertson to bar the claim asserted by Quire.
Its
factual underpinnings are wholly distinguishable, and it simply
cannot serve as precedent for this case.
Under these circumstances, and in light of the
principle that our workers’ compensation laws should be
interpreted liberally “[i]n light of the munificent, beneficent
and remedial purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act,” CoalMac, Inc. v. Blankenship, 863 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Ky.App. 1993), we
reverse the opinion of the Board and remand this case for entry
of an award consistent with this opinion.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
In
my view, the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that Quire’s
injury of February 2003 was an exacerbation of his earlier
October 2002 injury is a purely factual finding and is based
upon substantial evidence.
That being so it is conclusive and
binding upon both the Board and this Court.
“The ALJ, as the
finder of fact, and not the reviewing court, has the sole
authority to determine the quality, character, and substance of
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the evidence.”
(Ky. 1993).
Square D. Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309
I find no error in the ALJ’s conclusion that the
case is controlled by Calloway County Fiscal Court v.
Winchester, 557 S.W.2d 216(Ky. 1977), nor in the Board’s
affirmance of the ALJ’s decision.
In my view, the Board’s brief
discussion of Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64 S.W.3d 284
(Ky. 2001) at the end of its opinion is dictum.
Applying the
standard of Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685
(Ky.1992), I cannot agree with the majority that in this case
“the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes
or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
we are bound to affirm.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Udell B. Levy
Louisville, Kentucky
Id at 687-688.
Hence,
I therefore dissent.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SHELBY
MOTOR COMPANY, INC.:
Philip J. Reverman, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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