RICHARD EDWARDS v. BUDGET RENT A CAR; HON. GRANT S. ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 15, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000674-WC
RICHARD EDWARDS
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-97121
v.
BUDGET RENT A CAR;
HON. GRANT S. ROARK,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE:
** ** ** ** **
BARBER AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Richard Edwards petitions this Court to review
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board)
entered March 3, 2006, affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ’s) decision to dismiss Edwards’ workers’ compensation
claim.
1
We affirm.
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
Edwards was born November 27, 1930.
by General Electric but retired in 1988.
He was employed
In 1995, Edwards went
to work for Budget Rent a Car (Budget), driving automobiles to
various dealerships.
Edwards was involved in a single vehicle
accident in Indiana on January 22, 2002.
While driving a van,
Edwards fell asleep and hit a guardrail that resulted in an
injury to his left elbow.
Several weeks after the accident,
Edwards testified that he began to experience back and neck
pain.
Edwards filed a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits as a result of the automobile accident.
He claimed to
have suffered permanent impairment to his elbow, cervical, and
lumbar spine.
The ALJ ultimately found that Edwards suffered a
work-related injury to his elbow and lumbar spine, but these
injuries were not permanent.
The ALJ also found Edwards failed
to prove that he suffered a permanent work-related injury to his
cervical spine.
benefits.
Thus, the ALJ dismissed Edwards’ claim for
Being unsatisfied with the ALJ’s decision, Edwards
sought review with the Board.
On March 3, 2006, the Board
entered an opinion affirming the ALJ’s decision, thus
precipitating this petition for our review.
Edwards contends the ALJ committed error by dismissing
his claim for a permanent work-related injury to his cervical
spine.
In this context, the ALJ specifically found:
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Even the Plaintiff concedes he has no proof
establishing a causal nexus between alleged
cervical complaints and the MVA.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for any neck
injury must be dismissed because he bears
the burden of proving every essential
element of his claim.
Edwards believes that the ALJ’s conclusion that he failed to
meet his burden of proof was erroneous.
He points to evidence
from Dr. Martin Schiller that Edwards suffered a cervical strain
and lumbo sacral strain that were work related.
To prevail on appeal, Edwards must demonstrate that
the record compels a finding in his favor.
Wolf Creek
Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky.App. 1984).
Also, it is
within the sole province of the ALJ to judge the credibility and
quality of the evidence.
308 (Ky. 1993).
Square D Company v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d
To answer Edwards’ contention that the ALJ
erred in dismissing his cervical injury claim, we cite to the
Board’s well-reasoned opinion:
First addressing Edwards’ cervical
condition, we note there were virtually no
findings made by the ALJ other than Edwards’
concession that he had introduced no proof
establishing a causal nexus between his
cervical complaints and the work-related
motor vehicle accident. Edwards’ petition
for reconsideration, however, did not
address any shortcomings he may have
perceived with respect to this particular
finding, nor did he allege that the ALJ
misunderstood, misconstrued or
misinterpreted the evidence on this point.
In the absence of a petition for
reconsideration, the only function of the
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Board is to determine whether there exists
substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s award.
We believe Dr. Petruska’s opinion,
after his review of Edwards’ medical
records, supports the ALJ’s finding of nonwork-related causation. Dr. Petruska
specifically stated he could not comment as
to the origin of Edwards’ cervical problems,
because there had been no diagnostic workup. Dr. Petruska rendered that opinion on
November 2, 2004, almost three years after
the accident, and after other physicians
concluded Edwards’ advanced osteoarthritis
provided a basis for impairment. Under
these circumstances we cannot say the ALJ’s
decision is so wholly unreasonable that it
must be disregarded as a matter of law. The
fact that Dr. Schiller opined Edwards had
sustained a work-related cervical strain
does not alter our conclusion, since Dr.
Schiller’s opinion does not compel the
result Edwards seeks in the face of the
conflicting evidence.
We agree that the evidence does not compel a finding
in Edwards’ favor as to the alleged cervical injury.
Even
though Edwards specifically cites Dr. Schiller’s opinion that he
did suffer a work-related cervical strain, Dr. Schiller further
opined the cervical strain was not a permanent injury.
Considering the evidence of both Dr. David Petruska and Dr.
Schiller, we cannot say the evidence compels a finding that
Edwards suffered a permanent work-related injury to his cervical
spine.
Edwards also argues the ALJ committed error by finding
that he suffered no permanent injury to his lumbar spine.
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Edwards argues the ALJ erred by relying upon the testimony of
Dr. Schiller.
Specifically, Edwards attacks Dr. Schiller’s
testimony because “[h]e did not address, however, whether or not
this arthritic condition could have been aroused, aggravated or
exacerbated by the accident, only that he had a lumbar strain
which would have improved long after the accident.”
Edwards
Brief at 18.
As pointed out by the Board, “[t]here is no evidence
in this claim from any physician that Edwards’ extensive
preexisting osteoarthritis was a dormant condition aroused by
the work-related injury.”
Indeed, Dr. Schiller’s opinion was
specific that Edwards’ symptoms were secondary to degenerative
changes in his back and neck and not related to the work
accident.
Dr. Schiller believed that the accident would have
resulted in a lumbo sacral strain but that this strain would
have improved after the accident.
Dr. Schiller specifically
stated that he could not attribute any permanent impairment
rating to Edwards’ elbow, neck, or back as a result of the workrelated accident.
Based upon the record as a whole, we do not
believe the evidence compels a finding that Edwards suffered a
permanent injury to his lumbar spine as a result of the
accident.
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Edwards last maintains the ALJ erred in its award of
medical expenses.
Edwards’ argument in this regard is somewhat
confusing and is stated as follows:
As to medical treatment, it is
submitted that the previous award of medical
expenses was fatally flawed. The Petitioner
cannot be entitled to medical expenses paid
to date for his lumbar strain. The reason
is that no medical expenses were paid for
the lumbar strain as there was a contested
issue as to causation so the award would be
a nullity. The ALJ should have awarded
reasonable medical benefits related to the
Petitioner’s lumbar condition pursuant to
the Act.
The Board states that unpaid medical
bills was not listed as a contested issue at
the BRC nor was it brought to the attention
of the ALJ as[sic] the final hearing. It
did not need to be. It is included in the
issue of work-related/causation and the
records from Dr. Gavin reflect that he
suggested an MRI and the Plaintiff testified
that the reason that he hired counsel was
that the insurance carrier refused to pay
for an MRI. While this was eventually paid
for by workers’ compensation, it is the
Plaintiff’s position that having found a
work-related condition, the Plaintiff is
uncategorically entitled to medical
treatment.
Edwards Brief at 20.
We are unsure as to whether Edwards is arguing for
past medical expenses or future medical expenses.
If he is
seeking entitlement to past medical expenses, Edwards has not
specifically listed any past medical expenses that were not
reimbursed by Budget.
If Edwards is seeking entitlement to
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future medical expenses, we agree with the Board that a claimant
may suffer a temporary injury for which temporary total
disability benefits and medical benefits may be paid and yet
fail to satisfy his burden of proof of a permanent injury for
which permanent medical benefits would be appropriate. See
Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2001).
We, thus, reject Edwards’ claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, Kentucky
M. Christopher Davis
FULTON & DEVLIN
Louisville, Kentucky
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